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This Thesis aims to present an overview of the development to this point of psychoanalysis as a 
discipline –both as a theory of the mind (Freud, Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein, 
Kernberg: theoretical prolegomena; Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) and a treatment of the disorders 
of the mind [Freud’s clinical text such as “Dora’s Case”, my own clinical cases, and the ‘Menninger 
Psychotherapy Research Project’ (MPRP): practical constructs; Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’)]– and 
offer a prediction (in my conclusion but also in my introduction) concerning evolving psychoanalytic 
development over its (near) future. My focus is on the coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical 
structure –and that is the coherence of my doctoral Thesis as a whole– starting with Freud’s strenuous 
endeavours to maintain the psychoanalysis that he had single-handedly created as a unitary and unified 
theory, tracing then the breakdown of this effort, even in Freud’s lifetime into the burgeoning theoretical 
diversity or ‘pluralism’ that characterizes worldwide psychoanalysis today, and then going on to the 
beginning appearance of evidences –not yet widely remarked– of growing convergences from within very 
disparate and even seemingly very opposed theoretical perspectives, at least at the level of technical 
interventions and experience-near clinical theory, with implications, however, even for the level of 
experience-distant general (metapsychological) theory: this is how the theoretical prolegomena as a 
‘secondary discourse’ relate to the practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary discourse’. All this is done 
under a hermeneutic meta-interpretation (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) because I am unfolding a 
systematization of theories of mind interpreting them according to my clinical experience (the ‘analyst’s 
mind’; Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’). Such a development, if sustained, as I anticipate (and this 
doctoral Thesis also tries to promote), would strengthen the credibility of psychoanalysis as a science of 
the mind, amenable to growth (this growth constitutes the epistemological leap from the hermeneutic 
categorisation to the positivist research) through empirical research (the MPRP is a heuristic example of 
how psychoanalytic research should be done; a positivist approach because ‘falsifiable’ research has to be 
positivist; being the MPRP a psychoanalytic clinical research, it is, by inherence, also a practical/clinical 
construct and, paradoxically, unfolds what Laplanche calls the ‘primary discourse’) in accordance with 
the canons of scientific method. My conclusion will summarize the present situation of psychoanalysis as 
one of increasing theoretical and practical diversity (sowing, once again, the theoretical prolegomena as a 
‘secondary discourse’ with the practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary discourse’) illustrating that the 
final aim of my entire dissertation is to consider in depth the impact of theoretical plurality on clinical 
practice and vice versa demonstrating that psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work. After noting 
that the analyst has much more than evenly suspended attention in his mind as he works with his patient 
in a session, I review both older and more recent contributions on what the analyst has in his mind when 
working with a patient. I suggest that the subject has been addressed mainly from a single-person 
perspective. In this connection, and on the basis of clinical material, I attempt to show how, against the 
background of the ‘implicit use of explicit theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’), an ongoing 
process of decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction takes place in the 
‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’). In my analysis of a session, I introduce the concepts 
of ‘theoretical reason and practical reason’, and contend that, whatever theories the analyst may have 
implicitly or explicitly in his mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’), they ultimately yield to 
clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the ‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method 
and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’). Pursuing the same line of thought, I describe validation in the 
clinical context as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and linguistic co-(de)construction 
of the intersubjective reality between patient and analyst (this is seen not only in the MPRP but also in the 
‘The Ulm Psychoanalytic Process Research Study Group’; the latter only referred briefly). This process 
includes mutual aspects of observation and of communicative and pragmatic validation. In conclusion, I 
suggest that the figure of the craftsman is an appropriate description of the analyst in his conception 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) of his (deconstructive) clinical work, whatever the theory he may 
espouse (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’).                       
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        INTRODUCTION 
                               Theoretical Prolegomena: a ‘secondary discourse’ 
Quo Vadis Psychoanalysis? 
                                                        
As a discipline, psychoanalysis has always been unusually preoccupied with 
both its status, beginning with Freud’s concern to anchor it firmly as a biologically 
rooted ‘natural science’, which is today one of the hotly argued controversies within the 
field, and also with its direction and its future as a clinical and an intellectual enterprise. 
Panels and articles abound on ‘the future of psychoanalysis’ but the ones that initiated 
the most cogent debate, in my perspective, were Wallerstein’s papers (cf., Wallerstein, 
1988c, pp. 5-22; cf., Wallerstein, 1990, pp. 3-20). One major current debate is that 
about our burgeoning theoretical pluralism (each time I use we, us, or our, I am 
referring to the ‘psychoanalytic community’), and the room within that for a ‘common 
epistemological ground’ within psychoanalytic theories and techniques. Of course, any 
such effort at defending (for example in a doctorate dissertation like this) that 
commonality is a very personal clinical reading (my ‘primary discourse’; the clinical 
work is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’; see below Laplanche, 1999) of where we have 
come from, where we are now and where we think we are heading, hence the title of this 
introduction (Quo Vadis psychoanalysis?).       
 We are, of course, familiar with both Freud’s intention and his conviction on this 
matter. In keeping with the nineteenth-century physio-chemical and evolutionary-
biological scientific world view within which he came to intellectual maturity, 
psychoanalysis, in Freud’s mind, had an indubitable place as a biological science, 
ultimately to be anchored in the growing understanding of brain functioning, and he 
strove incessantly to maintain this psychoanalysis that he had single-handedly brought 
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into being (the ‘magnetism’ between the object and its method as a ‘primary discourse’; 
see below Laplanche, op. cit.) as a coherent and unified theoretical structure (as a 
‘secondary discourse’, see below Laplanche, op. cit.), and as a ‘movement’ that guarded 
and maintained the integrity of that structure. In pursuit of his vision, he succeeded 
during his active lifetime in extruding so-called dissidents, like Stekel, Adler and Jung, 
and then later Rank, and almost Ferenczi, who all espoused differing or deviant views 
of what should best constitute psychoanalysis as a depth psychology.   
 To further this intent, in 1910 Freud and his followers established the 
International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) at the second International 
Psychoanalytical Congress, held that year in Nuremberg, and two years later, in 1912, 
Freud created the ‘Secret Committee’ of the seven ring-holders; both of these moves 
being efforts to guarantee the stability of his central psychoanalytic doctrines against 
fractious divisiveness from within, and against diluting or hostile pressures from 
without –thus trying to ensure the enduring capacity and loyalty of those who carried 
the psychoanalytic imprimatur. Freud’s 1914 monograph “On the history of the 
psychoanalytic movement” was, combined, an historical unfolding of the development 
of psychoanalysis to that time, a spirited exposition of what Freud conceived to be the 
central unifying psychoanalytic doctrines and a detailed statement of his reasons for 
parting with Breuer, Stekel, Bleuler and, at greatest length, with Adler and then with 
Jung, as no longer to be counted as part of psychoanalysis: “I considered it necessary to 
form an official association because I feared the abuses to which psycho-analysis would 
be subjected as soon as it become popular. There should be some headquarters whose 
business it would be to declare: ‘All this nonsense is nothing to do with analysis; this is 
not psycho-analysis’” (Freud, 1914e, p. 10).     
 And this feeling, of being a beleaguered discipline, constantly needing to define 
its parameters and to protect its integrity, has been an almost constant aspect of the 
psychoanalytic landscape worldwide over the 20th century (and continues in 21
st
 
century) since those early beginnings, with the single major exception of the first post-
Second World War decades, and then only in United States of America (in the decade of 
the 50’s) –a period now looked at nostalgically by many as the ‘halcyon days’. This 
was, of course, the period of great psychoanalytic popularity in America, and of the 
almost monolithic hegemony within American psychoanalysis of the ego-psychology 
paradigm architected by Heinz Hartmann and his many collaborators, and systematized 
8 
 
by David Rapaport (see below), all declared to be the direct line of descent from Freud’s 
ego-psychology articulated in “The Ego and the Id” (cf., Freud, 1923c, pp. 12-59), and 
“Symptoms, Inhibitions, and Anxiety” (cf., Freud, 1926a, pp. 87-172), and then 
expanded by Anna Freud’s landmark elaboration of the defensive functions of the Ego, 
“The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence” (cf., Freud, A., 1966-1980f), an eightieth 
birthday presentation to her father, and Heinz Hartmann’s counterpart elaboration of the 
adaptive functions of the ego, “Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation” (cf., 
Hartmann, 1939; cf., Hartmann,  1950, pp. 74-96).      
 This was also the period of the ‘capture’ of American psychiatry by the 
psychoanalytic idea, with psychoanalysts being avidly sought by medical schools to 
chair their departments of psychiatry, with psychoanalysis installed, under the banner of 
psychodynamics, as the psychological theory of psychiatry, and with psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy developed as the adaptation of psychoanalytic conceptions and 
techniques to the clinical exigencies of the more severely ill psychiatric patients 
crowding the teaching hospitals and associated out-patient clinics of the academic 
medical centres –more severely ill, that is, than the putatively classical neurotic patients 
around whom the technical constructs of psychoanalysis had been originally formulated. 
And this was also, concomitantly, the period of the full analytic practices of those 
trained within the rapidly burgeoning institutes of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, and of an ebullient optimism of an ever-expanding future for the 
practitioners of this psychoanalytic mainstream, the self-proclaimed carriers of the 
authentic unitary and unifying Freudian heritage.      
 But we also know that Freud’s strenuous efforts to establish and maintain such a 
unitary, and consensually accepted, structure of psychoanalysis –which the American 
ego-psychologists long felt that they could successfully enshrine– in the end failed, with 
the rise within organised psychoanalysis of an alternative metapsychology and its linked 
differing technical constructs, that is, the Kleinian movement that would not let itself be 
extruded –and this actually even in Freud’s lifetime.     
 It was in fact the Kleinians who insisted on their even more impeccable 
psychoanalytic credentials, with their unswerving adherence to Freud’s death instinct 
theory as a central theoretical building block, when the Viennese, who were closer to 
the persona and mind of Freud, split so sharply on the value to psychoanalysis of this 
particular theoretical turn of Freud’s. And the Kleinian movement thus remained within 
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the British organisational framework (and was indeed its largest component grouping), 
and therefore remained within the ‘house’ that Freud had created: the International 
Psychoanalytic Association. This particular history has been chronicled in magisterial 
detail, both personal and scientific, in the 1991 volume edited by King & Steiner, “The 
Freud-Klein Controversies, 1941-45” (see below). And though this ‘controversial 
discussions’ took place in the early nineteen forties, in wartime Great Britain when the 
central protagonists on both sides, Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, each with their 
strongly committed followers, were all in London, sharing in, and striving for control 
over, the British Psychoanalytical Society, the controversy itself originated a good deal 
earlier, in the latter nineteen twenties and through the nineteen thirties, when Melanie 
Klein was already established in London and had gained substantial support from the 
British analysts (together constituting the ‘English School’), and Anna Freud and her 
central supporters were still in Vienna (constituting the ‘Viennese School’), and when 
the two schools were vigorously arguing the proper theoretical and technical dimensions 
of the then nascent constructs that should govern the emerging arena of psychoanalytic 
work with children.          
 At the time there were vigorous –and, at times, contentious– exchanges of letters 
between Freud and Ernest Jones (a member of the favoured group of closest adherents, 
the ‘secret committee’ of seven ring-holders as I said above) in which Freud strongly 
backed his daughter Anna, and chided Jones for giving comfort and support to Melanie 
Klein, and there were ‘Exchange Letters’ in the mid-nineteen thirties between London 
and Vienna, in which Jones and Joan Rivière from London and Robert Waelder from 
Vienna aired the scientific differences between the two ‘schools’ (cf., King & Steiner, 
1991). In the end, neither group succeeded in delegitimizing the other 
psychoanalytically, and an administrative compromise was effected by the British 
Society in which both groups, the (Anna) Freudian and the Kleinian, would exist side 
by side, educationally and scientifically, under the same British Society umbrella, along 
with a third, called the Middle Group (and in more recent years renamed the 
Independent Group) which did not subscribe to the strict precepts of either of the 
arrayed opposed forces. Each of the three groups would be free to elaborate its own 
governing theoretical perspective (its own metapsychology), and its own technical 
constructs, each one claiming, of course, to be a comprehensive and sufficient 
understanding of mental functioning, and a competent, fully adequate guide to the 
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amelioration of mental disorder. It was at this point, and still in Freud’s lifetime (as I 
said above), that the Kleinians successfully fought off the label of dissident –and the 
implied threat of extrusion– and, in its place, psychoanalytic theoretical diversity, or 
pluralism, as we have come to call it, was born (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22; cf., 
Wallerstein, 1990, pp. 3-20; cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).    
 With this beginning of the theoretical diversification of institutional 
psychoanalysis, organised within the IPA –except, as already stated, in the United 
States– the succeeding decades saw: the rise of Bion’s extensions of Kleinian thought; 
of the crystallization of the British Object-Relational School grounded in Fairbairn, 
Winnicott and Balint emerging as the Middle Group, and therefore neither (Anna) 
Freudian nor Kleinian (see below); of the emerging of  Lacan and his disciples mainly 
in France but that also disseminated to other countries [Jacques Alain-Miller (Lacan’s 
son in law) created the World Association of Psychoanalysis as the Lacanian worldwide 
psychoanalytic institution]; of the hermeneutic emphasis spearheaded by Ricoeur in 
France and Habermas in Germany; and ultimately of ‘others’ still, all claiming their 
accepted place within the ‘house’ of Psychoanalysis (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).
 Not a few commentators have stated their conviction that, had the deviations of 
Adler, Jung and even Lacan occurred within the more recent decades of an 
accommodating pluralism in psychoanalytic ranks, they too might now represent 
alternative theoretical perspectives within the framework of the IPA, not psychological 
movements outside it (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997). And indeed, many of their central 
tenets, once the basis for a declared departure and extrusion, have come back to an 
accepted place within the main corpus of psychoanalysis, almost across the board; for 
example, Adler’s stress, long before it was incorporated by Freud, on the aggressive 
drive (and concomitant sibling rivalry, masculine protest, compensatory mechanisms, 
etc.) and his emphasis on the centrality of ego functioning in psychic equilibration 
(again, before Freud), or Jung’s stress on the importance of continuing adult 
psychological development, later elaborated into psychosocial stages across the entire 
life span by Erik Erikson, albeit in a different way.      
 And finally, even in the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA), where 
Freud’s vision of a unified theoretical structure for psychoanalysis had long seemed to 
take root and succeed, this seeming theoretical hegemony of ego-psychology ultimately 
gave way, with the growth within American ranks of Heinz Kohut’s self- psychology, 
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with its alternative theoretical constructions of the bipolar self, of ‘Tragic Man’ rather 
than ‘Guilty Man’, of deficit and its restoration, rather than of conflict and its resolution. 
And alongside Kohut, there was Margaret Mahler’s developmental emphasis, and Roy 
Schafer’s action language built around the agency of the self, and of course the major 
paradigm shift of the past three decades exploding in America outside the APsaA ranks, 
away from the natural science-based ego-psychology embedded in what has come to be 
called a ‘one-person psychology’, to the object-relational, social – and then dialectical– 
constructivist, and intersubjective approaches (called in ensemble the ‘relational turn’): 
all expressions of what has come to be called a ‘two-person psychology’ (see below; cf., 
Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).         
 This ‘relational turn’ traces its roots partly to object-relational imports from 
Britain, but even more solidly to its indigenous American progenitors rallying around 
Harry Stack Sullivan’s ‘interpersonal psychiatry’ (like Clara Thompson, Karen Horney, 
Erich Fromm, etc.), who, at the time, in the nineteen forties, were either extruded from 
the ranks of organized American psychoanalysis (the APsaA), or completely 
marginalised within it, in what was then the heyday of ego-psychology, but now being 
revived with all due credit, including as its first forebear, the current great revival of 
interest in the contributions of Sandor Ferenczi, called now, in some quarters, the very 
‘mother’ of psychoanalysis, in an almost equal place of honour with Freud, the 
acknowledged father; Ferenczi, once Freud’s most cherished collaborator, himself came 
close to being extruded in his final days as I mentioned above (see below; cf., 
Roudinesco, 1997).          
 It is this issue of the collapse of Freud’s original unitary vision for 
psychoanalysis and the rise in its place of a burgeoning and, in some ways, bewildering 
theoretical diversity, or pluralism as we now call it, that Wallerstein undertook to 
present in his Presidential Address to the 35
th
 International Psychoanalytical Congress 
in Montreal in 1987, entitled “One psychoanalysis or many?” (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, 
pp. 5-22), as a topic of importance and concern to the worldwide psychoanalytic 
community, in the hope that a dialogue about it enhance our shared psychoanalytic 
understanding and commitment. In that Presidential Address, Wallerstein proposed that 
this growth in our theoretical diversity, by then widely acknowledged and accepted as 
reflecting our discipline’s state of affairs worldwide, even in United States, raised two 
fundamental questions: (1) what, in view of this ever-growing pluralism, still holds us 
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together as common adherents of a shared psychoanalytic science and profession; and 
(2) the corollary, what do we have in common that marks us off from other, non-
psychoanalytic psychologies, for surely not every kind of psychological understanding 
is psychoanalytic (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22; see below)?   
 Wallerstein’s response at that time –which subsequent analytic debate has 
revealed to be far from widely shared (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997)– is that our 
‘common ground’ is to be found in our experience-near clinical theory, our concern 
with anxiety and defence, with conflict and compromise, with self and object 
representation, with transference and countertransference, and with the like clinical 
constructs (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see below Laplanche, op. cit.) that 
Wallerstein posited as a ‘common ground’ for our understandings and our interventions 
across the entire array of theoretical (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see below 
Laplanche, op. cit.) perspectives (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22; see below). 
Wallerstein argues whereas our diversity is to be found in our experience-distant 
general theories or metapsychologies, which we invoke to try to explain the structure 
and functioning of our minds, and how we think our technical interventions that are 
guided by our clinical theory (psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary discourse’, is 
applied after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’; see below 
Laplanche, op. cit.) alter that mental functioning towards desired changes or psychic 
maturity or mental health –however we conceptualise those (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 
5-22; see below).        
 Towards that end, Wallerstein dubbed our diverse general theories, our 
metapsychologies, as nothing but our scientific metaphors (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’; see below Laplanche, op. cit.), ‘quite loosely coupled’ to our clinical 
theories and observations (the ‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method 
and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’): “The [psychoanalytic clinical] method is one 
of association and cross-referencing, a deconstruction, and only at the horizon of 
this dissolution (Lösung) or analysis can another reality be sketched: what is called 
an unconscious fantasy. There is no point-for-point correspondence, however, no 
analogy or similitude between the behavioral or conscious discursive sequence 
from which the associations start and the fragment of an unconscious sequence 
which can be outlined through cross-references. So much so that any method of a 
hermeneutic order –the direct transposition or translation of one discourse into 
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another, be that second discourse Jungian, Kleinian, Lacanian or even Freudian– 
is ruled out. Ultimately, the reciprocal implication of method and object consists in 
the fact that the former is not only adapted to the latter but oriented, magnetically 
attracted by it” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 63; my alterations).    
 As Laplanche argues, as a primary discourse ‘no analogy can be done 
between the behavioral or conscious discursive sequence from which the 
associations start and the fragment of an unconscious sequence’, but as a 
secondary discourse ‘scientific metaphors’, as Wallerstein posits, can be done and 
are done because, if not, no theoretical advance was possible. And since each of our 
metapsychologies purports to explain the whole spectrum of psychopathology, and 
the proper roads to its amelioration, Wallerstein defends that we are without 
warrant, at least at this stage of our development as a science, to claim the greater 
heuristic usefulness or validity of any one of our general theories over the others, 
other than by the indoctrinations and allegiances built into us by the happenstance 
of our individual trainings, our ‘differing personality dispositions’ and the 
explanatory predilections then carried over into our consulting rooms (cf., 
Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22).       
 Exactly for the reasons above mentioned by Wallerstein and also by 
Laplanche’s arguments as I will illustrate in the next chapter, my research agenda 
is an overview of the development to this point of psychoanalysis as a discipline 
both as a theory of the mind –formulated by Freud, Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-
Blanco, Grotstein and Kernberg: these formulations unfold my theoretical 
prolegomena which are this Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which 
constitutes what Laplanche (1999) calls the ‘secondary discourse’ (see above)–   
and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: Freud’s clinical text illustrated by 
Chapter 3, my own clinical cases addressed in Chapter 4 and in my Conclusion, 
and a clinical update on the MPRP shown in Chapter 5: these are my practical 
constructs, which Laplanche (see above Laplanche, op. cit.) calls the ‘primary 
discourse’–, and offer a prediction, in my Conclusion but also in this Introduction, 
concerning evolving psychoanalytic development over its (near) future.  
 My focus is on the coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure 
and that is the coherence of my doctoral Thesis as a whole: starting with Freud’s 
strenuous endeavors to maintain ‘the’ psychoanalysis that he had single-handedly 
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created as a unitary and unified theory, tracing then the breakdown of this effort, 
even in Freud’s lifetime –with special emphasis on “Dora’s Case” (Chapter 3) and  
Freud’s “Interpretation of Dreams”; because ‘the interpretation of dreams is the 
royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind’ (cf., Freud, 
1900b, pp. 339-621) I shall explain it threw the ‘dream-work’ Laplanche’s 
definition of the psychoanalytic clinical method (Chapter 1)– into the burgeoning 
theoretical diversity or ‘pluralism’ that characterizes worldwide psychoanalysis 
today, and then going on to the beginning appearance of evidences (not yet widely 
remarked) of growing convergences from within very disparate and even 
seemingly very opposed theoretical perspectives, at least at the level of technical 
interventions and experience-near clinical theory, with implications, however, even 
for the level of experience-distant general (metapsychological) theory: how the 
theoretical prolegomena relate to the practical/clinical constructs. All this is done 
under the hermeneutic meta-interpretation (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; 
see above Laplanche, op. cit.) because I am unfolding a systematization of theories 
of mind interpreting them according to my clinical experience (the ‘analyst’s 
mind’; Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.). Such a 
development, if sustained, as I anticipate (and this doctoral Thesis also tries to 
promote), would strengthen the credibility of psychoanalysis as a science of the 
mind, amenable to growth: this growth constitutes the epistemological leap from 
the hermeneutic categorization to the positivist research) through empirical 
research: the MPRP (Chapter 5) is a heuristic example of how psychoanalytic 
research should be done; a positivist approach because ‘falsifiable’ research has to 
be positivist– in accordance with the canons of scientific method.   
 My Conclusion will summarize the present situation of psychoanalysis as 
one of increasing theoretical and practical diversity (sowing, once again, the 
theoretical prolegomena with the practical/clinical constructs) illustrating that the 
final aim of my entire dissertation is to consider in depth the impact of clinical 
practice on theoretical plurality and vice versa because Psychoanalytic theory comes 
after clinical work. After noting that the analyst has much more than evenly 
suspended attention in his mind as he works with his patient in a session, I review 
both older and more recent contributions on what the analyst has in his mind 
when working with a patient. I suggest that the subject has been addressed mainly 
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from a single-person perspective as mentioned by Wallerstein (‘differing 
personality dispositions’; cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22). In this connection, and 
on the basis of clinical material, I attempt to show how, against the background of 
the ‘implicit use of explicit theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.), an ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined 
by the patient’s action and reaction takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.). In my analysis of 
a session, I introduce the concepts of ‘theoretical reason and practical reason’, and 
contend that, whatever theories the analyst may have implicitly or explicitly in his 
mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), they 
ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the ‘magnetism’ that 
Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.). Pursuing the same line of thought, I describe validation 
in the clinical context as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and 
linguistic co-(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between patient and 
analyst (this is seen not only in the MPRP but also in the ‘The Ulm Psychoanalytic 
Process Research Study Group’; the later only referred briefly). This process 
includes mutual aspects of observation and of communicative and pragmatic 
validation. In conclusion, I suggest that the figure of the craftsman is an 
appropriate description of the analyst in his conception (Laplanche’s ‘primary 
discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) of his (deconstructive) work, whatever 
the theory he may espouse (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.).          
 I will defend this perspective throughout my entire Thesis because I agree 
completely with Laplanche (1999): the psychoanalytic clinical method is a 
deconstruction of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. 
It is because of this ‘magnetism’ that I defend that the analyst can only be a 
craftsman (my Conclusion) integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a 
‘secondary discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’ [(only threw the ongoing 
process of decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and 
reaction which takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges 
unfolding the analyst’s conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, 
the ‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) 
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constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse 
as a ‘secondary discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a 
secondary discourse’, is always applied after the clinical work, which is the 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’] as Laplanche argues (see above Laplanche, op. cit.). 
Theoretical models are hermeneutic because there is a meta-interpretation of the 
theory done by each analyst, and my literature review (Chapter 2) will be based 
entirely in this premise, but the interpretation of the unconscious manifestations is 
not hermeneutic exactly for the reasons mentioned (Chapter 1) by Laplanche. 
 I will develop throughout my Thesis this dynamic. It seems a paradox but it is 
not because as it is obvious from what I just said: Psychoanalytic theory comes after 
clinical work as all Freud’s ‘cases’ illustrated and the best example of my statement is 
the “Interpretation of Dreams”. The importance of the analysis of Freud’s “The 
Interpretation of Dreams” and how it relates to my literature review and what this 
analysis contributes to the achievement of my initial research goals is demonstrated by 
what I say in Chapter 1 concerning the psychoanalytical clinical method: ‘it was only 
during the 19thC, particularly after the impact caused by Comtian positivism, that the 
term «clinical method» was introduced in medicine specifically to name a set of social, 
analytical, therapeutic and propædeutic techniques. These practices did spread rapidly. 
By the end of the century even Freud had adopted them as the hidden epistemological 
structure but he abandoned it with the publication of the “Interpretation of Dreams” 
where he created the «psychoanalytic clinical method»’.     
 The key difference between the clinical method and the psychoanalytic 
clinical method is that in the latter there is a never-ending deconstruction 
“work[ing] out the dissolution [Lösung] of the dream” (Freud, 1900, 2, in 
Studienausgabe, p. 280; my alterations); ‘the dream is the royal road to the 
unconscious’ and what is an absolute of the psychoanalytic clinical method is its 
deconstructive ‘way’ to ‘follow/explore/discover’ the unconscious fantasy (cf. 
Laplanche, op. cit.): ‘when at the bedside (couch) of a sufferer’ is an analyst where “the 
reciprocal implication of method and object consists in the fact that the former is not 
only adapted to the latter but oriented, magnetically attracted by it” (Laplanche, op. cit., 
p. 63). On the contrary, the clinical method is a ‘way to follow when at the bedside 
of a sufferer’ not by a deconstructing way of explore the unconscious fantasy but 
as a way of constructing nosological categorizations of how to explain the organic 
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or conscious pathology.         
 Only the psychoanalytic clinical method tries to understand (verstehen), not 
explain (erklären), the unconscious fantasies. That is why (following Freud’s own 
words as I will illustrate) the “Interpretation of Dreams” relate with the psychoanalytical 
practical/clinical constructs –hence the importance I give to it in elaborating an entire 
chapter (Chapter 1, which is entitled precisely ‘The Psychoanalytical Clinical Method’) 
on the foundational text of the psychoanalytic clinical method: the “Interpretation of 
Dreams”–, meaning, as I above-mentioned, the “Interpretation of Dreams” is where 
Freud created the ‘psychoanalytic clinical method’: all psychoanalytic 
practical/clinical constructs are inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method 
created by Freud in the “Interpretation of Dreams”: the ‘magnetism between 
method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary 
discourse’ (see above Laplanche, op. cit.): all the theories that I schematize in my 
literature review constitute a ‘secondary discourse’ regarding Freud’s 
psychoanalytic clinical method: the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ (see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.).          
 After this clarification, in my Thesis I will also establish the scientific 
accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing concrete 
examples (as I am doing in this introduction) of how the analyst deconstructs the 
clinical phenomena independently of what theoretical model he embraces: the 
keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work: by a permanent 
deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the analyst 
meta-interprets: the theoretical models.        
 The Freudian heritage is this never-ending dissolution (Lösung) that is 
psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) in its essence. Freud is the 
first object relations theorist because object relations have, like all other schools of 
psychoanalytic thought (like Laplanche states; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), as 
their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction: the theoretical meta-interpretations 
of Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Lacan, Grotstein and Kernberg 
(Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) constitute all 
clinical dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why I 
state in my literature review (Chapter 2) that all these authors follow Freud –
directly or indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist 
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model unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive 
method. I state even more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more 
the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence 
of psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.  
 The ‘common ground’ that I argue (in this Introduction, in my literature review 
and unfolded throughout my entire Thesis) is nothing more, as Wallerstein also 
recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), than acknowledge that there are a 
pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of our 
‘secondary discourse’ in my terminology [I will use (sometimes) throughout my 
Thesis the term ‘in my terminology’ borrowing Laplanche’s terminology in order to 
avoid to repeat myself so often]: they are all formalizations of the analyst’s psychic 
process present in the clinical session; that is why Bion’s Grid, Lacan’s mathemes 
and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the formalization of the 
analyst’s psychic process not as a ‘primary discourse’ but as a ‘secondary 
discourse’: they are epistemological tools that have only one purpose: being 
deconstructed by the ‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) in the clinical session. That is why we call it a formalization of 
the psychic process: it is its form, not its content.     
 In this connection, and on the basis of my own clinical material, I will attempt to 
show (in my Conclusion) how (repeating myself ipsis verbis to be absolutely clear about 
what are my Thesis aims), against the background of the ‘implicit use of explicit 
theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), an ongoing 
process of decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction 
takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.). In my analysis of a session, I introduce the concepts of ‘theoretical 
reason and practical reason’ (concepts that sow the theoretical prolegomena with the 
clinical/practical constructs), and contend that, whatever theories the analyst may 
have implicitly or explicitly in his mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’¸ see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.), they ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive 
‘reasons’ (the ‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its 
object’ as a ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.).    
 Pursuing the same line of thought, I describe validation in the clinical context as 
a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and linguistic co-(de)construction 
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of the intersubjective reality between patient and analyst: this is seen not only in the 
MPRP (Chapter 5) but also in the ‘The Ulm Psychoanalytic Process Research Study 
Group’; the later only referred briefly in my Conclusion. This process includes mutual 
aspects of observation and of communicative and pragmatic validation. In my 
Conclusion, I also suggest that the figure of the craftsman is an appropriate 
description of the analyst in this conception of his (deconstructive) clinical work 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), whatever the 
theory he may espouse (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, 
op. cit.).         
 Returning to Wallerstein and to explain better the ‘common ground’ 
problematic, the 36
th
 International Psychoanalytical Congress in Rome in 1989, inspired 
by Wallerstein’s Presidential Address to the 35th International Psychoanalytical 
Congress in Montreal in 1987 (see above), was devoted to the topic of the ‘Common 
ground’, with three major plenary addresses given by analysts representing the three 
major regions of worldwide psychoanalytic activity, and trained and practising within 
three different theoretical frameworks, in order to explore in the following formal and 
informal discussions, through the case material they were asked to present, the areas of 
convergence (reflecting common ground or common understanding) and of divergence, 
in the way they actually conducted their clinical work. In his own Presidential Address 
to that Congress, entitled “Psychoanalysis: the common ground” (cf., Wallerstein, 1990, 
pp. 3-20), Wallerstein first reviewed the rising chorus of argument that had arisen in the 
intervening two years over his first Presidential Address “One Psychoanalysis or 
many?” (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22) of where both our diversity and, within that, 
our unity (our common ground) resided, and then he tried to demonstrate where he 
‘felt’ that the presented clinical material of the three major plenary addresses sustained 
his initial thesis of the ‘common ground’.       
 Needless to say, the chorus of argument at that Congress over this issue both 
widened and intensified. Spirited disagreements with Wallerstein’s guiding argument 
were presented at that Congress on a panel immediately following his address, by Roy 
Schafer (1990) and by André Lussier (1991), and they are summarised in this 
Introduction as examples of the kinds and range of counter-arguments that Wallerstein’s 
views encountered then, as well as substantially in comparable ways, in the years since, 
hence the epistemological pertinence of this doctoral Thesis.   
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 Schafer’s passionately negative response to Wallerstein’s arguments was built 
around what Schafer labelled as three sets of considerations. The first he called 
linguistic. Since we all use our words (that constitute the ‘phenomenological envelopes’ 
of our clinical and technical constructs; see below) within widely differing connotative 
contexts: “to agree that we analyse transference amounts to little more than agreeing 
that we use the same words for whatever it is that we do” (Schafer, 1990, p. 49). And he 
continues positing that: “instead of identity of meaning, there will be only family 
resemblances. One might have to stand very far back from individual practices to give 
mere family resemblances the appearance of identity and then lay claim to common 
ground” (Schafer, ib.).        
 Schafer’s second point was what he called methodological considerations, 
basically that every turn within ‘psychoanalytic discourse’ can give rise to differing 
plausible responses, of conception, of style, of choice, and that these individually 
idiosyncratic interaction sequences within the consulting room obliterate any possibility 
for common ground in the conduct of an analysis. Wallerstein’s response to both these 
sets of considerations was that the conception of common ground as Wallerstein had 
advanced it had never laid claim to ‘identity’ of words, or of meanings, or of choices in 
what are, of course, inherently ambiguous and multi-potential situations. Wallerstein’s 
claim was more modest, for ‘family resemblances’ indeed, so long as the family 
resemblances are strong enough, and consensually agreed enough, and as a comparable 
enough guide to understanding (‘verstehen’; see below). Common ground was never 
intended to mean identity; it is always subject to the variations built into our differing 
personality structures and propensities (cf., Wallerstein, 1992).  
 Schafer’s third set of considerations he properly called ideological, and these 
constitute, from my perspective, the heart of his argument. He put it thus: 
“Ideologically, the search for common ground seems to imply a generally conservative 
value system. It turns us away from the creative and progressive aspects of the struggles 
between different systems of thought and practice. I say this with all due respect to the 
progressive intentions of Dr. Wallerstein, but as we know, intentions and consequences 
are not the same” (Schafer, op. cit., p. 52). And further on, Schafer made his own 
ideological posture explicit: “Ideologically, by placing a value on the search for 
specifically psychoanalytic common ground, one is implying that differences are 
regrettable, and one is acting on the impulse to level them. Knowingly or not, one is 
21 
 
then aiming for a single master text for psychoanalysis. I think that it is more truly 
progressive –and obviously this is my contestable ideological preference– to give up on 
the idea of a single master text and instead to celebrate and study our differences and to 
continue to grow as we have, though unsettledness” (Schafer, ib.; my alterations). All of 
which circles back to the very first sentence of Schafer’s article: “A search for common 
ground should be based on a shared understanding of why it is a good thing to do, why 
it should be a rewarding thing to do, and how to go about it in a sound way” (Schafer, 
op. cit., p. 49). To Schafer this ‘why’ is set in ideological terms, a conservative stance, 
imputed to Wallerstein, versus a progressive stance, championed by Schafer, which 
latter consists of ‘celebrating’ the ‘unsettledness’ of psychoanalysis.   
 From my perspective, this is not an ideological battle between conservatives and 
progressives, or however one characterises these differing posture, but rather a scientific 
issue. Which way do the phenomena under scrutiny seem to fall, and can we devise 
ways to test differing perspectives empirically? Certainly it is never the intent of science 
to ‘celebrate’ conditions of ‘unsettledness’ but rather to attempt to understand and, if 
possible, to resolve them. I will give a concrete example illustrating from where 
probably Schafer borrowed his terminology and part of his ‘ideology’: a celebrated 
instance in the realm of theoretical physics is the current ‘unsettledness’ between the 
theory of general relativity, a theory of the very large, the laws that govern our cosmos, 
and the theory of quantum mechanics, a theory of the very small, the laws that govern 
the particles of the subatomic world. Both sets of theory are vital to the understanding 
of the worlds that they encompass –the very large and the very small– but they also 
stand in stark contradiction to each other: if either one is valid, the other is not. A whole 
current generation of theoretical physicists is struggling with the dilemma of this 
particular ‘unsettledness’. They are working with superstring theory, an effort to unite 
these two pillars of modern physics into a single, harmonious whole, to try then to 
evolve ‘TOE’: ‘theory of everything’ (cf., Greene, 1999). A discipline such as ours, if it 
is to be a science, should strive for no less, whichever way the empirical outcome falls 
in each individual instance being studied.       
 Returning to the main argument, on that same panel in Rome, André Lussier also 
questioned Wallerstein’s arguments (as I said above). Lussier based his perspective not 
on ideological (Schafer’s position) but on pragmatic grounds. It can be summed up in a 
single quotation: “It seems that we have no choice but to go on being one association 
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composed of sub-groups sharing something vital in common, but also divided by hardly 
reconcilable divergences. The fundamentals for some will appear subsidiary to others, 
which means that the common ground will remain a fluctuating one” (Lussier, 1991, p. 
59).           
 Basically, Lussier’s contention was that the complexities that we deal with, both 
conceptually and technically, within psychoanalysis, as both theory and therapy, put any 
search for common ground beyond the possibility of practical achievement. All that one 
can do is declare one’s own fundamental vision (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; 
see above Laplanche, op. cit.), and Lussier did just that in familiar (ego-psychological) 
terms: the uncovering of the unconscious, the centrality of the Oedipus complex, the 
fostering and resolution of the transference neurosis, the privileging of the intrapsychic 
over the interpersonal, the intersubjective dimension in the transference-
countertransference matrix, the importance of defences and defence analysis, the 
frequency requirement, the need for the drive concept and the economic point of view. 
Lussier is, of course, well aware that others will set their conceptual priorities 
differently. And my point is that these differences amongst us, and the conceptual 
and technical complexities within which they are embedded, cannot be advanced to 
preclude the scientific mission, the search to bring order and consensual 
understanding, that is, a shared scientific common ground – no matter how 
difficult the task, or how slow the progress. That, after all, defines the 
developmental task of science.        
 In other words, what I defend is that all this can be done under a hermeneutic 
meta-interpretation (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.). 
Such a development, if sustained, as I anticipate (and this doctoral Thesis also tries to 
promote), would strengthen the credibility of psychoanalysis as a science of the mind, 
amenable to growth (this growth constitutes the epistemological leap from the 
hermeneutic categorization to the positivist research) through empirical research (the 
‘MPRP’ is a heuristic example of how psychoanalytic research should be done; a 
positivist approach because ‘falsifiable’ research has to be positivist; being the MPRP a 
psychoanalytic clinical research, it is, by inherence, also a practical/clinical construct 
and, paradoxically, unfolds what Laplanche calls the ‘primary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) in accordance with the canons of scientific method.  
 However, Arnold Richards, in a summary article reflecting on the above 
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mentioned Rome Congress called it: ‘a forum of starkly dichotomous viewpoints, of 
participants who believed that analysts must have a great deal in common, and 
participants who believed that analysts need have very little if anything in common’ 
(cf., Richards, 1992, p. 263). As between Schafer and Wallerstein, Richards said: 
‘Schafer focused on the differences, whereas Wallerstein focused on the similarities’, 
and further that: ‘Schafer was clearly implying that the yield of Wallerstein’s effort was 
political rather than scientific’ (cf., Richards, op. cit., p. 261) – political here, of course, 
meaning ideological. My perspective is that Wallerstein’s effort was scientific, not 
ideological, and what better arena for the play of science than in just such a contentious 
field as Richards describes.       
 Actually, the argument that I will advance is that there are currently telltale 
evidences of advancing convergences, conceptually and technically, among heretofore 
seemingly totally distinct theoretical perspectives, the different metapsychologies 
(Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), which Schafer 
would ‘celebrate’ because of the ‘unsettledness’ that they purportedly reflect.  
 From my perspective, the publication of Wallerstein’s edited book entitled “The 
Common Ground of Psychoanalysis” in 1992 brought together a full spectrum of the 
diverse views on this controversy over common ground. Back then, the only thing that 
seemed indubitably agreed upon by all was that, in a field where a central argument had 
long been over whether in fact it was (or could be) a unified and internally coherent 
body of theory, with an equally reasonably unified and internally coherent body of 
technical precepts flowing from the theory, we had now come, over the just prior 
decades, to a full realisation that, in this regard, Freud’s dream was not sustained, that 
we were at that juncture, and had been, indeed, for quite some time, a field marked by a 
clear and seemingly ever-growing pluralism of theoretical perspectives. Whether this 
was for better or for worse, whether it signified progress and should be celebrated or 
was just the fashions of change –maybe inherent in the very nature of what some have 
called ‘our unique science’ (cf., Harrison, 1970, pp. 125-149)– was itself a hotly argued 
issue.            
 What then have been the subsequent responses within psychoanalysis to that 
discourse initiated on this issue of the acknowledged diversity of our theoretical 
structures? In a long review essay on Stephen Mitchell’s 1988 book entitled “Relational 
Concepts in Psychoanalysis: An Integration”, in the section of their review devoted to 
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psychoanalytic model making, Bachant & Richards divide the constituents of what they 
call ‘psychoanalytic metatheories’ (cf., Bachant & Richards, 1993, p. 455) into five 
major groupings. The first they call the ‘common grounders’, which they identify with 
Wallerstein, a group which they say, rightly, espouses the concept of clinical common 
ground within the diversity of theoretical approaches in psychoanalysis.   
 The second group they call the advocates of a multimodal approach to the 
phenomena of psychoanalysis. This group, exemplified by Fred Pine, is stated to believe 
that the clinical phenomena discerned in our consulting rooms must forever be 
approached from within a range of four differing psychologies –of drive, of ego, of 
object and of self– with the psychoanalytic clinician always working within the frame of 
whichever set of theoretical constructs (of drive, ego, object or self) would fit most 
appropriately with, or illuminate most usefully, the exigent state of the patient in each 
shifting movement of the therapeutic interaction.         
 The third group is identified with Leo Rangell and his advocacy of what he calls 
‘total composite psychoanalytic theory’, which he states has grown by progressive 
accretion upon the work of Freud and then the creators of ego-psychology –Anna Freud, 
Hartmann, Otto Fenichel and all the others– and that has always encompassed within its 
frame what the advocates of other theoretical positions, like the object-relational or the 
self-psychological, have chosen to split off from the main body, and then have tried to 
elevate into total systems, efforts, in effect, to split off parts of an organic whole, 
designated by Rangell as ‘mainstream’ or ‘classical’ psychoanalysis. This can, of 
course, be seen by the proponents of all other theoretical perspectives as an effort to 
maintain the one-time American imperialism that saw its own ego-psychology as the 
only comprehensively whole psychoanalysis, with all the other theoretical schools as 
deviant or split-off partial positions.               
 Bachant & Richards dub the fourth group the anti-metapsychologists, those 
represented in United States by disenchanted former adherents of David Rapaport, like 
George Klein, Merton Gill and Roy Schafer, who could eschew all general psychologies 
(metapsychologies) in psychoanalysis, casting them out by what George Klein called a 
‘theorectomy’ and concentrating only on the systematic study and the empirical testing 
of the clinical theory, the arena within which Wallerstein had tried to establish our 
common ground.          
 And fifth, and last, Bachant & Richards indicate the group they call the 
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‘dichotomisers’, those, among whom they count Stephen Mitchell as one of the most 
vigorous and persuasive spokesmen, who see all our variant metapsychologies as falling 
into one of just two fundamentally different and irreconcilable camps, those based on 
what is called, on the one hand, drive-structural theory, built on Freud’s  original 
structural concepts, which sees the ego as a pleasure-seeking organ, trying to satisfy 
drive pressures in ways compatible with superego demands and the constraints of 
external reality, and, on the other hand, object-relational theory, derived originally from 
the work of Fairbairn, and with antecedents back to Ferenczi, which sees the ego as an 
object-seeking organ, pursuing human relatedness.     
 Whatever stand we individually take towards each of the five groupings in this 
categorization of the variety of theoretical perspectives within our psychoanalytic 
universe, I am reasonably sure that we can all agree that it reflects well the confusing 
flux, as well as the intellectual ferment, in our collective orientation to the theoretical 
diversity that has pervaded, and has quite clearly expressed, much of the sate of 
psychoanalytic theorising of the most recent decades as I will illustrate (clarifying the 
confusion) throughout my dissertation, especially in my literature review (Chapter 2).
 But ‘pendulums do swing’ (Wallerstein’s expression concerning this 
problematic of the ‘common ground’; cf., Wallerstein, 1992) in ongoing developments 
in the world of ideas, and, I think, no less so in the system of ideas introduced to the 
world by Sigmund Freud. Just as a world of theoretical unity was the dominant 
influence in our field throughout most of Freud’s working lifetime, until the rise of the 
Kleinian movement in the nineteen twenties, that is; and just as it was followed by a 
world of ever increasing theoretical diversity which seems so dominant today, perhaps 
there are now tell-tale signs of significant convergences, at least on the clinical and 
technical levels, between once seemingly quite polarised perspectives, convergences 
that may be the harbingers of a not too far off coming together at ever higher levels of 
theoretic conceptualisation, perhaps ultimately at the level of an encompassing and 
transcending once-again unified general theory or metapsychology. These signs seem 
quite unobtrusive and are not often remarked as such within the cacophony of our 
contemporary psychoanalytic world, but I would like to submit that they express our 
next coming development as a field; and it is at this point that I want to set my attempt 
at prophesising the future, or at least the coming near future, of psychoanalysis as I see 
it (my literature review unfolds my vision of that future).     
26 
 
 It seems unsurprising to me that Otto Kernberg is one of those who I think 
heralds the new trend that I see developing and wish to defend in this dissertation. 
After all, Kernberg’s central lifetime theorising has consisted in the effort to forge 
links –contra the ‘dichotomisers’– between the drive-structural and the object-
relational perspectives, through advancing his views of internalised object-
relationships, consisting of self-representations, object-representations and the 
affective valences that link them, as the fundamental building blocks out of which 
the structured psychic apparatus of id, ego and superego is constituted. It is within 
the framework of this predilection that Kernberg published an article in 1993 
entitled “Convergences and divergences in contemporary psychoanalytic 
technique”; an article that I think has been much less remarked than is usual in his 
writings (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, pp. 659-673).     
 Taking as his starting point, not the general theories of psychoanalysis (our 
widely divergent metapsychologies), nor even the clinical theories, the more 
experience-near level at which Wallerstein had pitched his concerns (see above), but 
rather the ‘principles of technique’ that actually flow from our conceptual positions, 
Kernberg identified and elaborated some eleven major areas where he could point 
to actual growing convergences in technical interventions coming from clearly 
distinct, and even seemingly opposite, theoretical positions. He also identified some 
seven areas of persisting divergences, but this shorter list seems much less weighty, 
and, concerning some of them, he could even see signs of the coming resolution of 
the distinctions, or their relegation to an historical past, but no longer current 
issues. In each instance of convergence or continuing divergence, Kernberg clearly 
indicated which theoretical perspectives are involved, and in what way their 
technical implementations and even in places their higher-level explanatory 
frameworks are moving closely together.       
 To give the flavour of Kernberg’s exposition, I quote from his highly condensed 
summary paragraphs: “A broad survey of the psychoanalytic field reveals both 
convergences and divergences in technique. The major convergences include earlier 
interpretation of the transference, increased focus on transference analysis, as well 
as growing attention to countertransference analysis and increasing concern with 
the risk of ‘indoctrinating’ patients. Greater emphasis is found on character 
defences and the unconscious meanings of the ‘here-and-now’. Also noted are trends 
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towards translating unconscious conflicts into object relations terminology, as well as 
toward considering a multiplicity of royal roads to the unconscious. Regarding 
divergences, significant controversies continue regarding reconstruction and the 
recovery of preverbal experience, drawing the lines between psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, the role of empathy, and the relation of 
historical to narrative truth” (Kernberg, 1993a, p. 670; my bold). Regarding this last 
sentence, adding to the above mentioned reasons, Kernberg’s statement constitutes one 
more (and major) reason for me to address the ‘Menninger Psychotherapy Research 
Project’ (Chapter 5), which unfolds exactly the dynamic that Kernberg refers to: 
‘drawing the lines between psychoanalytic psychotherapy and psychoanalysis’.   
 It is this overview by Kernberg that I think reflects the still not so widely 
noticed, or acknowledged, current ‘swing of the pendulum’ (Wallerstein’s expression; 
see above) back towards increasing commonality, certainly at the level of our technical 
interventions in our consulting rooms (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above  
Laplanche, op. cit.), and more commonality than I think many in our field are ready to 
admit, at the level of experience-near clinical theories (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), linked closely enough by canons of inference 
to the technical activities that flow from them (the ‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits 
between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’; see below Laplanche, op. 
cit.). And perhaps, incrementally and ultimately, if this trend prevails, we will be able to 
build from an increasingly firm base of clinical theory, to painstakingly fashion a more 
truly unified and scientific broader theoretical structure that could then take its proper 
place as a full partner within the whole array of human sciences.    
 At least that is my vision, but it is a vision far from widely shared at this point. 
The influential 1983 book by Greenberg & Mitchell entitled “Object Relations in 
Psychoanalytic Theory”, traced the historical development of what they call the 
‘relational/structure model’ within and out of Freud’s ‘drive/structure model’, and 
culminated in their declaration, on philosophical as well as psychological grounds, of 
the fundamental incompatibility of the two models –very much contra the converging 
directions just quoted from Kernberg, and also against Kernberg’s own efforts to create 
an amalgam, consisting of relational approaches centred on internalised object relations 
as providing the building blocks for the creation of the traditional psychic structures.
 Greenberg & Mitchell in their book trace the historical unfolding of 
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metapsychology theory, beginning of course with Freud, and then contrapuntally, the 
development of the differing ‘interpersonal psychoanalysis’ of Harry Stack Sullivan 
[Sullivan always called it ‘interpersonal psychiatry’ (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997; see 
above)] and his followers, followed by the ‘alternative theorists’ (Melanie Klein, W. R. 
D. Fairbairn, Michael Balint, John Bowlby, D. W. Winnicott and Harry Guntrip), and 
then what they call ‘accommodationist theorists’ (Heinz Hartmann, Margaret Mahler, 
Edith Jacobson and Otto Kernberg), and then the ‘mixed model’ theorists (where they 
place Heinz Kohut and Joseph Sandler, but, from my perspective, they should also have 
more properly placed Kernberg based in their very own assessment of him), all this then 
culminates in a final chapter called ‘A deeper divergence’. As it is obvious from 
Greenberg & Mitchell’s categorisation one might say that they focus on the divergences 
and that I, in this doctorate dissertation, focus on the similarities (the same argument 
was used, respectively, towards Schafer and Wallerstein as I illustrated above).  
 To this argument I simply answer (once again to be absolutely clear) that my 
doctorate dissertation will demonstrate that psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical 
work (as all Freud’s ‘cases’ illustrated) and the best example of my statement is 
the “Interpretation of Dreams” (see below). In this Thesis I will establish the 
scientific accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing 
concrete examples (as I am doing in this introduction) of how the analyst 
deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of what theoretical model he 
embraces: the keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work (Laplanche’s 
‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): by a permanent 
deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the analyst 
meta-interprets: the theoretical models.  The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of 
my Thesis) is this never-ending dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its 
psychoanalytic clinical method) in its essence (see above Laplanche, op. cit.). Freud 
is the first object relations theorist because object relations have, like all other 
schools of psychoanalytic thought, as their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction 
(like Laplanche states; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): the theoretical meta-
interpretations of Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s 
‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) constitute all clinical 
dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why I state in 
my literature review (see below) that all these authors follow Freud –directly or 
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indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist model 
unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. I 
state even more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the 
theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of 
psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.   
 The ‘common ground’ that I am arguing in this introduction (and will be 
systematized in my literature review) is nothing more, as Wallerstein (1992) also 
recognizes, than acknowledge that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of our ‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s 
‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): they are all formalizations of 
the analyst’s psychic process present in the clinical session; that is why Bion’s 
Grid; Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the 
formalization of the analyst’s psychic process not as a ‘primary discourse’ 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) but as a 
‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, 
op. cit.): they are epistemological tools that have only one purpose: being 
deconstructed by the ‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) in the clinical session. That is why we call it a formalization of 
the psychic process: it is its form, not its content.    
 In this connection, and on the basis of my own clinical material, I will 
attempt to show (in my conclusion) how, against the background of the ‘implicit 
use of explicit theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, 
op. cit.), an ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by the 
patient’s action and reaction takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the analyst’s 
‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.). In my analysis of a session, I 
introduce the concepts of ‘theoretical reason and practical reason’ (concepts that 
sow the theoretical prolegomena with the clinical/practical constructs), and 
contend that, whatever theories the analyst may have implicitly or explicitly in his 
mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), they 
ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the ‘magnetism’ that 
Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.). Pursuing the same line of thought, I describe validation 
in the clinical context as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and 
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linguistic co-(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between patient and 
analyst (this is seen not only in the MPRP (Chapter 7) but also in the ‘The Ulm 
Psychoanalytic Process Research Study Group’; the later only referred briefly in 
my conclusion). This process includes mutual aspects of observation and of 
communicative and pragmatic validation. In conclusion, I suggest that the figure of 
the craftsman is an appropriate description of the analyst in this conception of his 
(deconstructive) work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. 
cit.), whatever the theory he may espouse (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.).         
 Therefore, my doctoral Thesis is neither opposite or in favour of Greenberg & 
Mitchell categorisation of what is psychoanalysis; my argument is just different because 
it is focused not in a simple ‘common ground’ but on an effective ‘secondary discourse’ 
(Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) that any valid  
theory constitutes (in my literature review I also explain, not arbitrarily in the beginning 
with the example of Grünbaum, and later on following Bion, what are the criteria that 
construct a valid theory).              
 Returning to Greenberg & Mitchell, in the above mentioned (final) chapter ‘A 
deeper divergence’ they unequivocally declare their position: “Placing the divergence of 
psychoanalytic models which we have traced throughout this volume within the larger 
context of the divergence of theories about human nature throughout the Western 
philosophical tradition sheds light both on the durability of the models within 
psychoanalysis and on the difficulties encountered by those who have tried to combine 
them” (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 403). This derives from the fact that they draw 
‘on two of the most fundamental and compelling approaches to human experience’, that 
we are ‘inescapably individual creatures’, and at the same time ‘inescapably social 
creatures’ (cf., Greenberg & Mitchell, ib.).       
 This is the ‘paradox’ that they say some have attempted to encompass by a 
‘mixed model’ approach. But ‘model mixing is unstable because the underlying 
premises upon which the two models are based are fundamentally incompatible. The 
drive model and the relational model rest on different visions, and each is a complete 
account’ (cf., Greenberg & Mitchell, ib.). This declaration is made even more flat-
footedly a little further on: “The drive model and the relational model are [each] 
complete and comprehensive accounts of the human experience. The premises upon 
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which they rest constitute two incompatible visions of life, of the basic nature of human 
experience [...] these premises are not subject to empirical verification [...]. [The criteria 
on which such theories can be judged] like scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness cannot be 
determined in any science universally or with pure objectivity [...]. [It depends] on the 
evaluator’s own values and presuppositions [...]. [Ultimately] the evaluation of 
psychoanalytic theories is a matter of personal choice [...] Does the theory speak to 
you?” (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, pp. 406-407; my alterations).  
 Though both Greenberg & Mitchell have subsequently each retreated somewhat 
form the absoluteness of this total dichotomisation and rather extreme vision of the 
psychoanalytic landscape (Greenberg much more so than Mitchell; cf., Greenberg, 
2001), their volume had a profound impact in defining and crystallizing the ‘relational 
turn’ that has played so major a role in what has been widely declared a paradigm shift 
in psychoanalysis (specially in United States), a growing acknowledgement of the major 
evolution of the now very prominent ‘two-body-psychology’ tracing its origins to Harry 
Stack Sullivan and his collaborators, and its precursors beyond that to Ferenczi, 
alongside the traditional ego-psychology, dubbed now a ‘one-person psychology’ with 
many of those trained classically within it now shifting emphasis in two-body directions 
–Gill, McLaughlin, Renik, Jacobs, Poland, Boesky and Chused prominently among 
them. Wallerstein labelled these shifting new alliances as ‘the new American 
psychoanalysis’ in an article entitled exactly with this expression (cf., Wallerstein, 
1998, pp. 1021-1043).        
 Nonetheless, the defining impact of the Greenberg & Mitchell book in 
counterposing two main emphases in psychoanalysis, the one tracing its descent from 
Freud and the other more from Ferenczi –if not necessarily two ‘fundamentally 
irreconcilable’ camps– has been to offer an alternative direction to current 
psychoanalytic theorising that Wallerstein (cf., Wallerstein, op. cit.) proffered in 
drawing upon Kernberg’s 1993 above mentioned paper (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, pp. 659-
673) on convergences (and divergences). And this seems to have affected Kernberg’s 
overview as well, since in an article entitled “Recent developments in the technical 
approaches of English-language psychoanalytic schools” (cf., Kernberg, 2001a, pp. 519-
547), his emphasis is on two major and differing crystallisations of psychoanalytic 
theorising very much in accord with the original Greenberg & Mitchell distinctions, but 
with a capital (and central to me as I will illustrate in my literature review) difference 
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of, alongside the two, placing a ‘third way’: the ‘French Psychoanalytic approach’ 
(cf., Kernberg, 2001a, pp. 534-537).       
 In Kernberg’s article –dealing with ‘recent developments’– he describes modern 
psychoanalysis as coalescing into two major contemporary currents. One, he calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’ (cf., Kernberg, ib.), and this mainstream he 
sees as a coming together of the modern Kleinians, the contemporary Freudians [that is, 
the ego-psychologists in their own modern transformation; for a full description of the 
evolution and the transformations of modern ego-psychology Wallerstein’s 2002 article 
constitutes a succinct and extremely clear assessment (cf., Wallerstein, 2002a, pp. 135-
169)], and the British Independents (or British object-relational grouping) all spark 
plugged by the growing mutual influencing, and even amalgamations in technical 
implementation, of converging understandings within the British Society; the second 
current Kernberg calls the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ movement 
(cf., Kernberg, ib.).         
 Kernberg then presents some ten shared characteristics of what he calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’. These are: (1) an early systematic 
interpretation of the transference; (2) a totalistic concept of the 
countertransference, with an emphasis on countertransference analysis; (3) 
systematic character analysis; (4) a sharp focus on unconscious enactments; (5) an 
emphasis on affective dominance; (6) a predominance of models of internalised 
object relationships; (7) technical neutrality [with the elaboration of what he calls 
a ‘three-person model’: by a ‘three-person model’, Kernberg means a 
consideration of (1) the intrapsychic state of the patient; (2) the interactional, or 
interpersonal, relationship between patient and analyst; and (3) the analyst, in his 
stance of ‘technical neutrality’ reflecting back to the patient his overview of the 
relationship between (1) and (2)]; (8) a multiplicity of royal roads to the 
unconscious; (9) a concerned avoidance of the indoctrination of patients; and (10) 
an increased questioning of linear models of human development (cf., Kernberg, 
ib.).          
 Kernberg next defines five shared characteristics of what he calls the 
‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current: (1) a constructivist 
approach to the transference as opposed to the traditional objectivist approach; (2) 
a rejection of technical neutrality as both illusory and predicated on hidden 
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authoritarianism; (3) a deficit model of early development; (4) a de-emphasis of 
the drives; and (5) the conception of the therapy as a new object relationship 
(implicitly linked to the once discredited Alexandrian notion of the ‘corrective 
emotional experience’). And for many of these listings, Kernberg indicates the basis 
for his categorisation: for example, in the statement of the first described characteristic 
of the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’, the early systematic interpretation of 
the transference, he offers, as evidence of the confluence of Freudian ego-psychology, 
modern Kleinianism and the British Independent Group, citations from Betty Joseph, 
Joseph and Anne-Marie Sandler and Merton Gill (cf., Kernberg, ib.).   
 And then Kernberg puts in a ‘third way’: the ‘French psychoanalytic 
approach’ –alongside with the other two– and this approach is actually elaborated 
into fourteen characteristics as follows: (1) a focus on the analytic method rather 
than analytic technique; (2) a strong focus on the linguistic aspects of analytic 
communication; (3) a sparing use of explicit transference interpretation; (4) by-
passing the ego resistances; (5) direct interpretation of deep, symbolised, 
unconscious conflict; (6) simultaneous consideration of somatisations and 
enactments; (7) avoidance of the realities of daily life; (8) interpretation of 
presymbolic psychosomatic expressions; (9) analysis of the symbolic function of the 
father/analyst as the carrier of presumed knowledge; (10) a focus on archaic 
sexuality; (11) a strong emphasis on the function of ‘après coup’; (12) a 
‘progressive’ vector of future-directed interpretation; (13) acceptance of the 
irreducible earliest transference, derived from mother’s enigmatic and eroticised 
messages; and (14) emphasis on analysis of preconscious fantasy (cf., Kernberg, ib.).
 At first blush this overview by Kernberg seems a retreat from his earlier 1993 
article that I quoted as an example of the beginning ‘swing of the pendulum’ (borrowing 
Wallerstein’s expression once again; see above) towards documenting the convergences 
in technical activities of adherents of disparate theoretical perspectives in 
psychoanalysis. And there are indeed some serious and contentious conceptual and 
technical differences between what Kernberg calls the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic 
mainstream’ and the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ schools, to leave 
the ‘French psychoanalytic approach’ aside for a moment, as, for example, over the 
place and continued use of concepts of neutrality, abstinence and objectivity as 
psychoanalytic desiderata in the ‘mainstream’ –as at least goals, if never as fully 
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achieved realities– as against their abandonment in favour of declared authenticity (and 
often spontaneity) of interaction, including appropriately judicious self-disclosure in the 
relational grouping.          
 On the other hand, I think that all those who would be grouped as 
‘intersubjectivist, interpersonalist, self psychologist’, would strongly subscribe –perhaps 
even more so– to a goodly number of the characteristics Kernberg ascribes to the 
‘mainstream’, that is, countertransference analysis, focus on unconscious enactments, 
on centrality of affects, on internalised object relationships, on questioning linear 
developmental models, etc.         
 What I am suggesting is that hidden within the two major contemporary 
psychoanalytic currents (or groupings) into which Kernberg now separates (at least) the 
English-speaking psychoanalytic worlds, are many of exactly the same kinds of 
convergences from seemingly very different theoretical perspectives that I think 
Kernberg started to adumbrate in the earlier 1993 paper. What I will develop throughout 
my Thesis is not an update on Kernberg’s views, but illustrate that the convergences 
and even the divergences that Kernberg heuristically categorised are all inherent 
to (once again I will repeat my central argument because it sows the coherence of my 
doctoral Thesis as a whole: I will repeat it several times throughout my dissertation 
exactly for this reason; sometimes I repeat the full argument; sometimes, like now, a 
part of the full argument because I sow it with what is being defended in each specific  
moment) how the analyst deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of 
what theoretical model he embraces: the keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s 
mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): by a 
permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the 
analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models.      
 The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending 
dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) 
in its essence (see below Laplanche, op. cit.). Freud is the first object relations 
theorist because object relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic 
thought (as the above mentioned by Kernberg), as their ‘primary discourse’ the 
deconstruction (like Laplanche states; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): the 
theoretical meta-interpretations of Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and 
Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) constitute 
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all clinical dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why 
I state in my literature review (see below) that all these authors follow Freud –
directly or indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist 
model unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive 
method. I state even more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more 
the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence 
of psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.   
 The ‘common ground’ that I am arguing in this introduction (and will be 
systematized in my literature review) is nothing more, as Wallerstein (1992) also 
recognizes, than acknowledge that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of our ‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s 
‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): they are all formalizations of 
the analyst’s psychic process present in the clinical session; that is why Bion’s 
Grid; Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the 
formalization of the analyst’s psychic process not as a ‘primary discourse’ 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) but as a 
‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, 
op. cit.): they are epistemological tools that have only one purpose: being 
deconstructed by the ‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) in the clinical session. That is why we call it a formalization of 
the psychic process: it is its form, not its content.       
 And exactly in this context I return to Kernberg’s argument: the inclusion of ‘the 
French psychoanalytic approach’ (mainly Lacanian) alongside the two major 
contemporary psychoanalytic currents: the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’ 
and the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current (Bion and Matte Blanco 
belong to the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’). This inclusion could be read 
as Kernberg’s effort to juxtapose francophone to anglophone analytic thinking in order 
to lay the basis for the consideration of discernible convergences between these major 
analytic traditions, that have been so significantly isolated from one another, in part 
because of the language barrier, in part because of the different philosophical traditions 
(this is one of the major reasons why I develop, in my literature review, Foucault’s and 
Bataille’s philosophical contributions to Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory) in which they 
are rooted. Parenthetically, just as the Kleinians were the first of the departures from the 
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ego-psychological development (in which Freud’s Viennese followers were taking 
analytic work in Britain and in America), who refused to be extruded from organised 
psychoanalysis and even claimed a truer descent from Freud’s own work, in embracing 
his death instinct theory as central to their theorising, so have the Lacanians and those 
influenced by them been a later deviation from many of Freud’s propositions, yet also 
claiming a truer adherence to Freud’s original drive theory and to the continuing 
centrality of infantile/archaic sexuality. Indeed, these are the facts and my argument, 
concerning this status quo, reinforces each theoretical position per se: the more the 
theorist differs from Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more 
the theory is following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical method: once 
again, the deconstruction. Of course all schools of psychoanalytic thought have 
their ‘roots’ and theories are built upon something as I have been demonstrating 
threw Kernberg’s (and my own) arguments. As I said above, mutatis mutandis, my 
argument is just different because it is focused not in a simple ‘common ground’ but on 
an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) that any valid theory constitutes (in my literature review I also 
explain, not arbitrarily in the beginning with the example of Grünbaum, and later on 
following Bion, what are the criteria that construct a valid psychoanalytic theory). 
 In this connection and returning to the dynamic inherent to Kernberg’s reflection 
it is not arbitrarily that almost simultaneously with Kernberg’s 2001 article in the 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Robert White published an article in the Journal of the 
American Psychoanalytical Association, entitled “The Interpersonal and Freudian 
traditions” (2001), with the subtitle “Convergences and divergences” that Kernberg had 
used in his title in 1993. The thrust of White’s article is very much in the same direction 
as Kernberg’s of 1993 –what Wallerstein had called the beginning ‘swing of the 
pendulum’ (see above) away from the previous ever-growing pluralism. White sets an 
illuminating historical context and offers a provocative analogy. He properly places the 
original splitting of the two traditions in United States (the interpersonal and the 
‘Freudian’) within ‘the psychoanalytic wars in New York City in the early 1940s’ (cf., 
White, 2001, p. 427).          
 It was in 1941 that Karen Horney and her followers (Clara Thompson, Erich 
Fromm, etc.) felt that they had to leave the New York Institute and, in the confusing 
flux of the ensuing decade, they established their own dissident institute, entered into 
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alliance with Harry Stack Sullivan’s simultaneous creation of an indigenous 
‘interpersonal psychiatry’ (see above), and then themselves split into several separate 
institute groupings, with some distinct differences, but an overall living within an 
interpersonal relational framework, some (Horney) with a more socio-cultural 
content, some (Fromm) with a Marxian-economic content, etc. (cf., White, 2001, pp. 
427-455).            
 What is germane in the context of this article is that for several decades the two 
traditions, the Freudian and the interpersonal, ignored each other quite thoroughly, and 
were to a significant degree even ignorant of each other; the one (the mainstream 
Freudian) was organised within the American Psychoanalytical Association as the 
official representative within the United States of the International Psychoanalytical 
Association, and the other grew in a group of independent institutes, mostly in New 
York and Washington, with some of its adherents sitting uneasily, but in a marginalised 
way, within the American Psychoanalytical Association (cf., White, ib.).   
 Here White makes an analogy with the British experience. He says: “Modern 
interpersonal thinking is a fusion of Sullivanian thought and European psychoanalysis 
[only one stream of it] as mediated by Ferenczi and Thompson. What the Kleinians did 
in England in the 1940s and 1950s, the interpersonalists did simultaneously and 
independently in the United States” (White, 2001, pp. 428-429).    
 But here, the analogy breaks down in part. For, while the British, after getting 
past the contention and the rancour of the ‘Controversial Discussions’ in the early 
1940s, were able to fashion the famous ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ (cf., King & Steiner, 
1991; see below) and create an institutional framework within which they could live 
together and influence each other in ways that have led over the decades to major 
comings together –in ways which I will discuss further on in this Introduction– the two 
American traditions lived independently, side by side, with the dominant American 
Freudian mainstream thoroughly ignoring the other, and the recently growing mutual 
acknowledgement and discourse has come decades later. This difference, from my 
perspective, has been a consequence of the existence from the beginning within Britain 
of a large Middle Group (now called the Independent Group; see below), which 
declared itself neither Kleinian nor Freudian, though willing to borrow from each, and 
offering itself always as a meeting ground and a potential mediating group. There was 
never an American counterpart.       
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 Returning to White and in accordance with White’s account, now there are 
convergences in America of these two major traditions, and that I think, again in accord 
with White, that these may well be more significant than the differences that Kernberg 
points to in his article appearing simultaneously with White’s. As White puts it: “I hope 
to show here that within each tradition there is at least as much difference and dissent as 
there is between traditions and that moreover, there is now considerable overlap 
between the traditions [...]. We are now seeing the beginning of a real exchange of 
ideas. There are journals now that solicit articles from both traditions, a CD-ROM that 
includes journals from both, and speakers who regularly cross the divide at national 
meetings” (White, 2001, p. 429).        
 I would state this same idea in less organisational terms, that so many of the 
tenets of what is now called ‘two-personal psychology’, the focus on the interactional 
and intersubjective quality of the analytic encounter, with its emphasis on the 
subjectivity (countertransference in the broader sense) of the analyst as a major 
contributor to the co-creation of the transference-countertransference matrix, and with 
the serious modification (if not the abandonment) of the analyst’s posture as objective 
outside observer and epistemic arbiter of reality, etc., have infiltrated widely into the 
classical or traditional Freudian perspective. Witness in this context the contributions of 
Gill, McLaughlin, Renik, Jacobs, Poland, Boesky and Chused (see above), all trained 
within the classical tradition.        
 And witness on the other side, the retreat by both Greenberg and by Mitchell 
from the categorical posture of their (see above) 1983 joint volume declaring the 
fundamental irreconcilability of Freud’s original drive-structural paradigm and the 
newer relational paradigm which they then represented and espoused. For their more 
current positions on these issues I make reference to Greenberg’s 2001 article, “The 
analyst’s participation: a new look”, which speaks to the excesses of relational 
psychoanalysis when taken to its logical extremes –which historically Greenberg sees as 
a corrective, or rather over-corrective, response to the prior extremes of ego-
psychological psychoanalysis when pursued to its extremes (cf., Greenberg, 2001, pp. 
359-381), and to Mitchell & Black’s “Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern 
Psychoanalytic Thought” (1995) in which the final two chapters on current 
controversies in theory and then in technique offer a balanced portrayal of the many 
interpenetrations and imbrications of the two perspectives coming from opposite 
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directions, the classical Freudian and the relational, in their nuanced consideration 
of each of the listed ‘controversies’, on the role of actual trauma versus fantasy 
elaboration in the creation of psychopathology, or of consideration of past versus 
present, or interpretation versus relationship factors in the amelioration of 
psychopathology, etc. (cf., Mitchell & Black, 1995).     
 And there are still other significant markers of these converging trends. Glen 
Gabbard, in a 1995 article entitled “Countertransference: the emerging common 
ground”, focused on the constantly enlarging place of the countertransference in the 
centre of analytic theorising and clinical scrutiny as what he called ‘the emerging 
common ground’ (hence, the title of the article). There he took the central Kleinian 
conception of projective identification, as articulated originally by Melanie Klein as an 
intrapsychic fantasy, and then enlarged interpersonally by Wilfred Bion (and others; see 
below my literature review), and now more fully and subtly evolved by Betty Joseph 
(and many others; see below my literature review) and brought it into conjunction 
with the conception of countertransference enactments as articulated by those ego-
psychology-trained American analysts moving in the interpersonal and interactional 
direction (Ted Jacobs and James McLaughlin and again many others; see above); and 
along the way, bringing in Joseph Sandler’s (1976) role responsiveness conception as a 
close enough version of Kleinian projective identification in Freudian clothing (cf., 
Sandler, 1976, pp. 43-47). All this Gabbard sees as a growing Kleinian-Freudian 
consensus on the interactions within the transference-countertransference matrix 
as a ‘joint creation’, with shifting emphases oscillating between the major 
emphasis on the contribution of the patient (the original Kleinian position) and on 
the contribution of the analyst (the recent Freudian position) (cf., Gabbard, 1995, 
pp. 475-485).           
 From my perspective, once again, after this argument is even more explicit that  
the convergences that Gabbard illustrated are all inherent to how the analyst 
deconstructs –threw countertransference– the clinical phenomena presented –threw 
transference– by the patient independently of what theoretical model the analyst 
embraces: the keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work (Laplanche’s 
‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): by a permanent 
deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the analyst 
meta-interprets: the theoretical models.      
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 Indeed, the psychoanalytic clinical method is a deconstruction of what the 
patient’s unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of this 
‘magnetism’ (see above Laplanche, op. cit.) that I defend that the analyst can only 
be a craftsman (my Conclusion) integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a 
‘secondary discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’ [(only threw the ongoing 
process of decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and 
reaction which takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges 
unfolding the analyst’s conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, 
the ‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) 
constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse 
as a ‘secondary discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a 
secondary discourse’, is always applied after the clinical work, which is the 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’] as Laplanche argues (see above Laplanche, op. cit.).
 Returning to Gabbard, from my understanding, Gabbard’s arguments are another 
documentation and example of arenas of convergence between once seemingly 
antipodal (meta)psychological perspectives, and it is only one among an array of such 
indicators, albeit a most important one. Further on in this Introduction, I will indicate 
other emerging Kleinian-Freudian rapprochements ramifying within the British 
Psychoanalytical Society –the long-time uneasy container of the three, above 
mentioned, disparate analytic metapsychologies– itself.     
 And, as a last citation across this narrowing gap that I am describing, witness the   
1994 book by Merton Gill, once one of the major systematisers of ego-psychological 
metapsychology (cf., Gill, 1963; cf., Rapaport & Gill, 1959, pp. 153-162), who 
subsequently renounced it completely in a 1976 benchmark article entitled 
“Metapsychology is not psychology” (cf., Gill, 1976, pp. 71-105), becoming then one of 
the staunchest advocates of the two-person relational turn in analysis, turning 
increasingly to the major relational journal (“Contemporary Psychoanalysis”), for the 
placement of his contributions to theory and practice. In his 1994 book entitled 
“Psychoanalysis in Transition: A Personal View” [it’s not arbitrarily that this title sows, 
literally and semantically, with my ‘personal view’ concerning the basic tenets of this 
doctorate dissertation, specially the ‘analyst’s mind’ dynamic: the psychoanalytic 
clinical method is a deconstruction of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to the 
‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of this ‘magnetism’ (see above Laplanche, op. cit.) that I 
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defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (my Conclusion) integrating the 
theoretical models in his mind as a ‘secondary discourse’ but never as a ‘primary 
discourse’ (only threw the ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by 
the patient’s action and reaction which takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary 
discourse’ emerges unfolding the analyst’s conception of his (deconstructive) work)], 
summing up his finally crystallised views on these issues on which he had done such a 
thorough about-face, Gill has a chapter, “One-person and two-person psychology”, 
where he makes the following sequential assertions: “As criticism of mainstream 
psychoanalysis has grown with more and more emphasis on object relations, there has 
been what many would regard as an overshooting of the mark, with a replacement of a 
one-person view of the analytic situation by a two-personal view. As balance is being 
restored, the question becomes, are both one- and two-person psychologies necessary, 
and if so, how are they related?” (Gill, 1994, p. 33).     
 This is followed after several pages of consideration of this question with: “If we 
ask whether human psychology involves more than a relationship with other people, the 
answer seems obvious. Important though relationships with other people are, there is 
much more to life than that. That the analytic situation involves two people may be a 
factor in overvaluing the role of relations with people as the alleged core of psychic life. 
That relationships with people are intrapsychically represented may also be a factor in 
undervaluing other aspects of the human psyche. Intertwining issues of relationships 
with persons with all other aspects of psychological functioning may be yet another 
factor in the failure to recognise these other aspects. And yet another possibility: 
because psychopathology is so often a matter of relationships, other aspects of human 
functioning may be overlooked” (Gill, op. cit., pp. 39-40).    
 And in summation of this section of that chapter, Gill concludes. “For the time 
being, I assert only that psychoanalysis needs both one-person and two-person 
psychologies [...]. It is important to note that this discussion of one-person and two-
person psychologies has been with regard to the theories of the analytic situation. In 
actual practice, analysts have always, to varying degrees, pragmatically worked in both 
one-person and two-person contexts” (Gill, op. cit., p. 40; my alterations). 
 Indeed, the ‘varying degrees’ that Gill heuristically speaks about constitute 
exactly the main argument of this doctoral Thesis, but these ‘varying degrees’ are 
not only ‘pragmatically worked in both one-person and two-person contexts’; these 
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‘varying degrees’ are pragmatically worked in all psychoanalytic ‘contexts’ 
because these ‘varying degrees’ constitute the essence of the psychoanalytic clinical 
method, which is a deconstruction of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to 
the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of this ‘magnetism’ (see above Laplanche, op. 
cit.) that I defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (my Conclusion) 
integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a ‘secondary discourse’ but never 
as a ‘primary discourse’ [(only threw the ongoing process of decision-making that 
is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction which takes place in the 
‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the analyst’s 
conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, the ‘magnetism 
between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes any analyst’s 
‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse as a ‘secondary 
discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary discourse’, is 
always applied after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’] 
as Laplanche argues (see above Laplanche, op. cit.).    
 And Kernberg illustrates exactly how psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary 
discourse’, is always applied (unfolding Gill’s ‘varying degrees’) after the clinical 
work, which is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ as Laplanche argues. Kernberg 
states, in the above mentioned article of 1993, that: ‘first there is a general 
tendency toward earlier interpretation of the transference, and an increased focus 
on transference analysis in all psychoanalytic approaches except, probably, the 
Lacanian (regarding this exception I agree with it but below Kernberg himself 
states the convergences between the Lacanian and others school of thought). The 
heightened stress on the transference is moving the technique of ego psychology, 
for example, closer to that of object-relations theory. There seems to be less 
emphasis on dreams, on the recovery of concrete memories, on external reality, 
and more on both early and systematic analysis of the unconscious meanings of 
transference developments’ (cf., Kernberg, 1993b, pp. 45-62).   
 And he adds: ‘then there is a move toward concentrating on the analysis of 
character defences instead of the analysis of the unconscious meanings of 
particular symptoms, experiences, or memories. Here, it is as if Kleinian technique 
were moving in the direction of ego psychology. That character pathology and 
severe personality disorders are becoming increasingly prevalent indications for 
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psychoanalytic treatment, may be contributing to this trend, but so is the growing 
awareness that analysis of verbal contents that bypass character structures often 
leads to intellectualization and pseudo-insight. Further, there is an increasing focus 
on unconscious meanings in the «here-and-now», as a crucial precondition for 
significant analysis of the «there-and-then» –which Sandler & Sandler have 
described as the «present unconscious» and the «past unconscious» (cf., Sandler & 
Sandler, 1987, pp. 331-341). This tendency is of course linked to an increasing 
concentration on the analysis of unconscious meanings of the transference. In this 
regard, we seem to be moving toward a broader concept of countertransference 
(see above). Countertransference as a significant factor for the analyst’s internal 
exploration as a preparatory step to transference interpretation, and consideration 
of intimate links between transference and countertransference developments 
characterize object-relations theories, ego psychology, self psychology, and 
interpersonal psychoanalysis (see above)’ (cf., Kernberg, ib.).    
 And he states the main ‘concern’: “I detect an increasing concern over 
‘indoctrinating’ the patient with the analyst’s theories, and an awareness that 
patients, as part of transference developments, tend to talk in the analyst’s 
language, and that this fosters intellectualized reconstructions of the past while 
feeding into character resistances. In this connection, there is a general tendency to 
interpret genetic antecedents more cautiously, a tendency particularly dramatic in 
the Kleinian school’s shift away from the interpretation of assumed earliest 
determinants of intrapsychic conflicts” (Kernberg, op. cit., p. 53).  
 He continues his argument defending that: ‘linear concepts of development –
the linear sequence from oral to anal to genital and oedipal conflicts, in contrast to 
highly individual sequences of condensed oedipal and pre-oedipal structures– are 
being questioned increasingly so that the analysis of transference paradigms 
operates with an oscillation between analyses of highly condensed structures 
incorporating disparate aspects of the past and analyses of a particular line of 
development that temporarily emerges within those condensed structures. This 
development, perhaps most strongly accentuated among Lacanians but 
characteristic of non-Lacanian French psychoanalysis as well, also focuses on the 
structural aspects and developmental consequences of early oedipalization, the 
archaic Oedipus. Then there is a growing consensus regarding the dyadic nature of 
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earliest psychic development as opposed to the traditional assumption of an 
autistic period, and a corresponding closer attention to the implications of this 
early development for psychic structure and psychoanalytic technique’ (cf., 
Kernberg, op. cit., pp. 45-62).      
 Finally, in a highly heuristic way, Kernberg’s argues that: “there is a tendency 
to apply stricter and more precise modifications of psychoanalytic technique to the 
psychotherapies, a tendency to question the traditionally subtle or not so subtle 
demeaning of psychoanalytic psychotherapies that are less than the «pure gold» of 
standard psychoanalytic technique, and less fear that the development of such 
innovations in method will harm the methodological «purity» of standard 
psychoanalysis” (Kernberg, op. cit., p. 54; my alterations).    
 Returning to Gill’s arguments, in spite of Gill circumscribe the ‘varying degrees’ 
only to ‘one-person and two-person contexts’ he still describes throughout the 1994 
book (one year after Kernberg’s benchmark article and two years after Wallerstein’s 
book concerning the ‘common ground’; see above) many kinds of situations in which 
analysts, alternately, or concomitantly, intervene within a one-person and a two-person 
conceptualisation. It is this final embracing of a ‘both/and’ instead of an ‘either/on’ 
(Wallerstein’s expressions, cf., Wallerstein, 1992) position that has been far less 
remarked about Gill than the quoting of his more familiarly noted prior positions at the 
seeming extremes of the two poles, the earlier allegiance to one-person, intrapsychic 
conceptions and the later espousal of two-person, interpersonal (interpsychic) 
conceptions.           
 This espousal of a ‘both/and’, integrative and transcending, posture in relation to 
many issues in psychoanalytic theorising is certainly in accordance: (1) with 
Wallerstein’s (1988c, 1990, 1992) founding perspective concerning the ‘common 
ground’ (see above); (2) with Kernberg’s (1993a, 1993b, 2001) understanding of the 
‘common ground’ as I just illustrated; with White’s (2001) accounts following (almost) 
Kernberg’s stream of thought (see above); (3) with Greenberg’s 2001 article, “The 
analyst’s participation: a new look”, which speaks to the excesses of relational 
psychoanalysis when taken to its logical extremes (see above); (4) with Mitchell & 
Black’s “Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought” (1995) in 
which the final two chapters on current controversies in theory and then in technique 
offer a balanced portrayal of the many interpenetrations and imbrications of the two 
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perspectives coming from opposite directions, the classical Freudian and the relational, 
in their nuanced consideration of each of the listed ‘controversies’ (see above); (5) with 
Glen Gabbard’s 1995 article entitled “Countertransference: the emerging common 
ground” –Kernberg is the author that articulate more schools of psychoanalytic thought, 
specially the one that all the authors just mentioned leave aside: ‘Lacanians and non-
Lacanian French psychoanalysis’ (in the 1993’s articles, specially the 1993b’s article,  
and in the narrowest 2001’s article as above mentioned); (6) and, finally, with my own 
argument, based (in its essence) on Laplanche (1999).     
 My argument is different from the authors above mentioned because it is focused 
not in a simple ‘common ground’ (though this conceptual framework greatly helps me 
to be more clear about my research agenda) but on an effective ‘secondary discourse’ 
(Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) that any valid 
psychoanalytic theory constitutes (in my literature review I also explain, not arbitrarily 
in the beginning with the example of Grünbaum, and later on following Bion, what are 
the criteria that construct a valid theory), or, in other words, the ‘common ground’ 
that I am arguing in this introduction (and will be systematized in my literature 
review) is nothing more, as Wallerstein (1992) also recognizes, than acknowledge 
that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the 
form of our ‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.): I argue that the analyst can only be a craftsman (my 
Conclusion) integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’ (see above Laplanche, op. cit.): only 
threw the ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by the 
patient’s action and reaction which takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the 
‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the analyst’s conception of his 
(deconstructive) work; or, in other words, the ‘magnetism between method and its 
object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, 
whatever the theory he may espouse as a ‘secondary discourse’; or, more 
objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary discourse’, is always applied 
after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ as Laplanche 
argues (see above Laplanche, op. cit.).      
 Starting the conclusion of this Introduction, as I said previously, the above 
mentioned espousal of a ‘both/and’, integrative and transcending, posture in relation to 
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many issues in psychoanalytic theorising constitute crisscrossing trends that have been 
played out not only on one side of the Atlantic. I mentioned earlier White’s (2001) 
statement that made an analogy between the events in United States to those taking 
place over a longer time-span within the British Psychoanalytical Society. The deep 
shift over several decades of Kleinian writing from a focus on early deep interpretation 
of underlying archaic fantasies with little attention to defences and resistances, and from 
body-part and part-object centred interpretations, and with an avoidance of attention to 
inherent countertransference involvement, to what is now called ‘Modern Kleinian’ 
conceptualising in terms of the immediate ‘here-and-now’ of the analytic interaction, 
with a focus on what the analysand is trying to evoke in the analyst and how this 
impacts upon and influences the countertransferential responses of the analyst, with a 
dropping away of the old language of part-objects and whole objects, of body parts and 
cannibalistic imagery, has been extensively documented. And it brings a whole 
contemporary generation of British Kleinians (Brenman, Britton, Feldman, 
O’Shaughnessy, Steiner and, of course, Betty Joseph and Bott Spillius, and many 
others; see below my literature review) into far greater accord in clinical behaviour 
and technical implementation with the converging clinical and technical trends 
from both the American contemporary ego-psychological position (now renamed, 
in many quarters, conflict and compromise formation theory) and the now 
ascendant relational (interpersonal, dialectical constructivist, etc.) theorising, than 
would have been at all conceivable just two or three decades back (cf., Spillius, 
1988; cf., Schafer, 1997b; cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).     
 All this has in fact led Kernberg to declare: “All of these developments moved 
Kleinian analysis in the direction of ego-psychology, without explicit acknowledgement 
of this shift” (Kernberg, 2001, p. 523). And, further on, after discussing ‘recent’ 
modifying trends arising out of their ongoing mutually interactive discourse in each of 
the three British Society theoretical groupings, he sates: “The general consolidation of 
what I have described as the psychoanalytic mainstream has gradually brought the three 
traditional currents of the British Psychoanalytical Society closer, to the extent that, in 
my experience, when hearing clinical presentations by British analysts, it is no 
longer easy to differentiate those with a contemporary Kleinian background, an 
independent background, or a contemporary Freudian background” (Kernberg, op. 
cit., p. 532; my alterations).         
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 And Kernberg credits Schafer’s 1997 book, “The Contemporary Kleinians of 
London”, with conveying to a North American audience a careful, critical, yet 
obviously sympathetic, exploration of key contributions from modern British Kleinians, 
and says of this: “A new mainstream of analytic techniques within the English-
language analytic community seems to be evolving” (Kernberg, op. cit., p. 525; my 
alteration).           
 From the other side, to trace the concomitant developments within the British 
Contemporary Freudian camp, I have selected, to conclude my Introduction’s argument, 
the ‘completed life work’ of Joseph Sandler (1987), who stood all his career at the 
intersection of the just mentioned three major theoretical perspectives, living in, perhaps 
often uneasy, harmony within the British Psychoanalytical Society, the Freudian, the 
Kleinian, and between them, the predominantly object-relational grouping, first 
articulated by Fairbairn, Balint and Winnicott, known originally as the Middle Group, 
but now renamed the Independent Group (as I said above), presumably because of its 
lack of an avowed coherent unifying perspective such as they feel marks their Freudian 
and Kleinian confreres.          
 Within this diversity –and often contentious– in the British array, Sandler, 
almost single-handedly, over his lifetime represented a harmonising role, pressing 
towards an ecumenical synchronisation that led Peter Fonagy to characterise him in a 
“New York Times” obituary as the leader of a ‘quiet revolution in psychoanalytical 
thought’. An instance familiar to us all is Sandler’s 1976 role responsiveness paper that 
did so much to bring the Kleinian concept of projective identification –though not by 
that name– into general acceptance and its current widespread employment, now by that 
name, in the rest of the psychoanalytical world (cf., Sandler, 1976, pp. 43-47). Let me 
on this context briefly outline the overall thrust of Sandler’s life work in order to 
demonstrate why I consider him such an outstanding exemplar of what I think is the still 
embryonic, but I predict, cumulatively growing, trend towards the new convergences 
that I see as the successor to our present era of psychoanalytic pluralism of 
hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of our ‘secondary 
discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.).
 Sandler actually began this labour early in his career, and at a time of ever-
increasing proliferation of psychoanalytical theoretical perspectives, in his capacity for 
more than two decades (1958-1979) as Director of the Index Project at the Hampstead 
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Child Therapy Clinic (now renamed the Anna Freud Centre). This was the launching 
pad for his systematic and truly groundbreaking studies into the logical structure of 
our bodies of psychoanalytic concepts, and the ‘goodness of fit’ of these concepts to 
the data of the psychoanalytic treatments at the Anna Freud Centre, data that 
were highlighted by the empirical application of the concepts to the indexing of the 
data. By constantly exploring the degree of congruence, or conversely, of 
discrepancy, between the Index categories that embody the working concepts of 
our psychoanalytical theories, and the clinical data from the ongoing cases at the 
Anna Freud Centre, that were to be indexed in accord with those categories, 
Sandler, and his several collaborators, again and again exposed a full range of 
semantic, definitional and conceptual problems of our science –and clarified, in 
often fundamental ways, such concepts as superego, ego ideal, ideal self, pain, 
trauma, strain, sublimation, projective identification, object relationships, 
transference; the list is seemingly endless (cf., Sandler, 1987).   
 Through this prodigious array of conceptual clarifications, a guiding 
intellectual thread clearly emerged, the incremental transformation of the traditional 
drive-structural psychoanalytical paradigm, based on the economics and dynamics of 
drives and energies, into a more object-relational model, the economics and dynamics of 
fluctuating feeling states embedded in internalised objects relationships, and reflecting 
the full human feeling range from anxiety, depression and pain to well-being and safety. 
And, yet, quite oppositely from the ‘dichotomisers’ above mentioned by Bachant & 
Richards (1993), who posit fundamentally irreconcilable drive-structural and object-
relational metapsychologies, Sandler’s evolving transformation of the so-called 
‘classical’ Freudian psychoanalysis into a depth psychology which adapts to changes in 
feeling states, was accomplished stepwise without ever losing the vital linkages to 
issues of instinctual gratification and frustration, which are after all so centrally 
important, as the ego balances its conditions of danger and safety, and adaptively 
regulates its shifting feeling states. In this sense, Sandler’s contributions constituted a 
profound effort at theoretical integration promoting valid hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.).         
 Clearly, Sandler’s transformative theory building was, as I have indicated, 
strongly influenced by his professional placement within the British Psychoanalytical 
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Society, where, ever since the famous ‘Controversial Discussions’ of the early nineteen 
forties, the three distinct theoretical schools (the Kleinian, the Freudian, and the object-
relational or Independent Group) have existed and taught side by side, with constantly 
interacting scientific discourse and, inevitably, mutual clarification and influence. But 
Sandler was also individually a distinct and major bridging voice in the convergences 
and growing areas of rapprochement that currently mark the once polemically 
separate theoretical perspectives that characterised the psychoanalytic landscape 
in Great Britain, and all over, not so long ago –a shining exemplar of exactly the 
growing trend that Kernberg so comprehensively presaged in his 1993 articles, and that 
others have since added to as I illustrated above.      
 And thus, Sandler, who never tried to develop a distinctive school or movement 
of his own within psychoanalysis, has indeed emerged (quite unobtrusively) rather as 
one of the architects of the new integrations, promoting valid hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.), that I think are beginning to mark the vibrant 
psychoanalysis of today, and that point hopefully to its future.    
 This, of course, is exactly what I think Fonagy had in mind in offering the phrase 
defining Sandler as a prime leader in a ‘quiet revolution’ in psychoanalytical thought. 
And, to conclude, I have to add Kernberg (1993a, 1993b, 2001a) as a partner in arms 
with Sandler in these endeavours. From my perspective, as above mentioned, even more 
so because: if the ten shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘contemporary 
psychoanalytic mainstream’; the five shared characteristics of what he calls the 
‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current; and the fourteen shared 
characteristics of what he calls the ‘French psychoanalytic approach’ –alongside 
with the above two– don’t constitute new integrations, not as a simple ‘common 
ground’, but as promoting valid hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures 
the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (see above Laplanche, op. cit.), I 
don’t know how one can say that psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work.
 Because I think, as above mentioned many times, that psychoanalytic 
theory comes after clinical work in this Thesis I will establish the scientific 
accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing concrete 
examples (as I did in this introduction) of how the analyst deconstructs the clinical 
phenomena independently of what theoretical model he embraces: the keynote 
50 
 
here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; 
see above Laplanche, op. cit.): by a permanent deconstructionist method; a 
methodological deconstruction of what the analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical 
models. The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending 
dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) 
in its essence (see below Laplanche, op. cit.). Freud is the first object relations 
theorist because object relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic 
thought, as their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction (like Laplanche states; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.): the theoretical meta-interpretations of Freud, 
Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.) constitute all clinical dissolutions inherent to the 
psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why I state in my literature review (see 
below) that all these authors follow Freud –directly or indirectly, theoretically 
speaking– building up a syncretic universalist model unified exactly by the Rosetta 
stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. I state even more: the more the 
theorist differs from Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more 
the theory is following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical method: once 
again, the deconstruction as I will explain in the next chapter.                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                   












Theoretical Prolegomena: a ‘secondary discourse’ 
The Psychoanalytical Clinical Method  
           
 In this chapter I am going to clarify what is the psychoanalytic clinical method 
following Laplanche’s definition of it: “The [psychoanalytic clinical] method is one 
of association and cross-referencing, a deconstruction, and only at the horizon of 
this dissolution (Lösung) or analysis can another reality be sketched: what is called 
an unconscious fantasy” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 63; cf., Freud, 1937b, pp. 257-269; my 
alterations).          
 Because the ‘the interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the 
unconscious activities of the mind’ (cf., Freud, 1900b, pp. 339-621) I shall explain it 
threw the ‘dream-work’ Laplanche’s definition of the psychoanalytic clinical method. 
The dream-work is a matter of deconstruction of the ‘unconscious fantasy’ (phantasy), a 
work of deconstruction. Only of deconstruction: nothing else; nothing more. In and 
through the dream-work nothing is produced except a deconstruction. This 
deconstruction of the unconscious fantasy is the psychoanalytic clinical method per se 
as Laplanche argues and this chapter will explain why: “First, to take things in their 
proper order, the question of [psychoanalytic clinical] method. For one should never 
stop stressing that what distinguishes this hitherto inaccessible domain [the 
unconscious] is a new method, a method of discovery and exploration. The domain of 
the unconscious is inseparable from the approach to it, something which already effects 
a break with all conceptions of a so-called ‘pre-Freudian unconscious’, which get stuck 
precisely on the question of method, either by simple positing the unconscious or by 
trying to divine it with some kind of soothsaying. The [psychoanalytic clinical] method 
is one of association and cross-referencing, a deconstruction, and only at the horizon of 
this dissolution (Lösung) or analysis can another reality be sketched: what is called an 
unconscious fantasy. There is no point-for-point correspondence, however, no analogy 
or similitude between the behavioral or conscious discursive sequence from which the 
associations start and the fragment of an unconscious sequence which can be outlined 
through cross-references. So much so that any method of a hermeneutic order –the 
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direct transposition or translation of one discourse into another, be that second discourse 
Jungian, Kleinian, Lacanian or even Freudian– is ruled out. Ultimately, the reciprocal 
implication of method and object consists in the fact that the former is not only adapted 
to the latter but oriented, magnetically attracted by it” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 63; my 
alterations).           
 I agree completely with Laplanche: the psychoanalytic clinical method is a 
deconstruction of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is 
because of this ‘magnetism’ that I defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (see 
above and my conclusion) integrating the theoretical models in his mind (as a 
‘secondary discourse’) but never as a ‘primary discourse’ as Laplanche argues. 
Theoretical models are hermeneutic because there is a meta-interpretation of the theory 
done by each analyst (and my literature review will be based entirely on this premise), 
but the interpretation of the unconscious manifestations is not hermeneutic exactly for 
the reasons above mentioned by Laplanche.       
 I will develop throughout my thesis this dynamic. It seems a paradox but it is not 
because as it is obvious from what I just said: Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical 
work (as all Freud’s ‘cases’ illustrated) and the best example of my statement is the 
“Interpretation of Dreams” (see below). I will establish the scientific accuracy or truth-
value interpretations in clinical work providing concrete examples (as I did in my 
introduction) of how the analyst deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of 
what theoretical model he embraces: the keynote here is always how the analyst’s mind 
work: by a permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of 
what the analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models. The Freudian heritage is this 
never-ending dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical 
method) in its essence. Freud is the first object relations theorist because object relations 
have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic thought (like Laplanche states; see above), 
as their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction: the theoretical meta-interpretations of 
Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) 
constitute all clinical dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. That is 
why I state in my literature review (see below) that all these authors follow Freud –
directly or indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist model 
unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. I state 
even more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the theorist 
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deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of psychoanalytic 
clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.      
 The ‘common ground’ that I argued in my introduction (and will be 
systematized in my literature review) is nothing more, as Wallerstein also recognizes (in 
my terminology; see above), than acknowledge that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic 
meta-interpretations that configures the form of our ‘secondary discourse’: they are all 
formalizations of the analyst’s psychic process present in the clinical session; that is 
why Bion’s Grid; Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they 
are the formalization of the analyst’s psychic process not as a primary discourse but as a 
secondary discourse: they are epistemological tools that have only one purpose: being 
deconstructed by the analyst’s mind (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) in the clinical 
session. That is why we call it a formalization of the psychic process: it is its form, not 
its content.           
 In this connection, and on the basis of my own clinical material, I will attempt to 
show (in my conclusion) how, against the background of the ‘implicit use of explicit 
theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’), an ongoing process of decision-making 
that is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction takes place in the analyst’s 
mind (the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’). In my analysis of a session, I introduce the 
concepts of theoretical reason and practical ‘reason’ (concepts that sow the theoretical 
prolegomena with the clinical/practical constructs), and contend that, whatever theories 
the analyst may have implicitly or explicitly in his mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’), they ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the 
‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary 
discourse’). Pursuing the same line of thought, I describe validation in the clinical 
context as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and linguistic co-
(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between patient and analyst (this is seen 
not only in the MPRP (Chapter 7) but also in the ‘The Ulm Psychoanalytic Process 
Research Study Group’; the later only referred briefly in my conclusion). This process 
includes mutual aspects of observation and of communicative and pragmatic validation. 
In conclusion, I suggest that the figure of the craftsman is an appropriate description of 
the analyst in this conception of his (deconstructive) work (Laplanche’s ‘primary 
discourse’), whatever the theory he may espouse (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’).                 
 Now I will just clarify the ambiguous term ‘Clinical Method’: at its broadest it 
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refers to whatever goes on between helper and complainer; at its narrowest, it names 
both the strategies of information-gathering required for a medical/clinical diagnosis 
and the didacticism involved in the teaching of such strategies to medical/clinical 
students. The ambiguity in question originates from the secular changes that have 
affected the historical epistemology of the medical language and the very 
conceptualization of the helper-complainer relationship.     
 Through more or less explicit norms most cultures regulate the interaction 
between those expressing physical or mental distress and those empowered as their 
helpers or curers. The cognitive organization and pragmatic enactment of the care 
response varies greatly from culture to culture. In some, the latter may need that the 
complaint be first identified and named (i.e. a ‘diagnosis’ made); in others, generic 
management routines can be triggered by the complaint itself regardless of its form. The 
‘information’ required for such identification can be obtained via observation and 
interrogation of the ailing subject (like in Western culture) or by other means such as 
divination, inspiration, etc. (as it was in the Babylonian culture). These varied responses 
reflect cultural beliefs concerning: a) the definition of ailment and what might cause it, 
and b) the extent of societal altruistic and philanthropic obligations.   
 The term ‘clinical method’, etymologically, means no more than ‘the ‘way to 
follow when at the bedside of a sufferer’. The word ‘clinical’ (from the Greek kliné 
=‘bed’) is relatively new having entered the English language only during the 17thC; 
the term ‘method’ (méthodos = pursuit, mode of searching) was incorporated into 
English a century earlier. When used in the singular, the term seems to imply that there 
is, or there can only be, one ‘standard’ tactic to gather, register, teach and implement 
clinical information. There is no good reason to believe this to be the case other than the 
since the 17th century the ‘clinical method’ became the privileged approach in Western 
medical epistemology.         
 It was only during the 19thC, particularly after the impact caused by Comtian 
positivism, that the term ‘clinical method’ was introduced in medicine specifically to 
name a set of social, analytical, therapeutic and propædeutic techniques. These practices 
did spread rapidly. By the end of the century even Freud had adopted them as the 
hidden epistemological structure but he abandoned it with the publication of the 
“Interpretation of Dreams” where he created the ‘psychoanalytic clinical method’ that I 
am referring to in this chapter. The key difference between the clinical method and the 
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psychoanalytic clinical method is that in the latter there is a never-ending deconstruction 
“work[ing] out the dissolution [Lösung] of the dream” (Freud, 1900, 2, in   
Studienausgabe, p. 280; my alteration); ‘the dream is the royal road to the unconscious’ 
and what is an absolute of the psychoanalytic clinical method is its deconstructive ‘way’ 
to ‘follow/explore/discover’ the unconscious fantasy (see above Laplanche) ‘when at 
the bedside (couch) of a sufferer’ is an analyst where “the reciprocal implication of 
method and object consists in the fact that the former is not only adapted to the latter but 
oriented, magnetically attracted by it” (Laplanche, ib.).     
 The clinical method is a ‘way to follow when at the bedside of a sufferer’ not by 
a deconstructing way of explore the unconscious fantasy but as a way of constructing 
nosological categorizations of how to explain the organic or conscious pathology. Only 
the psychoanalytic clinical method tries to understand (verstehen), not explain 
(erklären), the unconscious fantasies. That is why (following Freud’s own words; see 
below) the “Interpretation of Dreams” relate with the psychoanalytical practical/clinical 
constructs (hence the importance I give to it in elaborating an entire chapter on the 
foundational text of the psychoanalytic clinical method: the “Interpretation of Dreams”), 
meaning, as I above-mentioned, the “Interpretation of Dreams” is where Freud created 
the ‘psychoanalytic clinical method’: all psychoanalytic practical/clinical constructs are 
inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method created by Freud in the “Interpretation of 
Dreams”: the ‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) 
constitutes any analyst’s primary discourse: all the theorists that I schematize in my 
literature review constitute a secondary discourse regarding Freud’s psychoanalytic 
clinical method: the analyst’s primary discourse.            
 To conclude the ‘clinical method’ epistemological clarification I will just add 
that starting with Janet, Ribot, Dumas, etc., the clinical method adoption took place in 
the more conventional field of Clinical Psychology. Those attacking the so-called 
‘medical model’ as inappropriate for the conceptualization and management of mental 
complaints do not often realize that militant anti-psychiatrists share in the same model. 
This because, in conventional psychiatry, ‘medical model’ refers not the claim that 
mental disorders must all have ‘organic basis’ but to: a) the traditional linear form of 
cause-effect relationship and b) to the belief that the ‘clinical method’ is the only 
approach that can generates medical information.       
 The scientific, legal and ethical document generated by the clinical method is 
56 
 
called the ‘case history’. In terms of its rhetorical and epistemological power and 
structure, history shows that the ‘case history’ remains intriguingly similar to the ‘legal 
case’ and to others official (and more overtly disciplinarian documents) developed in 
the West to control the behavior of human beings (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997; see 
below Foucault, 1999).        
 Returning to the psychoanalytic clinical method and its never-ending 
deconstruction “work[ing] out the dissolution [Lösung] of the dream” (Freud, op. cit., p. 
280; my alteration) what Freud says of the dream-work is that its work consists solely in 
deconstructing, that its work produces nothing but a deconstruction. In the dream-work 
as such – though not in the constitution of what is given to it to be worked– the psyche 
functions solely as a deconstruction, carries out (below the level of consciousness) the 
work of deconstruction.         
 But what, then, gets deconstructed? Of what does the dream-work produce a 
deconstruction? Freud identify it again and again, names it in various formulations, 
various deconstructions, says, perhaps most directly, that the dream-work 
“accomplishes nothing else but deconstruction of the dream-thoughts [eine Übersetzung 
der Traumgedanken]” (Freud, 1900, p. 429). My source is “Sigmund Freud, Die 
Traumdeutung, vol. 2 of Studienausgabe” (ed. Fischer, 2000). Translations are my own, 
though I have consulted the translations by Joyce Crick (“The Interpretation of Dreams” 
[1999]) and by James Strachey (“The Interpretation of Dreams” [1953 in the Standard 
Edition]). In this chapter subsequent references to this work are given in the text 
according to the pagination of vol. 2 of the “Studienausgabe”.   
 Returning to the subject, this name already in effect says what is produced by the 
dream-thoughts, what they are deconstructed into –namely, the dream itself. Or rather, 
the dream-thoughts are deconstructed into what in other contexts, contexts other than 
that of psychoanalysis, one would commonly take as simply the dream itself. Thus, one 
would perhaps say –or at least wish to say– that the dream-thoughts are simply the 
thoughts underlying the dream. Yet if it is a matter of and not just of expression, the 
relation of the dream-thoughts to what they would thus underlie cannot be constituted 
by simple relocation or transposition, for deconstruction, as nearly all will attest, 
invariably produces distortion and loss in what is deconstructed, in what undergoes 
deconstruction.          
 This difference is what, on the one hand, allows Freud to: “work out the 
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dissolution [Lösung] of the dream” (Freud, op. cit., p. 280) in a new way while, on the 
other hand, endlessly ‘complicating’ that dissolution. No longer will it be a matter of 
deciphering the mere surface, or, rather, what is now recognized as being mere surface; 
merely interpreting as such the dream’s manifest content –which otherwise one would 
have taken as the dream itself– cannot suffice. For this content is (proves to be) only the 
result of a process of deconstruction of something else, of the dream-thoughts that 
underlie the dream-content and yet are concealed from the dreamer both in the course of 
dreaming and afterward when the dream is remembered. Thus distinguishing between 
the manifest content of the dream and the latent content, the underlying dream- 
thoughts, Freud identifies a task, the: “new task [one] that did not exist before” (Freud, 
ib.), that could not exist as long as one adhered to the surface of the dream without 
recognizing it as such, as long as one took the mere surface, the manifest content, to be 
the dream as such. The task is to investigate the relationship between the two distinctly 
posited levels, to trace (nachspüren) the processes (Vorgänge) by which the manifest 
content has come to be from the latent content.      
 The way in which Freud introduces his new (dis)solution tends initially to 
dissolve the very difference that makes it possible. He begins: “Dream-thoughts and 
dream-content lie before us [liegen vor uns] like two representations [Darstellungen] of 
the same content in two different languages” (Freud, ib.).     
 But -one will ask- do they both lie before us? And to whom is it that the ﬁrst-
person plural pronoun refers? Before whom (if before anyone) do they lie, both of them, 
so it seems, uniformly, both to the same degree? Certainly not before the dreamer, not 
even when, having awakened, he remembers the dream and perhaps narrates it. The 
dream-content may indeed lie before him, but the dream-thoughts definitely do not. 
They remain concealed as long as the psychoanalyst has not carried out an interpretation 
of the dream sufficient to reveal them. Before whom, then, do they lie revealed? 
Primarily before the psychoanalyst, though the associations carried out before him by 
the dreamer will typically have played an indispensable role in the interpretation of the 
dream. Many years later Freud reinforces this structure by distinguishing between two 
tasks (in l932 in his “Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die 
Psychoanalyse”, in vol. 1 of “Studienausgabe”, p. 453).     
 The first is the practical task carried out by means of dream interpretation 
(Traumdeutung): it consists in transforming (umwandeln) the manifest dream –Freud 
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calls it here the dream-text– into the latent dream-thoughts. The second task, the 
theoretical task, consists in explaining how in the dreamer –in his ‘Seelenleben’– the 
latent dream becomes the manifest dream: here, again, we see the linkage between the 
theoretical prolegomena (theoretical task) and the practical/clinical constructs (practical 
task) and how Freud posits the theoretical ‘task’ as a secondary discourse while the 
practical/clinical constructs (practical task) constitutes the primary discourse: once 
again, another evidence that psychoanalytic theory comes after the clinical work: 
psychoanalytic theory emerges from the clinical work; the secondary discourse emerges 
from the primary discourse.         
 It would seem that the second task must indeed be second, that is, subsequent to 
the practical/clinical task, which would first have exposed the depth, the underlying 
dream-thoughts, lying under the surface, under the manifest dream. Whatever 
theoretical anticipation might have been in play, the practical interpretation of dreams is 
what would first actually open up the space in which the theoretical task geared to the 
dream-work could commence.         
 Only through the interpretation of dreams does the theoretical work presented in 
“The Interpretation of Dreams” become possible. The question is whether the logic of 
this configuration can be other than simply circular, whether the practical task of 
interpreting dreams can proceed without presupposing what only the theoretical task can 
establish: the dream-work, which sustains the difference precisely by distorting the 
dream-thoughts into something quite other.       
 Even at this very general level it is a question of a ‘bi-logic’ (cf., Matte-Blanco, 
1956, 1975, 1981, 1988) and of ‘dissolution [Lösung]’ (cf., Laplanche, 1999, p. 63; cf., 
Freud, 1900, p. 280; cf., Freud, 1937b, pp. 257-269) that would negotiate the pertinent 
circularity in terms laid down by that bi-logic. At this level the bi-logic would be 
determined by the way in which the function of the dream-work within the theoretical-
practical configuration as a whole came to be (de)constructed. Yet it is a ‘bi-logic of the 
configuration’ (of the form: the analyst’s secondary discourse), not the ‘logic’ of the 
dream-work (of the content: the analyst’s primary discourse) proper (assuming that 
propriety can retain a determinate sense in reference to the dream-work).  
 One may put aside, then, all the complications posed by the supposition that 
dream-thoughts and dream-content lie before us. In reference to this passage, which 
orients the entire chapter on the dream-work, what is more to the point is to observe 
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how close Freud has already come to deconstructing both dream-thoughts and dream-
content as texts: he says that they are like representations of the same content in two 
different languages. Because they are like texts in different languages, one of them can 
be taken as a deconstruction of the other: “or better said, the dream-content looks to us 
like deconstruction [erscheint uns als eine Übertragung] of the dream-thoughts into 
another mode of expression” (Freud, 1900, p. 280).     
 Freud formulates the –presumably theoretical– task: “we are to get to know its 
signs and laws of grammatical construction” (Freud, ib.; here we find both Freud’s and 
Lacan’s secondary discourse). How are we (whoever the ‘we’ may be) to do so, to 
become familiar (kennenlernen) with the signs and the syntactical laws of the 
deconstruction? Again, it seems that both must to some degree lie before us; for Freud 
says explicitly that this familiarity with the signs and syntax of the deconstruction is to 
be acquired: “by comparing the original and the deconstruction [durch die Vergleichung 
von Original und Übersetzung]” (Freud, ib.).     
 In any case Freud insists that: “the dream-thoughts become understandable to us 
without further ado, as soon as we have learned these” (Freud, ib.). The point is that 
once one recognizes the manifest content as a deconstruction  and (by comparison with 
the dream-thoughts) becomes acquainted with its manner of construction, with the 
‘laws’ of deconstruction, then the dream-thoughts underlying that manifest content 
become understandable. In what does this becoming understandable without further ado 
(ohne weiteres verständlich) consist? Freud answers: “The dream-content is given, as it 
were, in a pictograph [Bilderschrift] whose signs are to be deconstructed individually 
into the language of the dream-thoughts” (Freud, ib.) as one would translate –Freud 
develops the example– a rebus. Once one knows how in general the deconstruction has 
come about, once one knows the ‘laws’ governing the deconstruction of the dream-
thoughts into the dream-content, then it will not be difﬁcult, beginning with a dream-
content, to counter-deconstruct it back into the dream-thoughts of which it is its own 
deconstruction. Everything will depend, then, on discovering the ‘laws’ governing the 
original deconstruction, that is, governing the deconstruction of the original. Yet one 
wonders whether this discovery can completely dispense with (or postpone until after its 
work is done) all counter-deconstructions. Can the circularity (which already has proven 
not to be simple) be so simply put aside?        
 This question of circularity, already posed by the difficulties arising from 
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Freud’s supposition that both the dream-thoughts and the dream-content ‘lie before us’, 
formulates in a hermeneutical (analyst’s secondary discourse) mode the same question 
that Derrida raises about the limit of the ‘metaphorical concept of deconstruction’. In 
“Freud and the Scene of Writing” Derrida writes: “Here again, the metaphorical concept 
of deconstruction (Übersetzung) or transcription (Umschrift) is dangerous, not because 
it refers to writing, but because it presupposes a text that would be already there, 
immobile, the serene presence of a statue, of a written stone or archive whose signified 
content might be harmlessly transported into the element of another language, that of 
the preconscious or the conscious” (Derrida, l967, pp. 312–313; my translation). It is 
exactly because of this danger of ‘transposition’ that Laplanche also refers to (see 
above), that my epistemological position throughout my entire doctoral Thesis is 
distinguishing what is the analyst’s primary discourse (that can only be deconstructive) 
and the analyst’s secondary discourse (that can only be hermeneutic/meta-interpretive).
 It is in the penultimate chapter of “The Interpretation of Dreams”, entitled 
simply “The Dream-work” that everything preceding is finally brought together into a 
‘definitive’ orientation. Afterward, in the final chapter, a transition is made to another 
level; Freud could hardly have marked this more clearly than he did at the outset of the 
final chapter where he contrasts the previous paths, which: “led us into the light” 
(Freud, op. cit., p. 490), with those on which he is about to venture and that, he 
confesses in advance: “lead into the dark” (Freud, ib.). Freud has especially in mind the 
schematic representation of the psyche as a whole that he is about to introduce and that 
governs much of the discourse of the final chapter. Following his reference to paths that 
‘lead into the dark’ he writes: “we will be obliged to put forth a set of new assumptions 
touching speculatively [mit Vermutungen streifen] on the structure of the psychic 
apparatus and the play of forces active in it, though we must take care not to spin them 
out too far beyond their first logical links, since otherwise their worth will vanish into 
uncertainty” (Freud, ib.; as we can see Freud is extremely cautious about his secondary 
discourse: he is ‘obliged’ to ‘speculate’).        
 In this sense, one can say that “The Interpretation of Dreams” culminates or is 
centered in the chapter on the dream-work. In this respect it mirrors the operative 
structure that it articulates; for that structure, differentiating between manifest and latent 
dream-content, is itself centered in the dream-work. The chapter “The Dream-work” is 
devoted to determining how the deconstruction of the dream-thoughts into the dream-
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content is carried out, to formulating the ‘laws’ or ‘principles’ that govern the 
deconstruction. In other words, Freud’s task is to distinguish and to describe the various 
forms of work, the modes (in my perspective the primary discourse and the secondary 
discourse; the latter Freud felt ‘obliged’ to do it giving epistemological legitimacy for 
what Laplanche argues) of working that, taken together, constitute the dream-work as 
such. Throughout the delimitation of these moments of the dream-work, there remains 
continuous tacit reference to the deconstructive character of the work carried out. 
Indeed, in the case of one moment, the work of displacement (Verschiebungsarbeit), the 
deconstructive character is so emphasized that a word deconstructed as deconstruction 
becomes a synonym for the proper name of the moment, hence, its dissolution 
(Lösung).          
 According to Freud’s account, the work of displacement is what brings it about 
that the dream is centered differently from the dream-thoughts. The value had by 
particular elements among the dream-thoughts is not retained in the dream-content; the 
most valuable elements among the dream-thoughts are stripped of their value, and their 
place is taken by other elements to which little value was attached at the level of the 
dream-thoughts. Thus, the work consists here in a displacement of the psychical 
intensity of the individual elements, as in Freud’s own dream of the botanical 
monograph in which the element of the dream-thoughts concerned with: “the 
complications and conflicts arising from obligations incurred by services between 
colleagues [is displaced into the element] botanical” (Freud, op. cit., pp. 183-189). 
 To designate this work, this moment of the dream-work, Freud uses two terms: 
Verschiebung (displacement) but also Übertragung, translatable as transference but 
equally as deconstruction. Freud’s way of expressing the consequence of such 
Übertragung gives further warrant for deconstructing the word as deconstruction: “as a 
consequence the difference between the texts [Textverschiedenheit] of the dream- 
content and the dream-thoughts appears” (Freud, op. cit., p. 307). Deconstructing them 
as texts, Freud is declaring that the difference between the dream-thoughts and the 
dream-content (indeed the very formation of the manifest dream in its difference from 
the latent content) is brought about by such deconstruction.      
 Yet, as he proceeds to delimit successively the individual moments of the dream-
work (condensation, displacement, regard for representability), Freud comes finally to 
the conclusion that in the dream-content there is one element, one kind of content, that 
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has no correlate in the dream-thoughts. This element occurs among those that, within 
the dream, are expressive of a certain criticism of the dream, of a certain resistance to its 
content. To be sure, Freud insists that most of the stirrings of criticism in which the 
dreamer is, for instance, astonished or annoyed by the dream or even recoils from its 
content derive from the dream-thoughts no less than does the dream-content to which 
these are reactions. Yet he grants that some critical responses within the dream cannot 
be so derived, have no correlate in the dream-thoughts. Freud cites a criticism that he 
says is quite often met with in dreams, a criticism that is no longer merely a mute, 
affective striving but that is expressed in the declaration ‘After all, it’s only a dream’. 
To explain such a case, Freud has recourse to the concept of the censor, to the 
supposition that a psychic censorship is decisively operative in dreams.   
 In “The Interpretation of Dreams” this supposition is axiomatic (as a ‘secondary 
discourse’); the operation is neither put into question nor analyzed in a thorough and 
rigorous manner. It is not insignificant that Freud introduces the notion of a censor 
behind dream-distortion by elaborating an analogy between such censorship and that 
operative in political situations, the censorship in face of which political writers can 
avoid having their words completely suppressed only if they speak allusively or conceal 
their objectionable views behind some disguise. Freud says: “The correspondence, 
traceable down to the last detail, between the phenomena of censorship and those of 
dream-distortion justifies us in assuming similar preconditions for both” (Freud, op. cit., 
p. 160).           
 One could say indeed that the notion of the censor is one of the primary axioms 
of Freud’s text, for even in those modes; the principal modes: condensation, 
displacement, regard for representability, in which the dream-work consists in 
deconstructing the dream-thoughts into dream-content, what prompts the 
deconstruction, what makes the dream-work necessary, is the operation of censorship. 
Because the dream-thoughts come under censor, they can enter consciousness as dream-
content only if, like the views of political writers in a situation of censorship, they are 
sufficiently disguised. They come to be disguised by being deconstructed into 
something different, as into another ‘language’. It is as if political writers were to 
publish their texts only deconstructing them into a language illegible to those in power, 
or at least, as such writers have always done, into a tale whose genuine intent remains 
illegible.           
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 In the case of the criticism expressed within the dream yet against the dream, the 
criticism expressed in the words ‘After all, it’s only a dream’, the role of the censor is 
not to prompt or require a deconstruction of the content but rather to intervene directly. 
Freud would have these words be the words of the censor, words uttered when, caught 
unaware, it is too late to suppress an objectionable content, to disguise it by the usual 
means, by translation. In such cases, something enters the dream that does not derive 
from the dream-thoughts. Thus, the dream-content proves not to consist solely of 
elements translated from the dream-thoughts. In such cases there will also be elements 
that derive from the direct intervention of the censor, something interjected to 
compensate for a lack of vigilance or, in any event, for some lack or other that otherwise 
would throw the economy of psychic censorship off balance: “There is no doubt that the 
censoring agency, whose influence we have so far recognized only in restrictions and 
omissions in the dream-content, is also responsible for interpolations and additions” 
(Freud, op. cit., p. 471). These products of what Freud calls secondary revision or 
reworking (die sekundäre Bearbeitung) display certain features, which he marks: they 
are not particularly vivid, are less easily retained by the memory, and are always to be 
found at points in the dream-content where they can function to link two pieces of 
dream-content. Most significantly, the purpose served by secondary revision is to fill 
the gaps in the structure of the dream: “The result of its labor is that the dream loses its 
appearance of absurdity and incoherence and approaches the pattern of an intelligible 
experience [dem Vorbilde eines verständlichen Erlebnisses]” (Freud, op. cit., pp. 471–
472).            
 Thus, in secondary revision the dream undergoes a very deep and thorough 
reworking by, as Freud describes it: “a psychic function that resembles waking thought” 
(Freud, op. cit., p. 472), by a function that in any case introduces into the dream the 
form and coherence demanded by waking thought. Or rather, more precisely, this 
function imposes form and coherence on what has been produced by the other three 
moments of the dream-work, the translational moments of condensation, displacement, 
and regard for representability. Though in “The Interpretation of Dreams” he refers 
explicitly to secondary revision as a part of the dream-work (dieses Stück der 
Traumarbeit) (cf., Freud, op. cit., p. 471), Freud will later qualify this assignment, 
remarking that, strictly speaking, secondary revision is not a part of the dream-work 
(this is noted by James Strachey in his translation of “The Interpretation of Dreams”, p. 
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528).            
 One could say of secondary revision: it belongs to the dream-work inasmuch as 
it contributes to the formation of the dream-content, but it is set apart from the other 
moments inasmuch as it does not translate dream-thoughts, does not deform them into 
dream-content, but rather imposes form on the deformed content. With its form, its 
coherence, restored, the dream seems to make sense, to have a meaning (einen Sinn zu 
haben) (cf., Freud, op. cit., p. 472). But this sense is not the sense -not even a sense-
belonging properly to the content of the dream; it is an imposed sense and is even, says 
Freud: “furthest removed from the actual sense of the dream” (Freud, op. cit., p. 472).
 There is reason to say that secondary revision institutes the logic of the dream-
work. But then one would be obliged to add that this logic is not properly the logic of 
the dream-work -whatever that logic might be, if there is such a logic- but only a logic 
that serves to conceal the absurdity and incoherence of the translation produced by the 
dream-work, by its (other) three moments. It would be the logic of the dream-work only 
as the logic of a single moment of the dream-work, of a moment that later will be said 
not to be, strictly speaking, a part of the dream-work. It is a logic of the dream-work 
that serves precisely to conceal the illogic of the dream-work.    
 In this regard the question of the logic of the dream-work is inseparable from the 
question of sense or meaning (Sinn). Here the word logic does not designate a discipline 
that would determine the ideal laws governing thought in various regards but rather 
those laws themselves, not in the form of laws but rather as they must be exempliﬁed by 
whatever becomes an object of thought. In other words, logic designates here the forms 
of connection that must be had by something, by some content, in order for it to be 
thought in some regard or other. In the case of the logic instituted in the dream-work 
through secondary revision, this regard has to do with meaning.   
 Whereas the translational moments of the dream-work give it the appearance of 
absurdity and incoherence, the logic instituted through secondary revision renders it 
intelligible or understandable (verständlich). But whatever is understandable is so 
precisely because it has a meaning, because it offers a meaning to understanding. 
Whereas the product of the translational moments has the appearance of absurdity and 
incoherence, of non-sense, whereas it displays an apparent illogic, the dream-content 
acquires, through secondary revision, forms of connection such that the dream comes to 
make sense, to have a meaning. And yet, it is a meaning that does not belong to this 
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content, an alien meaning that must be forced to adhere to it by the very force of 
censorship but that nonetheless remains: “furthest removed from the actual sense of the 
dream” (Freud, op. cit., p. 472). This logic of the dream-work is a false imposition, a 
false sense, a sham logic.         
 But can there be a false meaning otherwise than in contrast to a true meaning? 
Freud is conﬁdent that dreams have a meaning, one that properly belongs to them, that 
is true to them. After the critical survey with which “The Interpretation of Dreams” 
begins, Freud’s very ﬁrst move is to posit such meaning. As the title of his text 
indicates, the task he undertakes is: “to show that dreams are capable of an 
interpretation [Deutung]; [and, as he continues] to interpret a dream is to determine its 
‘meaning’” [heisst, seinen ‘Sinn’ angeben] (Freud, op. cit., p. 117). Freud’s very 
undertaking is linked to the supposition that beneath the dream there is meaning, that 
dreams are not ultimately non-sense. He gives every appearance of being conﬁdent that, 
as he says of certain absurd dreams that he discusses: “the absurdity of the dream-
content is only apparent [ein Anschein] and disappears as we go deeper into the 
meaning of the dream” (Freud, op. cit., p. 413).      
 And yet even to refer to the process of going deeper into the meaning of the 
dream is to grant that the meaning may not be revealed all at once, that it can be 
extended, articulated in depth, and that its various moments -the various dream-
thoughts- may be such as can be revealed only gradually. Indeed Freud grants that one 
always remains less than certain of having revealed all the dream-thoughts underlying a 
dream: “actually one is never certain of having completely interpreted a dream; even 
when the solution seems satisfying and without gaps, it remains always possible for a 
further meaning to announce itself through the same dream” (Freud, op. cit., p. 282). 
Thus, the meaning of a dream is open-ended; even if nothing whatsoever has indicated 
that it is outstanding, a further meaning can always come to light. No interpretation 
could ever be declared ﬁnished and in itself complete.     
 There are passages in which Freud goes beyond even this open-endedness of 
meaning. The most remote and yet severe and enigmatic limit to the interpretation of 
dreams is broached in two passages, both of which, though they are far apart in Freud’s 
text, refer to what he calls the navel of the dream. The ﬁrst passage is a note that Freud 
appends to his analysis of the dream of Irma’s injection. In this connection he writes of 
concealed meaning, of not having gone far enough in his interpretation of the dream to 
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follow all the hidden meaning (“um allem verborgenen Sinn zu folgen” [Freud, op. cit., 
p. 130]). Then he adds, generalizing: “Every dream has at least one place where it is 
unfathomable [unergründlich], the navel, as it were, by which it is connected to the 
unknown” [durch den er mit dem Unerkannten zusammenhängt] (Freud, ib.). One will 
want to ask: What is this navel of the dream? Yet one would ﬁrst have to determine -
even to make the question a possible question- that the navel is a what, an essence, a 
meaning, whereas this is precisely what remains questionable at this place where the 
dream is unfathomable and connected to the unknown. It is little wonder that Freud 
makes no attempt to say what this place is but instead has recourse to the ‘metaphorics’ 
of the navel.           
 The second of the two passages comes much later in Freud’s text, in the ﬁnal 
chapter where, as he acknowledges: “all paths lead into the dark” (Freud, op. cit., p. 
490). This passage extends the metaphors of the ﬁrst, compounding it with the ﬁgures of 
light and darkness: “The best-interpreted dreams often have a place that has to be left in 
the dark, because one notices in the course of interpretation that at this place a knot 
[ball, tangle: Knäue] arises, which refuses to be unraveled but which also offers no 
further contribution to the dream-content. This is, then, the navel of the dream and the 
place beneath which lies the unknown” (Freud, op. cit., p. 503). No matter how 
thoroughly interpreted, a dream may have a place of utter resistance, a tangle that 
cannot be unraveled, the threshold of the unknown and presumably unknowable. One 
wonders in what sense -whether still in the order of sense- this tangle: “offers no further 
contributions to the dream-content” (Freud, ib.). Is it only that, since the tangle cannot 
be unraveled, the meanings that it harbors cannot be revealed and thus shown to 
contribute, by way of the dream-work, to the dream-content?    
 Or is it that the tangle has nothing to offer to the dream-content, that it harbors 
no dream-thoughts that could be translated into dream-contents, that it is the place 
where meaning ceases so that what lies beneath it is unknowable by virtue of being 
anterior to the very order of meaning and understanding. Derrida puts the question 
succinctly: “one may wonder whether the in-soluble knot, the umbilicus, is of the stuff 
of sense [sens] or whether it remains radically heterogeneous, in its very secret, to 
signiﬁable sense, as well as to the signiﬁer, and one may also wonder whether what 
discourages the analyst, provisionally or deﬁnitively, is homogeneous or not with the 
space of analytic work, the work of interpretation (Deutungsarbeit)” (Derrida, 1996, p. 
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29; my translation).          
 This question of the limit of meaning, of the character of this limit, will return in 
another guise, from a direction that still has to be laid out. Yet, regardless of how it 
might be decided, even if it should prove quite undecidable, the question of the logic of 
the dream-work would remain unanswered, would remain in a sense -by its reduction to 
a question of sense- untouched. For just as the logic, the meaning, imposed by 
secondary revision is a logic apart from the dream-work and is in this respect a false 
meaning, a sham logic, so the meaning that would be revealed through the interpretation 
of dreams is situated at the limit of the dream-work, at a point where the dream-work 
has not yet commenced. For the meaning of a dream is nothing other than the 
underlying dream-thoughts, which in and through the dream-work come to be translated 
into the dream-content.         
 In other words, the meaning of the dream is what gets taken up by and into the 
dream-work and under the surveillance of censorship gets reworked -that is, distorted- 
into the dream-content. It is not the meaning -or, more precisely, the logic- of the 
dream-work as such. Anterior to the dream-work in the order of translation, the meaning 
of the dream is what gets translated, in distinction from the forms of connection that are 
produced in and through the dream-work and that would constitute its logic proper.  
 But if the logic of a content or process lies in the forms of connection that must 
be had by it in order for it to be thought in some regard or other, can one even suppose 
that there is a logic of the dream-work, since the work of the dream-work consists, not 
in instituting form and connection, but in deforming and disconnecting? In different 
terms, the question is whether there is some regard in which this deforming and 
disconnecting can be thought and, if so, what it is; for certainly these accomplishments 
of the dream-work cannot be thought as a coherent congeries of meaning.  
 One might attempt to determine the logic of the dream-work by following the 
directives that logic as a discipline traditionally followed. These directives prescribe 
attending to speech and to judgment; for it is in speech and in judgment that those forms 
that logic as a discipline would thematize occur concretely. Even if logic is, in the end, 
to determine the ideal laws governing speech and judgment, this priority would be 
reversed in the order of discovery. What about the speech and judgment carried out in 
the dream-work? Do these offer access to the logic of the dream-work?   
 Freud considers the case of dreams that contain speech, dreams in which the 
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speech is distinct from thought. In these cases, he insists: “the rule holds without 
exception that the dream-speech derives from the remembered speech of the dream-
material” (Freud, op. cit., p. 304). The words spoken may be retained intact or they may 
be slightly altered, and in either instance their sense is likely to be changed. Thus, the 
dream-work itself issues in no speech at all but at most deforms the meanings of words 
taken over from the dream-material. As Freud writes: “The dream-work is also 
incapable of newly creating speech” (Freud, op. cit., p. 406). In this sense there is no 
speech of the dream-work but only its deforming of the speech taken over from the 
dream-material. Freud insists that analysis in this regard always shows the same thing: 
that the dream-work takes up mere fragments of speech and deals with them quite 
arbitrarily (willkürlich), at least in ways that, measured against the speech as it was, 
appear quite arbitrary.         
 The dream-work is no more capable of judgment than it is of speech. In this 
connection Freud is even more emphatic: “A moment in the dream that appears to be an 
activity of the function of judgment is not to be taken as an act of thinking 
[Denkleistung] on the part of the dream-work [der Traumarbeit]; rather, it belongs to the 
material of the dream-thoughts and has passed from there as a ready-made structure into 
the manifest dream-content” (Freud, op. cit., p. 430). Thus, within the translational 
dream-work itself -as distinct from what, in very different ways, is given to it by the 
underlying dream-thoughts and by secondary revision- there is indigenously neither 
speech nor judgment. The traditional directives that the logical forms are to be sought in 
speech and judgment provide no aid in gaining access to the logic of the dream-work.
 Indeed, if one considers what Freud says directly about the relation of the 
dream-work to logic, one may well wonder whether there is in any sense -or even 
beyond sense- a logic of the dream-work. For Freud depicts the dream-work primarily 
as undoing the logic that, anterior to the dream-work, lies in the connections between 
the dream-thoughts. It would seem that in the dream-work itself, prior to the onset of 
secondary revision, there is no logic but only the illogic that secondary revision then 
covers up with its facade of form and coherence.      
 For this depiction Freud sets the stage by declaring that between the individual 
parts of the complicated structure of the dream-thoughts there are the most various 
logical relations. Next comes the scene of the dream-work: “Then, when the entire mass 
of these dream-thoughts is submitted to the pressure of the dream-work, and the pieces 
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are turned about, broken up, and pushed up against one another, rather like surging ice-
ﬂoes, the question arises: what has become of the bonds of logic that had previously 
given the structure its form […] [and] without which we can understand neither 
propositions nor speech?” (Freud, op. cit., p. 310).      
 Freud offers an initial answer, one that is still provisional: “one must initially 
[zunächst] answer that the dream has no means at its disposal for representing these 
logical relations among the dream-thoughts. For the most part it disregards all these 
prepositions and takes over only the factual content [den sachlichen Inhalt] of the 
dream-thoughts to work upon. It is left to the interpretation of the dream to reestablish 
the connections that the dream-work has destroyed” (Freud, op. cit., pp. 310–311). The 
dream-work -so this initial answer goes- dismantles the logical structure of the dream-
thoughts; it leaves the dream-material largely: “divested of its [logical] relations” 
(Freud, op. cit., p. 335).         
 Yet this is only an initial, provisional answer. While continuing to maintain that 
the dream-work undoes the logical relations of the dream-material, Freud grants, on the 
other hand, that the dream-work can take a certain account of particular logical relations 
by means of certain modes of representation. Freud compares the process to that of 
painters, who, unable to make use of speech in painting and unwilling to have recourse 
to scrolls issuing from the mouths of painted ﬁgures, found distinctively painterly 
means for expressing -for instance, through gestures- the intention of the words spoken 
by the ﬁgures. Thus, the dream-work renders logical connection as such by means of 
simultaneity, concentrating all the pieces of the dream-thoughts in a representation of a 
single situation or event. Freud compares such representation to that of the painter 
(Raffaelo) who assembles all the philosophers and poets in a single painting (The 
School of Athens). Spatial proximity, in dreams as in painting, can serve to represent 
signiﬁcant relations of another order, whether the order of logical relations or that of an 
intellectual and artistic legacy.        
 The dream-work also carries out such representation with respect to speciﬁc 
logical connections. For instance, causal relations between things thought in the dream-
thoughts can be represented in the dream-work by presenting the cause or condition as 
an introductory dream and then the effect or conditioned as the main dream. Another 
method of representing causal relations is by actually transforming one image (the 
cause) into another (the effect). Freud concludes: “in both cases causation is represented 
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by succession [Nacheinander], in the ﬁrst case by one dream following another, in the 
second by the immediate transformation of one image into another” (Freud, op. cit., p. 
314).            
 The dream-work is less effective in representing alternation (‘either…or’). The 
alternatives are represented either as options having equal rights or by the division of 
the dream into two halves. But what Freud ﬁnds most striking -and what indeed has the 
most far-reaching consequences- is the way in which the dream-work represents the 
category of opposition and contradiction (die Kategorie von Gegensatzund 
Widerspruch): “This is simply disregarded. To the dream ‘No’ seems not to exist. In 
particular, it prefers to draw opposites together into a unity or to represent them as one” 
(Freud, op. cit., p. 316). A similar means is used -more effectively, in Freud’s judgment-
to represent similarity, congruence, having features in common; this is represented by 
concentration, by drawing together into a unity whatever is thus related.   
 In the last chapter of “The Interpretation of Dreams”, Freud returns to the 
question of how the dream-work takes up the logical relations that connect the dream-
thoughts. In raising this question again, his primary intention is to explain what happens 
to these logical relations, to explain this happening in terms of the theoretical 
representation of the psyche that he introduces at this ﬁnal, very different stage of his 
investigation. His explanation is based on the concept of regression: regression occurs 
in psychic activity when, instead of moving toward the motor end of the system, an 
excitation moves toward the sensory end and ﬁnally reaches the system of perceptions. 
Instead of a motor response to the excitation, the response is hallucinatory, as in the 
case of dreams, which, Freud insists: “have a regressive character” (Freud, op. cit., p. 
518).            
 It is because of this regressive character that logical relations get lost, because 
such relations lie beyond the circuit of regression. But what in this discussion is most 
important for the question of the logic of the dream-work is the forcefulness with which 
-despite all that he has said about how the dream manages certain sorts of 
representations of logical relations- Freud reafﬁrms the loss of these relations and the 
difﬁculty with which they are represented. Here is Freud’s statement: “If we regard the 
process of dreaming as a regression within our hypothetical psychical apparatus, this 
explains without further ado the empirically established fact that all the logical relations 
between the dream-thoughts are lost in the course of the dream-work or are expressed 
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only with difﬁculty […]. In the course of regression the structure [Gefüge] of the 
dream-thoughts is dissolved into its raw material” (Freud, op. cit., p. 519).  
 And yet, a trace of that structure remains in the guise of the representations that 
the dream-work forms of the logical categories, that it forms precisely in deforming 
these categories (as noted earlier, Freud uses the word ‘Kategorie’ in reference to the 
logical relations of opposition and contradiction). What exactly is involved in this 
deforming–forming through which the categories are lost but a kind of representation of 
them remains in place of them? In virtually every case that Freud describes, the 
representation that comes to replace a category is a representation of a spatial or 
temporal relation.          
 Thus, logical connections in general, says Freud, come to be represented by 
simultaneity or spatial proximity. It is likewise with the representations of speciﬁc 
logical relations. Causal relations are represented by separating cause from effect in the 
form of the temporal sequence of an introductory dream followed by a main dream; or 
such a relation can be represented by transforming one image (cause) into the other 
(effect), that is, as temporal succession and spatial coincidence. Two equal portions in 
temporal succession can represent alternation. And both similarity and 
opposition/contradiction are represented by spatiotemporal concentration.  
 Hence, in each case something corresponding to the category comes, by way of 
the dream-work, to take the place of the category and, as it were, to function in its stead. 
This representative of the category is not just an image that would somehow exemplify 
it but rather is a schema by which in each case the image, the dream-material, is given a 
spatiotemporal ordering that corresponds to the pertinent category. Here it would not be 
inappropriate to speak of categorical or transcendental determinations of space/time, 
that is, of determinations that are of the same order as Kant’s transcendental schemata 
(cf., Kant, 1781/1956).          
 Thus, what the dream-work accomplishes with respect to the logical categories 
is precisely a schematizing; for each logical connection in the dream-thoughts, the 
dream-work substitutes a corresponding schema. If, in reference to the history of 
philosophy, one considers the enormity of the difference between concept and schema 
(the relation between concept and schema goes back, by a very complicated route, to the 
difference that comes brieﬂy into view at the center of Plato’s “Timaeus”, the difference 
between the intelligible εδη and the χω´ρα; cf., Plato, 1961), then it is not surprising that 
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Freud -without regarding that history, indeed on quite different grounds- declares that 
logical connections can be thus represented ‘only with difﬁculty’.   
 Thus, the logic of the dream-work is a schematized logic, a logic of schemata, of 
spatiotemporal determinations corresponding to the various logical categories. Yet if 
measured by traditional philosophical logic or by what Freud often calls waking 
thought, this logic of schemata cannot but appear to be contaminated by illogic. To 
mark its divergence, one could call it an exorbitant logic, a logic outside the orbit of the 
philosophical logic rooted in ancient ontology. It is exorbitant in that it is a logic that 
tolerates and even institutes the effacement of difference, as in the schema of causality, 
which can produce the transformation of one image into another different from it, a 
transformation of one into the other as if they were not different but mutually 
substitutable. This logic is perhaps even more exorbitant -or rather, exorbitant in a way 
that is paradigmatic of this exorbitancy as such- in the case of the schema provided for 
opposition and contradiction (Gegensatz und Widerspruch).    
 Freud says that this logical connection ‘is simply disregarded’ by the dream-
work, for which ‘«No» seems not to exist’. In the stronger case, that of contradiction, 
Freud’s point is that the necessity -prescribed by philosophical logic- of rejecting one or 
the other of two contradictory terms is simply disregarded, that the ‘No’ that 
philosophical logic would require be said to one or the other term seems not to exist for 
the dream-work. Rather, the schematizing of contradiction consists in carrying out what 
philosophical logic could never -absolutely never- tolerate: it draws the contradictory 
terms together into a unity, lets them be together, holds them together, in their very 
contradictoriness. If measured by the logic of philosophy or of waking thought, with 
this schema, whose effects will spread throughout, the logic of the dream-work becomes 
virtually indistinguishable from illogic. Freud writes: “Everything we have called the 
‘dream-work’ appears to be so remote from the psychical processes we know to be 
correct, that the harshest judgment passed by our authors on the low psychical 
performance of dreaming cannot fail to seem perfectly right and proper” (Freud, op. cit., 
563).            
 Indeed, if contradictory opposites are retained side by side, yoked together in a 
unity in which they remain nonetheless contradictorily opposed, then, by the usual 
standards, the very possibility of truth is undermined, the fundamental law of thought 
and discourse, the so-called law of non-contradiction, is violated. One could say that the 
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dream-work is attached by its logic -most notably by its schema of contradiction- to a 
point where, by the standards of philosophical logic and waking thought, truth ceases, 
breaks off no less decisively than meaning breaks off at that place in the dream-thoughts 
that Freud calls the navel of the dream. The dream-work, too, so it seems, has its navel.
 The peculiarities of the logic of the dream-work can be seen taking shape almost 
from the beginning of “The Interpretation of Dreams”. Following his analysis of the 
dream -his own dream- of Irma’s injection, which is the ﬁrst dream treated in Freud’s 
text, he notes that there are intrinsic inconsistencies operative. He says that the 
‘explanations of Irma’s illness’ -that is, the various moments of the explanation as a 
whole as it emerges from the analysis: “which concur in exonerating me [of blame for 
her illness] are not consistent with one another but on the contrary are mutually 
exclusive [schliessen einander aus]” (Freud, op. cit., p. 138). Freud draws a comparison 
with: “the defense offered by the man accused by his neighbor of returning a kettle to 
him in a damaged condition: in the ﬁrst place the kettle was not damaged at all, in the 
second it already had a hole in it when he borrowed it, and in the third he had never 
borrowed a kettle from his neighbor” (Freud, op. cit., pp. 138–139).   
 This ‘kettle logic’, as Derrida calls it (cf., Derrida, 1996, p. 19), exempliﬁes the 
logic of the dream-work. It is likewise with that found in what Freud calls the 
embarrassment-dream of being naked. In such dreams one thing that is essential is: “the 
embarrassing sensation of shame, of wanting to hide one’s nakedness, usually by 
mobility, and of being unable to do so […]. [One the other hand] the people in whose 
presence one feels ashamed are almost always strangers, their faces left indeﬁnite; […] 
[most signiﬁcantly] these people are indifferent […]. [Hence the contradiction]: 
Between them the shame and embarrassment of the dreamer and the indifference of the 
other people produce a contradiction of the kind that often occurs in dreams. After all, 
the only thing appropriate to the dreamer’s feeling would be for the strangers to gaze at 
him with astonishment and laugh at him, or be indignant at the sight” (Derrida, 1996, p. 
248). Here, then, there is a logic that yokes contradictory opposites together in the 
dream. Here, again, the exorbitant logic of the dream-work is operative.   
 Almost at the end of “The Interpretation of Dreams”, Freud returns to this 
theme: “Thoughts contradicting each other do not aim to cancel each other out, but 
persist side by side, often combining as if there were no contradiction into products of 
condensation, or they form compromises which we would never forgive our logical 
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thinking for committing” (Freud, op. cit., p. 566). Again, an exorbitant logic, a logic 
that borders on being indistinguishable from illogic: such is the logic of the dream-
work. With the dream-thoughts, however, it is quite otherwise. Freud insists that, prior 
to their being submitted to the dream-work, the dream-thoughts have a rational form: 
Freud’s phrase is: “die vorher rationell gebildeten Traumgedanken” (Freud, op. cit., p. 
566). More often he characterizes the dream-thoughts as ‘korrekt’. Here is the most 
explicit passage, which occurs near the end of Freud’s text: “Thus we cannot deny the 
insight that two essentially different psychical processes play a part in forming dreams; 
the one creates perfectly correct [korrekt] dream-thoughts, just as valid [gleichwertig] as 
normal thinking; the other treats these in a highly disconcerting, incorrect way” (Freud, 
op. cit., p. 567).          
 The latter Freud then identiﬁes as the genuine or proper dream-work (die 
eigentliche Traumarbeit), which he declares has been separated off or isolated 
(abgesondert). What is most remarkable in this regard is the relation that Freud proposes 
between the dream-thoughts and phantasy (Phantasie). Referring to Scherner’s view, 
which he had discussed in the initial chapter of “The Interpretation of Dreams”, Freud 
writes: “It is not that the dream forms phantasy, but that the unconscious activity of 
phantasy has the greatest share in the formation of the dream-thoughts” (Freud, op. cit., 
p. 562). Most remarkably indeed, Freud is declaring that the dream-thoughts, which are 
rationally formed, correct, and as valid as normal thinking, are for the most part the 
product of phantasy. But Phantasie is just one of the names given to what more 
generally is called imagination. The dream-thoughts are for the most part formed by 
imagination, by an unconscious activity of imagination.     
 In conclusion of this chapter I argue that the question is whether imagination, 
thus operative in forming the dream-thoughts, can be kept out of the dream-work. A 
passage in which Freud is discussing the various modes of representation that the 
dream-work has at its disposal suggests otherwise. In this passage he considers the 
creation of the composite formations that often give dreams their fantastic character (ein 
phantastisches Gepräge). He writes: “The psychical process of forming composites 
[Mischbildung] in a dream is clearly the same as when, while awake, we represent or 
depict before us [uns vorstellen oder nachbilden] a centaur or a dragon” (Freud, op. cit., 
p. 321). But this process, admitted into the dream-work, is just the process of phantasy, 
of imagination. It would seem, then, that the dream-work is perhaps less thoroughly 
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separated off than Freud would like, that the limit that would separate the dream-
thoughts from the dream-work is more fragile, more unstable, than one would have 
supposed, which, in my perspective, is nothing more, than the ‘primary discourse’ of the 























                              Theoretical Prolegomena: a ‘secondary discourse’                                   
       Review of psychoanalytic literature 
As I said in the previous chapter the psychoanalytic clinical method is a 
deconstruction of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is 
because of this ‘magnetism’ that I defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (see 
above and my conclusion) integrating the theoretical models in his mind (as a 
‘secondary discourse’) but never as a ‘primary discourse’ as Laplanche argues. 
Theoretical models are hermeneutic because there is a meta-interpretation of the theory 
done by each analyst (and this literature review will be based entirely on this premise), 
but the interpretation of the unconscious manifestations is not hermeneutic exactly for 
the reasons above mentioned by Laplanche.       
 I will develop throughout my Thesis this dynamic. It seems a paradox but it is 
not because as it is obvious from what I just said in the previous chapters: 
Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work (as all Freud’s ‘cases’ illustrated) and 
the best example of my statement is “The Interpretation of Dreams” (see above). In this 
literature review I will establish the scientific accuracy or truth-value interpretations in 
clinical work providing concrete examples (as I did in my Introduction) of how the 
analyst deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of what theoretical model he 
embraces: the keynote here is always how the analyst’s mind work: by a permanent 
deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the analyst meta-
interprets: the theoretical models. The Freudian heritage is this never-ending dissolution 
(Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) in its essence. I 
will argue that Freud is the first object relations theorist because object relations have, 
like all other schools of psychoanalytic thought (like Laplanche states; see above), as 
their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction: the theoretical meta-interpretations of 
Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) 
constitute all clinical dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. That is 
why I state in this literature review that all these authors follow Freud –directly or 
indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist model unified 
exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. I state even 
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more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs 
Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical 
method: once again, the deconstruction.      
 As I said in my Introduction (but now will be developed in detail) the ‘renewed’ 
(cf., Wallerstein, 1988c; Cooper, 1991; Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b) interest in the 
hermeneutic approaches towards the ‘conflicting psychoanalytic theories’ looking for a 
‘common epistemological ground’ (cf., Wallerstein, 1988b, 1988c, 1990) can be 
accounted for by two factors: on the one hand a reformulation of psychoanalysis in the 
context of heuristic developments in the philosophy of science, inspired largely by the 
publication in 1962 of Kuhn’s “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, and often 
referred to as ‘post empiricist philosophy and history of science’ (cf., Hesse, 1980); and 
on the other hand the imposing presence of a multiplicity of conflicting psychoanalytic 
theories: these are the main reasons why I am elaborating my review of psychoanalytic 
literature from a introductory hermeneutical standpoint. Not doing so will put me, after 
Kuhn’s discoveries, in a position of ‘epistemological naivety’.   
 The most vehement attack on psychoanalytic hermeneutics has been carried out 
by Adolph Grünbaum (1984). Therefore before I continue with this stream of thought I 
will just ‘deconstruct’ Grünbaum’s now famous ‘Tally Argument’, which constitutes 
the essence of the above mentioned ‘epistemological attack’ and doing so I clarify what 
psychoanalytic epistemology is.      
 Accordingly, among those who believe that psychoanalysis is not science is the 
philosopher Karl Popper (hermeneuticists like Ricoeur, Habermas and Gadamer have 
‘different’ views; see below). Popper holds that the demarcation criterion that separates 
science from logic, myth, religion, metaphysics, etc. is that all scientific theories can be 
falsified by empirical tests –that is, a scientific theory rules out some class of events, 
and if one of those events occurs, then the theory is declared false. According to Popper, 
psychoanalysis does not meet the falsification criterion because it does not rule out any 
class of events. Because it explains everything, it explains nothing.  
 Adolf Grünbaum disagrees with Popper. Grünbaum believes that Freud meant 
his theory to be scientific, that he made falsifiable predictions, and that those predictions 
proved false. For example, Freud’s Master Proposition, also known as the Necessary 
Condition Thesis (NCT) is that only psychoanalysis can produce a durable cure of a 
psychoneurosis. This is a strong statement that could be falsified if, for example, 
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another form of therapy such as behaviour therapy cured someone of a neurosis, or even 
if spontaneous remission occurred. We now know that neurosis yields to both of these 
alternatives. Therefore, Grünbaum concludes that psychoanalysis, being false, is ‘bad 
science’.           
 Adolf Grünbaum contends that he has discovered in Freud’s writings a hitherto 
overlooked thesis (the Tally Argument), enunciated by Freud to underwrite his 
psychoanalytic method of clinical investigation (cf., Grünbaum, 1984, pp. 127-172). He 
claims that until at least 1917, and possibly up to 1926, Freud invoked the unique 
efficacy of analytic therapy to vindicate the Freudian theory of personality, including 
the specific aetiologies of the psychoneuroses and the general theory of psychosexual 
development (cf., Grünbaum, op. cit., pp. 140-141).     
 In this meta-critic my critic over Grünbaum’s critic I shall argue (i) that the Tally 
Argument itself is defective, and (ii) that Freud did not invoke it as Grünbaum claims. In 
short, I shall argue that Grünbaum’s Tally Argument thesis is untenable and, as a 
corollary, that his depiction of Freud as a ‘sophisticated scientific methodologist’ is 
misconceived.         
 Grünbaum contends that the Tally Argument provides the philosophical 
justification for virtually all of Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts. But, in fact, the 
Argument bears mainly on the idea of the unconscious. Its implications for that other 
great pillar of psychoanalysis, the theory of infantile sexuality, are, at best, indirect. 
Significantly, Freud’s ideas about the beginnings of sexual life figure only marginally in 
Grünbaum’s analysis. His focus on the unconscious to the neglect of infantile sexuality 
makes his treatment of Freud very unlike the critiques of Frank Sulloway (1992) and 
Jeffrey Masson (1984, 1991), in which Freud’s notions about the sexual lives of 
children are always the centre of attention, while the unconscious is largely ignored.
 The clinical defence of psychoanalysis suffers one great philosophical weakness: 
the possibility that information gathered from patients under analysis cannot be trusted. 
For some critics that information is unreliable because the sample on which it rests 
(persons who seek analysis) is unrepresentative. But a far weightier objection –and the 
one to which virtually all of Grünbaum’s attention is devoted– is that analytic patients 
are victims of suggestion. The interpretations that emerge in analysis, critics charge, are 
compromised by the analyst’s theoretical expectations. Far too often, the patient simply 
tells the analyst what the analyst wants to hear. Because information from the couch is 
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so hopelessly tainted, it cannot be considered ‘probative’.    
 Freud’s lecture on “Analytic Therapy” (1917c) provides what is for Grünbaum 
the most considered methodological defence of psychoanalysis ever written. This is the 
so-called Tally Argument, in which Freud “brilliantly, albeit unsuccessfully, came to 
grips with the full dimensions of the mortal challenge of suggestibility” (Grünbaum, op. 
cit., p. 135).          
 Grünbaum returns to the crucial passage over and over in his writings, and one 
can fairly say that his entire philosophical critique of psychoanalysis ultimately depends 
on his reading of it. The passage exhibits the sweet reasonableness so characteristic of 
Freud’s expository works, in which he shows a masterly skill at anticipating his 
listeners’ objections: “But you will now tell me that, no matter whether we call the 
motive force of our analysis transference or suggestion, there is a risk that the 
influencing of our patient may make the objective certainty of our findings doubtful. 
What is advantageous to our therapy is damaging to our researches. This is the objection 
that is most often raised against psycho-analysis, and it must be admitted that, though it 
is groundless, it cannot be rejected as unreasonable. If it were justified, psycho-analysis 
would be nothing more than a particularly well-disguised and particularly effective form 
of suggestive treatment and we should have to attach little weight to all that it tells us 
about what influences our lives, the dynamics of the mind or the unconscious. That is 
what our opponents believe; and in especial they think that we have «talked» the 
patients into everything relating to the importance of sexual experiences –or even into 
those experiences themselves– after such notions have grown up in our own depraved 
imagination. These accusations are contradicted more easily by an appeal to experience 
than by the help of theory. Anyone who has himself carried out psycho-analysis will 
have been able to convince himself on countless occasions that it is impossible to make 
suggestions to a patient in that way. The doctor has no difficulty, of course, in making 
him a supporter of some particular theory and in thus making him share some possible 
error of his own. In this respect the patient is behaving like anyone else –like a pupil– 
but this only affects his intelligence, not his illness. After all, his conflicts will only be 
successfully solved and his resistances overcome if the anticipatory ideas he is given 
tally with what is real in him. Whatever in the doctor’s conjectures is an inaccurate drop 
out in the course of analysis; it has to be withdrawn and replaced by something more 
correct” (Freud, 1917c, p. 452).      
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 Grünbaum of course dubs this the Tally Argument after the crucial verb in the 
penultimate sentence: the patient’s difficulties will be solved (his neurosis cured) only if 
the analyst’s interpretations ‘tally with what is real in him’. The passage, Grünbaum 
writes, contains Freud’s “cardinal epistemological defence of the psychoanalytic 
method of clinical investigation and testing, a pivotal vindication whose import had 
gone completely unnoticed in the literature, as far as I know, until I called attention to 
its significance in two recent papers” (Grünbaum, ib.).   
 Grünbaum proceeds to ‘tease out’ and give more precise philosophical 
expression to the assumptions of the Tally Argument (cf., Grünbaum, 1987, p. 221). In 
essence, Grünbaum suggests, the Argument involves two propositions, whose 
‘conjunction’ (cf., Grünbaum, 1984, p. 139) he calls the Necessary Condition Thesis, or 
NCT. The first proposition is that psychoanalysis alone provides insight into the 
unconscious causes of the patient’s illness: “Only the psychoanalytic method of 
interpretation and treatment can yield or mediate to the patient correct insight into the 
unconscious pathogens of his psychoneurosis” (Grünbaum, ib.). The second proposition 
is that such insight is essential to the patient’s cure: “The analysand’s correct insight 
into the aetiology of his affliction and into the unconscious dynamics of his character is, 
in turn, causally necessary for the therapeutic conquest of his neurosis” (Grünbaum, op. 
cit., pp. 139-140).           
 Simply put, the truth of Freud’s ideas is guaranteed by the success of his 
therapy: his theories are validated by the fact that patients are cured. (Freud does not, be 
it noted, claim that analysis always results in cures; more modestly, according to 
Grünbaum, Freud says that analytic insight is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of 
therapeutic success).          
 The Tally Argument protects analytic interpretations from the charge of 
suggestion because only if those interpretations are true, the Argument asserts, will the 
patient get well. Interpretations that do not reflect the patient’s reality will not result in 
cures and, Freud asserts optimistically, will in fact wither away as the analysis proceeds. 
Grünbaum adds that just as individual cures assure Freud of the correctness of particular 
interpretations, so the cumulative therapeutic successes of analysis guarantee its general 
ideas: “Collectively, the successful outcomes of analyses… constitute cogent evidence 
for all that general psychoanalytic theory tells us about the influences of the 
unconscious dynamics of the mind on our lives” (Grünbaum, op. cit., p. 140).   
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 The Tally Argument, in Grünbaum’s ‘construction’, has two further 
implications, although Freud expressly mentions neither. Both involve empirical 
matters, and, as one might expect, they contain the seeds of the Argument’s downfall. 
The first is that the Argument implicitly rules out the possibility of spontaneous 
remissions –cures that happen without any kind of professional intervention. This 
conclusion follows logically from the Necessary Condition Thesis, which asserts that 
only analysis can provide the insights needed to affect a cure: spontaneous remissions, 
whatever their cause, are not produced by the insights of analysts. By the same logic, 
the Tally Argument commits Freud to the belief that analysis is therapeutically superior 
to all rival psychiatric methods, none of which, in Freud’s view, delivers insight into the 
repressed causes of neurosis –the sine qua non of therapeutic success, according to the 
Necessary Condition Thesis. Thus the twin spectres of spontaneous remission and rival 
cures hang like threatening empirical clouds over the Tally defence. If neurotics get well 
without psychiatric help, or if they get well through the ministrations of a non-Freudian 
therapist, then the Tally defence collapses.      
 Grünbaum ignores certain obvious objections to this promotion of the Tally 
Argument. More than once he expresses surprise that no one before him seems to have 
recognized the Argument’s significance. But, of course, this neglect could simply mean 
that the Argument possesses neither the cogency nor, more important, the centrality in 
Freud’s thinking that Grünbaum claims for it. After all, Grünbaum’s entire case comes 
down to his reading of a single sentence in the vast Freudian corpus, and that sentence 
occurs in what Freud himself regarded as a piece of popular writing –a kind of haute 
vulgarisation– in which he presented his ideas to a non-analytic audience.  
 If the Argument were as fundamental to Freud’s thinking as Grünbaum says, 
Freud might have been expected to follow his normal practice of making it the subject 
of a technical paper or monograph. At the very least, he presumably would have offered 
a more systematic and extended discussion of its logic, rather than contenting himself 
with a single, terse sentence embedded in the middle of a university lecture (and 
introduced almost offhandedly with ‘after all’). One cannot escape the impression that 
Grünbaum has seized on a relatively casual remark and blown it up into a major 
intellectual event –making a philosophical mountain out of an expository molehill.
 Ironically, Grünbaum finds one of the earliest invocations of the Tally defence in 
Freud’s 1896 paper on “The Aetiology of Hysteria” –the very paper that Jeffrey Masson 
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celebrates as “Freud’s most brilliant” because it contains his boldest assertion of the 
seduction theory (cf., Masson, 1984, p. 18). The irony, of course, is that therapeutic 
success is here made to testify on behalf of an idea Freud would repudiate a year and a 
half later in the most controversial intellectual about-face of his career. Nonetheless, 
Grünbaum detects the Tally Argument at work in Freud’s claim, in “The Aetiology of 
Hysteria”, that the seduction hypothesis had been “confirmed” therapeutically: “If you 
submit my assertion that the aetiology of hysteria lies in sexual life to the strictest 
examination, you will find that it is supported by the fact that in some eighteen cases of 
hysteria I have been able to discover this connection in every single symptom, and, 
where the circumstances allowed, to confirm it by therapeutic success” (Freud, 1896c, 
p. 199).         
 Grünbaum also maintains that the collapse of the seduction theory did not lessen 
Freud’s confidence in the Tally Argument. Nor, in Grünbaum’s opinion, should it have. 
To be sure, if Freud’s hysterical patients had actually been cured by being given false 
insights into childhood events (seductions) that never occurred, the Necessary Condition 
Thesis would have been “strongly disconfirmed” (Grünbaum, op. cit., p. 159). But 
Grünbaum infers –rather generously– that Freud must have come to regard at least some 
of those cures as bogus, perhaps because the patients in question suffered relapses. In 
support of this inference Grünbaum cites the famous renunciation letter of September 
21, 1897, in which Freud points to therapeutic disappointment as a major reason for his 
loss of confidence in the seduction theory: Freud speaks of: “the absence of the 
complete successes on which I had counted” (Freud, 1897b, p. 264).    
 Thus, far from discrediting the Tally defence, the abandonment of the seduction 
hypothesis implies that Freud continued to rely on the assumption that cures are the 
guarantor of truth: he gave up the hypothesis precisely because of therapeutic failures. 
The seduction debacle, Grünbaum concludes: “provides no basis for judging Freud to 
have been intellectually dishonest when he explicitly enunciated NCT in 1909(c) [the 
“Little Hans” case] and 1917(c) [the “Analytic Therapy” lecture]” (Grünbaum, ib.). But, 
one could object, while Freud may not have been dishonest, he was surely imprudent. 
Having confidently asserted in 1896 that therapeutic success confirmed his seduction 
hypothesis only to conclude the following year that at least some of those successes 
were bogus, Freud might sensibly have decided not to place so much trust in the 
evidence of cures. Certainly the experience ought to have made him leery about 
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invoking cures as testimony to the correctness of his views, and nowadays epistemology 
and psychoanalytic epistemology must be aware of this ‘clinical traps’ that promote, as 
we saw above, erroneous, even than legitimate, interpretations.    
 I will now return to my own ‘interpretation’ of psychoanalytic epistemology: in 
the context of psychoanalytic hermeneutics the main concern is how to facilitate 
dialogue and consensus among the conflicting psychoanalytic theories even if they 
unfold ‘secondary discourses’. From my epistemological perspective, Object Relations 
School, following ‘directly or indirectly’ Freud (see below: Alford, 2000), constitutes 
the most cogent school of thought among these conflicting psychoanalytic theories. 
 This position is taken because I was trained and practice clinically with a 
Kleinian/Bionian orientation; and the renewed interest in psychoanalytic hermeneutics 
thus bears directly on the need of contemporary theoreticians and clinicians to deal with 
the absence of a unified psychoanalytic theory, and because the theories conflict we 
have to clinically choose one as a ‘primary discourse’ (see above; cf., Gedo and 
Goldberg, 1973; Schwaber, 1987), but I am aware theoretically of the others: from a 
‘secondary discourse’ standpoint.         
 First I must clarify what is ‘object relations school’; as Hinshelwood posits: “the 
term ‘object-relation’ surreptitiously creeps up on the reader of Klein. It eventually gave 
rise to a whole strand of psychoanalytic theory, centred especially within the British 
Psychoanalytical Society. The lack of precise definition has been important because it 
has given free license for multiple uses of the term” (Hinshelwood, 1989a, p. 367).  
 Object Relations School includes a number of different theoretical points of 
view, and generally indicates those “British analysts who focus primarily on the state 
and character of the objects. It is to be contrasted with the Classical or Ego-Psychology 
School, which focuses more on the instinctual impulses that make up the energy of the 
interest” (Hinshelwood, ib.).        
 Object Relations School includes Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Balint particularly 
and in general the so-called ‘Independent Group’ (cf., Sutherland, 1980, pp. 829-860; 
Kohon, 1985; Hinshelwood, 1989a) of the British Psychoanalytical Society: “what they 
have in common is a tendency to ignore the ‘economic’ aspects of instinctual energy 
that distinguish them from the ego-psychologists. Klein was marked out as different by 
her acceptance of the death drive” (Hinshelwood, op. cit., pp. 367-368). There are two 
strands in the British Psychoanalytical Society: “the Fairbairnian framework which 
84 
 
categorically states that man is not pleasure-seeking at all, but object-seeking (see 
below); various intermediate positions –two-factor theories (Eagle, 1984) combining an 
emphasis on objects with an instinct theory. All these derive their inspiration from 
Klein” (Hinshelwood, op. cit., p. 368; our alteration).   
 However, there are many British analysts who would claim that Klein is not 
truly part of the Object Relations School (e.g., Kohon, 1985): “[many British analysts] 
reserve the term “[Object Relations School] for Fairbairn, Balint and Winnicott” 
(Hinshelwood, ib.; our alterations; cf., Sutherland, 1980, pp. 829-860). 
 Guntrip (Fairbairn’s disciple and analysand), for instance, in promoting 
Fairbairn, drew a particular map of progress in psychoanalytic theory in the ‘last fifty 
years’. It reaches out along a dimension starting with Freud’s scientific neurology, 
towards a psychological theory, whole and uncontaminated by biology (cf., Guntrip, 
1971). Guntrip’s ‘map’ was also described by Greenberg and Mitchell as the contrast 
between a ‘drive/structure model’ and a ‘relational/structure model’ (cf., Greenberg and 
Mitchell, 1983).         
 Kohon (1985) has suggested redrawing Guntrip’s ‘map’ along a dimension in 
which the tension in Freud’s approach between a scientific biology of the mind and a 
literary and humanistic psychology became divided, after the dispersion from Vienna, 
into a tension between American and British psychoanalysis characterized by British 
analysts developing a theory which: “concerns itself with the relation of the subject to 
his object, not with the relationship between the subject and the object, which is an 
interpersonal relationship” (Kohon, 1985, p. 27).      
 After this epistemological clarification I will now posit my psychoanalytic 
review schematization. My reflection will begin articulating, with detail, Freud with 
Object Relations School, because I argue, following Alford (2000), that there is a 
epistemological continuum between Freud and ‘a part of’ Object Relations School: I 
posit ‘Freud as the first object relation theorist’ (cf., Alford, 2000).   
 In this framework I will illustrate Lacan’s main scientific constructs and, 
inherently, Foucault’s and Bataille’s philosophical contributions towards Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic theory. Then I will return to the ‘other part’ of the Object Relations 
School: the theorists ‘independent’ from Freud’s epistemological continuum giving 
special attention to Fairbairn, the ‘Kleinian followers’ and inherently Bion, who will be 
profusely developed; I will approach these authors with more detail because of their 
85 
 
theoretical and clinical relevance.        
 The conclusion of my literature review will be a meta-psychoanalytic (Grotstein, 
2000) bi-logical (Matte-Blanco, 1956, 1975, 1981, 1988) perspective as a unifying 
conceptualization transversal to all psychoanalytic models where the “extension in the 
domain of myth” (Bion, 1963, p. 11) will be deeply developed. I emphasize, once 
again, that all of these models unfold not a simple and unified ‘common ground’ but 
effective ‘secondary discourses’ because, as above mentioned many times, 
psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work.    
 Indeed, to illustrate this assertion I will establish, in this literature review, 
the scientific accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing 
concrete examples (as I did in my introduction) of how the analyst deconstructs the 
clinical phenomena independently of what theoretical model he embraces: the 
keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary 
discourse’): by a permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological 
deconstruction of what the analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models.  The 
Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending dissolution 
(Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) in its 
essence (cf., Laplanche, op. cit.). Freud is the first object relations theorist because 
object relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic thought, as their 
‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction (like Laplanche states; cf., Laplanche, op. 
cit.): the theoretical meta-interpretations of Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco 
and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; cf., Laplanche, op. cit.) constitute 
all clinical dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why 
I state in this literature review that all these authors follow Freud –directly or 
indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist model 
unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. I 
state even more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the 
theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of 
psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.  
 Returning to the subject, I take this epistemological position (extend the domain 
of myth) because it is my perspective that the unconscious constitutes the ‘mental 
envelope’ of our phylogeny development and as Freud (1913k) and Darwin (1859, 
1872) argued: ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’. This ‘theory of recapitulation’, also 
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called the ‘biogenetic law’ or ‘embryological parallelism’ is often expressed in the 
above mentioned ‘law’ (cf., Gould, 2002; Gilbert, 2006). I prefer to address it as an 
epistemological regularity rather than a ‘law’.       
 This construct was put forward by Étienne Serres in 1824-26 as what became 
known as the ‘Meckel-Serres Law’. In 1866, the German zoologist Ernst Haeckel 
published “The History of Creation”, where he proposed that the embryonic 
development of an individual organism (its ontogeny) followed the same path as the 
evolutionary history of its species (its phylogeny), but Darwin in chapter thirteen of his 
seminal “Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of 
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life” (1859) already exposed what we can call the 
prolegomena of Haeckel’s conceptualization (cf., Gould, 1977, 2002).  
 Obviously I am aware of modern day science perspectives about this subject 
(Desmond & Moore, 1991; Hodge & Radick, 2003), but Gould’s first book “Ontogeny 
and  Phylogeny” about the ‘polemic’ allocates ‘it’ in the right terms when he begins by 
declaring that many medical professionals still believe, privately and informally, that 
there is ‘something in’ the notion (cf., Gould, 1977).     
 My perspective is not biological, but rather a psychological developmental 
evolutionary one, which was expressed in a heuristic metaphor by Frank Sulloway as 
‘Freud, Biologist of the Mind’ when he published his book in 1992 entitled precisely 
“Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend”.     
 Accordingly, I posit that our unconscious is a ‘mental envelope’ written ab 
initio with mythological letters (cf., Rank, 1909, 1912, 1998; Freud, 1913k; 
Abraham, 1909; Jung, 1969a, 1969b, 1970c, 1970d; Anzieu, 1966; Bion, 1963, 1970, 
1974, 1992) steering, as I said, into Grotstein’s (1981b, 2000) epistemological meta-
psychoanalytic syncretism and Matte-Blanco’s bi-logical (1956, 1975, 1988) meta-
theory; Lacan’s (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 93-100, pp. 101-124, pp. 237-322, pp. 401-
436, pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, pp. 765-790, pp. 793-827, pp. 829-850, pp. 855-877; 
1967-68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 1969-70; 1970; 1972-73; 1973; 1974-75; 1975a; 
1975-76; 1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-78b, pp. 548-556) algebraic structures will be 
illustrated as a ‘epistemological counterpart’ to Matte-Blanco’s bi-logic; I conclude 
my psychoanalytic review with Kernberg’s (1993b) insights towards the 
psychoanalytic status quo regarding a unified clinic epistemology unfolding all the 
major ‘secondary discourses’ inherent to ‘it’.      
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 I will now briefly approach some hermeneutic perspectives as an 
epistemological introductory reflection of my psychoanalytic review as I said above.
 Roy Schafer has offered what is probably the most straightforward use of the 
term. In his discussion of narration in psychoanalysis he writes: “What has been 
presented here amounts to a hermeneutic version of psychoanalysis. In this version, 
psychoanalysis is an interpretive discipline rather than a natural science. It deals in 
language and equivalents of language. Interpretations are re-descriptions or retellings of 
action along the lines peculiar to psychoanalytic interest…The facts are what the analyst 
makes them out to be: they are a function of the specifically psychoanalytic questions 
that guide this narration project, and these questions implement the narrative strategies 
that are favoured by the analyst’s own presuppositions, however un-systematized these 
might be” (Schafer, 1983, pp. 255-256).      
 For Schafer, the description of psychoanalysis as hermeneutic means that 
psychoanalytic activity is essentially interpretive and that the psychoanalyst is always 
interpreting according to a particular narrative structure or strategy (cf., Schafer, 1985, 
1990). The analysand’s story is retold psychoanalytically –as a story in which the 
emphasis now falls on: “infantile or archaic modes of sexual and aggressive action…but 
also as defensive measures adopted…to disguise…the actions in question” (Schafer, 
1983, pp. 223-224).          
 While Schafer points out that there are other psychoanalytic narratives structures 
than his own, which is a rather classical Freudian perspective as modified by his own 
action-language theory, he keeps the emphasis on the fact that psychoanalysis, as 
hermeneutic, involves the formulation of a second or alternate narrative to that of the 
analysand.           
 In employing the term hermeneutic in the context of their discussion of 
competing psychoanalytic models, Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) shift the emphasis 
from alternate –psycho-analytic– narrative to competing psychoanalytic narratives. 
Relying on the formulations of Thomas Kuhn (1962, 1977), they view the different 
psychoanalytic theories as inherently different models of mind that ultimately derive 
from different views of human nature. Thus of ‘their’ two major models they write: 
“The drive model and the relational model embody fundamentally different visions of 
human nature, and the theories of technique which have developed from them are 
similarly divergent in their basic premises” (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 388).  
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 In this context psychoanalysis is a discipline that interprets clinical data in 
accordance with a particular model or theory, and hermeneutic functions as an adjective 
to describe the ultimate, foundational quality of a particular model. Thus they write of 
Freud’s model: “The drive/structure model, like other models, by positing a clearly 
defined hermeneutic system, directs our attention to certain aspects of a situation and 
away from others” (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 43).    
 Finally, Levenson states rather sharply: “I find it hard to imagine how 
psychoanalysis cannot be hermeneutical. Hermeneutics being, by definition, the study 
of interpretation, we are all, like it or not, involved in an hermeneutical undertaking” 
(Levenson, 1988, p. 6). He then expands on the actually diverse meanings of this term 
in psychoanalytic writings: a canonical use by which the ‘data’ are interpreted according 
to a given interpretive scheme, a creative use in which canonical truth is superseded by 
narrative truth, and finally a deconstructive use in which the quest for final truth or 
interpretation is abandoned. The three authors just cited exhibit differing versions of the 
sense of hermeneutics in contemporary psychoanalysis.     
 Schafer’s is the most straightforward: psychoanalysis involves the substitution of 
the patient’s manifest narrative with a second narrative that will offer a more 
productive understanding than the first. Schafer may be seen as representing a bridge 
between the traditional (as a social science) hermeneutic and the newer (as dealing with 
incommensurable discourses in any field) hermeneutic. While he is clearly engaging the 
old (traditional) argument that psychoanalysis belongs to the humanities rather than the 
natural sciences, his emphasis on an alternate narrative leads naturally to the 
consideration that there may be more than one alternate psychoanalytic narrative: 
‘secondary discourses’, obviously .        
 The other two examples are fully in the scope of the newer hermeneutic (see 
above): Greenberg and Mitchell emphasize the critical point that there may be more 
than one alternative narrative, that different theoretical positions impose different 
narratives; Levenson with his deconstructive use of hermeneutics suggests a further 
extension of this progression: not one narrative, and not a choice between narratives, but 
rather a proliferation of narratives. Examples can be found of a persistent use of 
hermeneutics in the older sense, that is, to emphasize the humanistic status of 
psychoanalysis (cf., Stolorow and Atwood, 1984; Rubovits-Seitz, 1986; Freeman, 
1989).            
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 The examples cited here, however, point to the never understanding of 
hermeneutics (i.e., hermeneutics as a way of dealing with incommensurable discourses 
in any field) as having less to do with the science-humanities conflict than with the 
conflict of competing psychoanalytic models of mind.     
 What then of background to this interest in a psychoanalytic hermeneutic 
perspective? In a word, this interest reflects a breakdown in ‘recent’ years of any sense 
of a unified psychoanalytic theory. Whatever consensus existed in the past as to there 
being a single, general psychoanalytic theory, which could be subjected to the usual 
canons of scientific verification and be evaluated as to its veracity, has been exploded 
by the proliferation of general theories or models. Since none of these has been able 
to command the allegiance of the profession as a whole, the result has been an active 
discussion of competing theories –both expositions of the various points of view as well 
as discussion of how one should handle a multiplicity of points of view (cf., Gedo and 
Goldberg, 1973; Bornstein, 1984; Pine, 1985, 1990; Pulver, 1987; Rothstein, 1985; 
Michels, 1988).          
  Such discussion of alternative interpretive schemata is inherently hermeneutic, 
whether that term is used or not. In the preceding paragraphs I have pointed to actual 
usage of the term. It may now be useful to indicate examples of the kind of discussion 
that I am calling psychoanalytic hermeneutic in its essence but in which the term is not 
employed.           
 There was a journal issue of Psychoanalytic Inquiry (Pulver, 1987), entitled 
“How Theory Shapes Technique: Perspectives on a Clinical Study”, that offers a 
brilliant example of the discussion of competing models. The journal issue consists of 
the presentation of clinical material by an analyst (Martin Silverman, 1987), discussion 
of the material by a variety of other analysts chosen specifically because of their 
different theoretical persuasions, and an admirable effort by the issue editor (Sydney 
Pulver) and other discussants to make sense of the conflicting discussions. 
 What is most striking to the reader of these papers is the great diversity of 
opinion concerning both the dynamics and handling of Silverman’s case; as Shane 
summarizes: “In summary, I would say that the diversity of opinions regarding the 
diagnosis and dynamics of Silverman’s patient would suggest that one’s theoretical 
stance takes precedence over other considerations” (Shane, 1987, p. 205).  
 The influence of the theoretical stance is so strong that it affects the very 
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perception of what is going on in the consulting room, leading Pulver to conclude: 
“Facts, per se, do not exist. The very idea of what constitutes data and is thus worth 
recording is determined by the analyst’s theoretical bent” (Pulver, 1987, p. 292).  
 The summarizing papers do attempt to discern what the widely diverging 
discussants in fact share in common, and they offer various ways to approach the 
obvious divergence. I will make allusion only to Schwaber’s sophisticated, and, in 
effect, psychoanalytic hermeneutic recognition that the consequence of a 
multiplicity of models is not chaos and capriciousness; that the clinician is involved 
in a dialectical process of having to choose a model while at the same time trying 
both to remain aware of the effect of this model on one’s perception (‘secondary 
discourse’) and to remain open to having the model corrected by the patient 
(‘primary discourse’): “I argue, rather, for our recognition that no matter what theory 
we espouse, we run the risk of using it to foreclose rather than to continue inquiry, to 
provide an answer rather than to raise a new question. I speak for a search for ways to 
sharpen our attunement to hear new cues from the patient that may tell us that we have, 
even if unwittingly, superimposed our views and used our theory to justify it” 
(Schwaber, 1987, p. 274).         
 My final example, and also the conclusion of my introductory hermeneutic 
perspective, is the effort to confront the multiplicity of theories that was offered several 
years ago by Gedo and Goldberg (1973) in their “Models of Mind”. They argue that 
none of the existing unified models take adequate account of the ‘genetic’ point of view; 
in other words, that the phenomena to be accounted for at the different developmental 
stages are so different that any particular theory of the mind will give short shrift to one 
or another stage.          
 They then ‘resolve the problem’ of multiple models by tying particular theories 
and models to the different developmental periods. Specifically, they find Freud’s 
reflex-arc model (Chapter VII of “The Interpretation of Dreams”: cf., Freud, 1900b, pp. 
339-621) appropriate to psychic functioning at the beginning of life and his topographic 
and tripartite models (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243; 1920a, pp. 7-64; 1923c, pp. 12-
59) appropriate to psychic functioning at the point of full structuration. Throughout my 
review I will follow Gedo and Goldberg’s epistemological stream of thought, but 
with my own perspective of interpreting each ‘model of mind’ as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ as I have been defending since the beginning of this dissertation, that is,  
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to minimize any confusion caused by the current away of theories I will illustrate in 
the conclusion of my review the developmental contributions of those authors who 
have had a major impact on the field or who have offered a fairly systematized 
theory of object relations development as I started to do in my Introduction, but, 
as above mentioned, and, once again, to be absolutely clear: if the ten shared 
characteristics of what Kernberg (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b, 2001a; see my 
Introduction) calls the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’; the five shared 
characteristics of what he calls the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ 
current; and the fourteen shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘French 
psychoanalytic approach’ –alongside with the above two– don’t constitute new 
integrations, not as a simple ‘common ground’, but as promoting valid 
hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of an effective 
‘secondary discourse’ (cf., Laplanche, op. cit.), I don’t know how one can say that 
psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work.    
 Because I think, as above mentioned many times, that psychoanalytic 
theory comes after clinical work in this Thesis I will establish the scientific 
accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing concrete 
examples (as I did in my Introduction and I am doing in this literature review) of 
how the analyst deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of what 
theoretical model he embraces: the keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s 
mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; cf., Laplanche, op. cit.): by a 
permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the 
analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models.     
 Accordingly, returning to the subject, I will develop Freud’s model of mind, 
articulating it with other psychoanalytic and philosophical perspectives. As I said, I will 
argue that Freud is the first object relation theorist, and because of that reason I will 
posit ‘part of’ Object Relations School as an epistemological continuum of Freud’s 
work.           
 Freud’s topographic model was conceptualized in two topics (‘topus’, in Greek, 
means ‘place’ or ‘space’): the first topic was formulated in the “Three essays on the 
theory of sexuality” (1905b), but Freud in his famous letter on 15th October 1897 to 
Fliess (cf., Freud, 1897c) already wrote in detail about this thematic; the second topic 
was formulated in 1923 with “The ego and the Id”, but the death drive (‘thanatos’, in 
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Greek, means ‘death’), central to this ‘big reformulation of the twenties’, was 
introduced in 1920 with “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”: “The place where all things 
are generated is the same one where they must be destroyed according to necessity; 
because they must pay penance and be judged by their injustice according to the order 
of time” (Anaximander, VI  BC., in Nietzsche, 1903, p. 78).    
 This aphorism could represent the first conceptual abstraction that was 
formulated in relation to what we term today (in the psychoanalytic community) as the 
death drive (cf., infra). It is considered the oldest aphorism in the Western world 
proffered by Anaximander, six centuries before Christ. I use Nietzsche’s translation, 
because: “Nietzsche [is] the other philosopher [the first is Schopenhauer] whose 
premonitions and insights agree in the most amazing manner with the laborious results 
of psychoanalysis” (cf., Freud, 1925j, pp. 7-70; my alterations).   
 I will articulate Freud’s epistemological standpoint with regard to the death drive 
with its revised reading grid presented by Object Relations School. Fred Alford is (one 
of) the object relation theorists that reformulated the death drive juxtaposing the 
theoretical framework with its clinical applications. My theoretical ‘choice’ falls, as a 
‘secondary discourse’, on Alford because this author, in the context of illustrating the 
epistemological continuum between Freud and ‘a part of’ Object Relations School, is 
one of the most objective and heuristic.       
 Taking this epistemological position I also steer into Freud’s harbour that the 
fundamental concepts of Psychoanalysis are: ‘Oedipus Complex; Sexuality; Repression 
and Resistance’ and ‘those who don’t accept them should not consider themselves as 
psychoanalysts’ (cf., Freud, 1923a, pp. 235-254). The intent of this reflection is to 
analyze and delineate the basic elements of Freud’s death drive theory in relation to the 
ideas proposed by Alford and some fecund observations by James Grotstein, whom I 
will develop further later on as I said.        
 First I will begin with the origin of the death drive, as well as how it came to be 
represented in ‘non-being’ configurations: “silence, sleep, night and death, the eternal 
peace of non-being, the total cessation of stimulation –these too are dimensions of 
thanatos, dimensions that come frighteningly close to eros” (Alford, 2000, p. 63). 
Alford presents the ‘human-non-being’ in the above four mythological categories 
because: “in Greek mythology, ‘Thanatos’ is the twin brother of Hypnos, sleep” 
(Alford, ib.).            
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 In this sense, the ‘death drive’ represents the part of the human that is the ‘non-
being’ (the world of ‘thanatos’): this is not an abstract definition but an inner reality 
where: “the fear and I were born as twin brothers” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 311). Twin 
brothers constitute the semantic container for a mental concept.    
 This mental concept becomes an embodied conception only when it is contained 
by the ‘psychoanalytic envelope’ (cf., Merleau-Ponty, 1945) created and termed by 
Freud as ‘Trieb’: “By drive (Trieb), one cannot designate anything other than the 
psychic representation that flows continuously, in contradiction to the stimulation 
produced by external and sporadic excitations. Therefore, the drive is a demarcation 
concept between the psychic and the somatic” (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243; my 
alteration).          
 The twin brothers, ‘Eros’ and ‘Thanatos’, are: “mythological beings, very 
powerful in their imprecision” (cf., Freud, 1933a, pp. 5-182). Alford explains the 
epistemological reformulations present in the drive theory, which Freud calls: “our own 
mythology” (cf., Freud, ib.). Alford shows that: “it was not until ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’ that Freud explicitly posited an independent aggressive drive, derived from 
the ‘Todestrieb’, against which Freud set ‘Eros’, which assimilates all that strives 
towards life, including the self-preservative instincts” (Alford, op. cit., p. 63). 
 As I said, Freud published his “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” in 1920, a time 
during which he was developing major reformulations in his on-going theory. Alford 
states that: “Freud’s concept of the Todestrieb, introduced in ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’ has always been controversial (…). For this reason most analysts who hold to 
the concept of instinctual drives distinguish between libidinal and aggressive drives, 
while ignoring or rejecting the metaphysics of the Todestrieb, Freud’s postulation of a 
drive to be dead, an aspiration to deadness” (Alford, op. cit., pp. 62-63). In Freud’s 
words: “The goal of all life is death and, looking back, the non-alive existed before the 
alive” (cf., Freud, 1920a, pp. 7-64). Freud’s concept of ‘non-alive’ serves as the 
metaphysical shell for Alford’s concept of ‘non-being’: “The earliest state is inorganic 
being” (Alford, op. cit., p. 65).        
 Heidegger conceptualizes an equal essence of the ‘non-being’: “origin signifies 
something from which and by which something is what it is, and how it is. For what it is 
(being) how it is, we call its essence. The origin of something is the source of its 
essence” (Heidegger, 1954, p. 78). The Heideggerian essence tries to represent the 
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Freudian existence (cf., Binswanger, 1926). From Heidegger’s perspective, the: “being-
in-possibility [constitutes itself as] being-for-death” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 101). 
 From Freud’s standpoint, we have to live our existence, our life, in order to live 
our death, our essence: “seen in this light, the theoretical importance of the instincts of 
self-preservation, of self-assertion and of mastery greatly diminishes. They are 
component instincts whose function is to assure that the organism shall follow its own 
path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence 
other than those which are immanent in the organism itself” (cf., Freud, ib.).  
 Alford argues that: “we fight and kill each other not because violence is 
satisfying, but in order to be left alone to die in our own time” (Alford, op. cit., p. 65). 
In this sense, Sartre’s aphorism: “Man is condemned to be free” (Sartre, 1943, p. 505)  
is truthful in that our freedom is our freedom to die in our own time. From this inner 
freedom in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud extrapolates to external freedom in 
“Civilization and its Discontents” published 10 years later: “Here the evidence of the 
Todestrieb is historical, not psychological (…). Freud says several times, aggression 
sounds much like sexual satisfaction. He compares the use of others for sexual purposes 
with their use as objects of aggression. Homo homini lupus, man is the wolf to man, 
and he is running loose all over the world” (Alford, ib.; my bold).   
 “Homo homini lupus” (Hobbes, op. cit., p. 390) is the aphorism that Thomas 
Hobbes coined to illustrate human nature. Hobbes calls his masterpiece The Monster 
(«Leviathan»), meaning State, because he believes that this Monster dilutes the 
superegos of all the: “supermen Zarathustra” (Nietzsche, 1883-85, p. 12) promoting the 
State as the only mean of restraining the aggressive drive inherent to individuals who 
are in a permanent: “war of all against all” (Hobbes, ib.).     
 For the first time the dynamic between the human/superego and the 
Monster/State (State as a projection of the unconscious: the inner monster) was foreseen 
and allowed Freud to pursue his psychodynamic investigations in understanding why 
man is the wolf of man, but because, at the moment, I am developing a historic narrative 
(‘Civilization and its Discontents’[1930b]), we must keep in mind that: “its 
characteristic of the human society to not be a whole, but to be just a part of what we 
could be” (Rawls, 1971, p. 127), whether this outlet is psychological, internal or 
external, man continues to be driven towards achieving this sense of communion. This 
leads us to the first element (silence) present in Fred Alford’s object relations’ theory.
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 The force with which society imposes suppression onto the superego appears 
outwardly accepted and adapted to but it is unconsciously resisted. This resistance rears 
its consequences externally or internally and sometimes both. The former compromises 
societal freedom and the latter, individual freedom; because man seeks freedom he is 
therefore ‘condemned’, at the cost to himself and/or those with whom he lives bringing 
us to the rampant chaos existent in society.      
 Freud’s speculation in the end of “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (cf., Freud, 
1920a, pp. 7-64), where he states that a primary destructive drive can be 
psychoanalytically (in silence) detected in Plato’s “Symposium” (apparently a paradox 
as Plato’s “Symposium” illustrates seven ‘versions’ of the definition of love, none 
which imply hate or any destructive drive; cf., Guthrie, 1975) is articulated with 
Alford’s solution which is that: “If aggression run rampant over the world is the theme 
of ‘Civilization and its Discontents’, the solution is to turn aggression inward. This 
turning inward has nothing to do with the inward-turning of ‘thanatos’. Instead, 
aggression turned inward is the source of the superego, conscious release of all the 
aggression one would have liked to have unleashed on their father and others, turned 
back against the self. Here is the discontent in civilization, the price of a world of 
peaceful wolves, each wolf doing perpetual violence to itself in order not to violate 
those it loves or must live with” (Alford, op. cit., p. 65).     
 From the psychological perspective, it is clear that the four categories of the 
non-being (silence, sleep, night and death: the world of ‘thanatos’) are diluted in what 
we call ‘civilization’: “Civilization is aggression turned back against the self (that is, 
conscious), the alternative to the war of all against all. Superego or super-state: these are 
the choices we live with. Any other choice is to die” (Alford, ib.). Due to the species 
propensity to strive towards a death in its own time, ‘thanatos’ must fight for its 
existence. When this space is threatened or impinged upon, it is defended aggressively. 
This aggression is uncontained and is found lurking in the darkest corners of society and 
the human psyche.          
 Alford explains this aggression as the dissolution of boundaries (sleep), the 
second essential element of his theory. In order to fully capture this position, let us 
consider Dante awakening Beatrice, depicting: “absolute fusion” (Dante, 1472/1555, p. 
34): the same fusion that Alford describes when he refers to the dissolution of 
boundaries and distinctions so that separateness no longer exists and fusion and chaos 
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ensue. Fusion as dissolution of distinctions can be seen also in: “Stevenson’s «Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde»; Oscar Wilde’s «Dorian Grays’s Portrait»; Edgar Poe’s «William 
Wilson»; Mary Shelley’s «Frankenstein», and Conrad’s «Secret Sharer»” (Rank, 1914, 
p. 55): “When boundaries disappear, thanatos comes into possession of every other 
drive, especially eros: that of having an object, not just an aim” (Alford, ib.). Here is 
precisely where ‘thanatos’ obtains its space to exist, by attaching itself to an object. It is 
in this regard that Alford refers to Freud as being the first object relations’ theorist.    
 From this perspective the world of ‘thanatos’, the world of silence, sleep, night, 
and death (the world of ‘thanatos’) is a world of darkness which is enlightened by a 
dark object so to speak, or an obscure object. In order to compensate for this obscurity 
Freud spoke of blinding himself artificially in order to illuminate this obscure object: 
“Freud, in a letter to Lou Andreas-Salome 25th May 1916, suggested his method of 
achieving a state of mind which would give advantages that would compensate for 
obscurity when the object investigated was peculiarly obscure. He speaks of blinding 
himself artificially” (Bion, 1970, p. 43; my alterations), or in Freud’s own words: “I 
know that I have artificially blinded myself at my work in order to concentrate all the 
light on the one dark passage” (Freud, 1916d, p. 25).    
 Bion, heuristically, articulates Freud and Milton in his 4
th
 ‘Brazilian lecture’ 
proffered in Rio de Janeiro: “In the third book of ‘Paradise Lost’ Milton says, ‘Hail, 
holy Light, offspring of heaven first-born! Or of the Eternal co-eternal beam May I 
express thee unblamed? Since God is light, And never but in un-approached light Dwelt 
from eternity –dwelt then in thee, Bright effluence of bright essence increate! … Won 
from the void and formless infinite!’ There seems to be no doubt, and Milton certainly 
had no doubt, that he was blind– ‘so thick a drop serene hath quenched these orbs which 
roll in vain’; although they can feel the warmth he can see nothing. A capable eye 
specialist would nowadays have ideas about the nature of Milton’s blindness. We 
cannot really say whether Milton blinded himself artificially, or whether he realized, 
unconsciously, that he could not investigate these ‘things invisible to man’ while he was 
blinded by the brilliant light of facts. One cannot psychoanalyze Milton, but it is 
puzzling that he could apparently turn the experience of being blind to good account, 
exactly as Freud could not investigate these dark and obscure places unless he 
artificially blinded himself” (Bion, 1974, p. 104; my alterations).                           
 Freud discovers this obscure object when he dreams, when no boundaries 
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between the self and the other exist, when the nothingness is something without 
boundaries, without limits: “In every dream there is a object that is unreachable, an 
umbilicus, so to speak, that is its connection object with the unknown” (cf., Freud, 
1900b, pp. 339-621; my bold). This connection object that Freud describes signifies this 
world of darkness, the world where Alford’s ‘thanatos’ thrives.    
 In chapter II of Die Träumdeutung, Freud refers to his “Irma’s injection dream” 
(1897a): ‘as the first dream he subjected to exhaustive interpretation’ (cf., Freud, 
1897a; 1900a, pp. 1-338; my alteration). Meltzer stated that this interpretation gives the: 
“impression that word and symbol remained very closely bound in his mind as 
representations of meaning in a far more rigid sense than Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing as’ and 
in a far more restricted sense in regard to the meaning of words than Russel’s meta-
levels” (Meltzer, 1984a, p. 110).       
 This concept is important because the nature of the object, in object relations 
theory, is represented by Freud’s dream umbilicus. Freud wrote the word Uner Kannten 
to designate the nature of that unknown object, but Uner Kannten does not mean 
unknown (Un bekannte). Uner Kannten evokes the biblical expression ein weib 
erkennen which means to meet a woman. The “Irma’s injection dream” is not only the 
Jocasta’s dream for psychoanalysis but it also provides the substance with which to 
defend that: “the dream goes along with the object relation in the real world” (cf., 
Winnicott, 1971, pp. 53-64; Pereira, 2000): object relation emerging from the word 
umbilicus, symbol for the omphalic as primary representation.   
 This primary representation illustrates the archaic meaning of the word 
umbilicus that is mystery. In order to fully conceptualize this dynamic I will trace its 
etymological root. The word mystery has a Greek etymological root in which the 
etymon myo means closed, and the etymon ystero means uterus. Omphalic derives from 
the etymological root of umbilicus, which is omphalos (cf., Graves, 1955, 1963). The 
most famous omphalos at Delphi was assumed to mark the centre of the earth…the 
centre of Mother Nature…the central object that Freud calls the obscure object. If we 
are to seriously examine Alford’s reformulation of thanatos, a clear understanding of 
this closed and mysterious obscure object with relation to its nature is essential.  
 Alford continues: “Hatred seeks to destroy its object forever in both senses of 
the term. Hatred seeks obliteration of its object forever, and hatred seeks to be forever 
obliterating its object, so that it will not have to be alone. Here is the telos of thanatos, 
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hatred that binds self to its object in an infinity of destruction, nirvana in the realm of 
violence” (Alford, op. cit., p. 68).       
 Arthur Schopenhauer in his principal work, “The World as Will and Idea” 
(1818-19) formulated the ‘Nirvana principle’, published in the end of 1818. Barbara 
Low (a British psychoanalyst) published “Psycho-Analysis: A Brief Account of the 
Freudian Theory” in 1920, where she enunciates the: ‘presence of the Nirvana principle 
in psychic life’ (cf., Low, 1920). Freud agrees with her and in the same year he 
publishes “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” where he says that the Nirvana principle: 
‘seems to express the predominant tendency of psychic life and, perhaps, of the nervous 
life in general, aiming the reduction, the constancy and the elimination of the tension 
resulting from internal excitation’ (cf., Freud, 1920a, pp. 7-64).    
 According to Alford, the presence of this tension is derived from the turning 
inward of ‘thanatos’ in order to create a world of peaceful wolves or to contain the 
discontents in civilization but simultaneously he warns us of the consequences of this 
solution; Man’s superego, in its quest for freedom is drawn into a perverse nirvana’s 
quest by ‘thanatos’. It is here that ‘thanatos’ takes possession of every drive, especially 
‘eros’. ‘Thanatos’ consuming ‘eros’ brings us to an uncontrolled Zarathustra, in turn 
leading us back to Hobbes’s world: ‘the fear and I (‘Thanatos’ and ‘Eros’) were born as 
twin brothers’ in a perverse nirvana’s realm, where every man is for himself because 
anything else means death.         
 Alford proffers many illustrations of the perverse nirvana’s quest (‘will’) taken 
from the studies he conducted that exhibit the will of ‘thanatos’ running rampant, as 
well as the process of boundary dissolution in creating fusion with another object that it 
will attack and obliterate infinitely. His examples clearly illustrate what ‘thanatos’ looks 
like in the realm of ‘eros’: “the quest for nirvana marked by the collapse of any 
distinction between love and hate” (Alford, op. cit., p. 68; my bold).   
 From this perspective, ‘thanatos’ almost represents one of the dimensions of 
what Grotstein calls the ‘dual-track (‘eros’ and ‘thanatos’) of psycho pathogenesis’: “I 
advocate a dual-track conception of psycho pathogenesis as follows: (1) The infantile 
neurosis organizes the infant’s unconsciously experienced phantasies about its 
relationship to its primal objects and regulates the dialectic between its «narcissism and 
socialism». (2) Infantile catastrophe occurs with the impact of overwhelming 
externality when the infant (or even an adult) has not had the opportunity to prepare for 
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the trauma by initially having (autochthonously) created it” (Grotstein, 2000, p. 54; my 
bold).           
 In order to further elucidate ‘thanatos’ existing in a state of ‘perverse nirvana’ 
we can contemplate the most famous actor of this tragedy: Oedipus. In the preface to 
Ernest Jones’s “Hamlet and Oedipus”, Jean Starobinski shows that, if ‘Sophocles’s 
Oedipus represents the revelation’s tragedy for Freud, then Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
illustrates repression’s drama’: “Oedipus, ancient hero, symbolizes the unconscious 
universal, disguised as destiny: Hamlet, modern hero, evokes the birth of guilty 
subjectivity, contemporary of a time in which the traditional image of the Cosmos 
collapsed” (Jones, 1949, p. 3; cf., Freud, 1928b, pp. 177-194; my bold).   
 Alford reasons that the collapsing of this cosmos is what precipitates acts of 
severe violence such as particularly sudden murders. In one particular study Alford 
describes the case of a young college student, Sinedu Tadesse, who stabs her roommate 
forty five times killing her while she lay asleep one night in their college dormitory. 
Later is was discovered in the content of Sinedu’s diary that she had been experiencing 
intense and overwhelming feelings toward her roommate for quite some time leading up 
to the act of the murder: “Our situations would never reverse, for me to be strong and 
her to be the weak. She’ll live on tucked in the warmth and support of her family while I 
cry alone in the cold” (Alford, op. cit., p. 69).     
 Sinedu was found hanging in her college dormitory bathroom. She had violently 
murdered her roommate and then turned the aggression inward, killing herself: “the one 
who hates has given up so much of herself to the desire to be the other that there is no 
going back, not enough self to go back to, or so it seems. The self of the hater has been 
destroyed, and no return is possible, only the perverse satisfaction that the one who is 
hated will share the obliteration, fusion in the realm of entropy, nirvana” (Alford, op. 
cit., p. 70).           
 The third and fourth crucial elements (night and death) in this newly theorized 
‘thanatos’ is that the: “hatred behind affective violence is a path to fusion, a hot 
relationship in a cold world. Affective violence seeks to fuse with the other, preserving 
the relationship in the absence of the other, without the bother of the reality of the other 
[that all] (…) stems from the fear of abandonment, the un-mastered terror of loss, one of 
the three leading psychological dangers according to Freud” (Alford, op. cit., pp. 70-71, 
my alteration; cf., Freud, 1926a, pp. 87-172).     
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 This particular case clearly exemplifies what constitutes a perverse linkage with 
an object. The “Nemesis object” by James Grotstein is defined as follows: “This 
internalized prison becomes an inner labyrinth, ruled by an omnipotently harassing, 
taunting, and denigrating superego subjective object, which I term the Nemesis object, 
the shadow side of the ego ideal. Its counterpart in benign, non-traumatic play is the 
‘challenge object’, and the locale of this play is that intermediate area that Klein (1935) 
calls ‘mother’s insides’, Meltzer (1992) the ‘Claustrum’, and Winnicott (1971) 
‘Potential Space’” (Grotstein, op. cit., p. 211).      
 According to Alford, this is the result of a collapsed cosmos, the result of the 
dissolution of boundaries, the result of fusion, the result of ‘thanatos’ running rampant 
in nirvanas will. When Sinedu was unable to achieve the external freedom that she so 
desperately desired as evidenced in her written confession, she sought to make internal 
reparations by latching onto an object, her roommate. When her chosen object did not 
respond reciprocally, ‘thanatos’ led her into nirvana as Beatrice led Dante into inferno, 
mutatis mutandis.          
 When the Nemesis object emerges: “affective violence seeks to control 
abandonment, destroying the other so that he or she cannot leave. Even, or especially, if 
the killer wants to leave. Deep down in their psyche there is little difference between 
leaving and abandonment. Little difference and, all the difference in the world: the 
difference between control and its absence” (Alford, op. cit., p. 71). This little difference 
is what precipitated the cosmos collapsing (cf., supra) in the case example described by 
Alford.          
 The absence of control in the self creates a space of reciprocal exclusion. When 
boundaries are destroyed a space emerges that does not have an identity. This space is 
located: “in the borders of the interior and the exterior, of representations and of 
expression, of affection and of perception. The imaginary space corresponds to a wide 
variety of pathological phenomena and normal phenomena, whose intimate structure 
has the imprint of that fundamental ambiguity” (Ali, 1974, p. 18).   
 Alford theorizes that this fundamental ambiguity finds its roots in hatred: “If the 
murder is sudden, the hatred behind it takes years to mature (…). Hatred is ego-
structuring. It can define a self, connecting it to others, anchoring it in the world, while 
at the same time acting as a fortress” (Alford, ib.). In Otto Kernberg’s words: ‘The 
underlying mechanism, I am suggesting, is the establishment of an internalized object 
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relationship under the control of structured rage, that is hatred…Hatred consolidated the 
unconscious identification with the victim and victimizer’ (cf., Kernberg, 1995, pp. 53-
82; my bold), such as lived and described by Sinedu Tadesse in her diary.   
 Sinedu could not cope with the ambivalence of being victim and victimizer, or 
rather Sami Ali’s fundamental ambiguity and Winnicott’s primary failure. As Alford 
says: “In the end, hatred chains an individual to those he hates (…). Hatred promoted 
ego-shrinking rather than ego-enhancing relationships, in which there is no need to cope 
with ambivalence. Yet, it is only by dealing with ambivalence, the complexity of our 
feelings, how we love those we hate, and vice-versa, that we integrate ourselves. Sinedu 
knows reality, and will obliterate herself along with the one she knows she cannot be 
(…). The hatred of affective violence traps the victim and victimizer in a world of 
bodies that is the world” (Alford, op. cit., pp. 73-74; my bold).    
 Alford uses this particular expression, World of bodies, because it represents the 
unconscious identification between victim and victimizer. This representation is clearly 
exemplified in “The Brothers Karamazov” narrative where Fedor and Smerdiakov (I use 
Dostoevsky’s novel as an example because Freud himself recognized that this novel 
was more Freudian than even Oedipus or Hamlet; cf., Dostoevsky, 1880; cf., Freud, 
1928b, pp. 177-194) are trapped in a labyrinth of affective violence: “The labyrinth is 
the unconscious counterpart to the potential space/claustrum and can be mediated by the 
‘transformational object’ (Bollas, 1987), of challenge or by the ‘demon of Nemesis’, 
depending respectively on whether we have hope or have forfeited our authenticity to 
the demon of Nemesis in a Faustian bargain” (Grotstein, op. cit., p. 211): in “The 
Brothers Karamazov” Dostoevsky describes acts for which Dostoevsky himself thinks 
forgiveness will be impossible and grotesque, mutatis mutandis, Arendt’s work on 
Eichmann argued that Eichmann’s actions were such as to put him outside the human 
community and beyond the possibility of ‘forgiveness’ (cf., Arendt, 1963).
 Catastrophic mental impairment renders forgiveness irrelevant because the 
‘object’ is not a moral agent; monumental cruelty may rather make forgiveness 
impossible; as we saw above: “the hatred of affective violence traps the victim and 
victimizer in a world of bodies that is the world” (Alford, op. cit., p. 74), a world where 
forgiveness is impossible, a world where reparation is impossible, a world where our 
‘demons’ are completely loose representing a half-way path between Dante Alighieri’s 
‘Inferno’ and Greek’s own Hades were victim and victimizer are ‘forever’ trapped. The 
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outcome of this trial-by-ordeal depends largely on: “how much omnipotent authority 
the infant has invested in its cruel internal subjective objects” (Grotstein, ib.). Or, as in 
the case study provided, the omnipotent authority that the murderer invests in their 
harassing and taunting internal subjective objects. This omnipotent authority is derived 
from the costly effects of repression to maintain a world of peaceful wolves: “Freud’s 
great contribution to social theory is his delineation of the cost to individuals and to 
society as a result of the modifications necessary to the psyche to contain the species’ 
propensity to violence. Both Freud, and his great critic Herbert Marcuse, understood the 
self-defeating quality of these modifications: by making society and existence even less 
pleasurable, they actually heightened the propensity to violence, violence as rage 
against the burden of civilization; in other words, Freud and Marcuse understood history 
to be tragedy, the solution to violence likely to foster more violence in the long run” 
(Alford, op. cit., p. 76).        
 In conclusion, I defend that Freud is the first object relation theorist (like 
Alford states). Freud is the first because he starts from the beginning: “For Freud (…) 
the battle is not between the inner and external manifestations of thanatos, but between 
what Freud, in one of his later works called the two fundamental principles of 
Empedocles, eros and thanatos, love and hate, one perpetually seeking to destroy what 
the other has created (…). The more thanatos is loosed upon the world, the more the 
superego must direct its violence against the self, making both self and world a less 
hospitable dwelling for eros (…); the more violence eros must contend with, the less is 
available for creativity and culture” (Alford, op. cit., p. 83).    
 It is in this way that eros becomes imprisoned by ‘thanatos’. ‘Thanatos’, so 
envious of the fusion that ‘eros’ is capable of, obliterates itself in the attempt to attain it. 
‘Thanatos’ is almost responsible for the birth of civilization: before the advent of 
civilization, people had only the simplest, most necessary diseases. Peasants and 
workers still remain close to the basic nosological table; the simplicity of their lives 
allows it to show through in its reasonable order, without the Hobbesian monsters being 
projected.          
 From this perspective, we can see that Freud was, in fact, the first object relation 
theorist because he, as Empedocles, foresaw what the forces, the objects were that 
determined the beginning of our civilization and how we developed into what we are 
today.           
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 In epitome, I believe that Freud understood that the human beings cannot blind 
themselves (like Oedipus) when ‘thanatos’ tries to create fusion: the psychic reality of 
‘thanatos’ configures an object relation where the object of ‘thanatos’ is the 
dissolution of boundaries in the Self. This dimension has been termed in 
psychoanalytic literature as ‘aphanisis’ (Jones, 1927), ‘the fear of annihilation’ (Klein, 
1946), ‘primitive agony’ (Winnicott, 1974), ‘the abject’ (Kristeva, 1980), ‘the black 
hole’ (Grotstein, 1990a, 1990b); ‘the white psychosis and the negative hallucinosis’ 
(Green, 1999) are often traumatic events of massive proportion (cf., Freud, 1926a, pp. 
87-172; Jones, 1927; Tustin, 1981a; Hopper, 1991) as we saw above. 
 Accordingly, Giovanecchi observes, for example: “that intrusiveness, 
abandonment and even brutality are often dominant qualities of the infant milieu” 
(Giovanecchi, 1997, p. 36), and Boyer notes that: “there is an ample evidence that the 
development of…[psychotic and borderline personality disorder]…results from 
continuous minor psychological assaults [proto-dissolution of boundaries in the Self]…I 
have found with startling regularity that in borderline and schizophrenic patients, actual 
dramatic psychological and/or physical sexual assaults have been commonplace rather 
than exceptional” (Boyer, 1978, p. 65; my alterations).     
 In an outstanding article published posthumously, Winnicott writes in a similar 
vein: “it is wrong to think that psychotic illness is a breakdown, it is a defence 
organization against a primitive agony…The underlying agony is unthinkable… [it] is 
the fear of a breakdown that has already been experienced” (Winnicott, 1974, p. 103). It 
is ‘unthinkable’ since it cannot be expressed symbolically in neurotic terms because it 
came into being during a pre-conceptional phase of development. Winnicott outlines the 
consequences for therapy: “there are moments, according to my experience, when a 
patient needs to be told that the breakdown, a fear of which destroys his or her life, has 
already been” (Winnicott, ib.).       
 This is of great importance because it is an essential factor in the creation of 
internal and/or external chaos. Had ‘eros’ not overcome ‘thanatos’, we would never 
have come to know the other object relations that exist today, such as ‘love, creativity, 
and culture’ (cf., Freud, 1930b, pp. 64-145). From this perspective we can see the 
continuum of Freud’s work with ‘a part’ of Object Relations School: I shall analyze 
now how modern day theorists cope and unfold a new ‘secondary discourse’ based 
on the heuristic premises that Freud formulated as the substrate of any Object 
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Relation: love and hate; creativity and culture.      
 Returning to the argument of Gedo and Goldberg in their “Models of Mind”, 
these authors argue that, after Freud, the intervening period calls for an object relations 
model ‘that can account for the formation of the self’ (cf., Gedo and Goldberg, 1973). 
Love, creativity and culture are the key substrates of ‘a part’ of Object Relations School 
as we saw above, but to articulate these constructs with a model of mind ‘that can 
account for the formation of the self’ as Gedo and Goldberg argue, I first have to 
present Lacan’s main scientific constructs and the inherent Foucault’s and Bataille’s 
philosophical contributions towards Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory.   
 I have this approach because before I ‘interpret’ the models of mind ‘that can 
account for the formation of the self’ I have to ‘interpret’ the model of mind that can 
account for the ‘genealogy’ of the self: Lacan’s model, which is, in my perspective, one 
of the most heuristic ‘secondary discourses’ ever developed in psychoanalytic theory as 
I will illustrate throughout this literature review, but, once again: throughout my 
review I will follow Gedo and Goldberg’s epistemological stream of thought, but 
with my own perspective of interpreting each ‘model of mind’ as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ as I have been defending since the beginning of this dissertation, that is, 
to minimize any confusion caused by the current away of theories I will illustrate in 
the conclusion of my review the developmental contributions of those authors who 
have had a major impact on the field or who have offered a fairly systematized 
theory of object relations development as I started to do in my Introduction, but, 
as above mentioned, and to be absolutely clear: if the ten shared characteristics of 
what Kernberg (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b, 2001a; see my Introduction) calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’; the five shared characteristics of 
what he calls the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current; and the 
fourteen shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘French psychoanalytic 
approach’ –alongside with the above two– don’t constitute new integrations, not as 
a simple ‘common ground’, but as promoting valid hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (cf., 
Laplanche, op. cit.), I don’t know how one can say that psychoanalytic theory 
comes after clinical work.        
 Because I think, as above mentioned many times, that psychoanalytic 
theory comes after clinical work in this Thesis I will establish the scientific 
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accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing concrete 
examples (as I did in my Introduction and I am doing in this literature review) of 
how the analyst deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of what 
theoretical model he embraces: the keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s 
mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; cf., Laplanche, op. cit.): by a 
permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the 
analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models.     
 Returning to the subject, from 1971 until his death in 1984, Michel Foucault 
gave public lectures at the Collège de France. These lectures were compiled in a 
volume entitled “Abnormal”, published in 1999. Firstly, this Lacanian review intends to 
develop some of the thesis defended here by Foucault, because Lacan developed his 
perspective about the ‘genealogy of the self’ from Foucault (and Bataille; see below) 
conceptualizations, among many other authors from different fields of knowledge; 
following Roudinesco & Plon (1997), the main references are: metaphysics, Georg W. 
F. Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” (1807); ontological phenomenology, Martin 
Heidegger’s “Being and Time (1927); anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s “The 
Elementary Structures of Kinship” (1949); linguistics, Ferdinand Saussure’s “Course in 
General Linguistics” (1916); logic and language, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus” (1922) and “Philosophical Investigations” (1953).  
 I will not work explicitly these authors, but, inherently to Lacan’s (and my own) 
cogitations, all of them are present in the corpus of the text; in the end of my review, as 
I said, Lacan’s (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 93-100, pp. 101-124, pp. 237-322, pp. 401-436, 
pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, pp. 765-790, pp. 793-827, pp. 829-850, pp. 855-877; 1967-
68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 1969-70; 1970; 1972-73; 1973; 1974-75; 1975a; 1975-76; 
1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-78b, pp. 548-556) algebraic structures [classical research as 
Diophantus of Alexandria’s “A Study in the History of Greek Algebra” was vital to 
understand some of Lacan’s fecund insights (cf., Diophantus, 1910)] will be illustrated 
as an ‘epistemological counterpart’ to Matte-Blanco’s bi-logic (1956, 1975, 1981, 
1988), and the above mentioned authors will be there implicitly developed.
 Building on the themes of societal self-defence developed in works like: “The 
Birth of the Clinic” (1963), “Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison” (1975), 
and “Society Must Be Defended” (1975-1976), Foucault illustrates (in the Abnormal) 
how and why categorizing ‘abnormality’ (madness/badness) and ‘normality’ were 
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prerogatives of power (Foucault’s key concept) in the nineteenth century, shaping 
institutions from the prison system to the family, meant to deal in particular with 
‘monstrosity’, whether sexual, physical, or spiritual.     
 This reflection will focus on the basic tenets present in this problematic. I will 
use the same methodology used by Foucault: the archaeology [the genealogy] of the 
human: “that opening up of the concrete individual, for the first time in Western 
society, to the language of rationality, that major event in the relationship of man to 
himself and of language to things” (Foucault, 1994, p. 25; my alterations).  
 This review will try to grasp Foucault’s understanding concerning deviance, 
prison and the asylum of the nineteenth century in order to explain how the ‘self’ of the 
twentieth century ‘emerged’ from those realities: “We have undertaken the history of 
subjectivity by studying the divisions carried out in society in the name of madness, 
illness, delinquency and their effects on the constitution of a reasonable and normal 
subject” (Foucault, 1994, p. 214).        
 Secondly, I will articulate Foucault’s thought with Bataille’s conceptualizations, 
specifically the one coined by the author as “heterology” (1970b): his key-definition of 
what the ‘Real’ is; the “Real as Impossible”, the real as a ‘thing outside of us’ never 
apprehensible, as something that we have to ‘arrive to’ but we never do (see below; cf., 
Bataille, 1970b, pp. 167-178; Lacan, 1966, p. 32): Hegel’s ‘aufheben’, the Real is 
something that we are not ‘in off’, we are ‘out off’, the self relates to the Real by a never 
ending dialectic: ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’ (cf., Hegel, 1807).    
 This dialectic, for Bataille is the dialectic of ‘garbage’ (‘heterology’ means 
‘science of garbage’), and constitutes one of the ‘categories’ that can be considered as 
his ‘phenomenology of the Real’, which will be explored and further developed. The 
outcome of this refection will be the Lacanian critique regarding the above stated 
problematic.             
 After this introduction, I will now turn to the genealogical narrative with one of 
the lectures that Foucault proffered and presented on January 22, 1975: “Today I would 
like to begin the analysis of the domain of abnormality as it functions in the nineteenth 
century. I would like to try to show that this domain was constituted on the basis of 
three elements. The first of these figures is what I will call the «human monster». The 
frame of reference of the human monster is, of course, law” (Foucault, 1999, p. 55).
 From this perspective, the ‘human monster’ is a juridical notion, but in a broad 
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sense since it concerns the laws of nature, as well as the laws of society: “the field in 
which the monster appears can be called a «juridical-biological» domain. However, the 
monster emerges within this space as both an extreme and an extremely rare 
phenomenon. The monster is the limit, both the point at which law is overturned and the 
exception that is found only in extreme cases. The monster combines the impossible and 
the forbidden” (Foucault, 1999, p. 56; my alterations).    
 Foucault uses delimitation concepts that represent what may constitute a 
symbolical border surrounding his first figure: a border that isolates the space of the 
Real, the limit of the Real as something that is impossible and forbidden. This double 
dimension is represented successively by the figure of a being that is half human and 
half animal (given prominence especially in the Middle Ages): a figure that has its 
archetype in the archaic Oedipal myth: “the Minotaur may symbolically represent the 
archaic internalised father phantasmally constituted as part of a combined parent imago 
or also as phallic mother, as well as assertive aspects that the toddler projects into the 
internal penis and that he is now destined to reclaim” (Klein, 1921-1945 in Grotstein, 
2000, p. 203). I will develop this thematic, with detail, later on in my reflection.  
 From another perspective, Lacan states that what generates a human monster is 
the annihilation of the archaic internalized father: the annihilation of the “Name-of-the-
Father” or the “Law-of-the-Father” (Lacan, 1966, p. 220). Lacan created these concepts 
in his Seminars “Freud’s Papers on Technique, The Seminar, Book I” (1953-54) and 
“The Psychoses, The Seminar, Book III” (1955-1956): the former about ‘the Rat Man’ 
Ernst Lanzer; the latter about Daniel Paul Schreber. Here the author explains the figure 
of the father as having the role of ‘primary signifier’. The primary signifier constitutes 
the first and most important signifier of culture ‘assimilated’ by the infant; this operates 
as the symbolical function of the law.        
 When the father nominates the name of the infant he simultaneously nominates 
the law of the infant: when the Name-of-the-Father is ‘internalized’ (a concept that is 
not Lacanian: I ‘borrowed’ it from Object Relations Theory) by the infant, Lacan argues 
that the infant earns his identity through acquiring, inherently, his space inside of 
culture according to the law given by the father. When this space in culture is not 
created, a space of real without limits appears: psychosis. Lacan calls it: “the 
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father” (Lacan, 1966, p. 240), the rejection of all 
signifiers, the rejection of all laws: this is the territory in which the human monster is 
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created: “When the monster violates the law by its very existence, it triggers the 
response of something quite different from the law itself. (…) One of the first 
ambiguities is that the monster is a breach of the law that automatically stands outside 
the law. The second is that the monster is, so to speak, the spontaneous, brutal, but 
consequently natural form of the unnatural. In this sense we can say that the monster is 
the major model of every little deviation” (Foucault, 1999, p. 56).   
 We can see the epistemological similarities between Lacan and Foucault, which 
are not arbitrary in two authors who refuse (and explain why) the kinship between 
illness and deviance. It should be noted that I am defending a Foucaultian hermeneutic 
of the notion of the ‘self’ (my own ‘secondary discourse’ regarding Foucault’s theory), 
not the notion itself as the author poses it.     
 Additionally, it can be stated that illness and deviance had a scholastic (and, by 
inherence, Aristotelian) linkage, initiated by Saint Thomas Aquinas in his “Summa 
Theologica” in the 13th century (cf., Thomas Aquinas, 2000), that had its first 
philosophical obstacle with Descartes (1641) in his “Meditations on First Philosophy” 
where he proffers his famous “I experience, therefore I am!” (cf., Descartes, 1641, pp. 
59-124); the Cartesian experience didn’t isolate the cogito (reason) in a closed space 
(the mind): rationality didn’t exclude madness (cf., Descartes, 1637, pp. 123-179). 
 In 1946, Lacan reread, during a Seminar on “Formulations about the Psychic 
Causality”, this Cartesian aphorism (cf., Lacan, 1966). The author illustrated in his 
doctoral thesis (“De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité” 
about Marguerite Anzieu: the case ‘Aimée’) published in 1932, and one year later with 
the case of the “Papin Sisters”[from which later on Jean Genet wrote a famous play 
entitled “Les Bonnes” (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, op. cit.)], that Descartes’ intuition was 
correct: in both, Lacan states that the crimes committed [Marguerite tried to kill a 
famous French actress called Hughette Duflos; the Papin Sisters killed their female 
employers; (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, op. cit.)], constituted: “a principle of intelligibility” 
(Lacan, 1966, p. 182): “We can say that until the end of the nineteenth century and 
perhaps until the twentieth century the abnormal individual is essentially an everyday 
monster, a monster that has become commonplace intelligible. For a very long time 
the abnormal individual will be something like a pale monster. This is the first figure I 
want to consider. (…) The second figure in the genealogy of abnormality could be 
called the «individual to be corrected»” (Foucault, op. cit., p. 56; my alteration). 
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 As we have seen, Foucault describes the domain of abnormality as being 
constituted by three elements, three figures. The second figure ‘the individual to be 
corrected’ will now be scrutinized through the archaeological method: “The individual 




 centuries, of 
the Classical Age. The monster’s frame of reference was nature and society, the systems 
of the laws of the world. The frame of reference of the individual to be corrected is 
much narrower. The individual to be corrected emerges in the play of relations of 
conflict and support that exist between the family and the school, workshop, street, 
quarter, parish, church, police, and so on” (Foucault, op. cit., pp. 57-58).  
 This play of relations between the different micro-societies (‘family, school, 
church, and so on’), the role played by «the individual to be corrected», and its 
(un)specific function steers into the harbour of Durkheim’s definition of society as: “an 
integrated system where each element has a functional role” (cf., Durkheim, 1897). The 
individual to be corrected does not have a function until he is corrected: “The individual 
to be corrected appears to require correction because all the usual techniques, 
procedures, and attempts at training him within the family have failed to correct him. 
What defines the individual to be corrected is that he is incorrigible” (Foucault, op. cit., 
p. 58).            
 From this perspective we can foresee the emergence of replacement techniques, 
new practices for training bodies, behaviour, and abilities, which open up the problem 
of those who escape the functional role inside of the integrated system that has ceased to 
be that of the sovereignty of the Law-of-the-Father: “An axis of rectifiable 
incorrigibility emerges on which we will later find the abnormal individual and which 
will serve as a support for all the specific institutions developed for abnormal 
individuals in the nineteenth century. The pale, commonplace monster is also an 
incorrigible who will be placed in the centre of an apparatus of correction. This, then, is 
the second ancestor of the nineteenth-century abnormal individual” (Foucault, op. cit., 
pp. 58-59).          
 The specific institutions that Foucault refers are, obviously, the psychiatric 
institutions, which were primarily developed for the ‘abnormal individuals’ by Philippe 
Pinel in France, William Tuke in England, and Benjamin Rush in the United States of 
America, (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, op. cit.). I will now analyze the third and last 
element that constitutes the domain of abnormality as it functions in the nineteenth 
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century: “The third figure is the «masturbator». The masturbator, the child masturbator, 
is a completely new figure of the nineteenth century (…) and whose field of appearance 
is the family or even something narrower than the family: (…) it is the bedroom, the 
bed, the body; it is the parents, immediate supervisors, brothers and sisters; it is the 
doctor. It is a kind of microcell around the individual and his body” (Foucault, op. cit., 
p. 59). The masturbator is a completely new figure in the eighteenth century. The 
masturbator is the correlate of new relations between sexuality and the organization of 
the family, of the ‘child’s new position at the centre of the parental group’, and of the 
new importance accorded to the body and health. The masturbator marks the appearance 
of the child’s sexual body.        
 There is, in fact, a long genealogy to this appearance: the linked development of 
techniques of ‘spiritual direction’ [in the new pastoral arising from the ‘Reform’ and 
from the Council of Trent with the outcome in one of Paul VI’ encyclicals where this 
Pope (elected in June of 1963, succeeding to John XXIII only eight months after the end 
of Council of Vatican II) states that ‘masturbation is a sin’ (cf., Levillain, 1994)], and 
‘institutions of education’: “Masturbation is a kind of polyvalent causality to which one 
can attach, and to which doctors in the eighteenth century will immediately attach, the 
entire panoply, the entire arsenal of physical, nervous, and psychiatric illness (…). In 
the pathology of the end of the eighteenth century, there will be practically no illness 
that cannot, in one way or another, be laid at the door of this aetiology, that is to say, of 
this sexual aetiology” (Foucault, op. cit., pp. 59-60).    
 However, the crusade against masturbation and sexuality represents a break with 
this background. Actually, in the eighteenth century at least, this crusade does not take 
the form of a general sexual discipline: it is aimed primarily at adolescents or children, 
and even more specifically at those from rich or well-off families: “It is this kind of 
aetiology with regard to sexuality and sexual abnormalities that we find at the heart of 
the nineteenth and twentieth century” (Foucault, op. cit., p. 60).     
 Herbert Graf, the famous “Little Hans”, belonged to these bourgeois families. In 
1909 Herbert Graf was a two-year-old child that was being ‘analyzed’ indirectly by 
Freud; Max Graf, the child’s father, was the direct observer, who then transmitted the 
observed elements to Freud (cf., Freud, 1909c, pp. 5-147; Roudinesco & Plon, op. cit.). 
Lacan dedicated the second part of his seminar in 1956-1957, entitled “La relation 
d’objet et les structures freudiennes, Le Séminaire, Livre IV”, to the “Little Hans” case. 
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In his exegesis, Lacan places the child masturbator in a double psychic dimension: 
symbolic (mythological) and imaginary (phantasmatic signifier: cf., supra): “So that 
imperious proliferation of particular symbolic creations, such as what are called the 
sexual theories of the child, which supply the motivation down to the smallest detail of 
neurotic compulsions, these reply to the same necessities as do myths. Thus, to speak of 
the precise point we are treating in my seminars on Freud, little Hans, left in the lurch at 
the age of five by his symbolic environment, and suddenly forced to face the enigma of 
his sex and his existence, developed, under the direction of Freud and his father, Freud’s 
disciple, in mythic form, around the signifying crystal of his phobia, all the 
permutations possible on a limited number of signifiers” (Lacan, 1966, p. 185).
 Additionally, we can infer that Freud, Foucault and Lacan explain this same 
psychic reality through different vertices (from my perspective, different ‘secondary 
discourses’): its genealogical process is that the child becomes responsible for his own 
body and his own life. Parents are denounced as the real culprits for the child’s «abuse» 
of his sexuality: it is the absence of supervision, the neglect, and especially that lack of 
interest in the bodies and conduct of their children that leads parents to entrust their 
children to ‘wet nurses’, servants, and private tutors, that is to say, to all those 
intermediaries regularly denounced as initiators into debauchery. Freud will take his 
‘seduction theory’, formulated between 1895 and 1897, from this (cf., Roudinesco & 
Plon, op. cit.; see, in detail, Freud, “The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to 
Wilhelm Fliess: 1887-1904”, edited by Masson in 1985).     
 Lacan steers into Freud’s archaeological harbour: “We should be struck by the 
fact that it is in the co-extensivity of the development of the symptom and of its curative 
resolution that the nature of the neurosis is revealed: whether phobic, hysterical, or 
obsessive, the neurosis is a question that being poses for the subject «from where it was 
before the subject came into the world» (Freud’s phrase, which he used in explaining 
the Oedipal complex to little Hans)” (Lacan, op. cit., pp. 185-186). The small incestuous 
family that is characteristic of our societies, the small, ‘sexually saturated family space’ 
in which we are raised and in which we live, was formed from this (cf., Foucault, 1999).
 The «abnormal» individual that so many institutions, discourses, and fields of 
knowledge have been concerned with since the end of the nineteenth century derives 
from the «juridical-natural» exception of the monster, the multitude of incorrigible 
individuals caught in the «apparatus of rectification», and the «universal secret» of 
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childhood sexuality: “To situate this kind of archaeology of abnormality we will say 
that the nineteenth-century abnormal individual is the descendant of these three 
individuals: the monster, the incorrigible, and the masturbator (…)” (Foucault, op. cit., 
p. 60).            
 Accordingly, it can be said that the abnormal individual born in the nineteenth-
century grew into a deviant young man in the twentieth-century. This deviant young 
man tries to adapt to the Real, but Bataille and Lacan consider: “the Real as impossible” 
as I said above (cf., Bataille, 1970b, pp. 167-178; Lacan, op. cit., p. 32). In 1953, Lacan 
formulates his first topic entitled “the Symbolic, the Imaginary, the Real”, where he 
gave primacy to the Symbolic because: “the production of the Real is made by the 
Symbolic” (Lacan, op. cit., p. 199).        
 Therefore, each one of these deviant young men’s ancestors is represented by 
each category, in line with Lacan’s first topic (the «child masturbator» represents both 
the symbolic and the imaginary as I stated above). Foucault’s «individual to be 
corrected» is represented by the Symbolic as having: “supremacy over the Imaginary” 
(Lacan, op. cit., p. 215), and: “supremacy over the Real” (Lacan, op. cit., p. 218). The 
Symbolic defines the individual to be corrected as a system of significations constituted 
through language, specifically, signs and significations, which determine the subject 
‘without him wanting it’.        
 The Symbolic also designates the dimension to which the individual is attached: 
this dimension is its symbolic function (Foucault called it «institutions of education»). 
The concept of the Symbolic is inseparable from the other three ‘Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis’ (cf., Lacan, 1964): the ‘Signifier; the Foreclosure; and the Name-of-
the-Father’. The following intends to explain the dynamic of this conceptualization. 
 In 1964, Lacan presented a Seminar entitled “The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis, The Seminar, Book XI” where he categorizes them as: ‘The 
Unconscious and Repetition; Gaze as object (little) a; The Transference and the Drive; 
The Locus of The Other and the Return of the Transference’ (cf., Lacan, op. cit.). 
 In my perspective, «The Unconscious and Repetition» is represented by what 
Lacan coined as the: “Signifying Chain” (Lacan, 1966, p. 111), and the chain that 
signifies is the chain that exists between the Symbolic and the Real, between the 
Unconscious and its Repetition: the Unconscious is the Symbolic and the Real is its 
Repetition.           
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 The second concept is «Gaze as object (little) a» that according to Lacan means 
that the object that is desired (gazed) by the subject ‘escapes him’, and becomes of 
something that cannot be symbolized: the gazing of the «object (little) a» becomes a: 
“lack-of-Subject” (Lacan, op. cit., p. 218), and the Subject therefore becomes 
foreclosed. The «object (little) a» literally means that the Subject is fragmented into four 
partial objects that are foreclosed from the body: the breast as an object of suction; 
faeces as an object of excretion; the voice and the gaze as objects of desire. 
 The third concept is «The Transference and the Drive», which Lacan links 
because he believes that the analytic experience is a stage where unconscious reality 
(Drive) is expressed, and the Analyst is the Signifier who nominates the experience, 
thus allowing it to be significant in the Transference.    
 The fourth concept is «The Locus of The Other and the Return of the 
Transference» where «the Other» designates the symbolic place (the locus) of the 
signifier, of the law, of language, of the unconscious, and even of ‘God’.   
 These sub-categories of the Other determine the Subject in two ways: it can be 
exterior to him (God, Law); or intra-subjective in relation to his desire (unconscious, 
signifier, language). In the last sub-category the Subject interacts with an Other in a 
transferencial dynamic, and as a result the Name-of-the-Father is ‘assimilated’. The 
«Return of the Transference» in this process promotes an internal elaboration (cf., 
Lacan, op. cit., pp. 67-74).        
 Returning to the concept of the Symbolic, Lacan posits that the signifier 
represents the true essence of the symbolic function (its «letter»); the foreclosure is the 
psychotic process through which the symbolic disappears; the Name-of-the-Father is the 
concept through which the symbolic function is integrated into law. This law is the 
prohibition of incest (cf., Lacan, 1964). From this perspective, the «individual to be 
corrected» evokes the famous ‘Fort/Da’ mechanism that Freud observed in his grandson 
(Ernstl Halberstadt) when the child was playing; the ‘Fort/Da’ mechanism will be now 
elaborated for clarification (cf., Freud, 1920a, pp. 7-64).      
 Lacan defends that the: “Fort/Da appears because the Other is absent, because 
the Other is not available or does not entirely put himself in the place of the victim. It is 
the same as saying we begin to symbolize or nominate because we are introduced to 
negativity, to absence. And, the child repeats the movements and the ‘Fort/Da’ exactly 
in the same way in which he attempts to control the situation of abandonment, of 
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separation to which he was introduced” (Lacan, 1953-1954, pp. 195-196). ‘Fort/Da’ is 
the expression that the child used in his play with a toy: when he would throw the toy he 
would say ‘fort’ meaning that the toy was ‘out’ (away from him); when he pulled the 
toy back, he would say ‘Da’, meaning ‘Here it is’ (cf., Freud, op., cit.).   
 I will now turn my attention to Foucault’s «human monster» represented by the 
third category of Lacan’s first topic: the ‘Real’, in the sense that Bataille illustrated: “the 
desire is alongside deviance, side by side with evil” (Bataille, 1988, pp. 401-402).
 According to Lacan and Bataille, «the Real as impossible» exists because desire 
is something that reason and consciousness attempt to hide, preventing the appearance 
of the monster that all humans have within themselves: “A recent privilege has come to 
exist between behaviour and reason: the primacy of the wonderful that can provoke 
terror and still wonder, that stops and destroys the way of things, seeming to belong to 
the past. But it is without any doubt, that in the same way that consciousness deceives 
us, it leaves in its shadow of unconscious our most fixed desires” (Bataille, 1976f, p. 
272).           
 Man’s desire to become the monster is exactly what Lacan defends as 
constitutive of the Real. Lacan linked Bataille’s heterology with Freudian psychic 
reality to construct his category of the Real. The Real, in his perspective, has as its 
outcome everything that is the «rest», the «garbage», as Bataille defines it: heterology, 
literally meaning: “the science of garbage” (Bataille, 1970b, p. 168).   
 In psychoanalysis, according to Freud, psychic reality is the term employed to 
designate a form of existence for an individual, distinguished from material reality in 
the way in which it is dominated through the imperiousness of fantasy, through desire. 
Historically, the idea came about as the result of the abandonment of Freud’s seduction 
theory as well as through the elaboration of the concept of the psychic apparatus based 
on the: ‘primacy of the unconscious’ (cf., Freud, 1915c, pp. 159-215; Freud, 1923c, pp. 
12-59).           
 The human monster is human garbage, it is the: ‘doomed part’ (cf., Bataille, 
1976a, pp. 17-179) of the human, because we cannot accept within ourselves any 
presence of demons (unconscious demons); this is why the monster is representative of 
the human demon. It is the language of the unconscious transposed into reality.  
 The Real as impossible exists because it is not possible to symbolize something 
that is considered evil: the monster translates the ‘semantic of evil’ (cf., Ricoeur, 1960b) 
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and we do not accept that; we desire that reality but that reality is inaccessible to any 
subjectivity. The subject projects his ‘doomed parts’ into the monster. The subject 
nominates them as garbage: something that does not belong to him, it belongs only to 
the monster, to the unconscious. The monster is the continent where all desires, 
pleasures, deviances and perversions unfold: “As it happens, without the evidence of a 
deviance, we have not yet experienced this sentiment of liberty that demands the 
plenitude of sexual realization. (…) In the same way that erotic essence is given in the 
inextricable association of sexual and interdicted pleasure. Never, in the human sense, 
does the interdiction appear without the revelation of pleasure, or pleasure without the 
sentiment of interdiction” (Bataille, 1987a, pp. 107-108).     
 It is the Symbolic absence of the monster that provides the Real in-sign-ia to the 
Subject. In Lacanian terminology, the monster is the sign of the Subject. The desire to 
become a monster forces us to put him outside the borders of society and outside the 
borders of consciousness: “But this original place of the subject, how would one recover 
it in that elision which constitutes it as absence? How would one recognize that void as 
the Thing that is nearest, even when one excavates it anew in the heart of the Other, to 
make its cry resonate in it? One will take more pleasure in it the marks of a response, 
which were powerful enough to make a call of one’s cry. It is not in vain that these 
realities are called insignia. The term is nominative here. It is the constellation of these 
insignia that constitutes the ego ideal for the Subject” (Lacan, 1966, pp. 658-659). 
 The void is the human and the Thing is the monster. The insignia is the signifier 
of the human that presents itself as a significant void. The humanmonster is an 
artificial antinomy that the ego ideal tries to construct (crying) putting outside the 
borders its private Thing, its private signifier: the unconscious; the monster.  
 This monster is represented by the constellation significantsignifier, where the 
Subject erases one part (the ‘doomed part’) and it, therefore, remains as some-thing that 
is not a Thing (in Lacanian lexical) but just a void: “Firstly, if it is true that the global 
man separates himself from nature, the totality belonging to him is limited from the 
moment he separates (where, in consequence, two separate parts are formed): the full 
totality would not be given if not in the development of time. We say strictly: ‘they 
expel the natural, it returns galloping’. Full totality, without the slightest doubt, also 
comprehends the return of ‘natural’, but we should, before becoming accustomed to the 
idea that the natural returns, understand that it is not as natural as it appears. It returns 
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but transfigured by the doomed part by which it was damaged: it is no longer ‘natural’, 
seeing as it is now doomed” (Bataille, 1976a, p. 41).     
 For the human, the monster (the thing; the doomed part; the unconscious) that is 
found in the real is the monster without Subject, or rather, the discourse of a human 
pursuing the preclusion of desire. If the desire of the Subject is defined as the desire of 
the Other, (Other as: monster; Thing; doomed part; unconscious) it is because there is 
always a Other, of arbitrary transcendental preference, as well as to the difference 
between human and monster, that situated the cause of the desire. This arbitrary 
transcendental preference is illustrated by Lacan’s formula: “The Thing (monster, 
doomed part, unconscious) becomes absent so that it can become present in our 
thoughts (human, consciousness)” (Lacan, 1953-1954, p. 196; my alterations). 
 In conclusion, by disqualifying, bit-by-bit, all traditional figures of the Other 
Thing, doomed part, unconscious (Lacan, Bataille); human monster, individual to be 
corrected, masturbator (Foucault), the discourse of the human ends by disorientating or 
misplacing the cause that regulated desire and installs a crisis in the (un)real. In other 
words, a crisis in the human and not in the monster: “The ignorance serving man with 
respect to his desire is less ignorant that that which he asks, and can however restrain 
that ignorance from where he desires. The unconscious is the discourse of the Other. 
But also adding here that Man’s desire is the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1966, p. 814).
 ‘Man’s desire is the desire of the desire of the Other’. This aphorism is one of 
the most famous ones proffered by Lacan exactly because it illustrates human nature to 
a great extent: the three abnormal figures of Foucault and the doomed locus of Bataille 
(where the topology of the abnormal subject was described) have a direct kinship with 
the Lacanian expression: ‘The unconscious is the discourse of the Other’. ‘Normal man’ 
puts everything he desires outside the borders of society and outside the borders of 
consciousness. The Thing (in the Lacanian sense) that is more desired is the thing that is 
most repressed and projected into that ‘doomed part’.    
 The three figures presented by Foucault’s genealogy of the self represent man’s 
strongest desires repressed throughout mankind. For the institutions of power, pleasure, 
‘jouissance’ (in Lacanian terminology) and freedom are dangerous. Psychoanalysis 
promotes these three ‘Things’ as a developmental process because they are part of 
unconscious discourse and ‘the unconscious is the discourse of the Other’: Other as 
human monster, individual to be corrected or masturbator. All of them are on the 
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«Other» side of the mirror but the «Other» is also the «I». Lacan’s first statement in his 
“Écrits” grasps this problematic in its primary scene: “The Mirror Stage as Formative of 
the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” (Lacan, 1966, p. 1).
 Franz Kafka, in his ‘Metamorphoses’ nominates this experience through the 
following dialogue: “‘Grete! Grete! You must go to the doctor’s at once. Gregor is ill. 
Fetch the doctor, quick. Did you hear Gregor talking just now?’ ‘That was the voice of 
an animal’, said the chief clerk” (Kafka, 1915, p.14). ‘Chief clerks’ have linked mental 
illness to monstrosity (the ‘animal’) since the beginning of Christianity. In a so-called 
post-modern world we should deconstruct that heritage and allow the emergence of a 
space of freedom (psychoanalysis) that transforms that reality (‘metamorphoses’ 
etymologically meaning ‘to transform’), where man is not afraid of himself. If man 
cannot accept the masturbator and the monster within, society is left with an individual 
to be corrected: man himself.        
 After Lacan’s ‘genealogy of the self’ model I return to Gedo and Goldberg’s 
(1973) conceptualization of psychoanalytic ‘models of mind’ because, by 
psychoanalytic ‘anachronism’, after the ‘genealogy of the self’ model comes the 
Object Relations School ‘formation of the self’ model: the main theorists 
‘independent’ from Freud’s epistemological continuum (the ‘other part’ of Object 
Relations School); this will be a more descriptive categorization and less eclectic 
cogitation, but always unfolding a ‘secondary discourse’ dynamic threw its 
inherent deconstructive method, and, once again, to be absolutely clear: throughout 
my review I will follow Gedo and Goldberg’s epistemological stream of thought, 
but with my own perspective of interpreting each ‘model of mind’ as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ as I have been defending since the beginning of this dissertation, that is, 
to minimize any confusion caused by the current away of theories I will illustrate in 
the conclusion of my review the developmental contributions of those authors who 
have had a major impact on the field or who have offered a fairly systematized 
theory of object relations development as I started to do in my Introduction, but, 
as above mentioned, and, once again: if the ten shared characteristics of what 
Kernberg (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b, 2001a; see my Introduction) calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’; the five shared characteristics of 
what he calls the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current; and the 
fourteen shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘French psychoanalytic 
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approach’ –alongside with the above two– don’t constitute new integrations, not as 
a simple ‘common ground’, but as promoting valid hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (cf., 
Laplanche, op. cit.), I don’t know how one can say that psychoanalytic theory 
comes after clinical work.        
 Because I think, as above mentioned many times, that psychoanalytic 
theory comes after clinical work in this Thesis I will establish the scientific 
accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing concrete 
examples (as I did in my Introduction and I am doing in this literature review) of 
how the analyst deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of what 
theoretical model he embraces: the keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s 
mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; cf., Laplanche, op. cit.): by a 
permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the 
analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models.      
 The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending 
dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) 
in its essence (cf., Laplanche, op. cit.). Freud is the first object relations theorist 
because object relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic thought, as 
their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction (like Laplanche states; cf., Laplanche, 
op. cit.): the theoretical meta-interpretations of Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-
Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; cf., Laplanche, op. cit.) 
constitute all clinical dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. 
That is why I state in this literature review that all these authors follow Freud –
directly or indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist 
model unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive 
method. I state even more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more 
the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence 
of psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.  
 Following exactly this ‘deconstructive method’, among the main theorists 
‘independent’ from Freud’s epistemological continuum, Fairbairn is by far the most 
deconstructive of all object relations theorists and, not paradoxically, in Hinshelwood’s 
and my perspective, Fairbairn is among the most heuristic of these theorists (cf., 
Hinshelwood, 1989a, p. 368). Indeed, Fairbairn argued that the basic assumptions upon 
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which the drive theory rests are ‘anachronistic’ (derived from 19th century Newtonian 
Physics) and misleading, and, in the broadest sense, he saw his work as entailing a: 
“reintegration of Freud’s views on the basis of a different set of underlying scientific 
principles” (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 149).       
 I will work with some extent Fairbairn’s conceptualizations and with great 
extent Bion’s constructs and theoretical developments, but in an effort of 
epistemological syncretism of different and deconstructive ‘secondary discourses’, I 
just want to clarify that the plethora of studies on object relations in the past few 
decades may give the impression of ‘conceptual confusion’ (cf., Wittgenstein, 1953), 
but in my Introduction I’ve shown that I don’t agree with that perspective of ‘focusing’ 
only on ‘divergences’ rather than on ‘convergences’. To inscribe Fairbairn’s ‘review’ in 
the wider context of Object Relations (I will work first the ‘Kleinian followers’ and 
inherently Bion, and then I develop Fairbairn), I emphasize that the notion of the object 
(and inherent object relation) was present in Freud’s ideas from the beginning, when he 
described the object as the vehicle for instinctual gratification. He examined object 
relations primarily in connection with drive expression but made no attempt to describe 
a developmental progression of evolving object relations independent of the drives (it 
was not his purpose). Definite progress has since been made in understanding the early 
development of object relations.        
 Indeed, all the major object relations theorists have departed from Freud in 
adopting the view that psychological structure is a product of object relationships and 
not simply their frustrating aspects, therefore, psychoanalytic work within the object 
relations paradigm is based on a group of theories that, although differing considerably, 
have as their underlying commonality (see below and my Introduction; Kernberg, 
1993a, 1993b; Grotstein, 2000) the view of development and pathology as products of 
the internalization of early interpersonal relationships.     
 Object Relations is an umbrella concept but, historically, Freud’s concept of the 
ego as the: “precipitate of abandoned object cathexes” (Freud, 1923c, p. 29) provided 
the foundation viewpoint of object relations theories: ego formation as a function of 
object relationships. The following authors are ‘independent’ from Freud’s 
epistemological continuum, but they all departed from Freud’s concept of the ego.
 W. Ronald D. Fairbairn in Scotland and Melanie Klein (I will work Klein not 
explicitly but implicitly to ‘Kleinian followers’ specially to Bion, because in spite 
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Klein’s ‘theoretical inspirations’ towards Object Relations School, Klein is not a object 
relations theorist; see below) in London, working independently, both inferred from 
Freud’s above statement that the ego consists of internalized object relations. 
 Fairbairn (1952) endorsed the concept of the ego’s autonomy from the drives but 
pointed out that the growth of the ego is dependent on satisfactory object relationships. 
His disciple and analysand, Harry Guntrip (1968), further developed the relationship 
between early object relationships and the growth or arrest of the ego.   
 Klein also believed that ego development is a product of internalized object 
relationships (see below: cf., Klein, 1930b, pp. 219-232; 1933, pp. 149-162). I will work 
first the ‘Kleinian followers’ and inherently Bion, and then I develop Fairbairn as I said.
 Klein, unlike Fairbairn and Guntrip, contended that endogenous libidinal and 
aggressive drives give rise to object relationships and that from the earliest phase of 
infancy these form the basis of the ego (cf., Klein, 1928b, pp. 202-214; 1930b, pp. 219-
232; 1937, pp. 306-343; 1948, pp. 25-42; 1952c, pp. 61-93). The significance she 
accorded the drives sets her theoretical views apart from those of other object 
relations theorists (this is why she is not considered an object relations theorist), 
but her theoretical and clinical system (cf., Klein, 1968, 1975, 1984) was based on the 
concept of ego growth through the internalization of objects (cf., Klein, 1955b, pp. 141-
175; 1957, pp. 176-235; 1959, pp. 247-263; 1960a, pp. 300-313).    
 Klein’s modifications of psychoanalytic theory spawned a group of followers 
who adopted the fundamentals of her conceptual scheme but revised certain aspects of 
it: Bion (cf., Bion, 1957a, pp. 43-64; 1959, pp. 308-315; 1962a, pp. 306-310; 1977e); 
Meltzer (cf., Meltzer, 1967; 1978b, pp. 145-267; 1984a); Rosenfeld (cf., Rosenfeld, 
1952a, pp. 111-131; 1965; 1971a, pp. 115-128; 1987); Segal (cf., Segal, 1957, pp. 391-
397; 1964a, pp. 24-38; 1967, pp. 357-368; 1981a) among ‘several’ other authors of 
minor theoretical relevance (see below: King et al., 1921-1945).     
 I will illustrate some (with the exception of Bion, who will be profusely 
developed as I said above) of the clinical and theoretical fundamentals of Klein’s 
‘exegetes’ instead of approaching Klein ‘directly’ not only for the above mentioned 
reason (Klein is not a object relation theorist as I repeat so often in order to be 
absolutely clear), but also because: “Any systematic attempt to teach Melanie’s Klein 
work runs almost immediately into difficulties that are the exact opposite of the 
problems facing one in teaching Freud. Where the theoretical tail wags the clinical dog 
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with him, hardly any theoretical tail exists to be wagged with her” (Meltzer, 1978b, p. 
145).            
 We have also to bear in mind that the most striking additions to Klein’s thought 
among her followers fall into five general categories: (1) the expansion of the concept of 
projective identification; (2) the differentiation of clinical syndromes and their specific 
mechanisms and treatment approaches, based on Kleinian concepts; (3) the application 
of Kleinian technique to psychotic states; (4) the inclusion of non-interpretive 
techniques in treatment; and (5) the evolution of the treatment model to an emphasis on 
counter-transference (cf., Hinshelwood, 1989a).      
 Klein’s theoretical constructs are abstruse and unsystematic but, for example, 
Hanna Segal explains them in a surprising objective and ‘succinct’ way: “The Kleinian 
Technique is psychoanalytical and strictly based on Freudian psychoanalytic concepts. 
The formal setting is the same as in classical Freudian analysis; the patient is offered 
five or six fifty-minute sessions a week; a couch is provided for him to recline on, with 
the analyst sitting behind him; he is invited to free-associate, and the analyst interprets 
his associations. Not only is this formal setting the same as that in classical technique, 
but in all essentials the psychoanalytic principles as laid down by Freud are adhered to. 
The role of the analyst is confined to interpreting the patient’s material, and all 
criticism, advice, encouragement, reassurance, and the like, is rigorously avoided. The 
interpretations are centered on the transference situation, impartially taking up 
manifestations of positive and negative transference as they appear. By transference I 
mean here not only the «here-and-now» relation to the analyst, but the relation to the 
analyst, including reference to past relationships as transferred onto the analyst, and 
current problems and relationships in their interrelation with the transference. Special 
attention is paid to the transference onto the analyst of internal figures from the patient’s 
inner world. The level at which the interpretations are given, again as indicated by 
Freud, is determined by the level of the patient’s maximum unconscious anxiety. In 
these respects, the Kleinian analyst may be considered to be following the classical 
Freudian technique with the greatest exactitude, more so indeed than most other 
Freudian analysts, who find that they have had to alter their analytical technique in 
some of its essential aspects when dealing with pre-psychotic, psychotic, or 
psychopathic patients. Analysts using the Kleinian approach (Rosenfeld, 1965; Segal, 
1950, 1956; Bion, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959) find it both possible and useful to retain the 
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strictly psychoanalytic technique even with these patients. Could it be said, therefore, 
that there is no room for the term Kleinian technique? It seems to me that it is legitimate 
to speak of a technique as developed by Melanie Klein in that the nature of the 
interpretations given to the patient and the changes of emphasis in the analytical process 
show, in fact, a departure, or, as Melanie Klein saw it, an evolution from the classical 
technique. She saw aspects of material not seen before, and interpreting those aspects, 
she revealed further material which might not have been reached otherwise and which, 
in turn, dictated new interpretations seldom, if ever, used in the classical technique. To 
understand the rationale of the Kleinian approach and to appreciate the way in which the 
technique grew, it is best to place it its historical setting. When Melanie Klein, in the 
1920s, started her work with children, she assumed that Freud’s method could be 
applied to children with only such modifications as would not alter the essence of the 
psychoanalytical relationship and the interpretative process. Since children do not 
verbalize easily, and since play is one of their major means of expression, she provided 
each child patient with a drawer of small, simple toys and play material, and she 
interpreted their play, behaviour, and verbal communications in the way in which she 
would have interpreted an adult’s free associations. She observed that children develop 
transference, both positive and negative, very rapidly and often intensely. She found out 
that the children’s communications, through various activities in the session, revealed 
their unconscious conflicts with a clarity identical to or even greater than that of the 
adult’s free associations. The analysis of children fully confirmed Freud’s deductions 
about childhood derived from work with adults, but, as might be expected, certain new 
facts emerged. The Oedipus complex and the superego seemed both to be in evidence at 
an earlier age than one would have expected and to have pre-genital, as well as genital, 
forms. Indeed, the roots of the oedipal situation seemed to lie as far back as the second 
oral phase. The superego of the small child was equally well in evidence, possessed of 
savage and primitive oral, anal, and urethral characteristics. She was impressed by the 
prevalence and power of the mechanisms of projection and introjection: the 
introjections leading to the building of a complex inner world and the projections 
colouring most of the child’s perceptions of reality. Splitting was very active as an early 
mechanism preceding repression, and the child’s development appeared to be a constant 
struggle toward integration and the overcoming of powerful splitting mechanisms. Once 
seen in the child, these more primitive levels of experience could be understood and 
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detected in the material of adult patients” (Segal, 1981a, pp. 3-5).   
 This long quotation of Hanna Segal’s “The Work of Hanna Segal, a Kleinian 
approach to clinical practice” illustrates threw a cogent ‘synthesis’ what was, borrowing 
Segal’s expression, ‘Melanie Klein’s rationale’.      
 Segal: “worked particularly to organize and establish more soundly the Kleinian 
Group after Klein’s death, and has been extremely active in making Kleinian concepts 
known to those outside the Kleinian Group and outside psychoanalysis” (Hinshelwood, 
op. cit., p. 424). I put also in attention the authors that Segal identified as ‘followers’ of 
Klein’s work: herself, Rosenfeld and Bion. Segal contributed to the pioneering: “of the 
psychoanalysis of schizophrenics in the 1940s and 1950s together with Scott, Rosenfeld 
and Bion. She was particularly struck by the importance of the disturbance to symbol-
formation in schizophrenics (Segal, 1950)” (Hinshelwood, op. cit., p. 424).
 Accordingly, Jones, Ferenczi and Milner have discerned a particular form of 
symbolism in which there is an equation of the symbol with the things symbolized, 
resulting in the symbol being dealt with as if it really were the original (cf., Jones, 1916; 
Ferenczi, 1912a, pp. 215-224; Milner, 1952a, pp. 181-194). However, these problems 
had to wait proper elucidation until Segal’s crucial paper “Notes on symbol formation” 
published in 1957, republished in “The Work of Hanna Segal, a Kleinian approach to 
clinical practice” (cf., Segal, 1957, pp. 391-397; 1981a, pp. 49-65).    
 Segal showed that the capacity to use symbols entailed constructing a 
relationship between the symbol and what is symbolized (at root, a part of the body) 
which could leave room for a distinction to be made between them. She contrasted this 
with the ‘symbolic equation’: when there is a failure to distinguish between the things 
symbolized and the symbol, it: ‘is part of a disturbance in the relation between the ego 
and the object. Parts of the ego and internal objects are projected into an [external] 
object and identified with it. The differentiation between the self and object is obscured. 
Since a part of the ego is then confused with the object, the symbol –which is a creation 
and a function of the ego– becomes, in turn, confused with the object which is 
symbolized’ (cf., Segal, 1957, pp. 391-397).    
 Equating symbols and their referents interferes with thought and behaviour in 
serious ways because of the disturbance of the ability to recognize reality. Symbolic 
equation results from the use of pathological projective identification, which confuses 
objects with parts of the self, but Segal in a postscript (1979) to the original paper 
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(1957) clarifies that: “Since writing this paper, and largely under the influence of Bion’s 
work on the relationship between the container and the contained, I have come to think 
that it is not projective identification per se that leads to concretization. One has to take 
into account the particular relationship between the projected part and the object 
projected into: the container and the contained” (Segal, 1981a, p. 60).  
 The whole phenomenon of disturbed symbol-formation, pathological projective 
identification and a damaged sense of reality is a feature of the ‘paranoid-schizoid 
position’ (see below). These papers (Segal, 1957, 1964a) were confirmation of Klein’s 
original working hypothesis that the fixation points for the psychoses lie in the 
paranoid-schizoid position (cf., Klein, 1935, pp. 282-310; 1940, pp. 311-338; 1946, pp. 
292-320).          
 To conclude Segal’s ‘review’ I must clarify her allocution to Bion’s ‘container-
contained model’. Bion’s concept of ‘container-contained’ corresponds to an abstract 
model of psychoanalytic ‘realizations’, representing a ‘psychoanalytic element’ to 
which Bion bestowed the signs of ♀: ‘container’, and ♂: ‘contained’, meaning feminine 
and masculine respectively, but without having a specific sexual connotation (cf., Bion, 
1970, p. 106). They are linked, according to the pleasure principle, to objects or 
concepts such as vagina-penis, mouth-breast, thinker-idea, or to models such as 
‘evacuation-retention’, ‘remembering-forgetting’, etc. (cf., Bion, op. cit., p. 29).  
 The applications of this model are heuristic but, in its ‘essence’, Bion describes 
three different kinds of links between container and contained: ‘(a) commensal, (b) 
symbiotic, (c) parasitic’ (cf., Bion, op. cit., pp. 95-96; 1962b, p. 91). These 
epistemological variables are fecund but need clarification: “By ‘commensal’ I mean a 
relationship in which two objects share a third to the advantage of all three. By 
‘symbiotic’ I understand a relationship in which one depends on another to mutual 
advantage. By ‘parasitic’ I mean to represent a relationship in which one depends on 
another to produce a third which is destructive of all three” (Bion, 1970, p. 95). I will 
further on develop this construct in a more detailed way.     
 With the definition of Bion’s ‘container-contained model’ and its ‘variables’ I 
approach now this author, who was a ‘Kleinian follower’, but a man of great 
epistemological independence, a prolific theorist and a heuristic clinician. Some say his 
achievements were second only to those of Klein herself (Segal, 1981a); though some 
would say (Harris, 1987e, pp. 340-344; Meltzer, 1978b, 1986a) their potential far out 
125 
 
strips those of Klein: “if there is yet a post-Kleinian school or tradition, Bion is it” 
(Hinshelwood, op. cit., p. 231). These are the reasons why I will develop Bion in such 
detail; I steer into Meltzer’s harbour in what concerns Bion’s epistemological and 
clinical conceptualizations: Bion ‘surpasses’ Klein theoretically, meta-theoretically and 
clinically, as I will try to illustrate below.       
 Bion’s contributions are very extensive, but his writings appear gnomic (like 
Klein’s writings, as I said), irritating but paradoxically intensely stimulating, and this 
style has been responsible for a tendency to sanctify him (exactly what happened to 
Klein) while not really understanding him. All Kleinians today regard their present 
practice and theory as having been significantly moulded by his work (cf., Schafer, 
1997b).           
 It is impossible, by the very nature of a review, to convey the scale of Bion’s 
impact on Kleinian and especially psychoanalytic thinking. The character of Kleinian 
psychoanalysis has developed significantly from Klein’s paper on schizoid mechanisms 
(cf., Klein, 1946, pp. 292-320), but the following up of those ideas was done largely by 
her group of followers, as I said, and Bion has emerged as the most original of them (in 
my, Meltzer’s and Hinshelwood’s perspective, among others). The most far-reaching 
developments are: “(a) the recognition of normal and omnipotent projective 
identification; (b) the theory of the emotional containing of the personality; and (c) the 
theory of thinking that derive meaning itself from the most primitive infantile 
configurations of emotions. In all these developments Bion has been the foremost 
figure” (Hinshelwood, op. cit., p. 235).        
 A major point in contemporary Kleinian debate is how to allot Bion his 
significance: whether he has moved beyond Klein to be acknowledged as, in effect, the 
founder of a new school of psychoanalysis, as me, Meltzer, Harris and others suggested 
(cf., Harris, 1987e, pp. 340-344; Meltzer, 1978b, 1986a), or whether the developments 
with which Bion has been especially associated: “are part and parcel of a general 
development of Kleinian thought that also includes (a) Segal’s development of a 
Kleinian theory of symbolism [see above] and the aesthetic experience, (b) the 
developments made by Rosenfeld [see below], Joseph and others on personality 
structure, and (c) the continuing study of children and infants by Bick and others, 
developing the theory of internal spaces and adhesive identification” (Hinshelwood, op. 
cit., p. 235; my alterations).          
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 I will not develop the various variables from this epistemological debate, but, for 
the above mentioned reasons (and because I was trained with a Kleinian/Bionian 
orientation) I will work Bion in a extensive detailed way, doing so I take Bion’s ‘vertex’ 
into my harbour: “In using the term «vertex» I employ a geometrical concept of a high 
degree of sophistication” (Bion, 1965, p. 92). Bion uses this term as a point of view, or 
a projection from a vertex, but with a mathematical association instead of just a simple 
expression: “You cannot use terms like ‘from the point of view of smell’ because the 
patient will say ‘I don’t view things with my nose’. It sounds as if the patient was trying 
to be difficult, but he is in fact being extremely accurate; he cannot understand a phrase 
which is conversational language. It is, therefore, better to borrow a term from 
mathematics like ‘vertex’” (Bion, 1974, pp. 88-89).    
 Therefore, from Bion’s ‘vertex’ I will develop the key-concept of Klein, Bion 
and all the ‘Kleinian followers’: projective identification. Projective identification has 
been used by the ‘Kleinian followers’ to re-conceptualize the psychoanalytic theory of 
early development and psychopathology, as well as its principles of technique (cf., 
Hinshelwood, op. cit.; see above). I will unfold this key-concept articulating it with 
some other major constructs of Bion’s conceptualizations.     
 Bion, in his “Transformations” published in 1965, is explicit about his 
epistemological orientation: “I mean to employ the following theories: (1) The theory of 
projective identification and splitting; mechanisms by which the breast provides what 
the patient later takes over as his own apparatus for α-function. (2) The theory that some 
personalities cannot tolerate frustration. (3) The theory that a personality with a 
powerful endowment of envy tends to denude its objects by both stripping and 
exhaustion. (4) The theory that at an early stage (or in a primitive level of mind) the 
oedipal situation is represented by part objects. (5) The Kleinian theory of envy and 
greed. (6) The theory that primitive thought springs from experience of a non-existent 
object, or, in other terms, of the place where the object is expected to be, but is not. (7) 
The theory of violence in primitive functions” (Bion, 1965, p. 51).   
 From Bion’s perspective, projective identification is a crucial component of the 
early child-mother interaction and regarding this issue (and several others as I will 
develop further on) the author conceptualized a complete new theory (see above) and a 
complete new terminology, unfolding a highly fecund new deconstructive 
‘secondary discourse’.        
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 Therefore, before I approach Bion’s constructs I will illustrate his thinking 
towards projective identification and (from his perspective) its inherent categories with 
a preparatory sketch (some paragraphs) where his epistemology is already ‘translated’, 
but afterwards I will work his theoretical and clinical constructs ‘directly’: I will work 
this author with extensive detail as I said above.     
 Returning to the subject, Bion argues that in the early child-mother interaction 
projective identification is a central dynamic: the infant attempts to rid itself of distress 
by projecting it into the mother.         
 In Bion’s view the primary role of the mother in early infancy is to be a 
‘container’ for the frustration and pain the child’s infantile ego is too fragile to contain. 
The mother not only contains the tension but also gives it back to the infant in a 
tolerable form. The mother’s ability to soothe the infant in distress is dependent on her 
capacity to absorb the infant’s tension and to allow the infant to internalize her as an 
object capable of tolerating the original anxiety (cf., Segal, 1981a). In this way the 
infant becomes capable of managing frustration and anxiety, thus acquiring a primary 
foundation of mental stability. That is to say, the mother’s ability to allow the infant’s 
projective identifications plays a crucial role in its eventual mental health.  
 The corollary of this view of early mothering is that if the mother is unable to 
contain the infant’s distress, the child is left with overwhelming anxiety and is forced to 
deny reality. In extreme cases the denial leads to psychosis.   
 According to Bion’s particular way of formulating psychotic thought process, 
which is based on Klein’s theory of the early projective and introjective processes and 
his own theory, thinking originates in a mating of a ‘preconception’ and a ‘frustration’ 
(cf., Bion, 1957a, pp. 43-64). If the infant expects a breast and none is forthcoming and 
if a minimal capacity for frustration exists, the thought ‘no breast’ will be created to 
bridge the gulf between the want and the satisfying action. Bion calls this process 
‘learning from experience’ (cf., Bion, 1962b). The development of thought, in this view, 
both depends on the capacity for frustration tolerance and increases it. If the mother 
cannot fulfil her function as container, the infant does not have enough frustration 
tolerance for thought development to occur (cf., Bion, 1959, pp. 308-315). 
 Instead, the infant evades frustration by treating thoughts as bad objects that 
must be evacuated and by ‘attacks on linking’ (see below: cf., Bion, 1959, pp. 308-315; 
1967a) between thoughts in an effort to deny reality. The result is a fragmenting of the 
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thought process and eventual psychosis (cf., Bion, 1957a, pp. 43-64). Further, the infant 
is forced into a desperately excessive use of both projective identification and splitting 
in an effort to rid itself of frustrating experience; the outcome is forceful effort to enter 
the object, which results in psychotic delusions: “This paper [Attacks on linking] relate 
to that state of mind in which the patient’s (the infant’s) psyche contains an internal 
object which is opposed to, and destructive of, all links whatsoever from the most 
primitive (which I have suggested is a normal degree of projective identification) to the 
most sophisticated forms of communication and the arts. In this state of mind emotion is 
hated; it is felt to be too powerful to be contained by the immature psyche, it is felt to 
link objects and it gives reality to objects which are not self and therefore inimical to 
primary narcissism. The internal object which in its origin was an external breast that 
refused to introject, harbour, and so modify the baneful force of emotion, is felt, 
paradoxically, to intensify, relative to the strength of the ego, the emotions against 
which it initiates the attacks. These attacks on the linking function of emotion lead to an 
over-prominence in the psychotic part of the personality of links which appear to be 
logical, almost mathematical, but never emotionally reasonable. Consequently the links 
surviving are perverse, cruel and sterile” (Bion, 1959 in Spillius, 1988, p. 100; my 
alteration).           
 In Bion’s (1957a, pp. 43-64, 1962a, pp. 306-310) view, even if the infant 
attempts at projective identification are successful the object does not completely 
tolerate the anxiety, and when it is re-introjected it becomes attacking and starves the 
personality of all good qualities. If the infant’s intolerance for frustration is too great –
yet not enough for evasion– the outcome will be the use of omnipotence to avoid 
reality. In this case, omniscience becomes a substitute for ‘learning from experience’, 
and reality is denied, but thought does not become fragmented and the resulting 
personality organization is borderline rather than psychotic: “The establishment 
internally of a projective-identification-rejecting-object means that instead of an 
understanding object the infant has a wilfully misunderstanding object –with which it is 
identified. Further its psychic qualities are perceived by a precocious and fragile 
consciousness. The apparatus available to the psyche may be regarded as fourfold: (a) 
thinking, associated with modification and evasion; (b) projective identification, 
associated with evasion by evacuation; (c) omniscience (on the principle of tout savoir 
tout condemner); (d) communication” (Bion, 1962b in Spillius, 1988, p. 184).  
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 After this preparatory sketch I will now develop the ‘technicalities’, specially his 
fecund complete new psychoanalytic terminology articulated with also a complete new 
theory and meta-theory, unfolding a complete new ‘secondary discourse’, which is as 
heuristic as it is deconstructive, validating what I defend throughout my entire Thesis: 
the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs 
Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical 
method: once again, the deconstruction.        
 Bion posits projective identification as the ‘first theory’ that he ‘employs’, but he 
also articulates this concept with the α-function: α-function is deeply interconnected, 
along to projective identification, with the above mentioned ‘container-contained 
model’ and with transference–counter-transference interaction in the analytic setting; α-
function represents an ‘abstraction’ used to describe the capacity to change sense 
information into ‘α-elements’: “By α-function I mean that function by which sense 
impressions are transformed into elements capable of storage for use in dream and other 
thoughts” (Bion, 1963, p. 4; cf., Bion, 1992, p. 63), as well as providing the mind with 
material to create ‘dream thoughts’ that could allow discrimination between being 
asleep or awake, conscious or unconscious and give a sense of identity and selfness (cf., 
Bion, 1967a, p. 115).          
 Alpha-function (α-function) is also the product of an adequate relationship 
between the baby and the mother, which permits the existence of normal projective 
identifications. Usually the baby is not fit to use his sense information for himself, and 
this is why he needs to evacuate it into the mother and to depend on her capacity for 
‘reverie’, to change ‘β-elements’ into ‘α-elements’ that he will then be able to use; α-
function works over sense experiences and emotions, and if successful, it will produce 
α-elements that could be stored as a ‘contact barrier’ between unconscious and 
conscious, capable of producing thoughts (cf., Bion, 1963, pp. 17-18): “the term 
‘contact-barrier’ emphasizes the establishment of contact between conscious and 
unconscious and the selective passage of elements from one to the other” (Bion, 1963, 
p. 17).             
 If α-function becomes inoperative, sense impressions and emotions experienced 
by the person remain unaltered, creating what Bion called the above mentioned ‘β-
elements’, or following Kant (1781), the ‘thing-in-itself’ or ‘noumenon’, different from 
α-function that represent the ‘phenomenon’. In the beginning of his work Bion 
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described ‘β-elements’ (without terming them) as: “objects compounded of things-in-
themselves, feelings of depression-persecution and guilt and therefore aspects of 
personality linked by a sense of catastrophe” (Bion, 1963, p. 40). He said they were: 
“indigested or non-dreamed facts” (Bion, 1992, p. 64) that have not been transformed 
by α-function, and also ‘unreal or dead objects’ in contrast with the above mentioned 
‘α-elements’, to which he referred as ‘alive and real objects’ (cf., Bion, 1992, p. 133).
 Finally he coined them, in an undated note in “Cogitations”, as ‘β-elements’ (cf., 
Bion, 1992, p. 181). The above mentioned ‘reverie’ is ‘maternal reverie’, which is a 
concept based on Kleinian projective identification theory (cf., Klein, 1935, pp. 282-
310; 1957, pp. 176-235; Bion, 1963, p. 90) and mentioned by Bion in his “Theory of 
thinking” (cf., Bion, 1962a, p. 116). It refers to the mother’s (analyst) capacity to 
develop a psychological receptor organ capable of metabolizing the baby’s conscious 
sensuous information and transform it into ‘α-elements’, which are necessary to develop 
α-function, as I said above. Bion says that: “reverie is a factor of the mother’s alpha-
function [α-function]” (Bion, 1963, p. 36; my alteration): her love is expressed by 
reverie.          
 According to Bion, a normal development takes place if the relationship between 
the baby (analysand) and the breast (analyst) enables the baby to project inside the 
mother a feeling such as, for instance, that he is dying, and then re-introject it after its 
permanence in the breast has made it more tolerable for the baby’s mind. If the 
projection is not accepted by the mother the baby feels his death to be real and instead 
of re-introjecting a more tolerable fear of dying, he will re-introject a ‘nameless terror’ 
(cf., Bion, ib.). The baby benefits from the mother’s daydreaming or capacity for 
reverie, just in the same way he benefits from the milk he consumes that is digested in 
the digestive canal. If the α-function is the one that makes available to the baby that 
which in other circumstances would be unavailable for any purpose except for 
evacuation as ‘β-elements’: Bion asks: “what are the factors of this function that relate 
directly to the mother’s capacity for reverie?” (Bion, ib.).     
 If the mother’s reverie is not associated with love for the baby, this fact will be 
communicated to him (baby/analysand) although in an incomprehensible way. Bion 
associates reverie only with feelings of love and hate from the child, and believes it to 
be a ‘factor’ of the mother’s α-function, which permits a total disclosure towards the 
reception of any projective identification coming from the baby regardless of being felt 
131 
 
as a good or bad object: “Whenever I use the term ‘function’ I use it to denote 
something which is and has a function. In so far as it is a function it has factors: in do 
far as it has a function it has aims” (Bion, 1963, p. 9; cf., Bion, 1962b, p. 36; cf., Bion, 
1974, pp. 83-85), or more explicitly: “I shall suppose that there are factors in the 
personality that combine to produce stable entities which I call functions of the 
personality… ‘Function’ is the name for the mental activity proper to a number of 
factors operating in consort. ‘Factor’ is the name for a mental activity operating in 
consort with other mental activities to constitute a function” (Bion, 1963, pp. 1-2).  
 As we can see this entire psychological dynamic describes a new theory of 
relationships which advances beyond the traditional paradigm of sexuality. However it 
may be stated the other way round: that the Oedipus complex and its disturbance can 
come to invest any one of these interpenetrating contacts. Contact can be thought of as a 
process of containing. One thing becomes jammed into another, with or without 
violence. Bion described, as I said above, a whole phenomenology of the container-
contained relationship articulated with many ‘psychoanalytic elements’ (reverie; α-
function; β-elements; α-elements), in which the contained might ‘explode’ the 
container, or in turn might be constricted and suffocated by the container; or 
alternatively there could be a mutual adaptation between the two. He described 
‘symbiotic’, ‘parasitic’ and ‘commensal’ forms of the relationship (see above: Bion, 
1970) as I said above.         
 The clinical notion of this theory seems to have been mentioned for the first time 
when Bion, in his 1959 article “Attacks on linking” (see above: this article was 
originally a paper read before the British Psychoanalytical Society on 20 October 1957, 
and was first published in 1959 in the “International journal of Psychoanalysis”, 40, pp. 
308-315, and was reprinted in “Second Thoughts”, 1967a, pp. 93-109), refers to 
mother’s aptitude to deal with the baby’s ‘primary aggression and envy’.   
 Bion used several words to describe the mother’s reaction: ‘un-receptiveness’, to 
‘remain balanced’, ‘comfortable state of mind’ (cf., Bion, 1992) and finally, when 
describing the transference–counter-transference interaction with a patient, he says: 
“Projective identification makes it possible for him to investigate his own feelings in a 
personality powerful enough to contain them” (Bion, 1967a, p. 106). 
 Although Bion described this interpenetrating form of contact first of all in the 
process of developing thoughts and theories, he extended it to all kind of phenomena: 
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getting thoughts into words; the thought, or the feeling, in the individual’s mind; the 
individual in his social group; the infant in mother’s consciousness (reverie), inter-alia 
(cf., Bion, 1992).          
 These heuristic applications of this new theory/‘secondary discourse’ reside 
mainly, as I said above, in the inherent dynamic between the alpha-function and the 
‘container-contained’ model; it is because of alpha-function operations that a baby 
(analysand) is capable of incorporating relations of the kind present in ♀ ♂. One word 
could contain a ‘meaning’, or the opposite: a meaning could contain a word; the 
relationship between the two will be established following one of the forms mentioned 
above: ‘commensal’ will mean that both, container and contained benefit from each 
other; for instance an invention could benefit from a thinker and vice versa.  
 Or it could be ‘symbiotic’, and then one will destroy the other, for instance the 
word ‘testify’ was originally represented by Egyptian hieroglyphics with the picture of 
male genitalia, meaning that only men, having testicles, were qualified to bear witness 
(cf., Bion, 1992; Eliade, 2005). Today the meaning of the word still remains, but the 
concept that originally ‘contained’ it disappeared (in this context the ‘phenomenological 
envelope’ that Merleau-Ponty [1945] posits in his “Phenomenology of Perception” is a 
semantic envelope: etymology being the semantic envelope of all words).  
 Finally the relationship could be ‘parasitic’ were both ♀ ♂ would destroy each 
other, for instance a relationship dominated by envy and revenge that at the end will 
only have ‘–K’ as a result: “–K represents the link constituted by NOT understanding 
i.e. mis-understanding. The implications can best be grasped by noting that –L is not the 
same as H, nor –H the same as L” (Bion, 1962b, p. 52). I will explain these signs below.
 Bion published “Learning from Experience” in 1962 and then he introduced the 
signs L, H, and K from chapter fourteen to chapter sixteen formulating what is today 
called a ‘Theory of Linking’ (cf., Meltzer et al., 1982, pp. 185-202): “Chapters 14-16 
introduce the signs L, H, and K, for use in the discussion of the matter in this book” 
(Bion, 1962b, p. 1). This theory is articulated (once again) with the container-contained 
model because the coupling of penis and vagina, or mouth and nipple, is taken by Bion 
as a prototype of the way mental objects are put together, one inside the other. Thus 
putting experiences into thoughts, and thoughts into words, entails a repeated chain of 
linking processes modelled on physical intercourse between two bodily parts (cf., Bion, 
1970, pp. 106-107, p. 123).         
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 With this model (container-contained) Bion went on to investigate the nature of 
thoughts itself and described its basis in the linking together of thoughts, in the mating 
of ‘pre-conceptions’ (expectations) with ‘realizations’. The particular kind of links that 
go to make up thinking are designated by the notation ‘K’ that he develops in detail (cf., 
Bion, 1962b, pp. 47-52, pp. 76-99), and existing alongside other kind of links, ‘L’ and 
‘H’ (cf., Bion, 1962b, pp. 42-46) representing loving and hating the object: “the feelings 
we know by the names ‘love’ and ‘hate’ would seem to be obvious choices if the 
criterion is basic emotion. Envy and Gratitude, Depression, Guilt, Anxiety, all occupy a 
dominant place in psycho-analytic theory and would seem with Sex to be choices to 
place with love and hate. In fact I prefer three factors I regard as intrinsic to the link 
between objects considered to be in relationship with each other. An emotional 
experience cannot be conceived of in isolation from a relationship. The basic 
relationships that I postulate are (1) X loves Y; (2) X hates Y; and (3) X knows Y. 
These links will be expressed by the signs L, H, and K” (Bion, 1962b, pp. 42-43; my 
underline).          
 Accordingly, with these signs Bion postulated a ‘minus phenomena’ as we saw 
above: ‘–L, –H, –K’ that represent a negative form of link; –L is not equivalent to H, as 
–H is not equivalent to L either (see above). Bion provided little illustration of the 
meaning of –L and –H, as he did with –K (see above). They are related to the ‘absence 
of something’ (cf., Bion, 1992) but it is not clear what exactly was that ‘something’ for 
Bion: “the first problem is to see what can be done to increase scientific rigor by 
establishing the nature of minus K (–K), minus L (–L) and minus H (–H)” (Bion, 
1962b, pp. 51-52).           
 In the end of chapter 11 (that he starts with the discussion of the Oedipus myth) 
he questions: “is it possible to glean from the mechanisms involved in this behavioural 
any material that will through light on minus phenomena (–L, –H and –K) and 
incidentally on the problem of establishing the elements of psychoanalysis?” (Bion, 
1962b, p. 53).          
 The author is not explicit but he gives some ‘epistemological clues’ about it: 
“the conflict between the view of the patient and analyst, and in the patient with 
himself, is not therefore a conflict, as we see it in the neuroses, between one set of ideas 
and another, or one set of impulses and another, but between K and minus K (–K) or, to 
express it pictorially between Tiresias and Oedipus, not Oedipus and Laios” (Bion, op. 
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cit., p. 51).          
 From my perspective, perhaps –L could be represented by emotions observed in 
the transference, as we saw above, as in the classical ‘transference love’, or the 
difference between ‘need’ and ‘unconditional love’. –H, on the other hand, might be 
equivalent to emotions present in autistic patients, where repudiation of the object is 
achieved by means of mechanisms different from splitting and direct aggression, which 
Meltzer has described as ‘dismantling’ (cf., Meltzer et al., 1975) in his “Explorations in 
Autism”.           
 This entire dynamic is articulated with the ‘growth’ or ‘non-growth’ of the 
patient, and using Elliot Jacques (1960) notion of ‘integrative reticulum’, which 
describes the existence of a complex mental schema that will help the mind finally to 
acquire the idea of a total object, Bion explains how growth, intricate and successive, 
between container and contained, achieves such levels of abstraction that allows the 
possibility of ‘learning from experience’ (cf., Jacques, 1960, pp. 357-367; Bion, 1962b).
 Development follows the evolution of Klein’s paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions (cf., Klein, 1946, pp. 292-320), and will require at a given moment the 
presence of a ‘selected fact’ (see below). Contents (♂) characterize doubts, questions or 
variables linked by emotional experiences that successively add to each other within the 
containers (♀), in a continuum that could be portrayed as ♂ⁿ + ♀ⁿ (container and 
contained elevated to n: a never ending continuum growth), corresponding to a process 
that will guarantee growth and capacity to learn from experience.    
 This learning will depend on the capacity of ♀ⁿ to integrate and to keep open at 
the same time, free of rigidity and ready for further assimilations. An individual in 
whom this mechanism operates will be capable of preserving knowledge and 
experience, and capable of using his past experiences as well as being receptive to new 
ones (cf., Bion, 1962b, pp. 92-93).       
 Therefore the level of K will depend on this kind of ‘commensal’ relationship, 
for instance, the successive complexity of new ‘hypotheses’ (see below) that will form 
systems and later on ‘deductive scientific systems’ (see below). Bion also relates the 
‘apparatus for thinking’ (see below) to ‘I’ (Idea), assuring that the material out of which 
the apparatus is formed and has to deal with, is ‘I’ (cf., Bion, 1962b, p. 31). 
 There is, on the other hand, as we saw above, a ♂♀ situation completely 
dominated by envy, where the result will not be K but –K. Under these circumstances 
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the baby splits and projects its feelings of fear inside the breast together with envy and 
hate, a condition that obviously will prevent the appearance of the ♂♀ commensal 
relationship that will have K as a product (see above: cf., Bion, 1962b, pp. 47-52, pp. 
76-99).            
 In this condition it is felt that the breast enviously removes all goodness and 
valuable ‘elements’ (see below) that could metabolize the baby’s fear of death, and in 
its place forces back inside denigrated residues that will determine the manifestation of 
a ‘nameless terror’, a kind of container-contained provision that Bion represents as –K 
(see above).           
 This condition becomes very serious when the breast not only is unable to 
neutralize the wish to die, but removes the wish to live (see below: cf., Bion, 1962b, pp. 
97-99), represented again by Bion as (minus) ‘–(♂♀)’ (see below) and qualified as a 
‘without-ness’, meaning: “…an internal object without an exterior. It is an alimentary 
canal without a body. It is a super-ego that has hardly any of the characteristics of the 
super-ego as understood in psycho-analysis: it is a «super» ego. It is an envious 
assertion of moral superiority without any morals. In short it is the resultant of an 
envious stripping or denudation of all good…and will continue this process till –♂–♀ 
represents hardly more than an empty superiority-inferiority that in turn degenerates to 
nullity” (Bion, 1962b, p. 97; see below).       
 I must clarify some of the above mentioned terminology because, mutatis 
mutandis, Bion is similar to Heidegger (cf., Heidegger, 1927, 1959): he created a new 
psychoanalytic language with a new semiotic cipher [strongly based in the etymology of 
words: that is why throughout this review I ‘apply’ this etymological method; words 
are semantic envelopes… etymologic containers (see above); a ‘secondary discourse’ in 
its full meaning, that is, in its deconstructive method].     
 Bion introduced the concept ‘selected fact’ in “Learning from Experience” 
(1962b). This concept was originally used by the famous mathematician Henri Poincaré 
in his book “Science and Method” (1908) to explain the process of creation of a 
mathematical formulation.         
 Bion reproduces Poincaré’s text in “Learning from Experience”: “If a new result 
is to have any value, it must unite elements long since known, but till then scattered and 
seemingly foreign to each other, and suddenly introduce order where the appearance of 
disorder reigned. Then it enables us to see at a glance each of these elements in the 
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place it occupies in the whole. Not only is the new fact valuable on its own account, but 
it alone gives a value to the old facts it unites. Our mind is frail as our senses are; it 
would lose itself in the complexity of the world if that complexity were not harmonious; 
like the short-sighted, it would only see the details, and would be obliged to forget each 
of these details before examining the next, because it would be incapable of taking in 
the whole. The only facts worthy of our attention are those which introduce order into 
this complexity and so make it accessible to us” (Bion, 1962b, p. 72).   
 This is a fecund and highly heuristic new psychoanalytic construct, which Bion 
will articulate and develop with many other concepts: in his ‘commentaries’ about the 
“Imaginary twin” [Bion’s membership paper presented to the British Psychoanalytic 
Society (1950), published in the “International Journal of Psychoanalysis” (1955) and in 
“Second Thoughts” (1967a, pp. 3-22)], although by then (1950) he had not yet 
mentioned Poincaré, it is obvious that Bion is referring to the ‘selected fact’, when he 
said: “[It is] what I now call an ‘evolution’, namely, the coming together, by a sudden 
precipitating intuition, of a mass of apparently unrelated incoherent phenomena which 
are thereby given coherence and meaning not previously possessed” (Bion, 1967a, p. 
17; my alteration); and he adds is his very particular ‘metaphoric’ narrative: “From the 
material the patient produces, there emerges, like the pattern from a kaleidoscope, a 
configuration which seems to belong not only to the situation unfolding, but to a 
number of others not previously seen to be connected and which it has not been 
designed to connect” (Bion, ib.).        
 In “Cogitations” (1992), in an undated note, probably written some time before 
the previous quotation, Bion correlated selected facts and common sense, stating that 
the former would provide sense to an idea which, once proven to be true and 
communicated to others, would integrate, like a selected fact, a great amount of people, 
societies or groups, according to the sense such an idea had made common to all. At 
first it will be a private fact, and later on, after it is believed to be true because it fits into 
a ‘scientific deductive system’, it will become public through communication and 
common sense, and will be able to integrate a large group of minds: “The acceleration 
of the falling body could not be ‘understood’ by Galileo till he had selected the fact that 
the fall was proportional to the time through which the body had fallen, and not the 
distance (is this an instance of asking the right question: ‘when?’, not ‘where?’). This 
fact is not a scientific fact unless and until it can be communicated and then found to be 
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(or not to be) a fact that fulfils this function of integration for a large number of people, 
or a society or a group ‘in common’. But at first it is a private fact and is chosen 
because it fits into a scientific deductive system or calculus of immense complexity, for 
it is co-extensive with the entire mentality of the person” (Bion, 1992, p. 193; my bold).
 A ‘cause’ and a selected fact are very much alike, because they can both be 
associated with an emotional experience capable of providing, at a given moment, a 
sense of synthesis or creative association. At the same time it will also bring knowledge 
of the discrete, not yet connected objects. A selected fact is associated with the synthesis 
of objects in a synchronic manner where time is excluded, while cause relates in a 
diachronic way following time as narrative (cf., Bion, op. cit., p. 275; see above: cf., 
Heidegger, 1927).          
 For instance, an interpretation could act, at a particular instant (timeless), as a 
selected fact that triggers a series of associations that have unconsciously remained in 
‘constant conjunction’ (see below), while leaving out other ‘discrete objects’ no bound 
to this chain of associations. On the other hand, we know because of the Oedipus myth 
narrative, what exactly –emotionally– follows in time (diachronic time) after Oedipus’s 
arrival at the crossroads.         
 I will explain the above mentioned concept ‘constant conjunction’ and the way 
Bion articulates it with the selected fact and the interpretation itself; in this example is 
the interpretation ‘of breast’, which is inherent to ‘reverie’ and to ‘alpha-function’ 
already referred to (see above), but that I will clarify in this specific dynamic: “I used as 
the name for a definitory hypothesis the word ‘breast’, which has a historical meaning 
that is simple and direct. It may therefore be said already to be a definitory hypothesis –
in my terminology– which indicates the constant conjunction presumably for a number 
of simple phenomena such as woman, warmth, love, sensuality, and so forth… The 
situation in analysis that requires the use of the term ‘breast’…requires it because 
breast, if the interpretation is correct, is a hypothesis in the Humean (Hume, 1751) 
sense which fixes a constellation of associations that are constantly conjoined but have 
lost their connection with the material expressed by the free associations of the analysis, 
these last having become conjoined with material now alienated from, or never in 
contact with, the penumbra of associations of breast. The juxtaposition, by 
interpretation of breast, to the events of the analysis can be seen to resemble a provision 
by the analyst of a selected fact that the patient cannot find for himself” (Bion, op. cit., 
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p. 252; my alterations)…‘the patient cannot find for himself’ because he is lost in the 
‘crossroad’, he is lost in his own ‘labyrinth’ (see below: Grotstein, 2000): the selected 
fact is the Ariadne thread that allows the patient to find himself in his internal labyrinth.
 More objectively, Bion explains that the selected fact describes the synthesis 
processes experienced by the psychoanalyst, similar to the way in which paranoid-
schizoid objects become coherent and initiate the depressive positions, as adumbrated 
by Klein (see above: cf., Klein, 1930b, pp. 219-232; 1946, pp. 292-320), and also being 
very similar to Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’ (cf., Laplanche, 1999; see above). 
 The selected fact corresponds to an emotional experience that appears due to 
feelings of coherence and discovery, which does not necessarily have to be logical, but 
does require a relaxed attitude on behalf of the analyst in order to provide a matrix of 
abstraction from where the interpretation can spring. If this process is obstructed (by 
absence of reverie), on the other hand, it will be accompanied by an emotion similar to 
the one experienced during a ‘reversible perspective’: “the total process depends on 
relaxed attention; this is the matrix for abstraction and identification of the selected 
fact” (Bion, 1962b, p. 87).         
 To conclude my explanation of this cogent construct I will differentiate selected 
fact and interpretation (of breast); the former as having a function of discovery (a 
oedipal function), the latter as having a function of repair; and as both promote the 
growth of the patient: “the selected fact is a discovery made by the patient or individual 
and is the tool by which he ensures the constant progression, the very essence of 
learning and therefore of growing” (Bion, ib.).      
 This is represented by the sequence: paranoid-schizoid position, selected fact 
(precipitating coherence of the elements of the paranoid-schizoid position) ushering in 
the depressive position, which then instantaneously reveals yet vaster areas of hitherto 
unrelated elements belonging to domains of the paranoid-schizoid position which were 
previously un-revealed and unsuspected –a revelation that contributes to the depression 
peculiar to the depressive position: “The selected fact then is an essential element of 
discovery. The interpretation –employing definitory hypotheses, such as breast, which 
have many resemblances to, and in some respects are identical with, the selected fact– is 
concerned not with discovery so much as with repair. This difference, important as it is, 
must not obscure the fact that the definitory hypotheses employed in interpretation, and 
the selected fact, are in one respect identical: they must be α-elements” (Bion, 1992, pp. 
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252-253; my italic), which are necessary to develop α-function, as I said above.  
 Bion says that: “reverie is a factor of the mother’s alpha-function [α-function]” 
(Bion, 1962b, p. 36; my alteration): her love is expressed by reverie; without ‘reverie’ 
nothing is discovered or repaired, everything remains as β-elements.   
 I will now explain in more extent the above mentioned concept ‘without-ness’. 
Bion uses this expression to describe a container-contained relationship controlled by 
‘envy’, which as a result would produce ‘–K’. In such a condition the baby splits and 
projects his fears inside the breast, together with feelings of envy and hatred that 
preclude a ‘commensal’ relationship. The breast is also felt enviously to remove the 
good or valuable elements that could be used to neutralize the baby’s fear of dying and 
in its place forces back into the infant worthless residues that will change the fear of 
dying into a ‘nameless dread’ or ‘terror without name’ (cf., Bion, 1962b; see below: 
Grotstein, 2000), which Bion represents as ‘–K’.      
 Bion considers this as a very serious condition (see above), because the breast 
not only does not neutralize the fear of dying, but might also remove the wish to live. 
This is also represented as ‘–(♀♂)’ (cf., Bion, 1962b, pp. 97-99), something Bion 
qualifies as ‘without-ness’ (that I explained above but, as I said, I will develop now in a 
much more  detailed and explicit narrative because of its heuristic potentialities) as Bion 
explains in chapter twenty-eight of “Learning from Experience” (1962b) entitled ‘–K’: 
“Since the projection by the infant is also impelled by envy the projection is felt as an 
envious denudation of the psyche from which, in K, only the fear of dying would have 
been removed. There is therefore hardly any infant to re-introject or into whom he 
denuded fear of dying can be forced. In K, ♀♂ can find a habitat because the infant can 
re-introject the related pair. But –♀ and –♂ are returned to an object that covers them 
with little more than the semblance of a psyche. The object that I described as being re-
introjected as ♀♂ in K was one in which the relationship of the elements ♀ and ♂ was 
commensal. In –K it is envious and therefore it is necessary to consider –♀ and –♂ and 
–(♀♂) in more detail. There are a number of peculiar features that are difficult to 
reconcile in a coherent theory. I shall accordingly describe them first without any 
attempt at explanation. In the first place its predominant characteristic I can only 
describe as «without-ness». It is an internal object without an exterior. It is an 
alimentary canal without a body. It is a super-ego that has hardly any of the 
characteristics of the super-ego as understood in psychoanalysis: it is «super» ego. It is 
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an envious assertion of moral superiority without any morals…The process of 
denudation continues till –♀–♂ represent hardly more than an empty superiority-
inferiority that it in turn degenerates to nullity [I repeat this paragraph already quoted 
above because of its epistemological importance to this context]. In so far as its 
resemblance to the super-ego is concerned –(♀♂) shows itself as a superior object 
asserting its superiority by finding fault with everything. The most important 
characteristic is its hatred of any new development in the personality as if the new 
development were a rival to be destroyed. The emergence therefore of any tendency to 
search for the truth, to establish contact with reality and in short to be scientific in no 
matter how rudimentary a fashion is met by destructive attacks on the tendency and the 
reassertion of the «moral» superiority…Restating in other terms, it can be seen as 
implying an attempt to retain a power to arouse guilt as an essential capacity. The power 
to arouse guilt is essential and appropriate to the operation of projective identification in 
a relationship between infant and breast. This guilt is peculiar in that its association with 
primitive projective identification implies that the guilt is meaningless. The –(♀♂) 
contrast therefore with conscience in that it does not lend itself to constructive activity. 
In contrast with the learning (K) function of ♀♂, –(♀♂) is engage in the collection of 
meaningful ♂ elements for subjection to –♀ so that these elements are stripped of their 
meaning and only the worthless residue is retained. The analyst’s interpretations are a 
part of the ♂ elements that are so treated, with the result that they are denuded of 
meaning. This envious extraction is to be contrasted with the process of abstraction 
peculiar to ♀♂ in K. The ego-like function of –(♀♂) is unlike ego function in 
destroying rather than promoting knowledge. This destructive activity is tinged with 
«moral» qualities derived from the «super» ego quality of –(♀♂). In other words –♀♂ 
asserts the moral superiority and superiority in potency of UN-learning. Successful 
operation of –(♀♂) has its achievement growth in development and power of –♀ and an 
ever-increasing accretion of ♂ elements for conversion to –♂ elements. In other words 
alpha-elements, however obtained, are acquired for conversion to beta-elements. In 
practice it means that the patient feels surrounded not so much by real objects, things-
in-themselves, but, by bizarre objects that are real only in that they are the residue of 
thoughts and conceptions that have been stripped of their meaning and rejected” (Bion, 
1962b, pp. 97-99; my alterations).        
 Later on in his book “Transformations” (1965) Bion develop even further this 
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fecund construct and represents ‘without-ness’ or ‘–(♂♀)’ as ‘–←↑’, even that he 
doesn’t explicitly establishes the epistemological  connection, but that we are ‘aware’ of 
because of his final works where he ‘sow’ the majority of his theoretical and clinical 
conceptualizations (cf., Bion, 1992): “First I consider ←↑ «in search for existence». 
What this sign represents must be determined by discovery of realizations 
approximating to it; it is both mental, and susceptible of sense-perception (sense-
perception must here be contrasted with, and distinguished from, Freud’s 
‘consciousness as a sense-organ of psychic quality’ [see chapter seven of «The 
Interpretation of Dreams» (cf., Freud, 1900b, pp. 339-621)]. Having allocated a sign 
←↑ which, according to my theory, means that there is a constant conjunction that 
requires being bound I need to know what the constant conjunction thus represented 
means. I might as well say that it is because I think there is a constant conjunction that I 
think there is a meaning. Further, my belief that that there is a meaning is itself one 
element that is constantly conjoined with other elements in any situation in which a 
constant conjunction is felt to occur. It is necessary to suppose that there is awareness of 
constant conjunction. Since I already allocated a meaning to ←↑ I could attribute 
awareness of constant conjunction to it. I shall not however do so. I shall keep it 
unaltered as β element. It may however improve the efficacy of ←↑ as a form of 
notation if I, who think that stupor and violent greedy ambition to possess all the 
qualities of existence have the same configuration, re-write ←↑ as ±←↑. To return to 
«awareness»; by analogy I would like as a temporary measure to use Cs as a sign for 
«awareness». It might be useful to attribute this to ±←↑, but Cs and –←↑ appear to be 
unconceivable…The state I have represented by –←↑ is one I can also represent in 
[Grid] terms classifiable as C3 [see below], thus: –←↑ may be personified as a non-
existent «person» whose hatred and envy is such that «it» is determined to remove and 
destroy every scrap of «existence» from any object which might be considered to 
«have» any existence to remove. Such a non-existent object can be so terrifying that its 
«existence» is denied, leaving only the «place where it was»” (Bion, 1965, pp. 107-111; 
my alterations).         
 As we can see all Bion’s major constructs are inter-related in what I can call 
(using his terminology) a ‘constant conjunction’ unfolded from a ‘scientific deductive 
system’ or a ‘system axiomatic deductive’ (cf., Bion, 1992, pp. 156-165, pp. 208-209). 
Bion, throughout most of his work, attempts to provide psychoanalysis with the 
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precision of a system based on mathematics and constructs taken from Euclidean 
geometry (see below; cf., Euclid, 2002): “I wish to introduce as a step forwards 
formulations that are precise, communicable without distortions and more nearly 
adequate to cover all situations that are basically the same” (Bion, 1965, p. 125). 
 Bion, using a quote from Braithwaite (1955), attempts to define the substance 
behind his system, which: “consists of a set of hypothesis which forms a deductive 
system, that is, which is arranged in such a way that from some of the hypothesis as 
premises, all the other hypothesis logically follow” (Bion, 1992, pp. 2-3) concluding 
that a: “peculiarity of psychoanalysis is that the scientific deductive system is a series of 
hypotheses about hypotheses about hypotheses” (Bion, op. cit., p. 46). Later on, still in 
“Cogitations” but in an undated note entitled “Need for study of scientific method” the 
author adds more objectively: “By the term, ‘scientific deductive system’, I mean any 
system of hypotheses in which certain hypotheses occupy a high level in the particular 
system, and are used as premises from which lower-level hypotheses are deduced. 
Lower-level hypotheses are of decreasing generalization until the lowest level of all, 
which have a degree of particularization that makes them suitable for verification by 
empirical experience such as scientific experiments, or, in the case of psycho-analysis, 
clinical experience” (Bion, op. cit., p. 156).        
 From my perspective, what Bion argues as his ‘constant conjunction’ (and the 
inherent above mentioned implications) sows completely with what I am defending 
throughout my entire Thesis: the psychoanalytic clinical method is a deconstruction 
of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of 
this ‘magnetism’ that I defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (my 
Conclusion) integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’ [only threw the ongoing process of 
decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction which 
takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the 
analyst’s conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, the 
‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes 
any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse as a 
‘secondary discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary 
discourse’, is always applied after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s 
‘primary discourse’] as Laplanche argues (see above Laplanche, 1999). Theoretical 
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models are hermeneutic because there is a meta-interpretation of the theory done 
by each analyst, and this literature review is based entirely in this premise, but the 
interpretation of the unconscious manifestations is not hermeneutic exactly for the 
reasons above mentioned (see my Introduction) by Laplanche (1999).  
 Indeed, mutatis mutandis, according to Bion, the above mentioned particular 
deductive system must be preceded by the structuring of a set of organized ideas 
accomplished by the use of symbols, requiring also the capacity to tolerate frustration 
and depression, similar to Klein’s description of the process of ‘synthesis in the 
depressive position’ (see above; cf., Klein, 1937, pp. 306-343).    
 From Bion’s perspective, the problem consists in how a primitive system of 
ideation reaches the level of sophistication present in a scientific deductive system, 
related to the formation of permanent knowledge: “Prichard points out that in 
ordinary life when we are seeking knowledge, our interest is chiefly absorbed in the 
nature of what we are trying to know, and not in the process by which we try to get to 
know. It is probably true that most psycho-analysts are similarly absorbed in 
psycho-analysis rather than in the process by which we arrive at a knowledge of 
psycho-analysis” (Bion, op. cit., p. 151; my alterations).    
 Prichard is H. A. Prichard, the author of “Knowledge and Perception” (1950), 
and Bion starts his ‘cogitation’ about the ‘need for study of scientific method’ and 
subsequently the ‘meaning of the scientific deductive system’ quoting him. 
 Related to this issue, Bion argues that from a genetic point of view (see below; 
this ‘genetic point of view’ is related to the ‘Grid’), or simply from the ‘vertex’ (see 
above) of ‘psychoanalytic listening’ we should take into account the following 
conceptualizations: (1) awareness of external facts, or ‘actual elements’ (see below), 
through the use of sense organs, equivalent to what scientists refer to as ‘observable 
facts’ (cf., Heisenberg, 1966). Bion gathers them into three groups: (i) touch and smell; 
(ii) sound; (iii) and sight.         
 The first one is non-verbal and related to sex; the second is verbal and musical; 
and the last one verbal and pictorial. (2) The possibility of an individual to translate an 
‘actual element’ into an idea and then create symbols would depend on the individual’s 
capacity to tolerate frustration produced by the absence of the object as well as to 
tolerate the depression from the depressive position. This operation is absent in 
psychotics, because for them words are things (cf., Bion, 1992, pp. 2-22, pp. 156-165, 
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pp. 208-209). (3) A mental development associated with the: “ability to see facts as they 
really are, [producing]…internally a sense of well being that has an instantaneous and 
ephemeral effect and a lasting sense of permanently increased mental stability” (Bion, 
op. cit., p. 6; my alteration). In others words, scientific knowledge is the consequence of 
growth of common sense knowledge (cf., Bion, op. cit., pp. 23-32).    
 In order for Bion’s terminology clarification, ‘actual element’ is a heuristic 
construct developed in a note entitled “Scientific method” dated 10th January 1959 
published later on in “Cogitations”. Bion articulates this concept with several others 
unfolding a epistemological syncretism typically idiosyncratic of his ‘secondary 
discourse’: “the fact that I here equate with what Bradley calls the ‘actual element’ is in 
a sense in no way different from the facts or actual elements that are the objects of 
curiosity, elucidation, and study in any science whatever, although this fact may be 
obscured because it is a ‘fact’ or ‘actual element’ of the kind that the analyst is inviting 
the patient to study –namely, the patient’s own ‘fact’. It will be observed that in the 
theory I am putting forward I am postulating a phenomenon with three facets: (1) what 
Bradley would call ‘actual elements in an actual union’, which is identical with what the 
scientist would call ‘observable data’ in a relationship with each other that is equally 
observable; (2) an ideational counterpart of the above, which is dependent upon the 
individual’s ability to translate an ‘actual element’ into an idea (the psychotic fails to do 
this, and even when he verbalizes still thinks that words are things). This operation 
depends on the individual’s capacity to tolerate the depression of the depressive position 
and therefore to achieve symbol formation. This phase is identical with the scientist’s 
ability to produce a scientific deductive system and the representation of this, which is 
called calculus [cf., Braithwaite, 1955, p. 23; see below]; (3) a mental development that 
is associated with an ability ‘to see facts as they really are’ and internally with a sense 
of well-being that has an instantaneous ephemeral effect and a lasting sense of 
permanently increased mental stability. The peculiarity that distinguishes the psycho-
analyst from his analysand is that the analyst is able to select the worthwhile fact, 
produce the deductive system and its associated calculus, experience the moment of 
union when the elements meet to give rise to a feeling that the cause has been found, 
and begin a process that issues in a change that produces a feeling that an effect and its 
cause have been linked [cf., Poincaré, 1908, p. 126; Braithwaite, 1955, p. 24]. The 
analysand, on the other hand, is made aware of an hypothesis (see above) in a deductive 
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system which he may or may not be able to use as a premise for further deductions. The 
deductive system thus formed may enable him in his turn to select one of these unifying 
facts of which Poincaré speaks” (Bion, 1992, pp. 5-6; my alterations).  
 After this long quotation we can see that most of these conceptualizations 
correspond to the role Bion gave to alpha-function, as capable of translating sense 
impressions or beta-elements into more sophisticated elements, useful in the process of 
thinking, or creating alpha-elements as I said above. The interpretation could act as a 
selected fact (see above) capable of providing order to the initial chaos of observations 
(cf., Bion, op. cit., pp. 6-7).        
 In order for a scientific deductive system to be achieved, says Bion, it is 
necessary that selected facts that organize the system (this is why I am so detailed in 
explaining the selected fact) be elaborated by means of a conscious rational process and 
not by emotional experiences; besides, hypotheses in the system should be grouped with 
the help of logical rules, different from those mechanisms that organize elements 
following a selected fact (cf., Bion, 1962b, p. 73).     
 According to Bion, a scientific hypothesis should contain three ‘functions’: (a) a 
private event should be made public (the interpretation) as we saw above; (b) it should 
consent to reality testing, be remembered, proved and predicted (see above); and (c) 
arranged in such a way for it to make sense (cf., Bion, 1992, p. 14). Let me take for 
instance the proverb ‘action without thought is like shooting without aim’, which is 
publicly known, it can predict a fact and organize a sense. ‘Common sense’ is an 
important aspect in scientific deductive systems; the interpretation, for instance, requires 
that at least both analyst and patient share a consensus: “The analyst, however, is also 
able to claim that his interpretation is based on common sense; but it is common only to 
some psychoanalysts who may be presumed to witness the same events and make the 
same deductions” (Bion, op. cit., p. 10).       
 I will now ‘start’ a ‘proto-conclusion’ of my Bion’s ‘review’ illustrating 
‘synoptically’ what I developed above, which was what Bion considered his ‘elements 
of Psychoanalysis’, what I can posit as his ‘five fundamental elements’ analogous 
to Freud’s ‘four fundamental concepts’ (see above) and also Lacan’s ‘four 
fundamental concepts’ (see above): ‘fundamental elements’ of a ‘constant 
conjunction’ of heuristic ‘secondary discourses’. Inherently to these elements, Bion 
created the “Grid” (1977b). From my perspective it’s not an arbitrary coincidence that 
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the “Grid” and “Elements of Psychoanalysis” (1963) were published in the same year 
[(I am using here the ‘final version of the ‘Grid’ published in “Two Papers: The Grid 
and Caesura” (1977b)]. Therefore I will develop (further below) as Bion’s final 
construct what he called the: “instrument for the use of practicing psycho-analysts” 
(Bion, 1977b, p. 3): the Grid.                 
 Initially, ‘psychoanalytic elements’ and ‘psychoanalytic objects’ were used 
interchangeably; for instance in the first three chapters of his book entitled precisely 
“Elements of Psychoanalysis”, the author, referring to the relationship with emotional 
links (L, H, and K), affirms that ‘psychoanalytic objects derive from psychoanalytic 
elements’ (cf., Bion, 1963, p. 11). The opposite is said when referring to ‘Idea’: he 
states that ‘psychoanalytic objects’ are made of elements, like alpha-elements (cf., 
Bion, op. cit., p. 4). Later on, when referring to passion, he makes no difference 
between them: “Further consideration of passion is not relevant to the immediate issue 
of passion as one of the dimensions of a psycho-analytic object and therefore of a 
psycho-analytic element” (Bion, op. cit., p. 13).      
 Meltzer, referring to this epistemological ambiguity states: “It therefore becomes 
extremely confusing when he [Bion] begins to describe ♀♂ as an element, along with 
Ps↔D, L H K, R (reason) and I (idea, or psychoanalytic object) when he later calls 
them mechanisms (♀♂) and Ps↔D or earlier had called them factors in a function (L H 
K). This is made even more confusing when he seems to discard ♀♂ as an element in 
favour of a «central abstraction» which it must contain or imply, to which the term 
«element» should be applied and reaches the conclusion that elements are essentially 
unobservable” (Meltzer, 1978b, p. 56; my alteration).     
 In the last chapter (chapter twenty) of “Elements of Psychoanalysis”, however, 
Bion finally established a clear difference between psychoanalytic objects and 
psychoanalytic elements. He states that the psychoanalytic object has three dimensions: 
‘analytic theory, mythology, and feeling’: “an analytic object is not the same as an 
element but may be regarded as having a relationship with an element analogous to that 
of a molecule to an atom. The analytic object is not necessarily an interpretation though 
an interpretation is an analytic object … [which] emerges as a result of the operation … 
of Ps↔D and ♀♂” (Bion, op. cit., pp. 101-102; my alteration).    
 He concludes, allocating both psychoanalytic objects and psychoanalytic 
elements in grid categories: “the elements of psycho-analysis are ideas and feelings as 
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represented by their setting in a single grid-category; psycho-analytic objects are 
associations and interpretations with extensions in the domain of sense, myth and 
passion, requiring three grid categories for their representation” (Bion, op. cit., pp. 103-
104). Referring to these dimensions, but before he made clear the difference between 
psychoanalytic objects and psychoanalytic elements, he had said: “psycho-analytic 
elements and the [psychoanalytic] objects derived from them have the following 
dimensions: 1 Extension in the domain of sense; 2 Extension in the domain of myth; 3 
Extension in the domain of passion. An interpretation cannot be regarded as satisfactory 
unless it illuminates a psychoanalytic object and that object must at the time of 
interpretation possess these dimensions … Extension in the domain of sense … means 
that what is interpreted must … be an object of sense. It must, for example, be visible or 
audible” (Bion, op. cit., p. 11; my alteration). It must also have a ‘common sense’ to 
allow a consensus, as I also above related to the epistemological framework inherent to 
the ‘scientific deductive system’.          
 The ‘extension in the domain of myth’ refers to personal myths that the analyst 
can use at a given moment in order to understand the patient’s latent content; to say for 
instance in the face of the patient’s aggression that his anger is like that of a: “child that 
wanted to hit his nanny because he has been told he is naughty” (Bion, op. cit., p. 12). 
 These represent statements of the analyst’s ‘personal myths’ and not ‘statements 
of observed facts’, or ‘formulations of a theory intended to represent a realization’: 
“unless the experience of the psycho-analytical object is accompanied by a formulation 
by the psycho-analyst of a statement that has this type of component [myth] it lacks a 
necessary dimension” (Bion, ib.; my alteration).       
 About the ‘extension in the domain of passion’, Bion says that it represents: “an 
emotion experienced with intensity and warmth though without any suggestion of 
violence … unless it is associated with the term «greed»” (Bion, op. cit., p. 13). 
Different from sense and myth, passion implies the presence of ‘two minds linked’. It 
could correspond perhaps to what others call ‘empathy’, which is completely different 
from counter-transference: “passion must be clearly distinguished from counter-
transference, the latter being evidence of repression” (Bion, ib.).    
 From my perspective, it is quite possible that the selection of the term ‘element’ 
could have been encouraged by ‘Euclidean elements’ [“The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s 
Elements” (cf., Euclid, 2002)] as well as by the relevance that such a concept has in 
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chemistry (see below). I have this epistemological position because Bion right in the 
beginning of “Elements of Psychoanalysis” assumes directly his source when he says: 
“the elements I seek are to be such that relatively few are required to express, by 
changes in combination, nearly all the theories essential to the working psycho-
analyst” (Bion, op. cit., p. 2; my bold and underline), and explicitly poses it in the 
footnote inherent to this sentence: “compared with the tendency to produce ad hoc 
theories to meet a situation when an existing theory, stated with sufficient generality, 
would have done. Compare Proclus, quoted by Sir T. L. Heath, on Euclid’s Elements 
(Heath, T. L.: “The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements”, Chap. 9, C.U.P., 1956)” 
(Bion, ib.).            
 According to Bion, ‘psychoanalytic elements’ represent abstractions, similar to 
letters in the alphabet, that if combined with each other form words; when combined 
they represent almost ‘all’ the necessary theories for the analytical work: ‘secondary 
discourses’. All elements must be functions of personality conceived as having 
dimensions which, in the analyst’s mind/‘primary discourse’, represents sense 
impressions, myths or passions: “the combination in which certain elements are held is 
essential to the meaning to be conveyed by those elements. A mechanism supposed to 
be typical of melancholia can only be typical of melancholia because it is held in a 
particular combination” (Bion, 1963, p. 2).       
 Therefore, all elements must have the following characteristics: ‘(a) they must 
be capable of representing the same ‘realization’ that they originally described; (b) they 
must be capable of articulating with similar elements; and (c) when articulated they 
must form a scientific deductive system capable of representing a ‘realization’ if it 
happens to exist. Among these elements is what we can coin, as I said above, Bion’s  
‘five fundamental elements’: (i) ♀♂ representing the dynamic relationship between 
container and contained, similar to Klein’s notion of projective identification and 
Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; (ii) Ps↔D, representing approximation to a 
combination between Kleinian paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions with 
Poincaré’s selected fact and Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; (iii) L (Love); (iv) H 
(Hate); and (v) K (Knowledge), representing the last three links between psychoanalytic 
objects’. All elements without exception are considered functions (cf., Bion, 1963, p. 3).
 In this context, Bion ends the first chapter of “Elements of Psychoanalysis” by 
stating from a Humean ‘vertex’: “using the notation R derived from the word «reason» 
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and the realizations it is thought to represent, and I derived from the word «idea» and all 
realizations it represents including those represented by «thought»; I is to represent 
psycho-analytical objects composed of α-elements, the products of α-function … R is to 
represent a function that is intended to serve the passions, whatever they may be, by 
leading to their dominance in the world of reality. By passions I mean all that is 
comprised in L, H, K. R is associated with I in so far as I is used to bridge the gap 
between an impulse and its fulfilment. R² insures that it is bridged to some purpose 
other than the modification of frustration during the temporal pause” (Bion, 1963, p. 4).
 In a footnote concerning this subject Bion explains his epistemological 
ambiguity (see above: cf., Meltzer, 1978b): “I have not carried through the discussion of 
R because I do not yet feel in a position to see its implications. I include it [as a 
psychoanalytical element] because my clinical experience persuades me of the value of 
such an element and others may be able to use it incompletely worked out though it is. 
See Hume. ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, Book II, Part III, Section 3. Clarendon Press 
1896” (Bion, ib.; my alteration).       
 However the ‘epistemological ambiguity’, it is my and Grotstein’s perspective 
that the election of ‘mathematical objects’: “had the advantage of being a language of 
signs and/or symbols which could conveniently represent objects in their absence and 
therefore facilitate a language useful for abstraction without the penumbra of 
associations typical of words” (Grotstein, 1981a, p. 12).    
 From this statement I arrive to Grid’s dynamics, but before I develop this highly 
heuristic construct I will just clarify one last concept that was mentioned above and that 
it’s vital to understand the Grid: ‘realization’.      
 This concept can be interpreted as an action to bring something into real or 
concrete existence. In his “Theory of Thinking” Bion refers to the: “realization of pre-
conceptions” (cf., Bion, 1967a, pp. 110-119); in other words, when the baby sucks the 
breast, a realization takes place between an innate preconception of the breast and the 
breast as a real object, a situation that will generate a conception, that is, the satisfaction 
of a wish. When the need for the breast meets an absence of the breast (see above; cf., 
Bion, 1962b, pp. 32-37; 1992, pp. 250-253) or ‘no-breast’, the realization of this 
absence, of this frustration, if well tolerated, will be translated into thoughts, as well as 
into an ‘apparatus’ to link thoughts and into a capacity for abstract thinking (cf., Bion, 
1962b, p. 60).          
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 In this same book, “Learning from Experience”, Bion in paragraph five of 
chapter one states with a surprising objectivity (not common as already mentioned) that 
the: “theory of functions [see above] makes it easier to match the realization¹ with the 
deductive system² that represents it” (Bion, op. cit., p. 2; my alterations), in a sense 
similar to the way in which three dimensional: “euclidean geometry has the structure 
of ordinary space as one of its realizations” (Bion, op. cit., p. 99; my alterations; see 
below Lacan’s topology).         
 From my perspective, in other words, the above mentioned means that the theory 
of functions facilitates the knowledge of the exact purpose a given scientific deductive 
system might have, similar to the way in which Euclidian geometry has as its purpose, 
dimensioning the ordinary space. Writing a doctoral Thesis would be, for instance, a 
realization of K.         
 Following Bion’s examples presented in his book “Transformations” (see above: 
cf., Bion, 1965), an artist can transform a landscape (‘realization’) into a picture 
(‘representation’), something he achieves by means of a series of ‘invariants’, which 
make his work something intelligible [Einstein formulated the theory of relativity 
(‘specific and general’) from Maxwell’s ‘invariant’: the ‘value C’, which was invariant 
to both Maxwell’s equations of electro-magnetism (cf., Einstein, 1954)]; invariants, 
according to Bion, are specific characteristics of an object that, by remaining unaltered 
regardless of any transformation experienced by that object, will allow the identity of 
that object. An interpretation, for instance, carries invariants that belong to some 
particular psychoanalytic theory, like the Oedipus situation (cf., Bion, 1965, p. 4). In 
this context, from my perspective, Aristarchus of Samos classical reflections are 
inherent to Bion’s cogitations (cf., Aristarchus, 1913).    
 Accordingly, through the use of a realization we might be able to know about the 
‘unknown’, the ‘thing-in-itself’, which represents what Bion referred to as ‘turbulence’, 
or the capacity to rouse a disturbance that will make the invisible visible, like 
introducing a stick in a clear and smooth stream of water. Realizations allow us to know 
about the ineffable, the ‘noumenon’, by changing it into a ‘phenomenon’ (cf., Bion, 
1974).           
 This terminology is obviously Kantian, who, along with Plato, constitutes Bion’s 
major philosophical reference; the ‘thing-in-itself’ is a term taken by Kant (1781) from 
the Greek ‘noumenon’, the past participle of ‘νοειν’, meaning ‘to think, to conceive’, 
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used to describe what the mind conceives beyond the ‘phenomenon’, but cannot be 
perceived, that is, the ‘thing-in-itself’, the absolute reality of which there is no empirical 
or sensible knowledge, but can be known through intellectual intuition (cf., Russell, 
1945).             
 Bion in an undated note entitled ‘Commentary on the scientific deductive 
system’ published in “Cogitations” says that the: “«phenomenon» and [the] «thing-in-
itself» are terms used in the Kantian sense to mean things as they appear to the observer, 
and things as they might be supposed to be in reality without an observer. «Things-in-
themselves» has much the same meaning as Bradley ascribes (in “Principles of Logic”) 
to the term, «things in actuality»” (Bion, 1992, p. 157; my alterations), and Bion also 
adds in “Learning from Experience” that: “a thing-in-itself … following Kant, cannot be 
known to us” (Bion, 1962b, p. 67).      
 Accordingly, Bertrand Russell in his “A History of Western Philosophy” 
explains the ‘things-in-themselves’ as: “the causes of our sensations, [which] are 
unknowable; they are not in space or time, they are not substances, nor can they be 
described by any of those other general concepts which Kant calls categories” (Russell, 
1945, p. 707; my alteration).         
 From my perspective I steer into Green’s harbour when, concerning this subject, 
he quotes Shakespeare’s “King Lear”, in the moment when Edgar, disguised as a 
madman who has escaped from Bedlam, initiates a conversation between the King, the 
Fool and Tom. The latter, so much impoverished, is addressed by the King: “… Thou 
owest the worm no silk, the beast no hide, the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. Ha! 
Here’s three on’s are sophisticated! Thou are the thing itself” (King Lear, 3, 4, p. 106 in 
Green, 2000b, p. 121). Green concludes: “this was long before Kant dreamt of these 
words” (Green, ib.).           
 It is true that Shakespeare’s “King Lear” is, in this ‘concept’, predecessor of 
Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (1781), but it is also true that Kant developed in this 
seminal work what we can call a proto-phenomenology, which was, in my perspective, 
the epistemological thread that Bion (among a plethora of fecund authors: see above; 
cf., Husserl, 1907, 1910, 1913a, 1913b, 1913c, 1913d, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1936/54; 
Freud, 1923c, 1930b; Heidegger, 1927, 1929, 1935, 1936-38, 1950, 1954, 1955-56; 
Sartre, 1943; Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Lacan, 1956-57, 1957-58, 1966, 1968, 1970) 
unravelled.            
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 Consequently, Bion in his book “Transformations” correlates the ‘thing-in-
itself’ with two completely different aspects: (a) with ‘O’ or the ultimate 
unthinkable ‘truth’; (b) with material that cannot be changed into thoughts or β-
elements, and can only be used for evacuation through projective identifications: 
“it is as if in one view man can never know the thing-in-itself, but only secondary 
and primary qualities [Bion is referring to the analyst listening during the 
analytical session]; whereas in the other view he can never «know» anything but 
the thing-in-itself [now referring to the psychotic patient]. This apparent attitude 
[of the psychotic patient] has similarities with another apparent attitude, namely, 
that postulated by the theory of projective identification” (Bion, 1965, p. 40; my 
alterations). By this quotation it is obvious to see that Bion’s ‘transformations’ 
sows completely with what I am arguing throughout my entire Thesis, that is: how 
the ‘secondary and the primary discourse’ transform the ‘analyst’s mind’ in the 
analytical session.          
 In “Bion’s Brazilian Lectures 1”, published in 1973, proffered in São Paulo, and 
“Bion’s Brazilian Lectures 2”, published in 1974, proffered in Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo, Bion differentiates between ‘noumena’ and ‘phenomena’ and articulates it with a 
‘realization’, which in this context is termed as ‘human mind’: “when the noumena, 
the things themselves, push forward so far that they meet an object [a realization] 
which we can call a human mind, there then comes into being the domain of 
phenomena. We can guess, therefore, that corresponding to these phenomena, 
which are something that we know about because they are us, is the thing itself, the 
noumenon: the religious man would say, «there is, in reality, God». What Freud 
and psychoanalysis have investigated is phenomena” (Bion, 1974, p. 41; my 
alterations).            
 Once again, by this quotation it is obvious to infer why I work “Dora’s Case” 
(in the following chapter) as an epistemological bridge between the Theoretical 
Prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ and the Clinical (Practical) Constructs as 
a ‘primary discourse’, that is, I work “Dora’s Case” from a semiotic perspective 
because the ‘semion’ (semion is the Greek etymological root of the word ‘sign’) 
constitutes a theoretical container for the praxis to be contained; the theory is a 
phenomenological container that is only ‘significant’ if the practical data that is 
contained becomes inscribed in a ‘signifier’: theory and practice are inherently 
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container and container, significant and signifier; ‘secondary and primary 
discourse’; theory is a ‘phenomenological envelope’ that must be written with 
‘practical letters’ (cf., Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Lacan, 1966; Bion, 1974, 1992). 
 After this epistemological clarification I will now develop, as I said above, 
Bion’s final construct: the ‘Grid’ (1977b): 
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In the Grid Bion sows all his theoretical, meta-theoretical and clinical constructs. 
Therefore this concept will be developed with more detail; all the conceptualizations 
that were mentioned above are represented in the Grid. This construct is Bion’s 
own ‘selected fact’ and inherent implications, where all his epistemological 
‘elements’ are merged into one single and ‘clear’ synthetic syncretism: a unique 
articulation between the ‘secondary and the primary discourse’, from my 
perspective, obviously.         
 The formulation of this highly heuristic construct was based on Mendeleev’s 
‘Periodic Table’ (hence I have referred chemistry above) and represents Bion’s attempt 
to cross the ‘genetic’ evolution of thinking –as a ‘secondary discourse’–, on one 
hand, with the mind that contains and uses such evolution or transformation –as a 
‘primary discourse’–, on the other. He refers to it as: “instrumental for classifying and 
ultimately understanding [psychoanalytic] statements” (Bion, 1977b, p. 13; my 
alteration), or as a: “convention for construing psycho-analytic phenomena. But if an 
analyst uses this convention he entertains a pre-conception of which the Grid, as printed 
or written, is a representation” (Bion, 1963, p. 98; my bold).    
 As it is mentioned above: ‘what Freud and psychoanalysis have investigated 
is phenomena’; what Bion does with the Grid is ‘construing [an instrument to 
interpret] psycho-analytic phenomena’: the Grid is a representation of the 
‘analyst’s mind’ whatever theories the analyst may have implicitly or explicitly in 
his mind as a ‘secondary discourse’; these theories ultimately yield to 
clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ which unfold the ‘magnetism’ that 
Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’ (see 
above). Of course, this is my interpretation of the Grid.      
 To be more explicit, mutatis mutandis, the Grid’s morphology can be explained 
as following: Bléandonu suggests that in the second column Bion borrowed the ‘Ψ’ sign 
from the expression proton pseudos: ‘πρϖτον’ (proton), which means ‘first’; and 
‘ψευδοϛ’ (pseudos), which means ‘false’, ‘to lie’ (cf., Bléandonu, 1994, p. 166).  
 From my and Bléandonu’s perspective, Bion took these concepts from 
Aristotle’s “Prior Analytics” (cf., Aristotle, 1941, pp. 62-107; Aristotle, 1912-54a), 
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which in its chapter eighteen develops magisterially (‘Magister dixit’) the philosophical 
dynamics of false premises and false conclusions, asserting that ‘a false statement is the 
result of a proceeding falsity [proton pseudos]’ (cf., Aristotle, 1941, p. 66; my 
alteration).          
 This Aristotelian insight was also used by Freud (1895) in his “Project for a 
Scientific Psychology”, to describe the importance of lying in hysterical patients (cf., 
Freud, 1895, pp. 295-387). I will develop this dynamic further below.   
 In the first Grids the fifth column instead of ‘Inquiry’ was named ‘Oedipus’ (cf., 
Bion, 1977b, p. 7), and also in the original Grid, files G (Scientific Deductive System) 
and H (Algebraic Calculus) were not present. After the clarification of these 
morphological ‘details’, I will now illustrate the Grid’s contents and inherent dynamics.
 The Grid usually moves from left to right and from top to bottom as thinking 
progresses in degrees of sophistication both in the use as well as in the level of 
abstraction and organization. In this way it could be said that, on a structuring 
level, the vertical axis follows the progressive movements of Klein’s ‘positions’ 
(depressive and paranoid-schizoid): ‘PS↔D’ as a ‘primary discourse’, while the 
uses, or horizontal axis, follows the mechanisms of the container-contained (♀♂) as 
a ‘secondary discourse’, in the sense of  a mind that contains and is contained. 
Once again, this is my interpretation of the Grid.      
 The Grid is described as a manifestation of the development of ‘K’, which is 
consonant with the purpose of the psychoanalytical clinical method: “the analyst must 
decide whether the idea that is expressed is intended to be an instrument whereby 
feelings are communicated or whether the feelings are secondary to the idea” (Bion, 
1963, p. 96; my alterations). At the beginning Bion refers that the Grid is a 
manifestation of the I (idea), but later on, after he starts to use the ‘theory of 
transformations’ (1965), he changes to ‘K’ as its manifestation. According to Bion, 
emotions might disrupt the cognitive purpose of the analysis, just as the wind would 
disrupt the surface of a lake creating turbulence; the only difference would be that ‘in 
the Grid both emotional and cognitive aspects are mutually affected by each other’ 
(cf., Bion, 1965, pp. 70-71), and I add: ‘secondary and primary discourse’ are 
mutually affected by each other.       
 Concretely, the Grid combines two main axes that cross each other: the 
Horizontal axis, marked ‘1 to…n’ columns, which represents the ‘mind’ that ‘uses’ 
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thoughts, which follows the mechanisms of the container-contained (♀♂) as a 
‘secondary discourse’; and the elements in the Vertical axis. The Vertical axis 
consists of eight levels of evolution (A to H) showing the genetic development of 
thinking, from the most primitive aspects to the more complex ones, which follows the 
progressive movements of Klein’s ‘positions’ (paranoid-schizoid and depressive): 
‘PS↔D’ as a ‘primary discourse’.      
 According to Bion, in the horizontal axis the terms are the same, but they can be 
used differently, while in the Vertical axis the terms vary, but have the same use (cf., 
Bion, 1963, p. 87). Firstly I am going to schematize the Grid’s horizontal axis and 
secondly I will develop the Grid’s vertical axis.      
 Bion says that: “the columns in this [horizontal] axis represent the functions that 
a statement is being made to perform. The statement may be an oracular 
pronouncement, an announcement of the theme of the session” (Bion, 1963, p. 71; my 
alteration). This axis is considered to be incomplete (1 – …n), which means it can 
eventually be extended. The formulations on this axis are always the same; the only 
thing that varies is the use that they are given. For instance, statement X could be a 
formulation considered to be a ‘definitory hypothesis’ (column 1) used as defence, as a 
lie (column 2), recognized as a repetitive behaviour (column 3), that eventually might 
determine a certain kind of acting-out (column 6). The meaning varies according to the 
use that has been given to it, which in turn depends on the category, or column, where 
the formulation has been placed. The mechanism by which transition from one use of 
this axis (1 to…n) is transformed into another seems to depend on container-
contained mechanisms as a ‘secondary discourse’, while its dynamics are based on 
pleasure and pain (cf., Bion, op. cit., p. 34).      
 Bion states that Column 1 represents a series of definitions of various uses, such 
as a myth, or the content of a session that could represent a ‘definitory hypothesis’, 
denoting that facts in it are bound by a ‘constant conjunction’, that they are 
meaningful, but have no meaning, and very important, that they are limiting because the 
present constant conjunction excludes all the other previously recorded. If we say ‘cat’ 
for instance, such a term will represent a preposition or a constant conjunction that joins 
hair, colour, eyes, lives, etc.; it will be so restrictive that it will exclude all other animal 
characteristics: “carried to extremes, the term ‘cat’ is merely a sign analogous to the 
point as the ‘place where the breast use to be’ and should mean ‘no-cat’” (Bion, ib.); it 
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would be unique because it will exclude any other previous constant conjunction 
that, even if it might have represented something, will have no meaning.   
 The content of a session constitutes a ‘definitory hypothesis’ and at the same 
time it also represents the transformation of an emotional experience ‘O’, into a final 
product ‘(Tβp)’, which once presented in a session and understood by the analyst will 
help to construct the interpretation as a ‘secondary discourse’. This also represents a 
‘definitory hypothesis’ that excludes any other previously given interpretation and will 
correspond to the analyst’s final transformation product ‘(Tβa)’ as a ‘primary 
discourse’ to that particular moment (cf., Bion, ib.). Pereira (2000) introduces the 
possibility of subdividing this column into three parts: (a) the ‘definitory hypothesis’ as 
such; (b) the negative aspects of the definition; (c) the annihilation of the hypothesis.
 Column 2, as well as row C, could have its own grid. It is used as a false 
statement with the purpose of providing the patient with a theory that will act as a 
defensive barrier or a resistance against feared feelings or ideas, and thus oppose the 
appearance of ‘catastrophic change’ (cf., Bion, 1966, 1977e, pp. 5-6).   
 In classical (Freudian) theory, column 2 would correspond to ‘resistance’ in the 
patient and counter-transference resistance in the analyst. According to Bion, in a rather 
abstract way, there could also be some sort of meta-defence by which, for instance, an 
idea, a myth or a dream corresponding to C2, would act as a defence against another 
idea that in turn was acting as a defence against yet another one. Or, in other words, C2 
would be used to inhibit a G2 (cf., Bion, 1963, p. 80).     
 As I said above, Bléandonu suggests that this column (column 2), designated by 
Bion with the Greek letter Ψ could be related to the Aristotelian proton pseudos: 
‘πρϖτον’ (proton), which means ‘first’; and ‘ψευδοϛ’ (pseudos), which means ‘false’, 
‘to lie’ (cf., Bléandonu 1994, p. 166).        
 Steering in Aristotle’s harbour concerning the ‘first lie’, Bion distinguishes 
between falsities and lies: “the false statement being related more to the inadequacy of 
the human being, analyst or analysand alike, who cannot feel confident in his ability to 
be aware of the ‘truth’, and the liar who has to be certain of his knowledge of the truth 
in order to be sure that he will not blunder into it by accident” (Bion, 1977e, p. 5).
 Columns 3, 4 and 5 represent statements that are less ‘defensive and of a more 
‘co-operative’ level during the performance of the analytical work. Column 3, for 
instance, uses aspects related to memory, or notation of statements that might unite or 
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relate a given ‘constant conjunction’ with other constant conjunctions previously bound 
and registered, and in this sense, provide relatedness and coherence that could yield 
until then unrecorded (cf., Bion, 1965, p. 98).     
 Column 4 refers to what Freud defined as attention, especially to the way in 
which the analyst’s listening takes place, to ‘free floating attention’ or to the search and 
discovery of meaning. It also refers to the attention given to repetition of previous 
propositions or constant conjunctions (cf., Bion, op. cit., p. 79).  
 Column 5 is related to inquiry, curiosity, exploration or discrimination of facts 
related specially with search for moral meaning (cf., Bion, ib.). In the first Grids Bion 
referred to this column as Oedipus, mainly because of the tenacity with which Oedipus, 
according to the myth, had ‘inquired’ about the truth (cf., Bion, 1992, p. 10).
 Column 6 is related to acting out, in the patient as well as the analyst. According 
to Bion, the analysis itself could sometimes also be used as a form of acting out: 
muscular movements or any other form of motor discharges are important because they 
can be intended to disburden the mind from accumulations of stimuli (cf., Bion, 1963, 
pp. 71-72).          
 Functions related to the interpretation also fall into this category. For example, a 
phobic patient says ‘he repeats the interpretations in his mind with the purpose of not 
forgetting them’; such an asseveration could represent an E6 category, but if it happens 
that the patient repeats the interpretation to make sure he controls and ‘encapsulates’ 
them as strange elements in order to evacuate them, it would then be an A6 instead. 
However, it could also belong to row C if it was later found that what the patient stated 
was a lie, if he were to say, for instance, that he has dreamed it. Bion states: “All Grid 
categories may be regarded as having the quality of Column 1 categories in that they are 
significant but cannot be held to have meaning until experience invests them with it” 
(Bion, 1992, p. 10). And I add: ‘All Grid categories may be regarded as having the 
quality of Column 1 categories in that they are significant’ as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ but ‘cannot be held to have meaning until experience invests them with 
it’ as a ‘primary discourse’.       
 In conclusion of the Grid’s horizontal axis illustration, Bion proposes the uses of 
arrows in the horizontal (as well as in the vertical axis), to indicate                                                    
                               → 
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movements along the axes. For instance, 3 would mean a notation that means growth   
            ← 
while 3 also would mean notation that is growth-inhibiting (cf., Bion, 1965, p. 94). 
 Bion argues that the Grid’s vertical axis is formed by non-saturated elements 
waiting for a ‘realization’, except for row A, which corresponds to β elements. Each 
stage of this axis is a record of a previous one and a ‘pre-conception’ of the 
subsequent stage. Successive growth from A to H implies a difference in degrees of 
sophistication instead of a difference in functioning (cf., Bion, 1963, p. 87; 1965, p. 
43; 19927, p. 6), similar to mechanisms of integration and disintegration described 
in the Kleinian Ps↔D positions: ‘PS↔D’ as a ‘primary discourse’, where the 
dynamic links, as well as in the above described horizontal axis, are also L, H, and K 
elements (cf., Bion, 1963, pp. 34-35).      
 Growth of this axis will depend on the following mechanisms: (a) psycho-
mechanics; (b) an alternation of particularization and generalization (concretization and 
abstraction); (c) successive saturation; and (d) emotional drives (cf., Bion, op. cit., p. 
84). Concretely Bion sates that: (a) psycho-mechanics is described as a condition 
that takes place in the relationship that exists between projective identification and 
the alternation of the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive position, in relation to 
K: ‘PS↔D’ as a ‘primary discourse’. Bion considers that fragmented bits might be 
capable of providing integration and solution to problems, that will facilitate the 
alternation present in Ps↔D and also in ♀♂; (b) particularization and 
generalization processes are related to abstraction; that is, to a process by which 
an element is particularized following a realization or a saturation, from where, 
later on, a generalization takes place: as above mentioned, ‘in the Grid both 
emotional and cognitive aspects are mutually affected by each other’ (cf., Bion, 
1965, pp. 70-71):  ‘secondary and primary discourse’ are mutually affected by each 
other. Naming the process and then remembering it (notation), will prevent the 
loss of the experience by dispersion or disintegration of its components; (c) 
generalization or abstraction can be understood as a process by which an 
unsaturated element becomes saturated; (d) Bion relates emotional impulses to a 
premonitory state that would represent more of an emotional condition than an 
ideational content which is related more to a pre-conception, although similar to a 
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pre-conception, a pre-monition is also private and unconscious unfolding a 
‘primary discourse’.         
 In other words, emotions are to pre-monitions as a ‘primary discourse’ 
what ideas are to pre-conceptions as a ‘secondary discourse’: “I do not dissociate 
‘pre-monition’ from its association with a sense of warning and anxiety. The feeling of 
anxiety is of value in guiding the analyst to recognize the premotion in the material. The 
premonition can therefore be represented by (Anxiety (ζ)) where (ζ) is an unsaturated 
element” (Bion, 1963, p. 76).      
 Concerning anxiety Bion posits that counter-transference anxiety can become a 
premonition that guides the analyst in his investigation and in the structuring of his 
interpretation; concerning the word ‘premotion’ I have to clarify that Bion uses it 
without giving any definition for it. A few lines before this last quotation he says: 
“when a patient comes for a first consultation his premotions give information about 
him that cannot be obtained from other factors” (Bion, op. cit., p. 75). There are doubts 
whether this is a printing misspelling for ‘premonition’ or a neologism implying a 
condition previous to an emotional state (cf., Meltzer, 1978b, pp. 271-396; 1986a).
 Changes between A and H [successive growth in categories that form the 
vertical axis, could also be understood with the use of Piagetian constructs of 
‘Assimilation’ and ‘Accommodation’; although never mentioned by Bion, these are 
well known within the ambit of genetic epistemology (cf., Piaget, 1932, 1950, 1980a, 
1980b, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1964)] correspond to 
mechanisms of ♀♂, where a pre-conception (row D), for instance, is contained in a 
conception (row E), and this one contained in a concept (row F), and so forth. Dynamic 
links between different categories in the axis are reached by means of elements H, L and 
K.            
 The benignity of the operation ♀♂ will depend on the nature of the dynamic 
link; that is, the degree of persecutory anxiety will be related to the interaction between 
the envious attack (H) and the love relationship (L) directed towards the breast (cf., 
Bion, 1963, p. 34).         
 Bion proposes for both, horizontal and vertical axis, the use of arrows (↓→), as I 
started to illustrate above, to indicate either progression or regression from ‘K’. A 
downward arrow (↓) represents a movement from A to H or a progression in the 
direction of ‘K’, whereas the opposite (↑) or a movement from H to A, would indicate a 
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road to β, in the direction of fragmentation and destruction of ‘K’ (cf., Bion, 1965, pp. 
88-89); ↑← will represent movements contrary to the progressive movement of both 
axis of the Grid, a kind of ‘minus Grid’.       
 Bion also states that any existing object corresponding to the direction of these 
arrows, ↑←, would represent an object considered to be violent, greedy, envious: 
“ruthless, murderous and predatory, without respect for the truth, person or things. It is, 
as it were, what Pirandello [“Six Characters in Search of an Author” (1921)] might have 
called a Character in Search of an Author … This force is dominated by an envious 
determination to possess everything that objects that exist possess including existence 
itself” (Bion, op. cit., p. 102; my alteration).      
 Accordingly, the first row (A) of the vertical axis corresponds to β elements, 
which cover a field of ‘confusions’ in relation to thought and feeling. In the domain of 
thoughts the confusion is between them and things, similar to Segal’s concept of 
‘symbolical equation’ (see above). In the domain of feeling it might be equivalent to the 
confusion between fact and fantasy (cf., Bion, 1963, p. 97); therefore, they could only 
be used in columns 2 and 6 (cf., Bion, 1965, p. 44).     
 Beta elements cannot discriminate the animate from the inanimate, nor the 
subject from the object or what is moral from what is scientific; they can be used as 
projective identification and have a capacity for ‘imprisonment’ (cf., Bion, ib.). 
 The passage from A to B, that is, from β- to α-elements, is similar to a 
movement from a pre-conception to a conception and will depend on ♀♂ (see 
above). Beta elements are dispersed but could acquire cohesion by means of: (a) 
changes in terms of ‘PS↔D’ as a ‘primary discourse’; (b) according to an external 
organizer acting as a ♀, such as the breast, that would be a model, or some other 
factor that resembles a selected fact; other mechanisms that Bion has described as 
‘psycho-mechanics’ (see above): “the cohesion of β- elements to form ♂ is analogous to 
the integration characteristic of the depressive position; [while] the dispersal of β-
elements is analogous to the splitting and fragmentation characteristic of the paranoid-
schizoid position” (Bion, 1963, p. 40; my alteration).     
 Bion also advises that any inquiry about α- or β-elements, should always involve 
both of them: “β-elements and α-elements are intended to denote objects that are 
unknown and therefore may not even exist. By speaking of α-elements, β-elements and 
α-function, I intend to make it possible to discuss something, or to talk about it, or think 
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about it before knowing what it is. At the risk of suggesting a meaning, when I wish 
the sign to represent something of which the meaning is to be an open question, to 
be answered by the analyst from his own experience [as a ‘primary discourse’], I 
must explain that the term ‘β-element’ is to cover phenomena that may not reasonably 
be regarded as thoughts at all” (Bion, 1992, pp. 10-11; my alterations).   
 And further own Bion articulates this thematic with Freud’s 
conceptualizations: “Ideally, any meaning that the term accumulates should derive 
from analytic practice and from analytic practice alone [psychoanalytic theory 
comes after clinical work]. Much the same is true of the α-element, except that this 
term should cover phenomena that are reasonably considered to be thoughts. I would 
regard them as elements that make it possible for the individual to have what 
Freud described as dream thoughts [row C]” (Bion, op. cit., p. 11; my  alterations).
 For Bion, β-elements represent an early matrix from where thoughts are 
supposed to arise. They share the quality of inanimate and of psychic objects, but 
without any kind of distinction between them: “thoughts are things, things are thoughts; 
and they have personality” (Bion, 1963, p. 22). Bion is referring to the qualities of 
omnipotent magic thinking seen in psychotic patients, in the psychotic part of the 
personality, in children and in all sorts of religious beliefs (cf., Bion, ib.).   
 The second row (B) corresponds to α-elements, the product of α-function. One 
can question whether the inference of this function on the whole genetic evolution of 
this axis towards the evolution of thinking, might not justify its location at the margin of 
the Grid. Something of this sort could be read in Bion when he states: “By the same 
token [that of the reverie function exercised by individuals within themselves as they 
grow] α-function may be described as concerned with the change I have associated with 
the conception and the concept (E and F) as I have described these entities in my 
exposition” (Bion, 1963, p. 27; my alteration). And further on Bion adds heuristically 
that “all the categories in the table, with the possible exception of the row B sets, may 
be considered to play a part, sometimes more important, sometimes less, in any 
psycho-analytical material” (Bion, op. cit., pp. 29-30; my bold); once again, to be 
absolutely clear: the horizontal axis, marked ‘1 to…n’ columns, represents the ‘mind’ 
that ‘uses’ thoughts and follows the mechanisms of the container-contained (♀♂) as 
a ‘secondary discourse’; the vertical axis consisting of eight levels of evolution (A to 
H) showing the genetic development of thinking, from the most primitive aspects to the 
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more complex ones, follows the progressive movements of Klein’s ‘positions’ 
(paranoid-schizoid and depressive): ‘PS↔D’ as a ‘primary discourse’.  
 Row C corresponds to thought categories that could be expressed in sensuous 
terms, usually visual images like those that appear in dreams, myths, narratives, and 
hallucinations. Bion suggests that this category should have a grid of its own (cf., 
Bion, 1977e, p. 3): a ‘secondary discourse’ per se.      
 Row D corresponds to pre-conceptions, which could be conceived as similar to 
Kant’s concept of: “empty thoughts” (Bion, 1967a, p. 111). They represent a state of 
mental anticipation for some kind of realization, like the baby’s expectation of the 
breast right after birth, or the analyst’s expectation as he/she figures out the 
meaning of the patient’s manifest content, that will in turn enable the elucidation 
of the unconscious fantasy in order to structure the interpretation as a ‘primary 
discourse’. Bion represents the pre-conception with the following formula: ‘Ψ (ζ)’, 
where Ψ represents an incognita, the unknown, and ζ signifies an unsaturated element, 
which once saturated by knowledge, becomes a conception and will hence correspond 
to row E.           
 Row E represents conceptions that result from the union of a pre-conception 
with a realization: “when the pre-conception is brought into contact with a realization 
that approximates to it, the mental outcome is a conception” (Bion, ib.), and also: “in 
this respect it may seem misleading to describe Row E as consisting of pre-conceptions 
to the exclusion of the remaining rows, for they are capable also of functioning as pre-
conceptions” (Bion, 1992, p. 11), therefore a conception might be considered as a 
variable that has been replaced as a constant of a ‘secondary discourse’.  
 Row F corresponds to formulations of psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic 
theory, which intends to show ‘scientific’ observations. Conceptions change into 
concepts by a process: “designed to render it free of those elements that would unfit it to 
be a tool in the elucidation or expression of truth” (Bion, 1963, p. 24).   
 Row G is of little use and must ‘wait’ until the psychoanalytic scientific 
deductive system develops (a thought ‘waiting’ for a thinker): a ‘secondary 
discourse’ waiting for a ‘primary discourse’. Something similar could be said about 
row H, which also may have to ‘wait’ (or not: see below Lacan’s algebraic structures) 
until algebraic systems build up.       
 ‘Free floating attention’ and relaxed unsaturated listening to the patient’s 
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material, correspond to D4, that is, ‘attentive pre-conceptions’. The comprehension of 
this material would imply a movement from D4 (a pre-conception) to a conception or 
E4. Searching for a confirmation, comparing one material with the other, would signify 
a movement towards E3 and E5. Structuring the interpretation, verbalizing impressions, 
integrating and so on, would correspond to F5. Lastly, when the interpretation is 
verbalized with the intention of affecting the patient’s mind as a ‘primary 
discourse’, it could be placed on G6 (cf., Bion, ib.).    
 Accordingly, Meltzer posits how some aspects of the vertical axis function: “the 
‘molecules’ of psycho-analysis, are seen to be compounded of elements from three rows 
of the grid, B, C, and G, that is the sense, or alpha-elements which have been derived 
from the perception of the emotional experience, the myth or dream thought in which its 
elements are bound, and the passion of scientific deductive system into which it would 
grow if allowed” (Meltzer, 1978b, p. 67).       
 I now conclude Bion’s review reproducing ipsis verbis what I said above: Bion 
considered his ‘elements of Psychoanalysis’, what we can posit as his ‘five fundamental 
elements’ analogous to Freud’s ‘four fundamental concepts’ (see above) and also 
Lacan’s ‘four fundamental concepts’ (see above). Bion’s ‘five fundamental elements’ 
are: (i) ♀♂ representing the dynamic relationship between container and 
contained, similar to Klein’s notion of projective identification and Laplanche’s 
‘secondary discourse’; (ii) Ps↔D, representing approximation to a combination 
between Kleinian paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions with Poincaré’s 
selected fact and Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; (iii) L (Love); (iv) H (Hate); and 
(v) K (Knowledge), representing the last three links between psychoanalytic objects (cf., 
Bion, 1963). As we saw above ‘all these elements without exception are considered 
functions’ (cf., Bion, 1963, p. 3) of the Grid (cf., Bion, 1963); the Grid being the 
epistemological container of all psychoanalytic elements or ‘molecules’ (borrowing 
Meltzer’s metaphor).         
 After my Bion’s ‘review’, who, along with Fairbairn, is considered, because of 
the above mentioned reasons, one of the most heuristic of the psychoanalytic authors, I 
will illustrate Rosenfeld’s work (the last ‘Kleinian follower’ accepted by Segal). 
Obviously, this perspective is followed having Object Relations School as a wider 
‘secondary discourse’: schools of thought constitute a wider ‘secondary discourse’ 
while the most heuristic theorists unfold a ‘secondary discourse’ per se, 
165 
 
theoretically speaking; only now I clarify this view because, by far, Object 
Relations School is the school of thought that promote more ‘secondary discourses’ 
inside itself (as I am illustrating; see my Introduction), maybe because is dominant 
in the worldwide psychoanalytic community; I have this approach now because I 
am almost at the end of my review concerning Object Relations School as the 
source of more ‘secondary discourses’, and therefore I think it’s pertinent to 
clarify it only at this moment of my reflection.     
 Indeed, Object Relations School is a wider ‘secondary discourse’ but Bion 
(and Fairbairn) deconstructs it greatly validating what I defend throughout my 
entire Thesis: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the theorist 
deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of 
psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction. Rosenfeld has 
Object Relations School as a wider ‘secondary discourse’, obviously; Rosenfeld is 
less deconstructive than Bion (and Fairbairn), but, even so, is heuristic in his 
mitigated deconstructions.        
 Rosenfeld, after being analysed by Klein, become an important supporter of her, 
especially in his ability to make sense of psychotic patients in terms of Klein’s later 
theory: “Much of the contents of Klein’s paper on schizoid mechanisms in 1946 
depended on the work she did with students and analysands of hers who were also 
psychiatrists, such as Rosenfeld. He established himself as one of the foremost Kleinian 
authorities on schizophrenia and made continuous scientific developments up to his 
death in 1986” (Hinshelwood, op. cit., p. 421).     
 In 1947 Rosenfeld published the first detailed case history of the analysis of a 
schizophrenic, demonstrating the importance of Klein’s concepts of splitting of the ego 
and projective identification, with the characteristic schizoid depersonalization which 
she had described in 1946 (cf., Rosenfeld, 1947, pp. 130-139).   
 He investigated the confusional states in schizophrenia (cf., Rosenfeld, 1950, pp. 
132-137; 1952a, pp. 111-131; 1965), which was a precursor of Klein’s concept of envy, 
and developed Klein’s key concepts of ‘the paranoid schizoid position’ and ‘the 
depressive position’ (cf., Rosenfeld, 1952b, pp. 457-464; 1954, pp. 138-140; 1958a, pp. 
238-239; 1959, pp. 105-129).       
 Regarding these key-concepts I will quote Rosenfeld in detail because all 
Kleinians and non Kleinians refer to these constructs in a rather arbitrary way: “Melanie 
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Klein’s paper on ‘schizoid mechanisms’ was read to the British Society in 1946 [cf., 
Klein, 1946, pp. 292-320] and was a further important milestone. In it she elaborated 
the ideas in her paper ‘A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive 
States’ [cf., Klein, 1935, pp. 282-310]. In 1935 she had described in some detail various 
aspects of the early infantile object relations, experiences, ego mechanisms, and 
defences which she viewed as characteristic of certain phases of infantile development. 
The earliest phase, lasting approximately four to six months, she had named ‘the 
paranoid position’, because of the quality of the anxieties predominating at that early 
time. A later phase, which she thought started somewhere between the fourth and sixth 
month, she had named the ‘depressive position’, as during this time infantile anxieties 
and object relations assumed a depressive quality. She felt that the early anxieties of the 
infant had similarities to the psychotic illnesses developing later on in life and actually 
referred to the early infantile anxieties as ‘psychotic anxieties’, which she believed were 
regressively revived in the later psychotic illnesses. Now, in 1946, she emphasized in 
much greater detail the earliest infantile anxieties and the defences against them –
focusing on mechanisms such as the splitting of the ego, projective identification, denial 
and omnipotence. She took the view that these were characteristic of the earliest 
infantile phase, which she now renamed ‘the paranoid-schizoid position’ to emphasize 
the importance of the schizoid or splitting mechanisms she had discovered. She stressed 
that, if the early paranoid anxieties and schizoid mechanisms continued to persist and 
were not sufficiently modified during the later depressive position, there was a danger 
that schizoid or schizophrenic illnesses could develop in later life” (Rosenfeld, 1987, p. 
13; my alterations).                       
 In 1952 Rosenfeld described in outline the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis 
based on projective identification (cf., Rosenfeld, 1952a, pp. 111-131; 1971a, pp. 115-
128; 1987), which was subsequently elaborated by Money-Kyrle (cf., Money-Kyrle, 
1956b, pp. 360-366), Bion (see above), and many others: “Projective identification 
relates, first of all, to a splitting process of the early ego, where either good or bad parts 
of the self are expelled from the ego and, as a further step, are projected in the form of 
love or hatred into external objects. This process leads to a fusion of the projected parts 
of the self with the external objects; the individual is identical with the relevant aspect 
of the external object to the extent that he is it. A major consequence of such projective 
identification is that it gives rise to paranoid anxieties. Objects felt to possess the 
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aggressive parts of the self become persecuting and are experienced by the patient as 
threatening retaliation. He feels they will try to force themselves and the bad parts of the 
self which they contain back inside him. Patients using extensive projective 
identificatory processes are, therefore, constantly threatened by such paranoid anxieties” 
(Rosenfeld, 1987, pp. 157-158).      
 Accordingly, as I said above, Rosenfeld adds a further component to the 
Kleinian view of psychosis (a mitigated ‘secondary discourse’, but still a ‘secondary 
discourse’): he points out that the psychotic not only needs desperately to project 
unwanted parts of the self into others but also introject others just as forcefully into the 
self. Both processes result in the blurring of self-object boundaries, which the psychotic 
needs in order to defend against the awareness of separateness (cf., Rosenfeld, 1963a, 
1963b).          
 Rosenfeld also agrees with Bion that the mother must be a container for the 
infant’s projective identifications: “the process of projective identification can also be 
considered as an attempt to communicate. If the unbearable and often chaotic thoughts 
and feelings which are expelled can be contained, it is possible that what is happening 
can be understood and considered, paving the way for the thoughts and feelings to be 
tolerated and to become less unbearable” (Rosenfeld, 1987, p. 159), but he believed that 
the result of failed containment is excessive envy and aggressiveness and an intense 
need to defend against them. The blurring of self-object boundaries, according to 
Rosenfeld, is the psychotic defence against intolerable envy, aggressiveness, and the 
awareness of dependence (cf., Rosenfeld, 1983, pp. 261-267).   
 Rosenfeld was also acquiescent with Bion that borderline psychopathology is 
attributable to a failure by the mother to introject the infant’s projections (cf., Rosenfeld, 
1978, pp. 215-221).         
 However, Rosenfeld put more emphasis on the resulting increase in envy and 
aggressiveness, which, he believed, disrupts the normal splitting process and thus 
causes prolonged states of confusion in which love and hate are undifferentiated. When 
strong affects are evoked, the child resorts to pathological splitting of ego and object 
into fragmented bits, a process leading to loss of the reality sense. In therapy, these 
patients, unlike psychotics, are able to maintain a sense of reality outside the 
transference and to have other relationships that do not evoke strong affects (cf., 
Rosenfeld, 1979b, pp. 485-510). In these cases, Rosenfeld also argues that the reality 
168 
 
sense is always vulnerable to potential disruption by emotional contact or eruption of 
affect. The author attributed the chaos of the borderline patient to the ease with which 
affect disrupts the reality sense (cf., Rosenfeld, 1978, pp. 215-221).   
 Envy is defended against by attacking the dependent, libidinal self in an effort to 
destroy links to objects (see above). The result is a primitive, attacking superego and 
idealization of the destructive, omnipotent self that disdains contact with objects. The 
child resorts to a fixated omnipotence in which reality is denied, yet the thought process 
is not totally disturbed, as it is in the psychotic solution of attacking thought itself (cf., 
Rosenfeld, 1979a, pp. 187-206).        
 This formulation fits Bion’s concept of the ‘in-between’ childhood state in 
which the mother fails the infant’s need for projective identification enough so that 
there is insufficient ability to tolerate frustration but not so much frustration that total 
evasion of it is necessary: “If intolerance of frustration is not so great as to activate the 
mechanisms of evasion and yet is too great to bear dominance of the reality principle, 
the personality develops omnipotence as a substitute for the mating of the pre-
conception, or conception, with the negative realization” (Bion, 1967a, p. 114).
 Rosenfeld adds that since the failure of projective identification arrests 
development before the normal superego can develop the attacks on the dependent part 
of the self substitute for normal superego development. Moreover, this primitive 
superego is projected onto others, leading to the persecutory fear that others are 
constantly critical and attacking (cf., Rosenfeld, 1983, pp. 261-267).   
 To conclude my reflection about this last accepted ‘Kleinian follower’, I must 
add that Rosenfeld has also delineated narcissistic pathology in a more precise way than 
Klein did herself. Klein (1946; see above) referred to narcissism in the context of the 
narcissistic object ties in schizoid mechanisms. Her followers used her concepts to 
formulate a view of narcissistic pathology as a syndrome in itself. According to both 
Rosenfeld and Segal, the narcissistic character structure is a defence against envy and 
dependence (cf., Rosenfeld, 1971b, pp. 169-178; Segal, 1983, pp. 269-276).  
 I now approach, very briefly, the «last» ‘Kleinian follower’: Meltzer. I added 
Meltzer to Segal’s understanding of the Kleinians (see above), because: “his brilliant 
evocation of clinical material has made him a leading member of the Kleinian Group, 
though his interest in child analysis diverged from the contemporary interest of the 
group in psychosis and borderline disorders…Latterly his views on technique and the 
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training of psychoanalysts have brought him into conflict with the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis in London” (Hinshelwood, op. cit., p. 388).    
 From these last words we can infer that Segal ‘excluded’ Meltzer from the major 
authors following Klein because of institutional reasons, as Kernberg would say, 
because of: “politics” (see below: Kernberg, 1993b, p. 62).   
 Meltzer’s contributions: “to Kleinian psychoanalysis are many and outstanding, 
in particular (i) his extremely detailed understanding of the psychoanalytic process 
during the session (Meltzer, 1967) and (ii) his powerful exegesis of the work of Freud, 
Klein and Bion (Meltzer, 1978b, 1986a)” (Hinshelwood, op. cit., p. 348).  
 Meltzer’s interest in teaching psychoanalysis (clinically and theoretically) 
has led him to several major commentaries on Kleinian writings unfolding a 
heuristic ‘secondary discourse’. “The Kleinian Development” (1978b) is a major 
attempt to present the relevant strands of Freud’s writings (cf., Meltzer, 1978b, pp. 4-
141), Klein’s (1961) detailed case history “Narrative of a Child Analysis” (cf., Meltzer, 
1978b, pp. 145-267), and the work of Bion as a continuous thread of intellectual and 
clinical development (cf., Meltzer, 1978b, pp. 271-396). The growing point of 
Kleinian thought, in Meltzer’s (and my) view, is the consolidation of Bion’s work 
on thinking and experiencing (cf., Meltzer, 1986a) and he has worked towards 
creating a psychoanalytic epistemology of this as a ‘secondary discourse’, as I tried 
to illustrate in my Bion’s ‘review’.       
 After the ‘Kleinian followers’, I return to the unfolding of Object Relations 
School always as a wider ‘secondary discourse’ (I repeat myself so often to be as 
clear as possible): Klein’s views were sharply criticized by Anna Freud (1927), who 
adopted the position that the ego was formed from the frustration of drives (cf., Freud, 
A., 1927 in Freud, A., 1966-1980a).       
 The result was a split in British psychoanalysis between the “Kleinians” and the 
followers of Anna Freud as Pearl King and Riccardo Steiner exhaustively illustrated in 
their “The Freud-Klein Controversies 1921-1945”: “for scientific purposes, the main 
argument was between Edward Glover, Melitta and Walter Schmideberg, Willi and 
Hedwig Hoffer, Barbara Low, Dorothy Burlingham, Barbara Lantos, and Kate 
Friedlander, who, along with Anna Freud, opposed the new ideas of Melanie Klein, 
whose main supporters were Susan Isaacs, Joan Riviere, Paula Heimann, Donald 
Winnicott, and John Rickman. In the middle were the participants who were not 
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committed to either point of view but who wanted some compromise to be reached 
which would maintain the possibility of continuing dialogue and who searched for the 
common ground. Among these were Ernest Jones, Sylvia Payne, Ella Sharpe, Marjorie 
Brierley, William Gillespie, John Bowlby, James Strachey, Michael Balint, and Adrian 
and Karin Stephen” (King et al., 1991, pp. 3-4).     
 From these epistemological controversies emerged ‘indirectly’ Fairbairn 
(1952) and Guntrip (1961, 1968, 1971) who were most theoretically consistent as a 
‘secondary discourse’, obviously. They did most of their clinical work with a group of 
adult patients who were very difficult to treat, described diagnostically as schizoid. 
Their emphasis on the importance of early object relations led them, in 
contradistinction to the Kleinians and the Freudians, to see drives as unimportant 
in psychic structure formation. They believed that instinctual activity was simply an 
example of the activity of structures, including that of the self: “Personally I consider 
that a psychology conceived in terms of object relations and dynamic structure is more 
compatible with the recognition of such human and personal values as psychotherapy 
serves than is any other psychology hitherto available. It is not for this reason that I 
have adopted such a psychology, but for the purely scientific reason that its 
correspondence to the facts and its explanatory value seem to me greater than those of 
any other psychology, e.g., a psychology conceived in terms of ‘impulse’ and ‘instinct’. 
At the same time, its relative compatibility with the existence of values other than the 
purely scientific and explanatory seems to me an added recommendation; for, in the last 
resort, one must believe that all aspects of human life must be capable of some ultimate 
reconciliation, or at least be free from irreconcilable incompatibility” (Fairbairn, 1952, 
p. 127).         
 Fairbairn thought to re-conceptualize psychoanalytic theory as a 
‘secondary discourse’ by recasting it as an object relations model of personality 
development and psychopathology (cf., Fairbairn, 1944, pp. 70-92; Fairbairn, 1946 in 
Fairbairn, 1952, pp. 137-151). His interests remained the theoretical re-
conceptualization of the psychoanalytic theory as a ‘secondary discourse’ of 
development, mental structure, and pathology until near the end of his life, when he 
began to draw out the clinical implications of his views as a ‘primary discourse’ (cf., 
Fairbairn, 1951 in Fairbairn, 1952, pp. 162-180; Fairbairn, 1963, pp. 224-225).   
 Unfortunately, owing to his ill health and premature death, Fairbairn was never 
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able to complete his clinical theory, and it was left to his analysand and disciple Harry 
Guntrip to provide the clinical drama as a ‘primary discourse’ for Fairbairn’s object 
relations theory as a ‘secondary discourse’ (cf., Guntrip, 1961). Indeed, Fairbairn 
published no case studies demonstrating his theoretical views. The theoretical focus of 
Fairbairn’s detailed re-conceptualization of psychoanalytic theory, the clinical 
application of which is often difficult to discern, gives his writing a dry, abstruse quality 
(the same problem of Klein and Bion as I said above). Nonetheless, there is a great 
deal of theoretical innovation in Fairbairn’s work (hence, the importance of him 
and Bion to what I am arguing throughout my entire Thesis, as above mentioned 
many times) and Guntrip’s writings provide much of its concrete clinical 
application (cf., Guntrip, 1968): once again, ‘secondary and primary discourse’ are 
mutually affected by each other.      
 Fairbairn (1952) viewed as ground-breaking discoveries Freud’s concept of the 
unconscious and his interpretation of psychopathological phenomena and dreams as 
products of unconscious mental processes. However, Fairbairn felt the limitation of 
Freud’s thought lay in his ‘impulse psychology’, or drive theory, a limitation that led 
him to formulate his alternative object relations psychology. Fairbairn’s object 
relations theory was the first attempt in psychoanalysis to explain psychoanalytic 
therapy without referring to drive theory: a pioneer ‘secondary discourse’.
 Fairbairn still spoke of an id: “impulse (that) cannot be considered apart from 
objects, whether external or internal” (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 88; my alteration).  
 For this reason, he saw no further meta-psychological use to claiming a 
distinction between the id and the ego: “Freud’s conception of the origin of the ego as a 
structure which develops on the surface of the psyche for the purpose of regulating id-
impulses in relation to reality will thus give place to a conception of the ego as the 
source of impulse-tension from the beginning” (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 88; cf., Freud, 
1923c, pp. 12-59). This was a significant theoretical leap. The ego, that is, self-
structures, not the id, comes first. In here my strongest statement gains its full 
argument: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the theorist 
deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of 
psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.   
 Indeed, for Fairbairn, impulses, whether conscious or unconscious, exist only 
within an ego structure, however primitive or undifferentiated it may be, and derive 
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their relevance from this. They do not somehow exist prior to the development of the 
ego, either temporally or logically. For Fairbairn, human experience can have meaning 
only in terms of an ego (cf., Fairbairn, 1944, pp. 70-92; 1952, pp. 82-136).
 Consequently, he disputed not only Freud’s concept of an original id out of 
which the ego is born but as well as Hartmann’s concept of an undifferentiated 
matrix from which both ego and id develop (cf., Freud, 1923c, pp. 12-59; Hartmann, 
1939, pp. 308-321). For Fairbairn, the ego exists from birth. This ego present at birth is 
a ‘pristine’ ego, that is, a whole ego which has as a key function the libidinal search for 
infantile dependence on a gratifying object. The baby’s needs exist within an 
experiencing organism, however undifferentiated it may be, a view point that led 
Fairbairn to a primary theoretical postulate, namely, that structure exists before energy 
(cf., Fairbairn, 1952, 1954b).       
 Fairbairn disagreed with Freud’s concept of a directionless psychic energy 
existing from birth that must be harnessed as psychic structure develops; for him, the 
concept of psychic energy is meaningful only insofar as it is associated with an ego 
structure (cf., Fairbairn, 1946 in Fairbairn, 1952, pp. 137-151).     
 Fairbairn ultimately disputed Freud’s tripartite structural model of id, ego, 
and superego, viewing all divisions in the psyche as parts of the ego. That’s why 
Fairbairn pioneered in the treatment of schizoid personalities: once again, 
‘secondary and primary discourse’ are mutually affected by each other. It’s 
because of his conception of a ‘unified’ ego that he described the characteristics of 
schizoid personalities as follows: “(1) an attitude of omnipotence, (2) an attitude of 
isolation and detachment, and (3) a preoccupation with inner reality” (Fairbairn, 1940 in 
Fairbairn, 1952, p. 6).         
 He saw that schizoid behaviour was not possible without a ‘split in the ego’. 
Fairbairn appears to have been using Klein’s concept of splitting, but when he referred 
to splitting as: “resulting in all degrees of integration of the ego” (Fairbairn 1940 in 
Fairbairn, 1952, p. 9), he obviously was using it more broadly than the archaic form 
used by Klein.         
 Fairbairn’s meaning is close to Kohut’s idea of fragmentation and lack of 
cohesiveness (cf., Kohut, 1971, 1976, 1984). Also, with Fairbairn, splitting took place 
in the ego as well as between the good and bad internalized objects of Klein’s thinking. 
Fairbairn differed from Kohut in that he sought to heal the ‘splits in the ego’ in order to 
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develop in the patient the capacity for object relations, whereas Kohut sought the 
opposite: object relations to consolidate the nuclear self (cf., Brandchaft, 1986, pp. 245-
272; Kohut & Wolf, 1978, pp. 413-426).       
 These differences indicate a move away from Klein, who was still wedded to 
drive theory. Fairbairn’s major accomplishment was to shift theoretical concerns 
from drive theory toward the idea of a depressed, or hungry, ego. This word ego, 
as Fairbairn used it, was no longer a technical part of structural theory, but the 
self in a broad sense.        
 According to Fairbairn, not only do all impulses emanate from an experiencing 
ego but also they always have objects. In this regard he was influenced by Klein; Klein 
believed that ego growth is a process of internalizing objects. Fairbairn used Klein’s 
concept of the internal object as the building block of the personality to develop his own 
object relations theory of development and psychopathology, believing that Klein’s 
theory was too dependent on the drive concept (cf., Fairbairn, 1951 in Fairbairn, 1952, 
pp. 162-180; Klein, 1952b, pp. 51-53).       
 As I said above Fairbairn was set to ‘reintegrate Freud’s views’ (and I add) as 
a ‘secondary discourse’ and the first step in this reintegration was the: “recasting 
and reorientation of the libido theory” (Fairbairn, 1941 in Fairbairn, 1952, p. 28). 
 In Fairbairn’s (1951) view, libido is ‘object seeking’, but it no longer consisted 
of a drive or drives biologically based, urgently seeking a target of discharge. For 
Fairbairn, the libido was the self in a state of longing to be bonded to a nourishing 
source (‘object’). With the schizoid, there was a calm, detached surface self, repressed 
affect, and a well-defended, hungry internal self that emerged eventually in the 
therapeutic transference. To Fairbairn, the self grew: “from an infantile dependence 
through a period of transition to mature dependence” (Fairbairn, 1951 in Fairbairn, 
1952, p. 163). The stage of infantile dependence was characterized predominantly by an 
attitude of taking. The transitional stage saw the use of paranoid, obsessional, hysterical, 
and phobic techniques: “The stage of mature dependence had an attitude of giving, with 
accepted or rejected objects exteriorized” (Fairbairn, 1941 in Fairbairn, 1952, p. 39). 
 Fairbairn saw dependence on its own separate line of development years before 
Kohut & Wolf (1978) adopted a similar position. Therefore, the infant cannot exist 
without an object, and, indeed, objects are needed throughout life, although the type of 
need and the nature of the relationship with the object changes. Infantile libido, like all 
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stages of libido, is conceptualized as object seeking, as I said above.   
 Thus, Fairbairn reserves the primacy of libidinal zone and object. Freud and 
Abraham held to the erotogenic zone theory of development, dividing the epigenetic 
stages of child development into the oral, anal, and genital libidinal zones (cf., Freud, 
1905b, pp. 135-143; Abraham, 1921, 1924a, 1924b).      
 In opposition to this view, Fairbairn pointed out that the infant is oral not 
because of the primacy of the mouth, but because the mouth is the appropriate organ for 
the breast. The child becomes genital when it is able to have a more mature form of 
object relationship. In other words, the erotogenic zone the child uses is defined by the 
kind of object relationship it seeks and is capable of: “Libido is a function of the 
ego…The ego, and therefore libido, is fundamentally object-seeking” (Fairbairn, 1963, 
p. 224). Throughout his work Fairbairn used the word libido to refer to positive 
affective charge (cf., Fairbairn, 1946 in Fairbairn, 1952, pp. 137-151).   
 However, he criticized as a hypostatization Freud’s notion of libido as existing 
originally in a directionless, ‘pure’ state. Although he rejects Freud’s dual-instinct 
theory, he continues: “to accept Freud’s view that libido and aggression constitute 
the two primary dynamic factors in mental life” (Fairbairn, 1955 in Scharff et al., 
1998, p. 145).         
 Fairbairn’s view that libido exists within an ego seeking an object from the 
beginning caused him to dispute the importance of the pleasure principle in normal 
development and to postulate that libido is reality oriented, not pleasure seeking, from 
the start, although the relationship with reality is initially immature. Pleasure, according 
to Fairbairn, is a ‘signpost’ to the object. When pleasure is sought for its own sake, the 
psyche has broken down; a personality dominated by pleasure seeking is pathological, 
even in the earliest stages of development (cf., Fairbairn, 1944, pp. 70-92).  
 Fairbairn’s defence of this view is that there is no other way to understand the 
devotion of children and adults to their objects. Freud (1920a) recognized the problem 
of reconciling object attachment with the pleasure principle when he raised the question 
of why neurotics are so attached to painful objects; he resolved this dilemma with his 
concept of the death drive as I said above (cf., Freud, 1920a, pp. 7-64). Fairbairn’s 
view, which does not require the postulation of an abstract, ‘unverifiable’ concept 
like the death drive, is that neurotics are attached to their bad objects because they 
need them for survival, that any object contact is better than none at all (cf., 
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Fairbairn, 1943 in Fairbairn, 1952, pp. 59-81;  Fairbairn, 1944, pp. 70-92).  
 If the organism were pleasure seeking, Fairbairn reasoned, the internalization of 
bad objects would not be explainable, nor would the attachment to objects no longer 
valued as sources of pleasure. In explaining the internalizing of the bad object, he 
remarks: “It is better to be a sinner in a world ruled by God than to live in a world ruled 
by the Devil” (Fairbairn, 1943 in Fairbairn, 1952, p. 66).    
 Paraphrasing this, in light of his concept of the ‘conditionally bad object’, we 
might say that the Devil is internalized in a effort to transform him into an irate God, 
and later condensed with the ideal God in order to maintain the hope for an eventual 
redemption in God’s world.        
 Accordingly, Fairbairn’s rejection of the concept of the id: “there is no such 
thing as an ‘id’” (Fairbairn, 1963, p. 224), in favour of the concept of an ego 
present from birth did not mean he disputed Freud’s notion of psychic structures 
in conflict with each other. Instead, Fairbairn re-conceptualized Freud’s structural 
model as a ‘secondary discourse’ into three types of ego, each of which has a 
corresponding object: “the original ego is split into three egos –a central 
(conscious) ego attached to the ideal object (ego-ideal), a repressed libidinal ego 
attached to the exciting (or libidinal) object, and a repressed anti-libidinal ego 
attached to the rejecting (or anti-libidinal) object” (Fairbairn, 1963, p. 224). A re-
conceptualization is not an annihilation of what is re-conceptualized: it’s just a 
deconstruction: the vital essence of the psychoanalytical clinical method as above 
mentioned many times in order to be as clear as possible.   
 To conclude Fairbairn’s ‘review’ I will illustrate Fairbairn’s own ‘Synopsis of an 
Object-Relations Theory of the Personality’: “In response to many requests I have 
prepared the following brief synopsis of the theoretical views I have expounded over the 
last twenty years.         
 (1) An ego is present from birth.      
 (2) Libido is a function of the ego.     
 (3)There is no death instinct; and aggression is a reaction to frustration or 
deprivation.           
 (4) Since libido is a function of the ego and aggression is a reaction to frustration 
or deprivation, there is no such thing as an ‘id’.     
 (5) The ego, and therefore libido, is fundamentally object-seeking. 
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 (6) The earliest and original form of anxiety, as experienced by the child, is 
separation-anxiety.         
 (7) Internalization of the object is a defensive measure originally adopted by the 
child to deal with his original object (the mother and her breast) in so far as it is 
unsatisfying.          
 (8) Internalization of the object is not just a product of a fantasy of incorporating 
the object orally, but is a distinct psychological process.    
 (9) Two aspects of the internalized object, viz. its exciting and its frustrating 
aspects, are split off from the main core of the object and repressed by the ego. 
 (10) Thus there come to be constituted two repressed internal objects, viz. the 
exciting (or libidinal) object and the rejecting (or anti-libidinal) object.   
 (11) The main core of the internalized object, which is not repressed, is 
described as the ideal object or ego-ideal.      
 (12) Owing to the fact that the exciting (libidinal) and rejecting (anti-libidinal) 
objects are cathected by the original ego, these objects carry into repression with them 
parts of the ego by which they are cathected, leaving the central core of the ego (central 
ego) unrepressed, but acting as the agent of repression.     
 (13) The resulting internal situation is one in which the original ego is split into 
three egos –a central (conscious) ego attached to the ideal-object (ego-ideal), a 
repressed libidinal ego attached to the exciting (or libidinal) object, and a repressed anti-
libidinal ego attached to the rejecting (or anti-libidinal) object.   
 (14) This internal situation represents a basic schizoid position, which is more 
fundamental than the depressive position described by Melanie Klein.  
 (15) The anti-libidinal ego, in virtue of its attachment to the rejecting (anti-
libidinal) object, adopts an uncompromisingly hostile attitude to the libidinal ego, and 
thus has the effect of powerfully reinforcing the repression of the libidinal ego by the 
central ego.          
 (16) What Freud described as the ‘superego’ is really a complex structure 
comprising (a) the ideal object or ego-ideal, (b) the anti-libidinal ego, and (c) the 
rejecting (or anti-libidinal) object.       
 (17) These considerations form the basis of a theory of the personality conceived 
in terms of object-relations, in contrast to one conceived in terms of instincts and their 
vicissitudes” (Fairbairn, 1963, pp. 224-225).      
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 With Fairbairn is crystal clear my argument that psychoanalytic theory comes 
after clinical work: as above mentioned many times, in this Thesis I will establish 
the scientific accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing 
concrete examples (as I did in my Introduction) of how the analyst deconstructs 
the clinical phenomena independently of what theoretical model he embraces: the 
keynote here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary 
discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.): by a permanent deconstructionist 
method; a methodological deconstruction of what the analyst meta-interprets: the 
theoretical models.          
 The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending 
dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) 
in its essence (see above Laplanche, op. cit.). Freud is the first object relations 
theorist because object relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic 
thought, as their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction (like Laplanche states; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.): the theoretical meta-interpretations of Freud, 
Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.) constitute all clinical dissolutions inherent to the 
psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why I state in this literature review that all 
these authors follow Freud –directly or indirectly, theoretically speaking– building 
up a syncretic universalist model unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of 
psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. I state even more: the more the theorist 
differs from Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the 
theory is following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, 
the deconstruction.          
 Indeed and returning to Gedo and Goldberg (1973), as we saw by this review of 
psychoanalytic literature, these authors try to ‘resolve the problem’ of multiple models 
by tying particular theories and models to the different developmental [as I said in my 
Introduction concerning Lussier’s (1991) statement, this is the developmental task 
of science] periods and, once again, to be absolutely clear: throughout my review I 
will follow Gedo and Goldberg’s epistemological stream of thought, but with my 
own perspective of interpreting each ‘model of mind’ as a ‘secondary discourse’ as 
I have been defending since the beginning of this dissertation, that is, to minimize 
any confusion caused by the current away of theories I will illustrate in the 
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conclusion of my review the developmental contributions of those authors who 
have had a major impact on the field or who have offered a fairly systematized 
theory of object relations development as I started to do in my Introduction, but, 
as above mentioned, and, once again: if the ten shared characteristics of what 
Kernberg (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b, 2001a; see my Introduction) calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’; the five shared characteristics of 
what he calls the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current; and the 
fourteen shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘French psychoanalytic 
approach’ –alongside with the above two– don’t constitute new integrations, not as 
a simple ‘common ground’, but as promoting valid hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (cf., 
Laplanche, op. cit.), I don’t know how one can say that psychoanalytic theory 
comes after clinical work.        
 Therefore, the conclusion of my literature review will tie Grotstein’s (1981b, 
2000) epistemological meta-psychoanalytic syncretism and Matte-Blanco’s bi-
logical (1956, 1975, 1981, 1988) meta-theory; Lacan’s (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 93-100, 
pp. 101-124, pp. 237-322, pp. 401-436, pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, pp. 765-790, pp. 
793-827, pp. 829-850, pp. 855-877; 1967-68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 1969-70; 1970; 
1972-73; 1973; 1974-75; 1975a; 1975-76; 1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-78b, pp. 548-
556) algebraic structures will be illustrated as a ‘epistemological counterpart’ to 
Matte-Blanco’s bi-logic; I finish my psychoanalytic review with Kernberg’s 
(1993b) insights towards the psychoanalytic status quo regarding a ‘unified’ clinic 
epistemology as a ‘secondary discourse’.      
 Accordingly, Grotstein’s meta-psychoanalytic perspective illustrates a 
unifying conceptualization transversal to all psychoanalytic models as a ‘secondary 
discourse’, where the: “extension in the domain of myth” (Bion, 1963, p. 11; my 
alterations) is profusely ‘extended’: ‘the myth of the labyrinth symbolically and 
allegorically unites concepts of Freud and Jung and those of object relations 
theory, particularly those of Klein and Winnicott but also of Bion, Lacan, and 
Anna Freud. Jung’s concepts of transcendence, of the personal and collective 
unconscious, of archetypes, and of alchemy are linked to Klein’s conceptions of 
splitting, projective identification, and the combined parental imago and to 
Winnicott’s concepts of object usage and the subjective object’ (cf., Grotstein, 
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1981b, pp. 357-416; 2000).         
 I will articulate Grotstein’s approach with what Rank (1912) and Anzieu 
(1966) call ‘fraternal incest’, and its relation to the Oedipus complex. Furthermore 
I will posit, as argued by Grotstein (2000), the myth of the Minotaur as an archaic 
oedipal myth. This reflection intends to articulate both ‘mythologies’ with the 
purpose of creating an epistemological continuum of ‘secondary discourses’ 
between the different psychoanalytic schools of thought. I will also illustrate my 
own perspective (a mitigated ‘secondary discourse’) about the myth of Persephone 
and the myth of Orpheus. Accordingly, the study of myths, folk tales and 
narratives constitutes a fecund contribution to psychoanalytic understanding 
because, in all probability, the phantoms, ghosts, monsters, and chimera (the main 
characters present in myths, folk tales and some narratives) that occupy and haunt 
our internal world are part of our inherent template of possibilities and at the same 
time are created anew from the raw clay of our autochthonous creative projective 
identifications (including animation and personification).    
 Indeed, Analytical Psychology has welcomed an array of collective myths, 
into its discipline, while classical psychoanalysis has been dominated by the oedipal 
myth alone. Exceptions include Klein’s psychoanalytic essay on Aeschylus’ Oresteia 
(cf., Klein, 1963a, pp. 23-54) and Hamilton’s comparison of the myths of Narcissus and 
Oedipus (cf., Hamilton, 1993), to say nothing of Freud’s own brief reference to the 
Narcissus myth (cf., Freud, 1914f, pp. 73-102). Freud took the oedipal myth from only 
one of the plays in the Sophoclean trilogy and emphasized the themes of incest and 
parricide, a conjunction that came to be known as the Oedipus complex (cf., Freud, 
1897c; 1910f, pp. 165-175; 1924c, pp. 173-179).     
 Anzieu (1966) defends a proto-Oedipus entity and the existence of a ‘fraternal 
incest’, which: “repeats itself regularly from generation to generation” (Anzieu, 1966, p. 
12) among gods.          
 In Greek cosmogony Gaea is the primary mother; Gaia represents Earth, which 
itself emerges from Chaos. Gaea originates Heaven, which is called Uranus. Everything 
that is created on earth is the result of the union between Gaea and her brother-son-
husband Uranus (Heaven). Uranus ‘copulates’ with Gaea as frequently as: “rain 
copulates with earth” (Anzieu, op. cit., p. 19).      
 Gaea, tired and angry with her husband, Uranus, for having sent their child to 
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hell, Cyclopes, decides to help one of her sons castrate him. This son is Cronus who 
castrates his father with an axe. After doing so Cronus becomes ‘Lord of the Universe’ 
and marries his sister Rhea. Rhea, after seeing Cronus devour all of their children, hides 
her last son, Zeus. She decides to help Zeus overthrow his father and once overthrown is 
obliged to swallow a substance in order to throw up the children he had devoured, 
bringing back to life Zeus’s brothers and sisters: Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades and 
Poseidon. Zeus associates with Metis (Reason/mind), who belong to the race of Titans, 
as well as with Themis (Law). These associations represent two symbolic weddings that 
illustrate the moment that Zeus ‘gives’ Justice and Work to mankind. Zeus, afraid of 
being overthrown by his daughter, in Metis’s womb, devours Metis (as Cronus did with 
his children), and from himself ‘gives birth’ to Athena. Athena being born from Zeus’s 
brain comes to the world fully armed. Later, Zeus will marry two of his sisters: Demeter 
and Hera. Although he cheats on Hera several times with mortal women, she remains 
his wife for all of eternity (cf., Anzieu, op. cit., p. 20).      
 Aside with the ‘fraternal incest’ committed by Cronus and Zeus, we find some 
‘uncompleted incest’ among Zeus’s sons: Apollo-Artemis, who were twins and secretly 
in love with each other; Hephaestus-Athena. Hephaestus falls in love with Athena and 
chases her; upon catching hold of her he tries to rape her, but unable to, ejaculates on 
Athena’s tie. Athena, with repugnance, cleans the semen with a tissue that she drops on 
the ‘floor’. From the contact between the semen and the ‘floor’ Erechtheus is born, 
ancestor of the legendary Kings of Athens, the last King being Theseus (cf., Anzieu, op. 
cit., p. 21). This narrative of Theseus is inherent to the Minotaur myth and will be 
developed later on this reflection.      
 According to Anzieu, the Oedipus complex is not present in ancient Greek 
mythology because a combination of incest and the murder of a close relative do not 
exist. The author states that the murder is replaced by other ‘actions’ such as: father’s 
castration; falling from heights; blinding of the eyes; the usurpation of place and power 
(cf., Anzieu, op. cit., p. 25).        
 Related with this issue is what Rank describes in his “Incest-Motive” (1912). He 
defends the existence of a ‘fraternal incest’, which is characterized not only by the 
attraction of one brother for the brother of the opposite sex, but also by the rivalry of 
brothers of the same sex. This rivalry is motivated by the struggle for power or by the 
attempt of stealing for him a woman (or women) (cf., Rank, 1912, p. 12). Several myths 
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and narratives illustrate this dynamic. Such rivalries, between brothers of the same sex 
are clearly exemplified in the following myths and narratives: Eteocles and Polynices; 
Atreus and Thyestes; Jacob and Esau; Osiris and Set; Romulus and Remus. In almost all 
of these, the primary cause of rivalry is represented by the possession of the mother (or 
woman), and the possession of land (symbolic mother) (cf., Rank, op. cit., p. 14).
 Following the scholastic tradition, the fratricide fight between Cain and Abel is 
due to Cain’s jealousy regarding Abel’s offers to God. According to ‘The Bible’, Cain 
thought that God better received Abel’s offers (cf., Graves & Patai, 1963).  
 Rank’s perspective differs from the one that is described in the ‘Book of 
Genesis’. Rank posits that aside with the two brothers, there was a woman (Abel’s twin 
sister) that Adam and Eve wanted to ‘give’ to Abel as a wife. Therefore, Cain’s crime 
was not due to God’s love jealousy, but to Abel’s twin sister love jealousy.   
 Rank tries to argue that this ‘fraternal complex’ is a derivation of the Oedipus 
complex. The author states that the brothers fight for possession of the same woman, 
who (hidden or symbolically) correspond to the figure of the mother or the sister (cf., 
Rank, op. cit., p. 15).         
 Another situation is when the brothers fight for the love of a sister, who is not 
initially recognized as a ‘true sister’. Concerning this subject we find literature and 
theatre narratives such as: Schiller’s “The Bride of Messina” (1803); Goethe’s 
“Clavigo” (1774), “Die Geschwister” (1776) and “Iphigenie auf Tauris” (1787); 
Byron’s “Manfredo” (1817); Grillparzer’s “Die Ahnfrau” (1817); and others (cf., Rank, 
1912).            
 Rank defends that in these narratives the fraternal love cannot always be a 
simple transposition from the author’s life to his novel (which is what Freud argued 
with regard to Jensen or Meyer) (cf., Rank, op. cit., p. 15).    
 The author states that Schiller wrote “The Bride of Messina” about two brothers 
that were in love with the same woman, who was in fact sister to both [Schiller, in spite 
of having a ‘loved sister’, only had one brother who died after birth (cf., Schiller, 
1803)]. For Rank, Schiller’s “The Bride of Messina” was a new elaboration of Schiller’s 
primitive oedipal situation. A kind of continuum with his previous novels where the 
fight between father and son is illustrated, and the possession of the mother (or 
stepmother): Schiller’s “Don Carlos” (1787) is the best example (cf., Rank, op. cit., p. 
16).          
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 Grillparzer wrote “Die Ahnfrau”, in which simultaneously occurs fraternal incest 
and parricide (cf., Rank, op. cit., p. 17). In relation to the Oedipus complex, Freud in his 
“Letters to Fliess” quoted this novel (cf., Freud, 1887-1904).    
 Also in Grillparzer the fraternal love seems mysterious because the author had 
no sister. It seems difficult to generalize Rank’s theory, because these narratives that are 
based on ‘fraternal incest’ constitutes only what Freud called ‘alienation romances’ (cf., 
Freud, 1887-1904).          
 Freud characterized them as being detached of reality and as having a 
predominance of ‘Fate mechanisms’ over the psychological mechanisms of action (cf., 
Freud, ib.).          
 In contrast with the narratives based on fraternal incest phantasy we have the 
narratives based on oedipal feelings. These feelings represent an attachment with 
reality: political reality, such as the one present in Schiller’s “Don Carlos” (see above) 
or in Shakespeare’s “Julius Caesar” (1599); social reality, where new power relations 
are established, like the Oedipal novels of Stendhal (1830), Balzac (1835) and D. H. 
Lawrence (1913) (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997). In mythology, we regularly find 
fraternal incest present in God’s genealogy, but, here, the transformation of the world is 
illustrated by a phantasmatic representation.      
 On the contrary, the Oedipal dynamic is strongly shown in the heroes’ saga, the 
first of which was narrated by Homer [Heracles, Theseus, Jason, Perseus, Bellerophon 
(cf., Jaeger, 1936; Graves, 1955)].        
 In general these heroes were abandoned children. This abandonment took place 
because the oracle told the heroes’ parents that they were going to be killed by their 
children. The hero, in an attempt to re-conquer his position in the world and in the 
‘natural order of things, must accomplish great things (dangerous and deadly things), 
but at the same time the hero conquers a materiality, a power that he exercises over the 
rest of man’ (cf., Graves, 1955).       
 In this dynamic what is fundamental is not the presence of a fraternal or 
maternal (phantasmatic) figure like Rank and Anzieu defend; what is fundamental is the 
existence of a ‘third’ with whom identification is possible. This third is the Oedipal 
figure (the father).          
 The Oedipal legend that Freud singled out, however, was a patriarchally –and 
therefore a phallically– dominated one. Klein (1928b) postulated in her concept of the 
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archaic (early) Oedipus complex, first of all, that it was orally and then anally and 
unrethrally dominated and that the infant experiences unconscious phantasies of 
wishing to explore the mother’s insides and to sadistically appropriate her internal 
content. In this phantasy, the infant imagines that the mother’s inside contains the 
paternal penis, internal babies, and valuable faeces (cf., Klein, 1928b, pp. 202-214; 
1945, pp. 11-33).          
 Klein seems to have been unaware, however, that these unconscious phantasies 
resonated with another ancient Greek myth, that of the labyrinth. The mythic labyrinth, 
consequently, may represent the matriarchal or feminine Kleinian counterpart to the 
patriarchal or masculine oedipal myth. The Minotaur may symbolically represent the 
archaic internalised father phantasmally constituted as part of a combined parent imago 
or also as a phallic mother, as well as assertive aspects that the toddler projects into the 
internal penis and that he is now destined to reclaim (cf., Grotstein, 2000).
 Therefore, together, the labyrinth and the Minotaur signify the persecutory 
demons of the infant’s creation that, in the course of development, must be sought, 
explored, ‘defeated and reclaimed’ so that they can be known and realized as symbolic 
thoughts.           
 The elements of the labyrinth are highly condensed in the classical Greek myth. 
Europa had been carried to Crete by a bull that was the animal metamorphosis of Zeus 
it is characteristic in the myths of the birth of heroes, as Rank (1909), Campbell (1949), 
Caldwell (1989), and others have pointed out, for one parent to be divine and the other 
mortal; the god aspect of one of the parents was frequently disguised in his or her 
animal totem form. Minos was the product of that union (cf., Graves, 1955, pp. 55-59).
 Shortly afterward, a white bull, that emerged from the sea, seduced Pasiphaë, 
Mino’s wife and Queen of Crete (Bulls featured prominently in the religious rituals of 
matriarchally oriented Cretan and pre-Hellenic culture, as the snake did in other 
matriarchal cultures in Asia Minor and elsewhere). This union produced the Minotaur, 
and the shamed and fearful Pasiphaë hastened to have the bull/child hidden in a 
labyrinthine enclosure constructed by the peerless architect, Daedalus (cf., Graves, ib.).  
 The Minotaur living in the farthest reach of this prison could not leave because 
of its mysterious mazelike construction. Meanwhile, since he had hegemony over the 
mainland poleis, every eight years Minos exacted from Athens a sacrificial tribute of 
eight male and eight female youths to be fed to the Minotaur the number eight seems to 
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have been important in the ancient world; as a multiple of the number four, it suggests 
Jung’s (1969a) concept of the quaternary (cf., Graves, ib.).    
 On one of the occasions of these cannibalistic ‘festivals’, Theseus, son of the 
tyrant of Athens, undertook the heroic task of ending these sacrifices by killing the 
Minotaur. He accompanied the designated victims on their voyage to Knossos, where he 
caught the gaze of Ariadne, the beautiful daughter of Minos and Pasiphaë and half-sister 
of the Minotaur. Falling immediately in love with Theseus (just as Scylla had fallen in 
love with Minos and Ishtar with Gilgamesh), Ariadne, whose name means ‘the very 
holy one’, chose to save him by allowing him secret entry into the labyrinth (cf., 
Graves, ib.).            
 She gave him a thread woven by Daedalus that would guide him back to the 
entry after he slew the Minotaur. Holding the thread in one hand, he entered the 
chamber, located and killed the Minotaur (Theseus’s ability to locate the Minotaur in 
the labyrinthine mazes is a testimony to his status as a hero who, like Oedipus with the 
sphinx, could solve riddles), and triumphantly emerged (cf., Graves, ib.).   
 When he re-embarked for Athens with the spared youths, however, he 
abandoned Ariadne, and she committed suicide: Theseus’s father, the tyrant of Athens, 
also committed suicide; on seeing that the ship returning Theseus from Crete had 
hoisted black sails rather than white, he threw himself off a cliff to his death, not 
knowing that Theseus had forgotten his prearranged agreement with his father to hoist 
white sails if he returned triumphantly (cf., Graves, ib.).   
 Theseus’s heroic task was not only to locate the Minotaur in the maze, but also 
to slay this primitive rival for the mother during the hegemony of the matriarchal 
Oedipus complex.           
 Grotstein defends another reading of the relationship between the roles of 
Theseus and Ariadne: “Ariadne can be understood as projectively identified with her 
shadow life, her animus, that is, with her half-brother, the half-man, half-beast 
Minotaur. She seeks Theseus as the analyst/hero to rescue her from her demonic, 
beastly nature -a castration, if you will. Thus, not only is she the heroine/analyst for 
Theseus, but he is her hero/analyst as well. Moreover, if she is integrated with her split-
off, hidden animus self, Ariadne constitutes the combined parent that Klein posited. She 
therefore acts as a holographic representation and descendant of the larger combined 
figure of the personified labyrinth and Minotaur. From this perspective, Ariadne’s inner 
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beastly nature constitutes a fractal hologram of the entirety of the myth” (Grotstein, 
2000, p. 204).         
 Grotstein’s ‘secondary discourse’ of the myth coincide with the ‘fact’ that in 
Athens, Theseus was the protective spirit (another variant of the ‘holographic 
representation’: see above) of male initiates. Called ‘ephebes’ (‘on the verge of 
adulthood’), between the ages of eighteen and twenty they underwent a time of stringent 
testing after which, in an oath, they invoked the model of Theseus’s career and were 
admitted to full citizenship. A ‘holographic representation’ almost as important as 
Theseus was Daedalus. He was the trickster-inventor so common in folklore that 
invented the tools of carpentry, built the wooden cow for Pasiphaë, designed the 
labyrinth (as I said above), and threaded the conch shell. He is the prototype of the 
passionate artist, so jealous of his powers that he murdered Perdix, his nephew and only 
rival, and risked his life to show off by threading the shell. Imprisoned within the maze 
of his own making, he is the emblem of the artist captivated by his own creation 
[Freud’s archaic Jensen (cf., Graves, 1955)].     
 Although classically Daedalus’s origin is explained as a late personification 
from the common Greek adjective ‘daidalos’, which means ‘skilfully made’, he is 
mentioned already in the “Iliad”, where Homer describes the design on a wonderful 
shield that Hephaestus, Daedalus’ divine counterpart, makes for Achilles (Graves. op. 
cit, p. 65):  
“The god of the brawny arms, displaying the skill of the artist, 
modelled a dancing floor, as Daedalus once did in Cnossus, 
for Ariadne, the maiden of lovely soft-flowing ringlets” (Homer, 18, pp. 590-592 in 
Graves, ib.).           
 Grotstein also argues that the labyrinth designed by Daedalus has in itself a 
different meaning from the one that the mythology offers: “I should comment on the 
mysterious nature of the creation of the labyrinth. It was designed and constructed by 
Daedalus to keep the Minotaur hidden in solitary confinement -to hide the royal 
family’s shameful secret. It seems to have been an open prison, but only a clever hero 
could divine its secrets without himself getting lost. I suggest, therefore, that the 
labyrinth represents the Unconscious. The passageway of the labyrinth flows from 
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the inside to the outside with the ‘discontinuous continuity’ of the Möbius strip, 
like the repression barrier itself” (Grotstein, op. cit., p. 205; see below Lacan, 1961-
1962, 1962-1963; my bold); once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different 
‘secondary discourses’.         
 From my perspective, the labyrinth, like the sphinx and other puzzle sources, 
exists today in such challenging activities as crossword and jigsaw puzzles and even the 
analytic process itself. The labyrinth may also find its analogue in the ancient Greek 
practice of consulting oracles. The oracle at Delphi, like similar oracles, was originally 
dedicated to the earth-mother deity Gaea (see above), who was later militantly replaced 
by the patriarchal deity Apollo, who thereafter presided over the oracle through a 
priestess-intermediary. She was called the ‘pythoness’ because of her mythical 
affiliation to the sacred snake, which was a totemic residue from the days of Gaea. The 
Jew’s phylacteries, which clearly resemble snakes, probably speak to their matriarchal, 
idol-worshiping heritage. The combination of the oracle, which was a tunnel in the 
ground, and the pythoness at the other end, provides a variant of the combined object 
and the labyrinth (cf., Graves, op. cit., pp. 68-70).      
 In the labyrinth, the infant confronts the Minotaur, which represents the: 
“projective creation of sadistic and voyeuristic attributes, before which the infant 
cowers” (Grotstein, op. cit., p. 206).        
 The Minotaur is a chimera made of animal and human parts, like such other 
mythological monsters as the sphinx, manticore, and centaur. All internal subjective 
objects are chimerical phantasies, hybrid and therefore monstrous. The Minotaur is the 
demon who must be located, confronted and killed and who thereupon becomes sacred 
because it has been sacrificed (cf., Bergmann, 1992).      
 The quest to kill the Minotaur (minotaurmachy), like the medieval quest to slay 
the dragon, its descendant, constitutes the mythic challenge of the hero in many 
cultures: “if not confronted and properly killed the demons become our Nemesis object 
superegos, which negate us and judge our cowardice” (Grotstein, ib.; my bold).
 Accordingly, we can posit Satan as a representation of Grotstein’s Nemesis 
object. In Goethe’s “Faust”, Mephistopheles declares: “I am the angel who only 
negates” (Goethe, 1808, p. 101; my bold).       
 The theme of beast sacrifice also occurs in Euripides’ play “The Bacchae”, in 
which a ram or goat is chased up a tree and then killed, the beast then becomes 
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reincarnated as a prince or Dionysus, the god. This sacrifice seems to follow the ancient 
superstition: ‘Out with the old, in with the new!’; derivatively, killing the beast within 
us as is equated with transformation: “the patient’s heroic developmental task is to face 
the diabolical chimera and to challenge it by extracting and recalling what belongs to 
him and what belongs to his mother, father, and sibling relationships. These are the first 
steps toward the heroic motto that Freud borrowed from Oedipus, ‘Know thyself’! The 
heroic task that occurs in the claustrum of the mythic labyrinth is to confront, 
deconstruct, decode (‘kill’), reclaim and thereby transform the Minotaur signifier” 
(Grotstein, op. cit., p. 207).        
 The ‘patient’s heroic developmental task’ that Grotstein illustrates is a cogent 
and fecund epistemological construct, which emerges from a myriad of schools of 
thought and that is why I argue that Grotstein’s meta-psychoanalytic perspective 
illustrates a unifying conceptualization transversal to all psychoanalytic models as 
a ‘secondary discourse’: “my thinking about this task has been shaped by Bion’s 
(1963) ideas of inherent preconceptions, tropisms, alpha function, maternal reverie, and 
the container-contained; by Bowlby’s (1969) notion of the constitutionality and 
inheritability of ‘prey-predator anxiety’; by Schore’s (1991, 1994) formulation of the 
neurobiological aspects of exploratory and display activity in the practicing sub-phase 
of separation and individuation; and by Lacan’s (1966) concept of the mirror-
experience, in which the ego finds a misrecognized image of itself in the mirror and 
thereby becomes alienated from itself” (Grotstein, ib.; my bold).    
 From my perspective I state that the fears of our own destructive feelings lead to 
confusion between the ‘persecutor’ and the true ‘enemy’ that threatens us and our loved 
ones. The Minotaur is our persecutor; that is, we have created it through projective 
identification; it is ourselves. The true enemy lies beyond the paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive positions; the enemy lies in the Lacanian ‘Real’, the Greek ‘Ananke’ 
(Necessity), and in Bion’s ‘O’ (see above: cf., Lacan, 1966; cf., Bion, 1965): once 
again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary discourses’. 
 Accordingly, Grotstein argues that: “Bion’s (1970) concept of ‘inherent 
preconceptions’, conflates with Bowlby’s (1969) idea of the universal fear of the 
predator inherent on all animal species, suggests an inherent fear of the predator, 
which I believe anticipates stranger anxiety (Spitz, 1959). An unsuccessful 
attachment experience confuses this inherently feared object with our loved ones. That 
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is, an infant who feels prematurely separate may misperceive (through projective 
identification) the mother’s breast as the predator/enemy” (Grotstein, ib.; my bold): 
once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary discourses’. 
 Therefore, we can posit that the ‘heroic task’ devolves into an ‘epistemophilic’ 
one, a defensive one, and an assertive one. One’s ‘rendez-vous’ with the metaphoric 
labyrinth and the Minotaur (Grotstein’s object of challenge or nemesis) requires 
differentiating between the enemy (‘Ananke’/Necessity) and the persecutor, and 
knowing and accepting who one is in the shadow of the mirrored (by circumstance) 
‘moira’ (fate) handed to each of us (see below).      
 Related with this issue, Grotstein states: “The infant/toddler has to learn to 
surmount the anxieties of separation, strange situations, and prey-predator relationships 
(being either the hunter or the hunted), and exploration or play (taking risks). These 
tasks involve mediating the balance between the surges of developmental boldness 
during the practicing sub-phase and the phase-specific development of shame as a way 
of controlling that boldness during the rapprochement sub-phase (Schore, 1991). Either 
courage or cowardice (shame, xenophobia, self-consciousness) is fated to develop at 
this time” (Grotstein, ib.).       
 Following a different ‘secondary discourse’ that ‘shares characteristics’ 
with Grotstein’s ‘secondary discourse’, Girard (1986) postulates that human culture is 
founded on our need to mediate the inevitable violence that occurs when individuals (in 
families or cultures) become interdependent. This closeness and interdependency evoke 
a tropism that he terms ‘mimesis’. Persons tend to merge with-to become like- other 
persons they like. Violence allows for group solidarity by the: “selection of a scapegoat 
to bear the violence because it is Other” (Girard, 1986, p. 13). Upon being sacrificed, 
the scapegoat victim is sanctified.        
 From a different ‘secondary discourse’ that ‘shares characteristics’ with 
Grotstein’s ‘secondary discourse’, Kristeva (1980) describes the experience of 
‘abjection’ (see above) as the opprobrium that the infant feels about his needy, therefore 
abjectly discardable, self, which then becomes projectively trans-located into mother as 
her shameful, abject neediness for father’s penis. The Minotaur was ‘Pasiphaё’s abject’, 
representing her shame and disgust over her intercourse with the ‘bull from the sea’ and 
her shame that her own bestial side had become manifest.   
 According with Grotstein’s ‘secondary discourse’, the Greek myth of the 
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labyrinth and its chimerical inhabitant represents: “a previously unrecognized 
developmental line, in my opinion (A. Freud, 1963), that the ontological capacity to be 
courageous, competent, to be, to face, and to do! Every infant faces the task of 
accepting its lot, its moira (‘portion’ delivered by Fate)- that is, of accepting its self as a 
self, its mother as its mother” (Grotstein, op. cit., p. 209; my bold): once again, a 
different ‘secondary discourse’ that ‘shares characteristics’ with Grotstein’s 
‘secondary discourse’.         
 The experiences the infant undergoes are like a mythic journey in which 
obstacles seem to be placed in its path and must be overcome, as if some deity were 
continuously testing the infant’s mettle and heroism: “the infant becomes defined in its 
confrontational interaction with the nemesis (persecutory) object. Put another way, the 
nemesis or primitive superego object, the metaphoric Minotaur, is a challenge to the 
subject insofar as it seems to ‘colonize’ the subject under his hegemony; it tends to 
impose its ‘name’ and opinion onto the subject for the latter mimetically to submit to. 
Because the nemesis object casts a hypnotic spell onto the subject [because of the 
latter’s projective identification into it], the subject collusively believes that it has lost 
its will under the dominion of this alien within the self” (Grotstein, ib.; my alteration).
 Therefore, the central character of this mythic journey, the hero, represents 
a mythic term that corresponds to Bion’s (1970) concept of the messiah, mystic, 
and ‘man of achievement’, dares to know himself as he is in the Mirror of the Real 
without the disguises of the Imaginary or the Symbolic (see above: Lacan’s second 
topic; cf., Lacan, 1966, 1970): once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different 
‘secondary discourses’.         
 The hero must know himself in Bion’s ‘O’, as did Oedipus when he answered 
the riddle of the sphinx. To do so, the infant must accept and ‘run’ with the gift of life 
and transcend its ‘baggage’ of felt curses and handicaps. Psychoanalytically, this means 
that the infant must accept its own life scenario in its entirety. Ultimately, those who 
would be heroes must separate out those aspects of their phantasmal internal world that 
belong to themselves from those that had to be endured from their objects. Thus, they 
must distinguish among persecutors, true enemies (whether they are parents or 
strangers), and safe loved and loving ones: “To claim its own life, the infant must 
handle three potentially abusive situations: (1) the chaos of infinity (Matte-Blanco, 
1975, 1988), inherent beta elements, dread of ‘O’ (Bion, 1963, 1965, 1970), and the 
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instinctual drive urges and affects; (2) the traumatic impingements and mal-or 
misattunements (and counter-projective identifications) on the part of the parents and 
the family; and (3) the natural predator-enemies of the family, clan, or culture (e.g., the 
situation in the Holocaust or Bosnia)” (Grotstein, op. cit., p. 212).  
 Therefore, the infant must do battle with the phantom chimera of its own 
creation, the results of the inchoate ‘digestion’ and processing of painful experiences. 
The infant must ‘autochthonize’ (be the phantasied creator of) these traumas before it 
can begin to distinguish persecutors (always the self) from enemies (always the object 
and never the self). The infantile neurosis (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243) is the archaic 
organizing state of ‘pathology’ created by the infant in trying to mediate between 
narcissistic urges and the desire to adjust to the family. The next step is the battle of 
sorting out the self from the object, and both of those from the phantasmatic 
exaggerations of them. The infant must become the hero in its own saga, do battle with 
demons and overcome them; with the knowledge that emerge from courage. But the 
infant-who-would-be-hero needs the help of loving objects in this saga. In the myth it 
was Ariadne and her thread; in real life it is our loved and loving ones.  
 In a proto conclusion, and in this context of the ‘extension in the domain of 
myth’, I steer ipsis verbis as above into Grotstein’s meta-psychoanalytic perspective, 
which illustrates a unifying conceptualization transversal to all psychoanalytic 
models as a ‘secondary discourse’: “the myth of the labyrinth symbolically and 
allegorically unites concepts of Freud and Jung and those of object relations theory, 
particularly those of Klein and Winnicott but also of Bion, Lacan, and Anna 
Freud. Jung’s concepts of transcendence, of the personal and collective 
unconscious, of archetypes, and of alchemy are linked to Klein’s conceptions of 
splitting, projective identification, and the combined parental imago and to 
Winnicott’s concepts of object usage and the subjective object” (Grotstein, op. cit., 
p. 218; my alterations).         
 In accordance with Grotstein’s ‘secondary discourse’, those themes unite in 
the concept that the labyrinth may constitute ‘an archetypal myth from the collective 
unconscious’ that designates the universal need of all infants and people generally 
(mythically represented by Theseus): “to return to their mythic home (the 
womb/claustrum) in an epistemophilic/sadistic foray in order to encounter the phantom-
beast that they have projected into it” (Grotstein, ib.).     
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 Then they must challenge it and win over it, thus obtaining their ‘spurs of 
combat’ and its legacy, the courage to know and realize. The outcome determines 
whether the phantom object, the metaphoric Minotaur, becomes one’s ‘Nemesis Object 
or one’s Challenge Object’. In this heroic quest, one is encouraged and guided by ‘one’s 
magus object (Ariadne)’ (cf., Grotstein, ib.).      
 The magus that Grotstein talks about may appear with either a positive, 
shepherding function or a more disingenuous one, so that the hapless ‘hero’ may feel 
goaded or lured into danger.        
 From my final synoptic ‘secondary discourse’, following Grotstein’s 
‘secondary discourse’, we can see that since its earliest days psychoanalysis has 
emerged not just, or even not so much, as a form of treatment of neurotic or other 
mental conditions, but as a theoretically, technically and ethically organized attempt to 
recover, out of that huge reservoir (as I said above) we call the ‘unconscious’, 
something apparently lost, dead or gone mad. In other words, the psychoanalytic 
endeavour could be described as a vast ‘rescue operation’ as it was explicit in the 
precedent reflection. This is metaphorically represented by Freud in his ‘secondary 
discourse’ as an archaeological exploration of the mind. At the end of his life he writes: 
“[the analyst’s] work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction resembles to 
a great extent an archaeologist’s excavation of some dwelling-place that has been 
destroyed and buried…the two processes are in fact identical, except that the analyst 
works under better conditions and has more material at his command to assist him, since 
what he is dealing with is not something destroyed but something that is still 
alive…Both of them have an undisputed right to reconstruct by means of supplementing 
and combining the surviving remains” (Freud, 1937b, p. 259; my underline): once 
again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary discourses’.   
 The psychoanalytic process of recovery could then be seen as an instance of 
those powerful rescue fantasies which manifest themselves in many forms and shapes, 
depending, for example, on whether they also involve an element of self-sacrifice on the 
part of the rescuer (the ‘organ donor’) –sometimes to the extreme of risking his or her 
own life (the ‘freedom fighter’); on the presence of an ambition not just to save or 
salvage, but also to ‘convert’ the rescued; on what it is that one is rescuing oneself or 
others from (usually some real or imagined danger, illness, evil, sin, ignorance, or 
death); and, most importantly, on the specific combination and interplay of conscious 
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and unconscious components as it was illustrated above.      
 We can find manifestations of rescue fantasies in numerous aspects of everyday 
life, for instance, in our choice of friends and sexual partners, or in our choice of 
careers: be it social work, plastic surgery, tapestry restoration or ecology lecturing. 
However much we try and rationalize them, unconscious transference factors involving 
the re-enactment of earlier scenarios will always be influential in such choices of 
relationships and activities.         
 It goes without saying that, regardless of their unconscious motivation and of the 
fantasies underlying their performance, most rescuing acts –or, in Kleinian ‘secondary 
discourse’, ‘reparative’ gestures intended to assuage the sense of guilt stemming from 
primitive destructive ‘phantasies’ against the mother’s body (see above: cf., Klein, 
1937, pp. 306-343)– are highly valued by society and include some of the noblest (and, 
occasionally, most misconceived) deeds in the ‘history of our discontented civilization’, 
using a Freudian ‘secondary discourse’ (see above: cf., Freud, 1930b, pp. 64-145): 
once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary discourses’.  
 Rescue fantasies can find expression in either active or passive forms, depending 
on whether we see ourselves as subjects or objects of salvage operations: we may be 
committed to nursing disabled children, or be those accident-prone individuals to be met 
with uncanny regularity in the local hospital’s casualty department. We shall, however, 
not be surprised to find both the active and the passive versions combined in the same 
person (an accident-prone nurse!).        
 This is acknowledged in psychoanalytic trainings, which require prospective 
practitioners to undergo, first their own training analysis (in my case accordingly with 
International Psychoanalytical Association standard: minimum of 5 years, 4 times a 
week; my own training lasted 6 years, 4 times a week; my training was done with 
Doctor Pedro Luzes, who was supervised by Raymond Saussure, who was analyzed by 
Sigmund Freud) to be rescued themselves before they qualify to rescue others.  
 Indeed, active and passive rescue fantasies are present in all psychoanalytic 
consulting rooms, where analysis consciously strive to relieve their analysand’s’ 
suffering and unconsciously hope to relieve also their own through it (cf., 
Greenacre, 1966, pp. 193-212), while at the same time analysands often wish to 
‘save’, alongside themselves, their analysts too (cf., Grinstein, 1957, pp. 124-129; 
Searles, 1979, pp. 380 459), whom they may perceive as being weak and helpless 
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‘wounded healers’. This is the embryo of one of my main arguments repeated many 
times throughout this Thesis: the psychoanalytic clinical method is a deconstruction 
of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of 
this ‘magnetism’ that I defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (my 
Conclusion) integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’ [(only threw the ongoing process of 
decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction which 
takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the 
analyst’s conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, the 
‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes 
any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse as a 
‘secondary discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary 
discourse’, is always applied after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s 
‘primary discourse’] as Laplanche argues (see above Laplanche, op. cit.). 
Theoretical models are hermeneutic because there is a meta-interpretation of the 
theory done by each analyst, and this literature review is based entirely in this 
premise, but the interpretation of the unconscious manifestations is not 
hermeneutic exactly for the reasons mentioned (Chapter 1) by Laplanche. 
 Therefore and accordingly, in a clinical context, Atwood understands what he 
calls ‘messianic salvation fantasies’ (cf., Atwood, 1978, pp. 85-96; see above: cf., 
Grotstein, 2000) as reactions to traumatic childhood experiences of disappointment 
and loss. Another special case of rescue fantasy to be encountered in psychoanalytic 
work concerns the process of mourning and the not-infrequent attempt on the part of 
parents who have lost a child to replace –that is, to bring magically back to life– him or 
her by soon conceiving another one. Such ‘replacement children’ may develop 
psychological problems, especially in the area of self-identity, as they grow up with 
the sense that their parents expect them to be someone other than themselves (cf., 
Sabbadini, 1988, pp. 528-547): once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different 
‘secondary discourses’.         
 Whatever their original features, however, rescue fantasies often include 
among their over-determined sources a component of unresolved narcissistic 
infantile omnipotence with its related primitive delusional ideas of immortality 
[the fantasy of immortality is related to unconscious timelessness and to the 
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infantile undifferentiated temporal dimension of the ‘omnipresent’ (cf., Sabbadini, 
1989, pp. 305-313)]. These, in turn, have the role of defences (through a process of 
conversion into their opposites) stemming from, respectively, the dependence of 
children upon caring adults and from the reality of our biological condition as mortals. 
In this connection, Freud refers to the ‘rescue motif’ and speculates on its 
psychogenic significance as ‘an independent derivative of the…parental complex’. 
He explains: “when a child hears that he owes his life to his parents, or that his mother 
gave him life, his feelings of tenderness unite with impulses which strive at power and 
independence, and they generate the wish to return this gift to the parents and to repay 
them with one of equal value. It is as though the boy’s defiance were to make him say: 
‘I want nothing from my father; I will give him back all I have cost him’. He then 
forms the phantasy of rescuing his father from danger and saving his life; in this 
way he puts his account square with him…In its application to a boy’s father it is the 
defiant meaning in the idea of rescuing which is by far the most important; where his 
mother is concerned it is usually its tender meaning. The mother gave the child life, and 
it is not easy to find a substitute of equal value for this unique gift” (Freud, 1910f, pp. 
172-173; my bold): once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary 
discourses’.          
 Abraham further develops the oedipal theme of the rescue of the father by 
noticing the concomitant element of aggression against him (cf., Abraham, 1922, 
pp. 467-474), also emphasized by Sterba (cf., Sterba, 1940, pp. 505-508), while 
Frosch (cf., Frosch, 1959, pp. 503-522) explores rescue fantasies in the wider 
context of ‘Family Romances’ (cf., Freud, 1909b, pp. 237-241) fantasies as they 
emerge in the analytic transference (cf., Esman, 1987, pp. 263-270; Gillman, 1992, 
pp. 279-298): once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary 
discourses’.           
 By inherence and going to the root of our ‘collective unconscious’: popular 
narratives, from the Old Testament prototypical story of Noah’s Ark onwards, are 
frequently built around the rescue motif. This motif is often found in fairy tales, from 
“Little Red Riding Hood”, “Rapunzel” and “Sleeping Beauty” to Bernard Shaw’s 
“Pygmalion” (1913): in collective regressive fantasies of a nostalgic golden age 
(Ovid’s Aurea aetas); in the religious promoting hope in a Messiah still to come to earth 
(for the Jews) or already arrived to sacrifice his own life for mankind on the cross (for 
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the Christians), or in the belief in reincarnation (for the Hindus); and, of course, in 
countless works of fiction –be they novels, plays, operas, soaps or films (cf., Graves & 
Patai, 1963; Roudinesco & Plon, 1997). This can also be found in a number of Greek 
legends, notably in that of Theseus and Ariadne as I said above.    
 Indeed, classical Greek mythology has provided psychoanalysis with some of 
its fundamental narratives as I said throughout all my review, and this is the 
reason why I argue (once again, to be absolutely clear) that Grotstein’s meta-
psychoanalytic perspective illustrates a unifying conceptualization transversal to 
all psychoanalytic models as a ‘secondary discourse’ where the: “extension in the 
domain of myth” (Bion, 1963, p. 11; my alterations) is profusely ‘extended’. 
Indeed, as above mentioned by Grotstein, ‘the myth of the labyrinth symbolically 
and allegorically unites concepts of Freud and Jung and those of object relations 
theory, particularly those of Klein and Winnicott but also of Bion, Lacan, and 
Anna Freud’. That is why I did the articulation between Grotstein’s approach with 
what Rank (1912) and Anzieu (1966) call ‘fraternal incest’, and its relation to the 
Oedipus complex. Furthermore I’ve posited, as argued by Grotstein (2000), the 
myth of the Minotaur as an archaic oedipal myth. This reflection intended to 
articulate both ‘mythologies’ with the purpose of creating an epistemological 
continuum of ‘secondary discourses’ between the different psychoanalytic schools 
of thought. Now, I will also illustrate my own perspective (a mitigated ‘secondary 
discourse’) about the myth of Persephone and the myth of Orpheus as I said above.
 In this context, Sophocles’s dramatization of the story of Oedipus has in its 
multifaceted ramifications thrown an all-important light on the developmental history of 
human individuals, their conscious and unconscious internal worlds, and their 
interpersonal relationships as we saw by the various ‘oedipal dynamics’ presented in all 
schools of thought that I have illustrated above. Other Greek myths, such as those of 
Narcissus (see above: cf., Kohut, 1971) or of Electra (cf., Jung, 1969a) have also helped 
us to clarify many normal and pathological mental phenomena but no so all-important 
(see above).           
 I will not develop the Jungian (1969a) nor the Kleinian (cf., Klein, 1963a, pp. 
23-54) perspectives on Aeschylus’ “Oresteia”; I will just posit that Electra persuaded 
her brother Orestes to kill their mother Clytemnestra because Clytemnestra killed her 
husband and their father Agamemnon (in Sophocles’ “Oedipus King”, Oedipus killed 
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his father Laios); Electra persuaded her brother to kill their mother Clytemnestra, she 
didn’t kill her mother, which is completely different in its unconscious ramifications as 
it is obvious. Freud was more cautious about ‘female sexuality’ (cf., Freud, 1931b, pp. 
225-243).            
 From my ‘secondary discourse’ I agree with Reenkola that described the 
triangular situation when the mother becomes the rival of the girl: “This is a fateful 
combination. The ambivalence of love and hate towards the mother arouses immense 
guilt in a girl” (Reenkola, 2002, p. 15).        
 Confronted with the triangular (oedipal) situation and their attraction to their 
fathers, girls must carefully negotiate dual attachments to both parents. To this dynamic, 
as Burch (1997) suggests, is articulated the ‘idea’ that a female’s first experience of 
sexual intercourse always included, in some form or other, thoughts related specifically 
to her mother. These thoughts included fears of retaliation, competitive and rivalry 
feelings, or victorious fantasies about the embarking on the path of adult sexuality.  
 Hence, I argue as my ‘secondary discourse’, that the rich and complexly 
evocative myth of Persephone, which depicts a balancing of loyalties between the 
parents, revolves around the theme of Persephone’s separation from her mother, 
Demeter (that I spoke above in a different ‘secondary discourse’), and celebrates 
fertility, cyclical rhythms and female power, better describes the girl’s developmental 
crisis (cf., Graves, 1955; Burch, 1997, p. 21).      
 The myth is as follows: Kore/Persephone, the young daughter of Demeter and 
Zeus, is gathering flowers in a meadow with other young girls. Kore plucks a 
particularly beautiful narcissus that has attracted her. The earth opens suddenly and 
Hades, god and king of the Underworld and Death, abducts her. Nobody hears her 
screams and cries (some versions of the myth make a rape more explicit). When Kore 
next appears in the Homeric hymn, she is with Hades in the Underworld. The scene 
pictures Hades ‘reclining on a bed with his shy spouse, strongly reluctant’ (cf., Foley, 
1994).            
 It is noteworthy that, prior to her stay with Hades and presumably to the loss of 
her virginity, the girl is known only as ‘Kore’, which in Greek literary means the 
‘maiden’ [that is why throughout this review I ‘apply’ the etymological method; words 
are semantic envelopes…etymologic containers (see above; see below, specially 
“Dora’s Case”/Chapter 3); a ‘secondary discourse’ in its full meaning, that is, in its 
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deconstructive method as I said above concerning Bion but also concerning Lacan 
as I say below]. Thereafter, she takes on the new name of Persephone. In the meantime, 
Demeter descends from Olympus to search the earth frantically for her daughter. In her 
fury and pain, Demeter causes famine and drought to spread over the earth. Zeus is 
induced by this catastrophe to persuade Hades to release Persephone. However, 
Persephone is tricked by Hades to eat the seeds of a pomegranate (in some versions she 
is tricked; in some, forced; and, in others, takes the seeds willingly). Thus, she has 
broken an injunction not to eat in the Underworld and is now bound to Hades (cf., 
Foley, ib.).           
 A compromise between the gods is worked out by which Persephone spends 
one-third of the year with Hades, and two-thirds with her mother. This compromise is 
the ancient explanation of the origin of the seasons. Winter rules while Persephone lives 
with Hades, and the earth flowers in spring and summer while she is with her mother. 
The poem ends with Demeter founding the Eleusinian rites (cf., Foley, ib.).  
 I argue as my ‘secondary discourse’ that this myth heuristically portrays 
conflicts of the girl as she takes first steps into the world of sexual feelings for her 
father. In particular, the story of Persephone depicts the very commonly seen female 
defence: the disavowal of the sense of agency over sexuality.    
 I posit that the whole structure of the myth, in its various versions, reflects this 
defence. That is, Persephone is ‘forced’ into her union with Hades. Yet the ambiguity of 
her participation in the eating which seals her fate is reflected in the various versions of 
the myth. It is my ‘secondary discourse’ that the same dynamic holds for the 
expression of aggression in little girls at this phase of triangulation as for sexuality. 
 The incestuous motif (see above) is clearly represented in this tale, as 
Persephone queen and mate to her uncle. Demeter, Zeus and Hades are siblings. It can 
be said, however, that the myth of Persephone is not analogous or parallel to the myth 
of Oedipus because we can ask ourselves where is the rivalry and rage toward the 
mother in Persephone, compared to the rivalry and rage toward the father in Oedipus?
 Obviously I posit that aggression, on the part of a female, is not visible, except 
in the revengeful retribution of the mother, Demeter, unleashing famine on the earth 
until her daughter is returned to her. Aggression certainly does not seem to mark the 
mother-daughter relationship between Demeter and Persephone. It is my ‘secondary 
discourse’ that the sense of agency over aggression and sexuality is disguised and 
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inhibited in this myth, as in the female triangular situation, as it appears clinically from 
my own experience, in consonance, mutatis mutandis, with other psychological (cf., 
Gilligan, 1982) and psychoanalytical perspectives (cf., Chodorow, 1978; Person, 1983, 
pp. 193-204; Ogden, 1987, pp. 485-498).      
 Consequently, I argue that Greek mythology is, with no doubts, a ocean of 
psychoanalytic knowledge and constitutes what Jung (1969a) termed as the 
‘collective unconscious’ where all the ‘archetypes’ are ‘direct’ «products» of our 
mythological heritage, which was (and is) transmitted ‘through’ phylogeny, and 
this is one more reason why I’ve argued (once again, to be absolutely clear) that 
Grotstein’s meta-psychoanalytic perspective illustrates a unifying 
conceptualization transversal to all psychoanalytic models as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ where the: “extension in the domain of myth” (Bion, 1963, p. 11; my 
alterations) is profusely ‘extended’. Indeed, as above mentioned by Grotstein, ‘the 
myth of the labyrinth symbolically and allegorically unites concepts of Freud and 
Jung and those of object relations theory, particularly those of Klein and 
Winnicott but also of Bion, Lacan, and Anna Freud’. That is why I did the 
articulation between Grotstein’s approach with what Rank (1912) and Anzieu 
(1966) call ‘fraternal incest’, and its relation to the Oedipus complex. Furthermore 
I’ve posited, as argued by Grotstein (2000), the myth of the Minotaur as an archaic 
oedipal myth. This reflection intended to articulate both ‘mythologies’ with the 
purpose of creating an epistemological continuum of ‘secondary discourses’ 
between the different psychoanalytic schools of thought. In this context, I’ve 
illustrated above my own perspective (a mitigated ‘secondary discourse’) about the 
myth of Persephone; the myth of Orpheus will be developed (also according to my 
own mitigated ‘secondary discourse’) after the following five paragraphs (required 
to explain even better my reasoning).      
 Accordingly, I evoke once again the famous ‘theory of recapitulation’ (see 
above), which is articulated with Darwin’s ‘primitive horde’ conceptualized in his “The 
Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex” (1871) 5th chapter; Freud steered into 
Darwin’s (and Haeckel’s) harbour (see above) when he published “Totem and Taboo” 
in 1913 (cf., Freud, 1913k, pp. 1-161).       
 In this seminal work Freud’s epistemological roots were: in biology Darwin, 
Lamarck and Haeckel; and in anthropology Frazer, Smith, Atkinson and Westermarck. 
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Lewis Morgan was an important source with his conceptualization of the three stages of 
mankind, which were: ‘Savagery, represented by hunting; Barbary, represented by the 
production of ceramic objects and iron tools; and Civilization, represented by the 
invention of writing’ (cf., Freud, 1913k, pp. 1-161; Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).  
 Later on, related with this issue (our ‘mythological’ heritage) and because of the 
controversies inherent to the lay analysis Freud [defending Theodor Reik against a 
patient’s lawsuit of ‘illegal practice of medicine’; this happened in the spring of 1926 
and in the fall of  the same year New York State declared illegal the practice of 
psychoanalysis by non-doctors; in the year before, regarding this issue the President of 
‘New York Psychoanalytic Society’, Abraham Arden Brill, declared that he wanted to 
‘cut relations’ with Freud because Freud approved psychoanalysis being practiced by 
non-doctors (cf., Wallerstein, 2002b, pp. 639-642; Wallerstein, 2003b, pp. 273-82)] was 
hard on the medical profession saying that if a ‘faculty of psychoanalysis’ existed the 
contents should be: ‘history of civilizations, mythology and literature, and a clear 
autonomy from the psychic dimension over the physiological dimension’; aside a 
training analysis with a analyst specially qualified; the medical contents should be of 
minor relevance because ‘Medicine doesn’t own Psychoanalysis’ (cf., Freud, 1926b, pp. 
183-250).          
 Sharing Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’, I can state that from my perspective 
and own clinical experience Freud was absolutely correct in his harshness towards the 
medicine ownership of psychoanalysis, because on the clinical setting our counter-
transference obstacles are not the Aristotelian logic (see above and below) or Piaget’s 
‘operative formalism’ (cf., Piaget, 1932, 1950, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987; 
Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1964); the ‘obstacles’ are (among a ‘Penelope’s plethora) and 
giving just a example concerning this subject: ‘the Homeric legend of Odysseus’s 
encounter with the sirens is related to the technical problems involved in counter-
transferencial erotic attraction, and the story of Icarus’s suicidal flight explains 
manic episodes as instances of defences in the face of separation anxiety’ (cf., 
Sabbadini, 1988, pp. 528-547): once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different 
‘secondary discourses’, where the ‘extension in the domain of myth’ is, by far, the 
main ‘shared characteristic’ as I am trying to illustrate in this proto conclusion of 
my literature review.         
 Indeed, psychoanalysis ‘was born in medical soil but it is not a medicine of the 
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dream, it is a psychology of the dream’ (cf., Freud, 1926b, pp. 183-250); the ‘dream is 
the royal way to the unconscious’ (cf., Freud, 1900b, pp. 339-621; see Chapter 1) 
because the dream reproduces (‘recapitulates’) the mythological scenario from where 
we emerged and threw where we developed and to where we will ‘end’: it is our 
‘ontogeny’, our ‘phylogeny’ and our ‘telosgeny’.     
 Inherently, as I said above, the myth of Orpheus will be now developed 
according to my own mitigated ‘secondary discourse’. I argue that the myth of 
Orpheus and Eurydice (better known to us in later Latin versions from the first century 
BC), as a metaphor of our deepest fears, desires and conflicts, is also relevant to the 
analytic understanding of many psychological phenomena (cf., Segal, C., 1989; 
Bonaparte, 1954, pp. 109-112).        
 The most common version of the myth narrated by Ovid (8AD) in his 
“Metamorphoses” and by Virgil (29 BC) in his “Georgics”, goes as follows: Eurydice –
bride of the famous poet, singer and musician Orpheus– is fatally bitten by a snake. 
Orpheus, relying on the power of his art, descends to Hades to rescue her back to the 
world of the living, persuades the gods of the Underworld to relinquish her, but finally 
loses her again when he disobeys their command not to look back towards her before 
they re-emerge from Hades (cf., Ovid, 1955; Virgil, 1983).    
 This is the ‘essence’ of the tale, but the myth of Orpheus continues with his 
‘renunciation of women’ –in one version, turning to homosexuality– which provokes a 
band of angry Maenads to tear him apart. His head and lyre, still singing, float down the 
Hebrus River to the island of Lesbos [Safo was the poet that ‘ruled’ the island of 
Lesbos: they were all women and lovers with each other; it’s from here that emerged the 
term ‘lesbian’ regarding female homosexuality (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997)], where 
Apollo will protect Orpheus’s head from a snake and endow it with prophetic powers –
hence his status for the ancients as: “not only the archetypal poet but also the founder of 
a mystical religion known as Orphism” (Segal, C., 1989, p. 1).    
 Part of the everlasting attraction of this myth depends on the ‘personality’ of its 
protagonist, Orpheus, being not just a great poet and musician, but someone who would 
use his art to tame wild animals, to move plants and stones, to get dolphins to emerge 
from the sea to listen and enjoy his songs (cf., Segal, C., 1989). This in itself gives him 
an almost god-like quality, placing him above other mortals, in a fantasy space where 
others would feel induced to identify with, idealize and envy him (see above).
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 Classical interpretations of the crucial moment when Orpheus turn his gaze 
towards Eurydice, thus causing her second ‘death’ and his final loss of her, vary.  
 For Virgil (4
th
 Georgic, 29BC) this impulsive gesture is due to a moment of 
madness, what he calls ‘furor’ or ‘dementia’. Ovid, on the other hand, attributes it to the 
caring concern of a husband for his wife’s weakness –as well as to his own greedy 
passion. Ovid in his “Metamorphoses” (8AD) writes:  
 “Hic, ne deficeret, metuens avidusque videndi 
 flexit amans oculos, et protinus illa relapsa est. 
(He, afraid that she might fail and greedy of seeing her, 
 in love turned back his eyes and at once she slipped back)”  
 (Ovid, 1955, pp. 56-57). 
The myth of Orpheus and Eurydice has fascinated artists, writers and composers 
who, also in identification (see above) with its protagonist, have then reproduced it in 
their works. I shall limit myself in this context to mention Rainer Maria Rilke’s fifty-
five “Sonnets to Orpheus” (1922) and Christophe W. Gluck’s opera “Orpheus and 
Eurydice” (1762) where, the gods having promptly forgiven Orpheus for his voyeuristic 
peccadillo, the tragic ending of the story is replaced by an improbable ‘…and they lived 
happily thereafter’.          
 From my ‘secondary discourse’ concerning this myth, I would suggest two 
alternative ‘explanations’ for Orpheus’s irrational and (self) destructive gesture. If his 
journey to the Underworld represents a regressive immersion into the ‘unconscious’, a 
mental space dominated by ‘primary process’ functioning, he would as a consequence 
behave according to the ‘pleasure principle’ (see above: cf., Freud, 1920a, pp. 7-64). 
 In other words, Orpheus, like a hungry baby incapable of tolerating delays to the 
gratification of his needs, would become a victim to his own greed and turn his head 
back before the ‘reasonable’ time imposed on him by the gods, representing here the 
demands of external reality and his own superego.     
 The other ‘explanation’ for Orpheus’s behaviour may rest in his unconscious 
sense of guilt for daring to break a taboo, that is, for upsetting the ‘natural order of 
things’ whereby the dead must be left to rest for ever (‘let sleeping dogs lie’), and for 
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using his position as an artist to extort privileges from the gods. Much as he wants to 
rescue (see above) Eurydice, his superego does not allow him in the end to carry out his 
mission; he therefore unconsciously sabotages it by plunging her beloved back where 
she truly, if of course tragically, belongs.        
 Concerning this issue, Limentani (1989) describes certain psychoanalytic 
patients who, in identification with Orpheus’s ambivalence, are unable to repair 
the oedipal situation (see above). Furthermore, his encounter with Eurydice in the 
shadowy World of the Death has the basic structure of a romantic love story, and a 
doomed (see above) one to boot (man fights to conquer the woman of his dreams, 
seems to succeed against all odds, until tragedy destroy their happiness), with the 
universal appeal that such narratives have, for they represent everyone’s deepest and 
most regressive fears and desires.       
 Orpheus and Eurydice, in other words, while remaining beyond mankind’s 
reach, are at the same time idealized versions of us, as they let us project aspects of 
ourselves into them. This myth’s power, I suggest as my ‘secondary discourse’, 
stems from a complex structure or pattern: that basic ‘rescue motif’ which, as I 
said above, is the motor force behind many of our wishes and behaviours.  
 Rescue fantasies, whereby it is the ‘self’ that is to be relieved from an 
unbearable sense of guilt, may then constitute attempts to deal with all sorts of 
unconsciously desired, or even enacted, violations to ‘the natural order of things’, 
including the oedipal crimes of murder and incest. In the case of the Orpheus myth 
we could perhaps find here an even deeper wish: that Eros combined with art 
(Orpheus’s love for Eurydice combined with his musical capacity to move even the 
gods) –or, to put it more psychoanalytically, ‘libido’ combined with ‘sublimation’– 
could eventually defeat Thanatos (see above).      
 So, in fact, we are back to our unconscious and universal wish for immortality 
expressed by that ‘not something destroyed but something that is still alive’ which I 
emphasized above when quoting Freud (1937b) and from which we could say ‘if only 
Orpheus had not turned around to look at his Eurydice’ but the thought, rational as it 
appears to be (indeed, as I said above, even Virgil attributes Orpheus’s impulse to his 
‘dementia’ –folly), is naïve.          
 Much as we cannot teach old dog new tricks, human beings never entirely 
abandon the pleasure principle in favour of the ‘reality’ one. Whether because of lust or 
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greed, impatience or passion, we regularly –though, it must be said, some of us more 
frequently than others– end up behaving in ways that contradict our best intentions and 
interests. To make things worse, we also feel compelled –again some of us more 
frequently than others– to repeat neurotically our mistakes.     
 Our ‘dementia’, then, is but a fundamental incapacity to ‘learn from experience’ 
(see above: cf., Bion, 1962b). Having lost Eurydice once, Orpheus must lose her 
again…and again: this ‘unconscious scenario’ is the ‘text’ where is ‘written’ as a 
‘secondary discourse’ the ‘poetry of science’ (cf., Meltzer, 1967): Psychoanalysis.
 Accordingly, from any of the above mentioned ‘secondary discourses’ the 
major tasks of psychoanalysis (and of life), as seen from the myths of the 
Minotaur, Persephone and Orpheus (among all the others that were illustrated) as 
we saw above, are to confront the ‘Object of Challenge or Nemesis’ in order to 
separate out and retrieve those projections that belong to oneself from those that 
are alien to the self from the beginning.       
 One must be able to own and resolve one’s infantile neurosis/psychosis and 
distinguish it from infantile catastrophe or trauma, and resolve that as well. Ultimately, 
these myths signify psychoanalysis and its relentless quest for uniting with 
unconscious truth, ‘rescuing’ ourselves from ourselves ‘finding the man inside of 
the man’ (cf., Dostoevsky, 1880): having lost Eurydice once, Orpheus must lose her 
again…and again in an eternal ‘Penelope’s thread’: this is the work of the 
psychoanalyst; we cannot turn our gaze to the patient (the Freudian couch is Orphic) 
because there is the risk of causing the patient’s ‘second death’ and loose him 
completely, like Orpheus lost Eurydice when he turned his gaze to her before they re-
emerged from Hades (the unconscious).       
 This is a metaphor, but only the couch, from any ‘secondary discourse’, 
recreates the mythological/oniric scenario as a ‘primary discourse’ and this is what 
promote and allow the re-emergence from the unconscious (Hades) of the 
psychoanalyst (Orpheus) and of the patient (Eurydice): this is why one can say that 
psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work: psychoanalytic theory is a 
‘secondary discourse’;  the clinical work is a ‘primary discourse’: this is why, as 
above mentioned many times, that in this Thesis I am establishing the scientific 
accuracy or truth-value interpretations in clinical work providing concrete 
examples (as I did in my Introduction) of how the analyst deconstructs the clinical 
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phenomena independently of what theoretical model he embraces: the keynote 
here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; 
see above Laplanche, op. cit.): by a permanent deconstructionist method; a 
methodological deconstruction of what the analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical 
models.           
 The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending 
dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) 
in its essence (see above Laplanche, op. cit.). Freud is the first object relations 
theorist because object relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic 
thought, as their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction (like Laplanche states; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.): the theoretical meta-interpretations of Freud, 
Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.) constitute all clinical dissolutions inherent to the 
psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why I state in this literature review that all 
these authors follow Freud –directly or indirectly, theoretically speaking– building 
up a syncretic universalist model unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of 
psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. I state even more: the more the theorist 
differs from Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the 
theory is following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, 
the deconstruction.          
 Indeed and returning to Gedo and Goldberg (1973), as we saw by this review of 
psychoanalytic literature, these authors try to ‘resolve the problem’ of multiple models 
by tying particular theories and models to the different developmental [as I said in my 
Introduction concerning Lussier’s (1991) statement, this is the developmental task 
of science] periods and, once again, to be absolutely clear: throughout my review I 
will follow Gedo and Goldberg’s epistemological stream of thought, but with my 
own perspective of interpreting each ‘model of mind’ as a ‘secondary discourse’ as 
I have been defending since the beginning of this dissertation, that is, to minimize 
any confusion caused by the current away of theories I will illustrate in the 
conclusion of my review the developmental contributions of those authors who 
have had a major impact on the field or who have offered a fairly systematized 
theory of object relations development as I started to do in my Introduction, but, 
as above mentioned, and, once again: if the ten shared characteristics of what 
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Kernberg (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b, 2001a; see my Introduction) calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’; the five shared characteristics of 
what he calls the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current; and the 
fourteen shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘French psychoanalytic 
approach’ –alongside with the above two– don’t constitute new integrations, not as 
a simple ‘common ground’, but as promoting valid hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (cf., 
Laplanche, op. cit.), I don’t know how one can say that psychoanalytic theory 
comes after clinical work.        
 Therefore, the conclusion of my literature review will tie Grotstein’s (1981b, 
2000) epistemological meta-psychoanalytic syncretism and Matte-Blanco’s bi-
logical (1956, 1975, 1981, 1988) meta-theory; Lacan’s (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 93-100, 
pp. 101-124, pp. 237-322, pp. 401-436, pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, pp. 765-790, pp. 
793-827, pp. 829-850, pp. 855-877; 1967-68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 1969-70; 1970; 
1972-73; 1973; 1974-75; 1975a; 1975-76; 1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-78b, pp. 548-
556) algebraic structures will be illustrated as a ‘epistemological counterpart’ to 
Matte-Blanco’s bi-logic; I finish my psychoanalytic review with Kernberg’s 
(1993b) insights towards the psychoanalytic status quo regarding a ‘unified’ clinic 
epistemology as a ‘secondary discourse’.       
 The ‘common ground’ that I argue (in my Introduction, in this literature review 
and unfolded throughout my entire Thesis) is nothing more, as Wallerstein also 
recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), than acknowledge that there are a 
pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of our 
‘secondary discourse’ (in my terminology): they are all formalizations of the 
analyst’s psychic process present in the clinical session; that is why Bion’s Grid, 
Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the 
formalization of the analyst’s psychic process not as a ‘primary discourse’ but as a 
‘secondary discourse’: they are epistemological tools that have only one purpose: 
being deconstructed by the ‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) in the 
clinical session. That is why we call it a formalization of the psychic process: it is its 
form, not its content.        
 Accordingly, as shown above, I posit that our unconscious is a ‘mental 
envelope’ written ab initio with mythological letters (cf., Rank, 1909, 1912, 1998; 
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Freud, 1913k; Abraham, 1909; Jung, 1969a, 1969b, 1970c, 1970d; Anzieu, 1966; 
Bion, 1963, 1970, 1974, 1992) steering, as I said, into Grotstein’s (1981b, 2000) 
epistemological meta-psychoanalytic syncretism as a unifying conceptualization 
transversal to all psychoanalytic models as a ‘secondary discourse’ where the  
extension in the domain of myth was profusely ‘extended’ (with my own mitigated 
‘secondary discourse’ about the myth of Persephone and the myth of Orpheus),  
and Matte-Blanco’s bi-logical (1956, 1975, 1988) meta-theory, that will be now 
developed; Lacan’s (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 93-100, pp. 101-124, pp. 237-322, pp. 401-
436, pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, pp. 765-790, pp. 793-827, pp. 829-850, pp. 855-877; 
1967-68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 1969-70; 1970; 1972-73; 1973; 1974-75; 1975a; 
1975-76; 1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-78b, pp. 548-556) algebraic structures will be 
illustrated afterwards as a ‘epistemological counterpart’ to Matte-Blanco’s bi-
logic; I conclude my psychoanalytic review with Kernberg’s (1993b) insights 
towards the psychoanalytic status quo regarding a unified clinic epistemology 
unfolding all the major ‘secondary discourses’ inherent to ‘it’.  
 Therefore, Matte-Blanco’s ‘secondary discourse’, thinking and working from 
the beginning with the concepts and characteristics of the Freudian unconscious 
system (cf., Freud, 1915c, pp. 159-215), states that they obey to a logic widely 
distinct from that ruling our scientific thought (cf., Matte-Blanco, 1956): once 
again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary discourses’.   
 He points out that Freud (cf., Freud, 1911c, pp. 218-226) considered the 
existence of different psychic activities: one expressing voluntary reflection 
accompanied by consciousness (secondary process), and another representing the 
unconscious phenomena (primary process). The customary logic of scientific thought is 
the bivalent or Aristotelian logic.         
 Aristotle identified, two thousand and five hundred years ago, in two seminal 
works “Prior Analytics”, as I said above (cf., Aristotle, 1941, pp. 62-107), and 
“Posterior Analytics” (cf., Aristotle, 1941, pp. 108-186) the three principles of logic that 
still rule today our operative reasoning: ‘principle of identity’; ‘principle of non-
contradiction’; and ‘principle of the third excluded’; we find these magnificent 
masterpieces in “The Basic Works of Aristotle” (1941), which were edited by R. 
Mckeon and translated directly from Greek: by A. J. Jenkinson “Prior Analytics”;  by G. 
R. G. Mure “Posterior Analytics”.          
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 Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” (1922) re-conceptualized 
Aristotelian Logic, applying it mainly to language as it was clear in Wittgenstein’s 
second major work: “Philosophical Investigations” (1953), concerning exactly the logic 
of language, which Lacan, as I said above, developed in psychoanalysis as algebraic 
structures: the ‘mathemes’ (cf., Lacan, 1972-73, 1973). Like I said, these and other 
constructs will be illustrated after my reflection on Matte-Blanco’s ‘secondary 
discourse’, which will be a descriptive theoretical one like any ‘secondary discourse’.
 As I was saying the Aristotelian logic contrasts with that of the unconscious 
phenomena: “it cannot be said that the processes in the system Ucs happen without 
conforming to any logical law, for in that case we should only witness chaos; and if 
there were chaos there could be nothing predictable, and therefore Freud could not have 
described the characteristics mentioned at all” (Matte-Blanco, 1956, pp. 142-143).
 Matte-Blanco consequently concludes that: “if laws of the system Ucs exist, and 
if they do not conform to the principles of scientific logic, they must conform to some 
logical system that in some respect at least is different from scientific logic” (Matte-
Blanco, op. cit., p. 143).         
 In this regard, two basic subjects should be emphasized: first, the unconscious 
treats the part as the whole, and as a result the difference between the part and the 
whole disappears; hence the part can be placed in a bi-reciprocal relationship with 
the whole. This is the ‘principle of generalization’ by which each thing is treated as 
an element of a class which, in its turn, would be a sub-class of another class and so on. 
A being confronting a mind will be classified according to the group of signals it is able 
to emit.           
 Thus, for example, seeing itself before a signal such as a welcoming voice, the 
mind registers as a stimulus. Afterwards an emotion arises whose meaning could be ‘I 
am facing my mother’. The quality of the emotion in response to the signal may be of 
love, rage, fear, shame, etc., or their combinations, as well as being susceptible to 
variations from moment to moment. In the dynamic of the transference/counter-
transference relationship the analyst may at one instant be apprehended and confronted 
as an inimical rival and, at the next, seen and loved as an understanding father or 
mother. In the same way, the patient at one moment may be viewed by the analyst as a 
much damaged object, irreparable and, at another, amenable to changes [in the sense of 
psychic growth (cf., Matte-Blanco, 1975)].      
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 Second, the unconscious treats the inverse, the reciprocal of a relationship, 
as identical with the same relationship. Here we have the ‘symmetry principle’, by 
which asymmetrical relationships are taken as symmetrical. For example, ‘I am 
your brother, therefore you are my brother’ is a symmetrical relationship. ‘I am your 
father, therefore you are my son’ is an example of an asymmetrical relationship. Then, 
‘I am your father, therefore you are my father’ is an asymmetrical relationship 
treated as symmetrical, which is accepted in the unconscious but is nevertheless 
intolerable and perceived as absurd in the conscious system where classical Aristotelian 
logic prevails (cf., Matte-Blanco, ib.). These two basic subjects are related to the 
characteristics postulated by Freud (cf., Freud, 1915c, pp. 159-215) about the 
unconscious: the substitution of external reality for psychic reality (felt as being the 
same, one unique reality); a-temporality, displacement and condensation (the 
foundation of projection, transference, sublimation, splitting, and return of the 
repressed); and the absence of mutual contradiction [coexistence of contradictories 
and absence of negation (cf., Freud, ib.)]: once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of 
different ‘secondary discourses’.        
 Among so many other consequences of those characteristics it is possible to say 
that the repressed is not altered by time; in the presence of a-temporality, no succession 
can exist in the unconscious. According to symbolic logic, a succession of moments (a 
serial ordination) is impossible because: “when the principle of symmetry is applied 
there cannot be succession” (Matte-Blanco, 1975, p. 39).     
 Transference can make the analyst appear as the father, mother, son or any other 
figure, or a combination of them. Omnipotent, omniscient thought creates the 
conviction that what the subject and the object experience and think of as the same they 
then make part of an indivisible infinite.        
 In the case of infinite sets, taking into consideration their indivisibility (since if 
they were divisible they would, by definition, be finite), every member is identical with 
all. The part does not exist, only the whole, infinite. An example of this is the 
mathematical figure of the point. When sets are infinite, a sub-set is equivalent to the 
set. There are no limits separating individuals. Subject and object are like a 
homogeneous unity.  In this sense we would have a process of homogenization in 
which all that exits become equal and of similar value. A trajectory of increasing 
homogenization would occur in the inverse ratio to the development of the psychic 
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apparatus. More primitive levels would consequently correspond to a larger degree of 
homogenization. In clinical terms, the baby’s lack of discrimination of external reality 
serves as a model for the above formulation (cf., Matte-Blanco, ib.). 
 Symmetry demands non-existence of space and time in the Physics-
mathematical sense: space requires differentiation between the parts and the whole, 
and time establishes sequence of events. When sets are infinite, sub-set is equivalent to 
set. This is an application of Russel’s theory, which states that this is an exception to the 
rule by which a class cannot be represented by one of its members, that not being the 
case for infinite sets such as applies here (cf., Rayner & Tuckett, 1988 in Matte-Blanco, 
1988, pp. 3-42).         
 To this logic, predominant but not unique in the unconscious, Matte-Blanco 
gives the name ‘symmetrical logic’, using ‘asymmetrical logic’ to refer to what we 
know as habitual logic, which preponderates in the conscious.     
 Asymmetrical logic is that to which we are accustomed, which operates with 
space and time in a Physics-mathematical sense; it is the logic used in scientific thought. 
It is the logic which discriminates the categories and the differences between the part 
and the whole, between the present, past and future, between generations, between 
genera etc. In asymmetrical logic there is a tendency towards differentiation between 
objects, that is, towards their individualization and separation into ever more discrete 
units which are identified by separate signs (cf., Matte-Blanco, 1981, pp. 8-41).  
 In all mental functioning, both conscious and unconscious, symmetrical and 
asymmetrical logic are always present. Matte-Blanco calls this characteristic ‘bi-
logical’ (cf., Matte-Blanco, 1975). It is fitting to emphasize, once again, that, although 
both logics exist, asymmetrical logic predominates in the conscious and symmetrical 
logic in the unconscious. This makes it possible to state that the unconscious always 
tends to make symmetrical those relationships which are asymmetrical. The sense 
of reality would have to be considered not only under the aspects of asymmetrical 
logic but also those of symmetrical logic.       
 As already pointed out, in the latter there is a tendency towards the formation of 
inclusive classes and for reality to be experienced as infinite, that is, as homogeneous 
and indivisible. In this way there is no recognition of the individual but only of classes 
and functions (cf., Matte-Blanco, ib.).     
 Ahumada and Etchegoyen (1990), recalling Konrad Lorenz’s (1963) work on 
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aggression, point out that on the biological scale this is what seems to happen, the 
recognition of individualities occurring later than the recognition of ‘classes’ (cf., 
Ahumada and Etchegoyen, 1990, pp. 493-502).       
 In the lower vertebrates (fishes of the coral reefs) there is behaviour based only 
on the geographical context and on classes of the type ‘rival’, ‘female’, ‘predator’, 
‘prey’. Distinction among individuals is possible solely at the level attained very 
much later among the mammals.         
 It is therefore important to emphasize that the recognition of selfhood arises 
only at the peak of evolution. The chimpanzee possesses the ability to recognize the 
individuals of his band, to the extent of foreseeing their behaviour. For him to recognize 
himself in a mirror, to differentiate between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’, it is necessary for 
him to be trained. As in an analysis, the more primitive prevalence of the 
unconscious only slowly comes to be blended with the conscious to the extent of 
approximating to a means of knowing the external world as far as this is possible 
and of being able to distinguish itself from the other (cf., Ahumada and Etchegoyen, 
ib.).            
 From my perspective, since no ‘secondary discourse’ is an absolute as I have 
been defending throughout my entire Thesis, it is as impossible to conceive of 
asymmetrical logic in a pure state as it is of symmetrical logic. They cannot be 
considered in such a way once thought requires as much use of symmetrical 
relationships as of asymmetrical ones. For thinking we need to distinguish between 
categorizing and bringing into relationship. It is not possible to apprehend the notion of 
the infinite; the infinite is inconceivable since thought imposes limits and the infinite is 
unlimited.          
 In “The unconscious as infinite sets: An essay in bi-logic” Matte-Blanco 
postulates as his ‘secondary discourse’: “the mind is structured in such a way that in 
every one of its direct manifestations we can, if we look for it, detect the activity of its 
various levels, from the asymmetry seen in conscious thinking to the great proportion of 
symmetry of the deepest levels … in each case some levels are more obvious than 
others. The type of level which is more noticeable varies from one case to another” 
(Matte-Blanco, 1975, p. 161).        
 In conclusion of his highly heuristic ‘secondary discourse’, Matte-Blanco 
proposes five strata, according to the continuum of the possible combinations of 
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symmetry and asymmetry. There are also sub-levels depending on major or minor 
degrees of generalization.        
 Synthetically speaking, there is a first stratum where the objects are more 
differentiated, concrete, and where their relationships are established through 
similarities and differences, that is, where asymmetrical thought prevails.  
 A second stratum follows, in which there is already symmetry to an appreciable 
extent and where emotion exists. The emotion is well delimited, still at a conscious 
level, but the principle of symmetry helps in understanding it.     
 In the third stratum the individual is already identified with the class, which 
introduces a certain a-temporality, since moments are not differentiated. An example is 
the case in which an individual becomes emotional before a benefactor, saying, ‘you are 
a father to me’. The object is recognized consciously by its characteristics, but emotion 
takes over and establishes (symmetrical) connections with figures of the past.   
 As a result, the fourth stratum introduces the absence of contradiction and the 
substitution of the external reality by the psychical. A certain asymmetry is preserved, 
but nevertheless aggression loses a little of its force owing to the homogenization which 
occurs pari passu with this greater symmetricization. Subject and object constitute, as it 
were, a single unity. There being no contradiction, the asymmetry becomes attenuated. 
 The fifth and final stratum introduces the indivisible way, absence of 
asymmetrical relationships. Here, an infinite number is a sole number. Any ‘thing’ can 
be any ‘other’, at the same time at which everything is contained in a single thing (cf., 
Parada, 1993).          
 In this stratum, thought lacks significance because of the absence of 
asymmetrical relationships. Though the various strata are differentiated, one from the 
other, one should be aware that the coexistence of characteristics of one stratum with 
those of various other strata is possible (cf., Matte-Blanco, 1956, 1975, 1988).  
 After the development of Matte-Blanco’s ‘secondary discourse’ I will now 
illustrate Lacan’s ‘secondary discourse’, unfolding his algebraic structures, which 
constitute, from my perspective, a fecund and heuristic ‘epistemological counterpart’ to 
Matte-Blanco’s ‘secondary discourse’, unfolded by his ‘bi-logic’ meta-theory.
 Indeed and returning to Gedo and Goldberg (1973), as we saw by this review of 
psychoanalytic literature, these authors try to ‘resolve the problem’ of multiple models 
by tying particular theories and models to the different developmental [as I said in my 
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Introduction concerning Lussier’s (1991) statement, this is the developmental task 
of science] periods, and, once again, to be absolutely clear: throughout my review I 
will follow Gedo and Goldberg’s epistemological stream of thought, but with my 
own perspective of interpreting each ‘model of mind’ as a ‘secondary discourse’ as 
I have been defending since the beginning of this dissertation, that is, to minimize 
any confusion caused by the current away of theories I will illustrate in this 
conclusion of my review the developmental contributions of those authors who 
have had a major impact on the field or who have offered a fairly systematized 
theory of object relations development as I started to do in my Introduction, but, 
as above mentioned, and, once again: if the ten shared characteristics of what 
Kernberg (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b, 2001a; see my Introduction) calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’; the five shared characteristics of 
what he calls the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current; and the 
fourteen shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘French psychoanalytic 
approach’ –alongside with the above two– don’t constitute new integrations, not as 
a simple ‘common ground’, but as promoting valid hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of an effective ‘secondary discourse’ (cf., 
Laplanche, op. cit.), I don’t know how one can say that psychoanalytic theory 
comes after clinical work.          
 Accordingly, as shown above, I posit that our unconscious is a ‘mental 
envelope’ written ab initio with mythological letters (cf., Rank, 1909, 1912, 1998; 
Freud, 1913k; Abraham, 1909; Jung, 1969a, 1969b, 1970c, 1970d; Anzieu, 1966; 
Bion, 1963, 1970, 1974, 1992) steering, as I said, into Grotstein’s (1981b, 2000) 
epistemological meta-psychoanalytic syncretism as a unifying conceptualization 
transversal to all psychoanalytic models as a ‘secondary discourse’ where the  
extension in the domain of myth was profusely ‘extended’ (with my own mitigated 
‘secondary discourse’ about the myth of Persephone and the myth of Orpheus),  
and Matte-Blanco’s bi-logical (1956, 1975, 1988) meta-theory; Lacan’s (cf., Lacan, 
1966, pp. 93-100, pp. 101-124, pp. 237-322, pp. 401-436, pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, 
pp. 765-790, pp. 793-827, pp. 829-850, pp. 855-877; 1967-68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 
1969-70; 1970; 1972-73; 1973; 1974-75; 1975a; 1975-76; 1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-
78b, pp. 548-556) algebraic structures will be now developed as a ‘epistemological 
counterpart’ to Matte-Blanco’s bi-logic; I conclude my psychoanalytic review with 
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Kernberg’s (1993b) insights towards the psychoanalytic status quo regarding a 
unified clinic epistemology unfolding all the major ‘secondary discourses’ inherent 
to ‘it’.             
 Indeed, I am illustrating in this conclusion of my review the developmental 
contributions of those authors who have had a major impact on the field, or who 
have offered a fairly systematized theory of object relations development such as 
Matte-Blanco (and other authors above mentioned),   
 Therefore, if Matte-Blanco belongs to what Kernberg calls the 
‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’ and has offered a fairly systematized 
theory of object relations development, Lacan belongs to what Kernberg calls the 
‘French psychoanalytic approach’ and had a major impact on the field. 
 Indeed, and, once again (in this conclusion of my literature review I repeat 
my main arguments many times to be absolutely clear in order to illustrate exactly 
where, why, and how I sow the authors, the schools of thought and my own 
arguments), the ‘common ground’ that I argue (in my Introduction, in this literature 
review and unfolded throughout my entire Thesis) is nothing more, as Wallerstein also 
recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), than acknowledge that there are a 
pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of our 
‘secondary discourse’ (in my terminology): they are all formalizations of the 
analyst’s psychic process present in the clinical session; that is why Bion’s Grid, 
Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the 
formalization of the analyst’s psychic process not as a ‘primary discourse’ but as a 
‘secondary discourse’: they are epistemological tools that have only one purpose: 
being deconstructed by the ‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) in the 
clinical session. That is why we call it a formalization of the psychic process: it is its 
form, not its content.        
 Accordingly, Lacan’s use of mathematics represents an attempt to formalize 
psychoanalytic theory, in keeping with his view that psychoanalytic theory should 
aspire to the formalization proper to science. Lacan in his “On Feminine Sexuality, The 
limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, The Seminar, Book XX” is explicit: 
“Mathematical formalization is our goal, our ideal” (Lacan, 1972-73, p. 108; my bold). 
Mathematics serves Lacan as a paradigm of modern scientific discourse, which: 
“emerged from the little letters of mathematics” (Lacan, 1959-60, p. 236) as he posits in 
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“The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, The Seminar, Book VII”.    
 However, this use of mathematics is not an attempt to produce a meta-language 
since: “no meta-language can be spoken” (Lacan, 1977, p. 311), because since “Freud’s 
Papers on Technique, The Seminar, Book I” that Lacan argues that: “the root of the 
difficulty is that you can only introduce symbols, mathematical or otherwise, by using 
everyday language, since you have, after all, to explain what you are going to do with 
them” (Lacan, 1953-54, p. 2).         
 Thus, Lacan’s use of mathematics and inherent topology is not an attempt to 
escape from the ambiguity of language, but, on the contrary, to produce a way of 
formalizing psychoanalysis which produces multiple effects of sense without being 
reducible to a univocal signification. Hence, here it is another reason why I defend 
that also Lacan unfolds a ‘secondary discourse’: a ‘secondary discourse’ is never 
univocal as I am arguing since the beginning of this dissertation. Also, by using 
mathematics Lacan tries to prevent all attempts at imaginary intuitive understanding of 
psychoanalysis. The algebraic symbols used by Lacan, which appear principally in the 
‘mathemes’ like ‘Schema L’ and the ‘graph of desire’ (among others that I will also 
develop), are listed below together with their most common meaning.   
 However, it is important to remember that the symbols do not always refer to the 
same concept throughout Lacan’s work, but are used in different ways as his work 
develops. Therefore some caution should be exercised when referring to the following 
list of equivalences.         
 The ‘List of Algebraic Symbols’ (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 93-100, pp. 101-124, pp. 
237-322, pp. 401-436, pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, pp. 765-790, pp. 793-827, pp. 829-
850, pp. 855-877; 1967-68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 1969-70; 1970; 1972-73; 1973; 
1974-75; 1975a; 1975-76; 1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-78b, pp. 548-556):                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Multiplication table  
Symbol Translation 
A the big Other 
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A the barred Other 
Α  objet petit a   
 
 
1 (before 1957) the subject; 2 (from 1957 on) the signifier;   
3 (in the schemas of Sade) the raw subject of pleasure 
 
the barred subject 
 
the master signifier 
 
the signifying chain/knowledge 
S The signified (in the Saussurean algorithm) 
 
The signifier of a lack in the Other  
 
The signification of the Other (the message/symptom) 
D Demand 
D Desire    
M the ego (moi) 
I the specular image (schema R) 
i(a) 
1 the specular image (graph of desire) 
2       The ideal ego (optical model) 
I The ego-ideal (schema R) 
I(A) The ego-ideal (graph of desire) 
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Π The real phallus 
Φ The symbolic phallus [upper-case phi] 
(-φ) castration [lower-case phi] 
S The symbolic order (schema R) 
R The field of reality (schema R) 
I The imaginary order (schema R) 
P The symbolic father / Name-of-the-father 
P The imaginary father  
M The symbolic mother  
J Jouissance 
Jφ Phallic Jouissance 
JA the Jouissance of the Other 
E the statement 
E the enunciation 
V the will-to-enjoy (volonté de jouissance) 
 
The typographic details and diacritics are extremely important in Lacanian 
algebra; the difference between upper- and lower-case symbols, the difference between 
italicised and non-italicised symbols, the use of the apostrophe, the minus sign, and 
subscripts; all these details play their part in the algebraic system: for example the 
upper-case letters usually refer to the symbolic order, whereas the lower-case letters 
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usually refer to the imaginary; the use of the bar is also important (cf., Lacan, 1968).
 I will now develop the significance of the ‘mathemes’ (‘Schema L’ and the 
‘graph of desire’), and inherent structures like the ‘Borromean Knot’, the ‘sinthome’, 
the ‘Möbius strip’ and the ‘torus’.         
 The term ‘mathème’ is a neologism which Lacan derives from the word 
mathematics, presumably by analogy with the term mytheme, which is a term coined by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss in his “Tristes Tropiques” to denote the basic constituents of 
mythological systems (cf., Lévi-Strauss, 1955). The mathemes are part of Lacanian 




(cf., Lacan, 1954-55) 
In his 1954-55 “The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis, The Seminar, Book II”, Lacan introduced what could be called his first 
matheme, the relatively simple ‘Schema L’, illustrating the imaginary function of the 
ego.  
‘Schema L’ identifies four points in the signifying chain:  
, the unconscious or the ‘discourse of the Other’, and then.  
, the subject, which in turn results from the relation between  
, the ego and  
, the other (cf., Lacan, 1954-55). 
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Lacan’s second matheme was the ‘graph of desire’, which was a topological 
model of the structure of desire. Lacan began to develop the graph of desire in his 1957-
58 “Les formations de l’inconscient, Le Séminaire, Livre V”.    
 The graph of desire reappears in some of the following seminars in various 
forms, although the most well known form of it appears in “The Subversion of the 
Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious” (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 
793-827; Lacan, 1977, pp. 292-325). In this paper, Lacan builds up the graph of desire 
in four stages (see figures below): the first of these stages is the ‘elementary cell’ of the 
graph (cf., Lacan, 1977, p. 303); the horizontal line represents the diachronic signifying 
chain; the horseshoe-shaped line represents the vector of the subject’s intentionality. 
The double intersection of these two lines illustrates the nature of retroaction: the 
message, at the point marked s(A) in the elementary cell, is the point de capiton 
determined retroactively by the particular punctuation given to it by the Other, A; the 
pre-linguistic mythical subject of pure need, indicated by the triangle, must pass through 

















The ‘graph of desire’ (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 793-827; 







The intermediate stages of the graph of desire are not meant to show any 
evolution or temporal development, since the graph always exists as a whole; they are 
simply pedagogical devices used by Lacan in order to illustrate the structure of the 
complete graph (cf., Lacan, 1977, p. 31). Nevertheless, Lacan never intended to 
describe the genetic stages of a biological development; rather, it represents the ‘logical 
moments’ of the birth of a speaking subject (cf., Lacan, 1977, p. 315).   
 In the completed graph there are not one but two signifying chains: the lower 
chain (from the signifier to the voice) is the conscious signifying chain, the level of the 
statement; the upper chain (from jouissance to castration) is the signifying chain in the 
unconscious, the level of the enunciation. The structure is thus duplicated: the upper 
part of the graph is structured exactly like the lower part (cf., Lacan, 1977, pp. 292-
325).           
 By the same time of the graph of desire’s elaboration, Lacan creates perhaps the 
most familiar matheme: the ‘algorithm’, which in 1957 replaces Saussure’s simple 
diagram/arbour (see below) with the notion S/s (cf., Lacan, 1977, pp. 146-178). In 1957, 
date of the first formulation of “The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason 
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since Freud” (cf., Lacan, 1977, pp. 146-178), Lacan replaces Saussure’s diagram of the 
sign with what is now referred to as the: “Saussurean algorithm” (Lacan, 1977, p. 149).
 The matheme links the ‘laws’ of the unconscious discovered by Freud to the 
‘laws’ of language (metaphor and metonymy) discovered by Lacan.  
   
 
The ‘Saussurean algorithm’ (cf., Lacan, 1977, pp. 146-178)   
This is to be understood as demonstrating that the signifier is above the 
signified, showing the primacy of the signifier (which is capitalized, whereas the 
signified is reduced to mere lower-case italic), and that the two are separated by a bar 
that resists signification and forces the signifier to ‘slide’ endlessly (cf., Lacan, 1966, 
pp. 493-528; Lacan, 1977, pp. 146-178).        
 Lacan first introduced the notion of ‘mathème’ (matheme) in 1973: in his 
seminar, of course, but more particularly in “The Twit” (‘L’Étourdit’) (cf., Lacan, 1973, 
pp. 5-52), his last major piece of writing. That was the year of “On Feminine Sexuality, 
The limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, The Seminar, Book XX” as I said above: 
“Formalization is our goal, our ideal. Why? Because formalization as such is a 
matheme: it can be fully transmitted” (Lacan, 1972-73, p. 108; my alterations): that is 
why throughout this review I ‘apply’ the etymological method; words are semantic 
envelopes…etymologic containers (see above; see below, specially “Dora’s 
Case”/Chapter 3); a ‘secondary discourse’ in its full meaning, that is, in its 
deconstructive method as I said above concerning Bion and now concerning 
Lacan. In “The Twit”, Lacan says that he has mathematized his discourse so that it 
could be taught: “the unteachable, I turned into a matheme” (Lacan, 1973, p. 39). 
 But what exactly is a matheme? What does Lacan have in mind? Is he thinking 
of the formulas that punctuate his teachings, such as the formulas for metaphor and 
metonymy, for instance, or the formulas for ‘sexuation’? Or is he rather thinking of the 
topological constructions on the torus and the cross-cap that he had just introduced, not 
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as metaphor, but as structure itself?        
 If one tracks down the word matheme in “The Twit”, it first appears to be 
intertwined with the topological construction presented as contributing to the analytical 
discourse, to its fabric: “No other fabric to endow it with but the language of a pure 
matheme, in other words, the only teachable discourse” (Lacan, 1973, p. 28; my bold).
 The definition, which identifies the matheme with the teachable, supersedes the 
mathematizable itself, since the Real can only be apprehended through mathematics, 
except the real of the impossible sexual relation, which, in point of fact, cannot be 
transcribed by any mathematical relation: “This is why the mathemes which are 
transcribed as dead-ends by the mathematizable, that is, the teachable in the Real, are 
likely to be coordinated to this ‘impossible’ from the Real” (Lacan, op. cit., p. 35). 
 How is the matheme apprehended in the structure of our language? The first 
mathemes, the arithmetical figures, are on the border of language, in its fringe: “The 
matheme is a product of the only real which is first recognized in language: the 
arithmetical figure” (Lacan, op. cit., p. 37).  The arithmetical figure is on the border 
between common language and mathematical discourse (see above Bion, 1962b, 
1963, 1965, 1977b). The first figures are signifiers, but these quickly become 
meaningless.           
 In “L’Oeuvre Claire” (1995), J. C. Milner attempts to define the matheme on the 
basis of the definitions of phoneme (the linguist’s phonetic unit) and mytheme (part of a 
myth; see above). Milner proposes that the matheme is an ‘atom of knowledge’. But, 
apart from mathematical objects, there is no such thing as an atom of knowledge in 
mathematics. This is in fact what J. A. Miller means when, talking about the matheme 
in the “Revue de la Cause Freudienne”, he says that the aim of the analytical experience 
is to ‘know one’s own matheme’ (cf., Miller, 1996a, pp. 7-15).    
 To Miller, what is important, then, is less to formalize the knowledge achieved 
during the cure, than to identify with one’s own matheme. Miller gives the witty 
example of the triangles and the spheres, but it is obvious that in this particular context 
the mathemes are mathematical objects, such as the triangle or the sphere, but also the 
Borromean knot, the torus, the Möbius strip, and the geometrical projection (cf., Miller, 
1996a, pp. 7-15).         
 These objects are no longer at the edge of language, but rather at the point where 
the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic intersect. Rather than being atoms of 
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knowledge, each one of these objects is a concentrate of knowledge: that which governs 
the subject’s relation to the Real. This means that, as J. A. Miller makes clear in the 
above mentioned article, the knowledge which is formalized in the matheme (and 
intertwined with satisfaction), represents a stake for the ending of the cure: once 
again, ‘secondary and primary discourse’ are mutually affected by each other. This 
is what Lacan has reformulated when he suggested that the experience be carried 
on to the point when the subject accedes to his own matheme, and more 
particularly the matheme of the primary fantasy, since this fantasy conditions, 
indeed, determines, whatever keeps Mr. So and So going all through his existence (cf., 
Lacan, op. cit, p. 11). The stakes of the matheme are many. After the fundamental stake, 
which has to do with the aim of the cure, there is teaching, as my first allusions to the 
matheme and its definitions make clear; then there is a political stake and a clinical one. 
If the only valuable teaching is the one that can be transcribed into a matheme, then the 
teacher’s role is reduced to the ultimate: to transmit an elaboration without having 
anything to do with it.         
 The consequence is the same with all writing: “Scilicet”, the journal where “The 
Twit” (‘L’Étourdit’) was first published is –except for Lacan’s texts– a collection of 
unsigned articles after Bourbaki’s style of presentation, Bourbaki being one of the 
collective and anonymous mathematical writers of the time. As J. C. Milner points out 
in his book on Lacan, the master’s figure disappears with the mathemes: we are left with 
professors (cf., Milner, 1995).        
 If one takes Lacan’s topology and mathemes seriously, the clinical scene 
changes too. That which makes the symbolic ensnare and bump into the impossible of 
the real becomes clearer in the light of what Lacan called the topology of signifiers, 
which taps in the general topology of kinship between signifiers, a topology which, 
according to Lacan’s “Esquisse”, is budding, if not born, in Freud’s “Project for a 
scientific psychology” (cf., Lacan, 1945-46, pp. 7-15; Freud, 1895, pp. 295-387): 
once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary discourses’. 
 Inasmuch as it can be separated from the clinic of signifiers, the clinic of the 
object is spotted in, by, and through, the topology of surfaces, just as Lacan shows in 
“The Twit” and in some of his later seminars. Later on, J. A. Miller took up the clinical 
stake. He focused on interpretation. There is a trace of this concern in “Revue de la 
cause Freudienne”. The ‘classical interpretation that focused on meaning is no 
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longer convincing; we are witnessing what S. Cottet would describe as «the decline 
of interpretation»’ (cf., Miller, 1996b, pp. 7-18).      
 This led J. A. Miller to devise a conception of interpretation aiming at the level 
of the Real where ‘it is loving it’ (ça jouit) rather than at the level where ‘it speaks’ (ça 
parle). If the analytical interpretation is that through which the Real is asserting itself, 
then interpretation is a matter of formalization –supposing that the mathematical 
formalization is the only one that can reach the Real. This is what Lacan explores 
(cf., Miller, 1996b, p. 18): once again, the ‘common ground’ that I argue (in my 
Introduction, in this literature review and unfolded throughout my entire Thesis) is 
nothing more, as Wallerstein also recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), than 
acknowledge that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that 
configures the form of our ‘secondary discourse’ (in my terminology): they are all 
formalizations of the analyst’s psychic process present in the clinical session; that 
is why Bion’s Grid, Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so 
heuristic: they are the formalization of the analyst’s psychic process not as a 
‘primary discourse’ but as a ‘secondary discourse’: they are epistemological tools 
that have only one purpose: being deconstructed by the ‘analyst’s mind’ 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) in the clinical session. That is why we call it a 
formalization of the psychic process: it is its form, not its content. Indeed, Bion’s 
Grid, Matte Blanco’s bi-logic and Lacan’s mathemes are epistemological tools that 
use mathematics to represent an attempt to formalize psychoanalytic theory : once 
again (and I add), fecund ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary 
discourses’.          
 Accordingly, the Borromean knot provides an illustration of what Lacan was 
striving to achieve with a ‘mathematical clinic’. This knot consists of three ‘loops of 
string’: two of these loops are loose while the third is tied. Thus, when one loop 
becomes undone, all three become undone. This first enabled Lacan to illustrate the 
solidarity of the three registers, that is, the Imaginary, the Real, and the Symbolic, in the 
knot which defines the human subject (cf., Lacan, 1972-73).     
 But in the year of his seminar on Joyce, entitled “Le Sinthome, Le Séminaire, 
Livre XXIII”, is when the question of the structure of the writer arises, Lacan devises a 
knot with three untied loops that would collapse unless a fourth loop ties them all 
together. Lacan identifies this fourth loop with the symptom –spelled ‘sinthome’ in 
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Joyce’s case (cf., Lacan, 1975-76).        
 Thus, Joyce’s psychosis never manifested, because his writing acted as a 
substitute that held together the three registers, despite Joyce’s obvious lack of the 
paternal function (cf., Lacan, ib.).        
 One could therefore generalize the question of the real of the symptom as being 
equivalent to the Father, as father version (or to invert elements in the pun, ‘père-
version’), that holds the knot together. It might now be possible to differentiate between 
types and to outline a clinic. I will develop this dynamic below when I address the 
‘sinthome’ conceptualization (cf., Lacan, ib.).  
    
The ‘Borromean Knot’ (cf., Lacan, 1972-73) 
Lacan used the concept or image of the knot quite frequently. References to 
knots can be found in Lacan’s work as early as the 1950s “Les formations de 
l’inconscient, Le Séminaire, Livre V” (cf., Lacan, 1957-58), but it is not until the early 
1970s that Lacan begins to examine knots from the point of view of topological 
properties.           
 In the mid-1970s he tried to theorize the interrelation of the Symbolic, the 
Imaginary and the Real in terms of the topology of knots. The study of ‘knot theory’ 
marks an important development in Lacan’s topology; from the study of surfaces (the 
Möbius strip, the torus, etc.) Lacan moves to a much more complex area of the topology 
of knots (cf., Lacan, 1972-73).        
 Topology is increasingly seen as a radically non-metaphorical way of exploring 
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the symbolic order and its interactions with the imaginary and the real; rather than 
simply representing structure, topology is that structure. In this late period of his work, 
one kind of knot comes to interest Lacan more than any other: the above mentioned 
Borromean knot (see figure above). The Borromean knot –shown to the right– so called 
because the figure is found on the coat of arms of the Borromeo family, is a group of 
three rings which are linked in such a way that if any one of them is severed, all three 
become separated as I said above (cf., Lacan, 1972-73; Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).
 Strictly speaking, it would be more appropriate to refer to this figure as a chain 
rather than a knot, since it involves the interconnection of several different threads, 
whereas a knot is formed by a single thread. Although a minimum of three threads or 
rings are required to form a Borromean chain, there is no maximum number; the chain 
may be extended indefinitely by adding further rings, while still preserving its 
Borromean quality [i.e. if any of the rings is cut, the whole chain falls apart (cf., 
Roudinesco & Plon, ib.)].         
 Lacan first takes up the Borromean knot in the seminar “On Feminine Sexuality, 
The limits of Love and Knowledge: Encore, The Seminar, Book XX” of 1972-73, but 
his most detailed discussion of the knot comes in the seminar of 1974-75. It is in this 
seminar entitled “R.S.I., Le Séminaire, Livre XXII” that Lacan uses the Borromean knot 
as, among other things, a way of illustrating the interdependence of the three orders of 
the real, the symbolic and the imaginary, as a way of exploring what it is that these three 
orders have in common (cf., Lacan, 1974-75, pp. 105-116).    
 Each ring represents one of the three orders, and thus certain elements can be 
located at intersections of these rings. In his view these orders are tied together in the 
form of a Borromean knot. The Borromean knot is a linkage of three ‘string rings’ in 
such a way that no two rings intersect. The structure of the knot is such that the cutting 
of any one ring will liberate all of the others (cf., Lacan, ib.).    
 Lacan used the theory of knots to stress the relations which bind or link the 
Imaginary, Symbolic and Real, and the subject to each, in a way which avoids any 
notion of hierarchy, or any priority of any one of the three terms [the ‘hierarchy’ (or 
not) between the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real is a epistemological subject that 
Lacanians are in disagreement (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997)].     
 In the seminar of 1975-76 entitled precisely “Le Sinthome, Le Séminaire, Livre 
XXIII”, Lacan goes on to describe psychosis as the unravelling of the Borromean knot, 
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and proposes that in some cases this is prevented by the addition of a fourth ring, the 
sinthome, which holds the other three together (cf., Lacan, 1975-76).  
 According to Lacan, sinthome is an archaic way of spelling the French word 
symptôme, meaning symptom. The seminar is a continuing elaboration of his topology, 
extending the previous seminar’s focus (RSI) on the Borromean knot and an exploration 
of the writings of James Joyce as I started to illustrate above. Lacan redefines the 
psychoanalytic symptom in terms of his topology of the subject (cf., Lacan, 1974-75; 
1975-76).           
 In “Psychoanalysis and its Teachings” published in his “Écrits” (1966) Lacan 
views the symptom as inscribed in a writing process, not as a ‘ciphered message’ which 
was the traditional notion. In his seminar “L’angoisse, Le Séminaire, Livre X” (1962-
63) he states that the symptom does not call for interpretation: in itself it is not a call 
to the Other but a pure jouissance addressed to no one.     
 This is a shift from the linguistic definition of the symptom –as a signifier– to 
his assertion that ‘the symptom can only be defined as the way in which each subject 
enjoys (jouit) the unconscious in so far as the unconscious determines the subject’ (cf., 
Lacan, ib.).           
 He goes from conceiving the symptom as a message which can be 
deciphered by reference to the unconscious structured like a language to seeing it 
as the trace of the particular modality of the subject’s jouissance. Sinthome then 
designates a signifying formulation beyond analysis: it is what allows one to live by 
providing the essential organization of jouissance. The aim of the cure is to identify 
with the sinthome (cf., Lacan, ib.).        
 Since meaning (sens) is already figured within the knot, at the intersection of the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary, it follows that the function of the sinthome –knotting 
together, the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic– is beyond meaning (cf., Lacan, 
1975-76).         
 According to Lacan, faced in his childhood by the absence of the Name of the 
Father, Joyce managed to avoid psychosis by deploying his art as suppléance that is a 
supplementary cord in the subjective knot. Lacan emphasizes Joyce’s ‘epiphanies’ [(or 
‘mystic ecstasies’; Lacan established a ‘theory of creation’ parallel between Joyce and 
Saint Thomas of Aquinas; cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997)] as instances of radical 
foreclosure in which the real forecloses meaning. Joyce’s texts entailed a special 
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relation to language, its destructive refashioning as sinthome: the invasion of the 
Symbolic order by the subject’s private jouissance (cf., Lacan, ib.).   
 The concept of sinthome in its particular relations to creativity is connected to 
the late Lacanian concept of ‘feminine supplementary jouissance’ (cf., Lacan, 1966). To 
Lacan, topology is conceived as a form of writing, aiming to figure that which escapes 
the Imaginary. Thus Joyce becomes a saint home [this alludes not only to the above 
mentioned theory of creation but also to Lacan’s language games: here he ‘plays’ with 
Joyce’s ‘sinthome’ and Thomas of Aquinas ‘saint homme’ (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 
1997)], who by refusing any imaginary solution was able to invent a procedure of using 
language to organize jouissance.        
 As I said above Lacan introduces the term sinthome in 1975, as the title for the 
1975-76 seminar, which is both a continuing elaboration of his topology, extending the 
previous seminar’s focus on the Borromean knot, and an exploration of the writings of 
James Joyce. Through this coincidentia oppositorum (bringing together mathematical 
theory and the intricate weave of the Joycean text) Lacan redefines the psychoanalytic 
symptom in terms of his final topology of the subject. Before the appearance of 
sinthome, divergent currents in Lacan’s thinking lead to different inflections of the 
concept of the symptom. As early as 1957, the symptom is said to be: “inscribed in a 
writing process” (Lacan, 1966, p. 445), which already implies a different view to that 
which regards the symptom as a ciphered message.     
 As I started to illustrate above, in 1963, Lacan goes on to state that the symptom, 
unlike ‘acting out’, does not call for interpretation; in itself, it is not a call to the Other 
but a pure  jouissance addressed to no one (cf., Lacan, 1962-63). Such comments 
anticipate the radical transformation of Lacan’s thought implicit in his shift from 
the linguistic definition of the symptom –as a signifier– to his statement, in the 
1974-75 seminar, that: ‘the symptom can only be defined as the way in which each 
subject enjoys [jouit] the unconscious, in so far as the unconscious determines him’ 
(cf., Lacan, 1974-75).         
 This move from conceiving of the symptom as a message which can be 
deciphered by reference to the unconscious ‘structured like a language’, to seeing it as 
the trace of the particular modality of the subject’s jouissance, culminates in the 
introduction of the term sinthome. The sinthome thus designates a signifying 
formulation beyond analysis, a ‘kernel’ of enjoyment immune to the efficacy of the 
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symbolic: the sinthome is what ‘allows one to live’ by providing a unique 
organization of jouissance. The task of analysis thus becomes, in one of Lacan’s 
last definitions of the end of analysis, to identify with the sinthome: a ‘primary 
discourse’ in its full meaning (see above and below).     
 The theoretical shift from linguistics to topology constitutes the status of the 
sinthome as un-analyzable, and amounts to an exegetical problem beyond the 
familiar one of Lacan’s dense ‘secondary discourse’, but I have to add that this 
exegetical problem is (among many other above mentioned reasons) what 
illustrates that Lacan formulated one of the most heuristic ‘secondary discourses’ 
ever developed in psychoanalytic theory, hence the immense difficulty of the 
exegetes to deconstruct it. Returning to the subject just to sow it better, the 1974-75 
seminar extends the theory of the Borromean Knot, which in RSI (Real, Symbolic, 
Imaginary) had been proposed as the structure of the subject, by adding the sinthome as 
the fourth ring to the triad already mentioned, tying together a knot which constantly 
threatens to come undone (see above; cf., Lacan, 1972-73; 1974-75; 1975-76). This 
knot is not offered as a model but as a rigorously non-metaphorical description of a 
topology: ‘before which the imagination fails’ (cf., Lacan, 1975-76).   
 I will now return to James Joyce. Lacan had been an enthusiastic reader of Joyce 
since his youth (cf., Lacan, 1966, p. 25; Lacan, 1972-73, p. 37). In the 1975-76 Seminar, 
Joyce’s writing is read as an extended sinthome, a fourth term whose addition to the 
Borromean knot of RSI allows the subject to cohere. Faced in his childhood by the 
radical non-function/absence (carence) of the Name-of-the-Father, Joyce managed to 
avoid psychosis by deploying his art as suppléance, as a supplementary cord in the 
subjective knot as I said.         
 Lacan focuses on Joyce’s youthful ‘epiphanies’ (experiences of an almost 
hallucinatory intensity which were then recorded in enigmatic, fragmentary texts; see 
above the epistemological and semantic articulation with Saint Thomas of Aquinas) as 
instances of ‘radical foreclosure’, in which ‘the real forecloses meaning’ (cf., Lacan, 
1975-76).           
 The Joycean text, from the ‘epiphany’ to “Finnegans Wake” (1939) entailed a 
special relation to language; a ‘destructive’ refashioning of it as sinthome, the invasion 
of the symbolic order by the subject’s private jouissance: one of Lacan’s puns, synth-
homme, implies this kind of ‘artificial’ self-creation; Lacan’s engagement with Joyce’s 
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writing does not, he insists, entail ‘applied psychoanalysis’ (cf., Lacan, 1966). To that 
extent, rather than a theoretical object or ‘case’, Joyce becomes an exemplary saint 
homme (as St. Thomas of Aquinas; see above) who, by refusing any imaginary solution, 
was able to invent a new way of using language to organize enjoyment as we see in all 
his work, but specially in the masterpiece “Ulysses” (1922).    
 After I presented the major tenets of Lacanian algebraic structures (and I 
add again: one of the most heuristic ‘secondary discourses’ ever developed in our 
field, especially because of its proximity with the ‘primary discourse’ as shown 
above), I will illustrate now the (later) epistemological framework from where 
Lacan conceptualized and re-conceptualized his last ‘secondary discourse’. I say 
last because, as I said above, ‘the theoretical shift from linguistics to topology 
marks the final period of Lacan’s work’. But what is topology? And what was his 
epistemology towards linguistics? I will answer to the former question now and I will 
answer to the latter question ‘lastly’ in my cogitation concerning Lacan’s last 
‘secondary discourse’.        
 Topology is a branch of mathematics which deals with the properties of figures 
in space where are preserved under all continuous deformations. These properties are 
those of continuity, contiguity and delimitation. The notion of space in topology is one 
of topological space, which is not limited to Euclidean two- and three-dimensional 
space, nor even to spaces which can be said to have a dimension at all [(cf., Euclid, 
2002; see above Bion’s ‘theory of functions’ (cf., Bion, 1962b)]. Topological space 
thus dispenses with all references to distance, size, area and angle, and is based only on 
a concept of closeness or neighbourhood.       
 In this context, in what have been called his two ‘topographies’ (the first dating 
from 1900 to 1920 and the second from 1920 to 1939 as I said above), Freud resorted to 
schemas to represent the various parts of the psychic apparatus and their interrelations 
(cf., Freud, 1900a, pp. 1-338; 1900b, pp. 339-621; 1905b, pp. 135-243; 1915c, pp. 159-
215; 1920a, pp. 7-64; 1923c, pp. 12-59).       
 These schemas implicitly posited equivalence between psychic space and 
Euclidean space. Freud used spatial metaphors to describe the psyche in “The 
Interpretation of Dreams”, where he cites G. T. Fechner’s idea that the scene of action 
of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life and proposes the concept of 
‘psychical locality’ (cf., Freud, 1900b, pp. 339-621). Freud is careful to explain that 
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this concept is a purely topographical one, and must not be confused with ‘physical 
locality in any anatomical fashion’ (cf., Freud, 1900b, p. 536).    
 His ‘first topography’ divided the psyche into three systems: the conscious (Cs), 
the preconscious (Pcs) and the unconscious (Ucs) (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243). The 
‘second topography’ divided the psyche into the three agencies of the ego, the superego 
and the id (cf., Freud, 1923c, pp. 12-59).      
 Lacan criticizes these models for not being topological enough. He argues 
that the diagram with which Freud had illustrated his second topology in “The Ego and 
the Id” (1923c) led the majority of Freud’s readers to forget the analysis on which it was 
based because of the ‘intuitive power of the image’ (cf., Lacan, 1977, p. 214). 
 Lacan’s interest in topology arises, then, because he sees it as providing a non-
intuitive, purely intellectual means of expressing the concept of structure that is so 
important to his focus on the symbolic order. It is thus the task of Lacan’s topological 
models: “to forbid imaginary capture” (Lacan, op. cit., p. 333; my bold). Unlike 
intuitive images, in which: “perception eclipses structure” (Lacan, ib.), in Lacan’s 
topology: “there is no occultation of the symbolic” (Lacan, ib.).    
 Lacan in “The Twit” argues that topology is not simply a metaphorical way of 
expressing the concept of structure; it is structure itself (cf., Lacan, 1973, pp. 5-52). He 
emphasizes that topology privileges the function of the cut (coupure), since the cut is 
what distinguishes a discontinuous transformation from a continuous one. Both kinds of 
transformation play a role in psychoanalytic treatment.    
 As an example of a continuous transformation, Lacan refers to the Möbius strip 
(see above Grotstein, 2000), a construct that had its major formulations in Lacan’s ninth 
and tenth seminars entitled “L’identification, Le Séminaire, Livre IX” (1961-62; 
unpublished) and “L’angoissee, Le Séminaire, Livre X” (1962-63): just as one passes 
from one side to the other by following the strip round continuously, so the subject can 
traverse the fantasy without making a mythical (hence I have posited that our 
unconscious is a ‘mental envelope’ written ab initio with mythological letters; see 
above) leap from inside to outside; as an example of a discontinuous transformation, 
Lacan also refers to the Möbius strip, which when cut down the middle is transformed 
into a single loop with very different topological properties; it now has two sides instead 
of one. Just as the cut operates a discontinuous transformation in the Möbius strip, 
so an effective interpretation proffered by the analyst modifies the structure of the 
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analysand’s discourse in a radical way (cf., Lacan, 1962-63) as a ‘primary 
discourse’: once again, here it’s clear the proximity of Lacan’s ‘secondary 
discourse’ with the ‘primary discourse’.       
 While ‘Schema L’ and the other schemata (see above) which are produced in the 
1950s can be seen as Lacan’s first incursion into topology, topological forms only come 
into prominence when, in the 1960s, he turns his attention to the figures not only of the 
Möbius strip, but also of the torus, the Klein’s bottle, and the cross-cap; these were 
conceptualized in “L’identification, Le Séminaire, Livre IX” (Lacan, 1961-62; as 
mentioned, this seminar remains unpublished). Later on, in the 1970s, Lacan turns his 
attention to the more complex area of knot theory, especially the Borromean Knot as I 
said above, but he develops his conceptualizations on the other figures as well, like the 
torus (see below).         
 Accordingly, I will now continue to illustrate the Möbius strip’s dynamic and 
inherent continuous discontinuous ‘transformations’ as I stated above; the torus will be 
the last topological figure that I will address. The Möbius strip is a three-dimensional 
figure that can be formed by taking a long rectangle of paper and twisting it once before 
joining its ends together (see figure below). The result is a figure which subverts our 
normal (Euclidean) way of representing space, for it seems to have two sides but in fact 
has only one. Locally, at any one point, two sides can be clearly distinguished, but when 
the whole strip is traversed it becomes clear that they are in fact continuous. The two 
sides are only distinguished by the dimension of time, the time it takes to traverse the 
whole strip (cf., Lacan, 1962-63).        
 The figure illustrates the way that psychoanalysis problematizes various 
binary oppositions, such as inside/outside, love/hate, signifier/signified, 
truth/appearance. While the two terms in such oppositions are often presented as 
radically distinct, Lacan prefers to understand these oppositions in terms of the topology 
of the Möbius strip. The opposed terms are thus seen to be not discrete but continuous 
with each other. Likewise, the ‘discourse of the master’ is continuous with the 
‘discourse of the analyst’ (cf., Lacan, 2001).      
 The Möbius strip also helps one to understand how it is possible to: “traverse the 
fantasy” (Lacan, 1977, p. 273). It is only because the two sides are continuous that it is 
possible to cross over from inside to outside (see above: Grotstein, 2000). Yet, when 
one passes a finger round the surface of the Möbius strip, it is impossible to say at 
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which precise point one has crossed over from ‘inside’ to ‘outside’ (or vice versa). In 
association with this problematic, Lacan coins the term extimité by applying the prefix 
ex –from exterieur, ‘exterior’– to the Freud word intimité, which means ‘intimacy’. The 
term extimité is the Lacanian neologism to denote the structure of subjectivity 
characterized by an: “intimate exteriority” (Lacan, 1962-63, p. 177).   
 This heuristic neologism, which may be rendered ‘extimacy’ in English, neatly 
expresses the way in which psychoanalysis problematizes the opposition between 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (cf., Lacan, 1962-63, p. 139). 
 
 The ‘Möbius strip’ (cf., Lacan, 1962-63) 
From Lacan’s ‘secondary discourse’, the real is just as much inside as 
outside. The unconscious is not a purely interior psychic system but an inter-
subjective structure: “the unconscious is outside” (Lacan, 1962-63, p. 139). Again, the 
Other is: “something strange to me, although it is at the heart of me” (Lacan, op. cit., p. 
71). Furthermore, the centre of the subject is outside: “the subject is ex-centric” (Lacan, 
1977, p. 165, p. 171). The structure of ‘extimacy’ is perfectly expressed in the topology 
of the möbius strip and of the torus; the latter will be now developed (very briefly).  
 
 
The ‘Torus’ (cf., Lacan, 1962-63)         
233 
 
The torus is, in its simplest form, a ring, a three-dimensional object formed by 
taking a cylinder and joining the two ends together. Lacan’s first reference to the torus 
dates from 1953, but it is not until his work on topology in the 1970s (as I said above), 
that it begins to figure prominently in his work (cf., Lacan, 1977, p. 105).  
 The topology of the torus illustrates certain features of the structure of the 
subject: one important feature of the torus is that its centre of gravity falls outside its 
volume, just as the centre of the subject is outside himself; he is de-centred, ‘ex-centric’ 
(cf., Lacan, ib.); another property of the torus is that: “its peripheral exteriority and its 
central exteriority constitute only one single region” (Lacan, ib.). This illustrates the 
way that psychoanalysis problematizes the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as 
I said above.           
 After I presented the major tenets of Lacanian algebraic structures (and I 
add again: one of the most heuristic ‘secondary discourses’ ever developed in our 
field, especially because of its proximity with the ‘primary discourse’ as shown 
above), and illustrated topology as the (later) epistemological framework from 
where Lacan conceptualized and re-conceptualized his last ‘secondary discourse’ (I 
say last because, as I said above, ‘the theoretical shift from linguistics to topology 
marks the final period of Lacan’s work’), I will present now, very briefly, Lacan’s 
‘secondary discourse’ concerning the first period of his work.   
 Lacan’s ‘secondary discourse’, ab initio, is summed up in his famous 
formula: “the unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan, 1955-56, p. 167; 
my bold). Lacan’s analysis of the unconscious in terms of ‘synchronic structure’ is 
supplemented by his idea of the unconscious opening and closing in a: “temporal 
pulsation” (Lacan, 1977, p. 143, p. 204).       
 Lacan himself qualifies his linguistic approach by arguing that the reason why 
the unconscious is structured like a language is that: “we only grasp the unconscious 
finally when it is explicated, in that part of it which is articulated by passing into words” 
(Lacan, 1959-60, p. 32).         
 Lacan also describes the unconscious as a discourse: “The unconscious is the 
discourse of the Other” (Lacan, 1966, p. 16). This enigmatic formula, which has become 
one of Lacan’s most famous dictums, can be understood in many ways. Perhaps the 
most important meaning is that: “one should see in the unconscious the effects of 
speech on the subject” (Lacan, 1964, p. 126).       
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 More precisely, the unconscious is the effects of the signifier on the subject, in 
that the signifier is what is repressed and what returns in the formations of the 
unconscious (symptoms, jokes, parapraxes, dreams, etc.). All the references to 
language, speech, discourse and signifiers clearly locate the unconscious in the order of 
the symbolic. Indeed: “the unconscious is structured as a function of the symbolic” 
(Lacan, 1959-60, p. 12). The unconscious is the determination of the subject by the 
symbolic order. The unconscious is not interior: on the contrary, since speech and 
language are inter-subjective phenomena, the unconscious is: “trans-individual” (Lacan, 
1977, p. 49).           
 The unconscious is, so to speak, ‘outside’: “This exteriority of the symbolic in 
relation to man is the very notion of the unconscious” (Lacan, 1966, p. 469). If the 
unconscious seems interior, this is an effect of the imaginary, which blocks the 
relationship between the subject and the Other and which inverts the message of the 
Other as I said above.        
 Although the unconscious is especially visible in the ‘formations’ of the 
unconscious: “the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field” (Lacan, 
1977, p. 163). For Lacan, the ‘laws’ of the unconscious are those of repetition and 
desire, and are as ubiquitous as structure itself. The unconscious is irreducible, so the 
aim of analysis cannot be to make conscious the unconscious [Freud’s injunction, (cf., 
Lacan, ib.; see above)].         
 I conclude my Lacan’s ‘review’ by stating that in addition to the various 
linguistic metaphors which Lacan draws on to conceptualize the unconscious 
(discourse, language, speech), he also conceives of the unconscious in other terms. 
Those terms are that the unconscious is also a kind of memory, in the sense of a 
symbolic history of the signifiers that have determined the subject in the course of his 
life: “What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history” (Lacan, 
1977, p. 52). Since it is an articulation of signifiers in a signifying chain, the 
unconscious is a ‘kind’ of knowledge (symbolic knowledge, or savoir). More precisely, 
it is an: “unknown knowledge” (Lacan, ib.).      
 Finally and in conclusion of my literature review, and returning (one last 
time) to Gedo and Goldberg (1973), as I stated many times throughout this review of 
psychoanalytic literature, these authors tried to ‘resolve the problem’ of multiple models 
by tying particular theories and models to the different developmental [as I said in my 
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Introduction concerning Lussier’s (1991) statement, this is the developmental task 
of science] periods, and, one last time: throughout my review I have followed Gedo 
and Goldberg’s epistemological stream of thought, but with my own perspective of 
interpreting each ‘model of mind’ as a ‘secondary discourse’ as I have been 
defending since the beginning of this dissertation, that is, to minimize any 
confusion caused by the current away of theories what I have had illustrated 
throughout my review (and mainly in its long conclusion) were the developmental 
contributions of those authors who have had a major impact on the field or who 
have offered a fairly systematized theory of object relations development as I 
started to do in my Introduction, and, as above mentioned, and, one last time: if the 
ten shared characteristics of what Kernberg (cf., Kernberg, 1993a, 1993b, 2001a; 
see my Introduction and below) calls the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic 
mainstream’; the five shared characteristics of what he calls the ‘intersubjectivist-
interpersonal-self psychology’ current; and the fourteen shared characteristics of 
what he calls the ‘French psychoanalytic approach’ –alongside with the above 
two– don’t constitute new integrations, not as a simple ‘common ground’, but as 
promoting valid hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of an 
effective ‘secondary discourse’ (cf., Laplanche, op. cit.), I don’t know how one can 
say that psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work.    
 Accordingly, as showed above, I have posited that our unconscious is a 
‘mental envelope’ written ab initio with mythological letters (cf., Rank, 1909, 1912, 
1998; Freud, 1913k; Abraham, 1909; Jung, 1969a, 1969b, 1970c, 1970d; Anzieu, 
1966; Bion, 1963, 1970, 1974, 1992) steering, as I said, into Grotstein’s (1981b, 
2000) epistemological meta-psychoanalytic syncretism as a unifying 
conceptualization transversal to all psychoanalytic models as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ where the  extension in the domain of myth was profusely ‘extended’ 
(with my own mitigated ‘secondary discourse’ about the myth of Persephone and 
the myth of Orpheus), and Matte-Blanco’s bi-logical (1956, 1975, 1988) meta-
theory; Lacan’s (cf., Lacan, 1966, pp. 93-100, pp. 101-124, pp. 237-322, pp. 401-
436, pp. 493-528, pp. 685-695, pp. 765-790, pp. 793-827, pp. 829-850, pp. 855-877; 
1967-68; 1968; 1968-69a; 1969; 1969-70; 1970; 1972-73; 1973; 1974-75; 1975a; 
1975-76; 1977-78a, pp. 12-34; 1977-78b, pp. 548-556) algebraic structures were 
developed as a ‘epistemological counterpart’ to Matte-Blanco’s bi-logic; and now I 
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conclude my psychoanalytic review with Kernberg’s (1993b) insights towards the 
psychoanalytic status quo regarding a unified clinic epistemology unfolding all the 
above mentioned major ‘secondary discourses’ inherent to ‘it’.   
 I will paraphrase Kernberg’s central arguments and, sometimes, I will 
quote him directly: ‘First there is a general tendency toward earlier interpretation 
of the transference, and an increased focus on transference analysis in all 
psychoanalytic approaches except, probably, the Lacanian (regarding this 
exception I agree with it but below Kernberg himself states the convergences 
between the Lacanian and others school of thought). The heightened stress on the 
transference is moving the technique of ego psychology, for example, closer to that 
of object-relations theory. There seems to be less emphasis on dreams, on the 
recovery of concrete memories, on external reality, and more on both early and 
systematic analysis of the unconscious meanings of transference developments’ (cf., 
Kernberg, 1993b, pp. 45-62).        
 ‘Then there is a move toward concentrating on the analysis of character 
defences instead of the analysis of the unconscious meanings of particular 
symptoms, experiences, or memories. Here, it is as if Kleinian technique were 
moving in the direction of ego psychology. That character pathology and severe 
personality disorders are becoming increasingly prevalent indications for 
psychoanalytic treatment, may be contributing to this trend, but so is the growing 
awareness that analysis of verbal contents that bypass character structures often 
leads to intellectualization and pseudo-insight’ (cf., Kernberg, ib.). 
 ‘Further, there is an increasing focus on unconscious meanings in the ‘here-
and-now’, as a crucial precondition for significant analysis of the ‘there-and-then’ 
–which Sandler & Sandler have described as the «present unconscious» and the 
«past unconscious» (cf., Sandler & Sandler, 1987, pp. 331-341; see my 
Introduction). This tendency is of course linked to an increasing concentration on 
the analysis of unconscious meanings of the transference. In this regard, we seem 
to be moving toward a broader concept of counter-transference. Counter-
transference as a significant factor for the analyst’s internal exploration as a 
preparatory step to transference interpretation, and consideration of intimate 
links between transference and counter-transference developments characterize 
object-relations theories, ego psychology, self psychology, and interpersonal 
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psychoanalysis (see below): “I detect an increasing concern over ‘indoctrinating’ 
the patient with the analyst’s theories, and an awareness that patients, as part of 
transference developments, tend to talk in the analyst’s language, and that this 
fosters intellectualized reconstructions of the past while feeding into character 
resistances. In this connection, there is a general tendency to interpret genetic 
antecedents more cautiously, a tendency particularly dramatic in the Kleinian 
school’s shift away from the interpretation of assumed earliest determinants of 
intra-psychic conflicts” (Kernberg, op. cit., p. 53; my alterations).   
 ‘Linear concepts of development –the linear sequence from oral to anal to 
genital and oedipal conflicts, in contrast to highly individual sequences of 
condensed oedipal and pre-oedipal structures– are being questioned increasingly 
so that the analysis of transference paradigms operates with an oscillation between 
analyses of highly condensed structures incorporating disparate aspects of the past 
and analyses of a particular line of development that temporarily emerges within 
those condensed structures’ (cf., Kernberg, op. cit., pp. 45-62).    
 ‘This development, perhaps most strongly accentuated among Lacanians 
but characteristic of non-Lacanian French psychoanalysis as well, also focuses on 
the structural aspects and developmental consequences of early oedipalization, the 
archaic Oedipus’ (cf., Kernberg, ib.; see above).      
 ‘Then there is a growing consensus regarding the dyadic nature of earliest 
psychic development as opposed to the traditional assumption of an autistic period, 
and a corresponding closer attention to the implications of this early development 
for psychic structure and psychoanalytic technique’ (cf., Kernberg, ib.). 
 Finally, there is a tendency to apply stricter and more precise modifications 
of psychoanalytic technique to the psychotherapies, a tendency to question the 
traditionally subtle or not so subtle demeaning of psychoanalytic psychotherapies: 
“that are less than the «pure gold» of standard psychoanalytic technique, and less 
fear that the development of such innovations in method will harm the 
methodological «purity» of standard psychoanalysis” (Kernberg, op. cit., p. 54; my 
alteration).           
 In conclusion, I steer (as I did and will do throughout my entire Thesis as 
above mentioned many times) into Kernberg’s (1993a, 1993b, 2001a) and Cooper’s 
(1991) harbour arguing that only the cross fertilization, derived from alternative 
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theories (cf., Cooper, 1991, pp. 107-122) as ‘secondary discourses’, constitutes the 
‘vital’ ingredient of scientific inquiry, research and development: “I have found, 
for example, the technical approach of systematic analysis of character defences a 
valuable contribution from ego psychology, which I have been linking with the 
concept of primitive defences and internalizes object relations derived from 
American and British object-relations theories in the diagnosis and treatment of 
borderline and narcissistic patients. Psychoanalytic object-relations theory has also 
been of great importance in the development of psychoanalytic understanding of 
the dynamics of the couple, of regressed groups, of organizations, and of psychosis. 
Self psychology has significantly enriched our knowledge of pathological 
narcissism; the alternative theories regarding the dynamics and treatment of these 
conditions posed by self psychology, ego psychology, and object relations theory 
demand empirical inquiry and theoretical discussion” (Kernberg, 1993b, p. 50; my 
alterations).           
 Kernberg is highly fecund in his epistemological position, because as I have 
argued throughout all this review, what I have suggested is that hidden within the 
two major contemporary psychoanalytic currents (or ‘groupings’) into which 
Kernberg (2001a) separates (at least) the English-speaking psychoanalytic worlds, 
are many of exactly the same kinds of convergences from seemingly very different 
theoretical perspectives that Kernberg started to adumbrate in the earlier papers 
(1993a, 1993b) and that I am focusing one last time. What I have developed 
throughout my Thesis was not an update on Kernberg’s views, but illustrate that the 
convergences and even the divergences that Kernberg heuristically categorised are 
all inherent to (once again I repeat my central argument because it sows the coherence 
of my doctoral Thesis as a whole: I have had repeated it several times throughout my 
dissertation exactly for this reason; sometimes I have repeated the full argument; 
sometimes, like now, a part of the full argument because I sow it with what is being 
defended in each specific moment) how the analyst deconstructs the clinical 
phenomena independently of what theoretical model he embraces: the keynote 
here is always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’): 
by a permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of 
what the analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models.    
 The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending 
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dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) 
in its essence as I showed in Chapter 1. Freud is the first object relations theorist 
because object relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic thought (as 
the ‘groupings’ above mentioned by Kernberg), as their ‘primary discourse’ the 
deconstruction (like Laplanche states): the theoretical meta-interpretations of 
Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco and Lacan (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’) constitute all clinical dissolutions inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical 
method. That is why I have stated in this literature review that all these authors 
follow Freud –directly or indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic 
universalist model unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its 
deconstructive method. I have stated even more: the more the theorist differs from 
Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is 
following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the 
deconstruction.          
 The ‘common ground’, that I have argued in my Introduction and was  
systematized in this literature review, is nothing more, as Wallerstein (1992) also 
recognizes, than acknowledge that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-
interpretations that configures the form of our ‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s 
‘secondary discourse’): they are all formalizations of the analyst’s psychic process 
present in the clinical session; that is why Bion’s Grid; Lacan’s mathemes and 
Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the formalization of the analyst’s 
psychic process not as a ‘primary discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) but 
as a ‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’): they are 
epistemological tools that have only one purpose: being deconstructed by the 
‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) in the clinical session. That is 
why we call it a formalization of the psychic process: it is its form, not its content.
 And exactly in this context I return to Kernberg’s (2001a) argument: the 
inclusion of ‘the French psychoanalytic approach’ (mainly Lacanian) alongside the two 
major contemporary psychoanalytic currents: the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic 
mainstream’ and the ‘intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology’ current (Bion and 
Matte Blanco belong to the ‘contemporary psychoanalytic mainstream’ and Lacan 
belongs to the ‘French psychoanalytic approach’ as I showed above). Concerning this 
subject I was very clear how I did my approach: as I started to do in my Introduction, 
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what I have illustrated throughout my review (and mainly in its long conclusion) 
were the developmental contributions of those authors who have had a major 
impact on the field (like Lacan) or who have offered a fairly systematized theory of 
object relations development (Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, the ‘Kleinian 
followers’, Grotstein, Kernberg); Freud was approached as the first object 
relations theorist and I have explained (in detail) why throughout all this review.
 On his hand, Kernberg’s (2001a) effort to juxtapose francophone to anglophone 
analytic thinking was different and it could be read in order to lay the basis for the 
consideration of discernible convergences between these major analytic traditions, that 
have been so significantly isolated from one another, in part because of the language 
barrier, in part because of the different philosophical traditions (this was one of the 
major reasons why I have developed, in this literature review, Foucault’s and Bataille’s 
philosophical contributions to Lacan’s ‘secondary discourse’) in which they are rooted. 
Parenthetically, just as the Kleinians were the first of the departures from the ego-
psychological development (in which Freud’s Viennese followers were taking analytic 
work in Britain and in America), who refused to be extruded from organised 
psychoanalysis and even claimed a truer descent from Freud’s own work, in embracing 
his death instinct theory as central to their theorising, so have the Lacanians and those 
influenced by them been a later deviation from many of Freud’s propositions, yet also 
claiming a truer adherence to Freud’s original drive theory and to the continuing 
centrality of infantile/archaic sexuality as I said (mainly) in my Introduction.  
 Indeed, these are the facts, and my argument, as I showed above, concerning this 
status quo, reinforces each theoretical position per se: the more the theorist differs 
from Freud and the more the theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is 
following the vital essence of psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the 
deconstruction. Of course all schools of psychoanalytic thought have their ‘roots’ 
and theories built upon something as I have demonstrated threw Kernberg’s (and 
my own) arguments. As I said above, mutatis mutandis, my argument is just different 
because it is focused not in a simple ‘common ground’ but on an effective ‘secondary 
discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) that any valid theory constitutes (in this 
literature review I have also explained, not arbitrarily in the beginning, with the 
example of Grünbaum, and later on following Bion, what are the criteria that construct a 
valid psychoanalytic theory), and I was very clear about my research agenda: my 
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research agenda is an overview of the development to this point of psychoanalysis 
as a discipline both as a theory of the mind –formulated by Freud, Lacan, 
Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein and Kernberg: these formulations unfold 
my theoretical prolegomena which were my Introduction, Chapter 1 and this 
Chapter, which constitutes what Laplanche (1999) calls the ‘secondary discourse’– 
and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: Freud’s clinical text illustrated by 
Chapter 3, my own clinical cases addressed in Chapter 4 and in my Conclusion, 
and a clinical update on the MPRP shown in Chapter 5: these are my practical 
constructs, which Laplanche calls the ‘primary discourse’–, and offer a prediction, 
in my Conclusion (that prediction was started in my Introduction as I said), 
concerning evolving psychoanalytic development over its (near) future. 
 Therefore and to sow even better my argument in this conclusion, and steering in 
Kernberg’s (1993b) harbour again, I continue with other heuristic examples that 
consubstantiates my central argument: ‘M. S. Mahler’s developmental psychology 
has clarified our understanding of the structural consequences of fixation at 
various stages of early development, and Jacques Lacan’s approach, its 
problematic technique notwithstanding, has helped us focus on the characteristics 
of archaic oedipal conflicts (see above), and on the irreconcilable contradictions 
between the adaptive aspects of ego functioning, on the one hand, and the 
vicissitudes of unconscious desire, on the other (see above). The creative 
contributions of the French psychoanalytic mainstream, partly in response to the 
Lacanian challenge, still need to be fully absorbed by the psychoanalytic 
community at large’ (cf., Kernberg, 1993b, pp. 45-62).    
 ‘Lacan’s focus on the link between the unconscious and language has 
strengthened the search for the nature of pre-linguistic psychic reality in some of 
his former followers (cf., Aulagnier, 1975; see above), while the exploration of the 
relation between the development of language and early inter-subjectivity in 
United States has established unforeseen connections with contemporary 
philosophy (see above). Too, the psychoanalytic study of psychosis owes much to H. 
S. Sullivan’s interpersonal psychoanalysis’ (cf., Kernberg, ib.).    
 I end my literature review with a long statement from Kernberg, which is 
necessary just to enlighten my biggest epistemological concern: psychoanalysis can be 
transformed into a doctrine, a religious narrative without the ‘falsification principle’ 
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(cf., Popper, 1959, 1962; see above) that the ‘conflicting’ theories as ‘secondary 
discourses’ allow, promote and constitute the guaranty of its scientific autonomy: 
“It is not that I believe all psychoanalytic theories can be combined into one. But I 
do believe that the implications these theories have for psychoanalysis are 
important, and that the result of remaining open to them will be an evolving spiral 
of scientific knowledge. There are undoubtedly psychoanalytic fashions, and facile 
combinations of incompatible theories can be both reassuring and damaging. How 
to avoid premature closure and keep the dialogue open is an exciting challenge to 
psychoanalytic educators. Limiting psychoanalytic candidates’ supervision to one 
theoretical approach when several are available has a stultifying effect. 
Psychoanalytic institutions have to protect themselves against the ‘intellectual 
terrorism’ that could result from charismatic proselytizing of any particular new 
approach. Will Freud continue to loom as largely in psychoanalytic education and 
discourse as he has until now? It is of interest that the Lacanian battle cry has been 
‘Back to Freud’, similar to that of the contemporary Freudian approach in this 
country [United States], and to the reaction against traditional Kleinian thinking 
in some Latin American psychoanalytic societies. This demand is only, in part, it 
seems to me, political. To a large extent, it corresponds to a genuine effort for a 
contemporary rereading of Freud. Such a rereading has historical value and 
heuristic implications for the English-language reader because it means a 
loosening of the adherence to one particular reading of Freud, namely that of the 
‘Standard Edition’. There is always the danger, of course, of transforming the 
reading of Freud into a Bible reading –a religious rather than a scientific exercise” 










Practical Constructs: a ‘primary discourse’ 
“Dora’s Case” 
An epistemological bridge between the Theoretical Prolegomena as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ and the Clinical (Practical) Constructs as a ‘primary discourse’ 
As I said in my Introduction and throughout my Thesis, and, once again, to 
be absolutely clear: my research agenda is an overview of the development to this 
point of psychoanalysis as a discipline both as a theory of the mind –formulated by 
Freud, Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein and Kernberg: these 
formulations unfold my theoretical prolegomena which were my Introduction, 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which constitutes what Laplanche (1999) calls the 
‘secondary discourse’ (see above)– and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: 
Freud’s clinical text illustrated by this Chapter, my own clinical cases addressed in 
Chapter 4 and in my Conclusion, and a clinical update on the MPRP shown in 
Chapter 5: these are my practical constructs, which Laplanche (see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) calls the ‘primary discourse’–, and offer a prediction, in my 
Conclusion (that prediction was started in my Introduction as I said), concerning 
evolving psychoanalytic development over its (near) future.     
 Indeed, to bridge the passage from ‘theory’ into ‘practice’ I will work 
“Dora’s Case” from a structural semiotic method (below I explain in detail how 
this method unfolds an epistemological bridge between the Theoretical 
Prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ and the Clinical (Practical) Constructs as 
a ‘primary discourse’). From my perspective, the ‘semion’ (‘semion’ is the Greek 
etymological root of the word ‘sign’) constitutes a theoretical container for the 
praxis to be contained; the theory is a phenomenological container that is only 
‘significant’ if the practical data that is contained becomes inscribed in a 
‘signifier’: theory and practice are inherently container and container, significant 
and signifier; ‘secondary and primary discourses’; theory is a ‘phenomenological 
envelope’ that must be written with ‘practical letters’ (cf., Merleau-Ponty, 1945; 
Lacan, 1966; Bion, 1974, 1992; see above); Bion in his 5
th
 lecture proffered in New 
York on April 1977 said that psychoanalysis: “is a word in search of a meaning; a 
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thought waiting for a tinker; a concept waiting for a content” (Bion, 1980, p. 59; 
my bold).           
 Hence, I adopt this structural semiotic method as a way of interpreting 
“Dora’s Case” directly, trying to grasp her ‘primary discourse’ as I will explain 
below; I also adopt this method because if I put forward in my interpretation ‘any’ 
psychoanalytical theory per se I will unfold a ‘secondary discourse’, and what I 
want to do here is to construct a epistemological bridge between the ‘secondary 
discourse’ which is psychoanalytical theory per se and the ‘primary discourse’ 
which is psychoanalytical clinical practice per se. Below my argument will be more 
clear after I approach the objective elements inherent to the clinical case of Dora.
 Indeed, Freud’s case of Dora, first described in a 1905 article entitled “Fragment 
of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, remains a subject of continuing commentary and 
reinterpretation. Some of this ongoing interest in “Dora’s Case” is related to the 
unfinished elements in it (cf., Freud, 1905a, pp. 7-122).      
 Dora abruptly left the analysis with Freud after only three months, leaving 
behind important unanswered questions about the nature of the relationships among 
Dora, her father, and a couple known as Herr and Frau K. Specifically, commentators 
have asked whether Herr K’s behaviour toward Dora should be viewed as the seduction 
of a child, and whether Dora’s father and even Freud himself who thought the fourteen-
year-old Dora should have responded to Herr K’s overtures as a mature woman, were 
culpable parties in the seduction. Interpretations abound: psychoanalysts (and 
psychologists) have attributed unrecognized transference and counter-transference 
(and I add) as a ‘primary discourse’ as significant influences on Freud’s view and 
Dora’s termination of her analysis (cf., Lewin, 1973-1974, pp. 519-532; Slipp, 1977, 
pp. 359-376; Gill & Muslin, 1978, pp. 311-330; Kanzer, 1978, pp. 72-82; Begel, 1982, 
pp. 163-169; Possick, 1984, pp. 1-11).      
 Feminist critiques have viewed Dora as a victim of class-based patriarchal 
values and beliefs and biased Freudian approaches to psychoanalysis (cf., Gallop, 1982; 
Hare-Mustin, 1978, pp. 311-330; Bernheimer and Kahane, 1985). Literary critics have 
approached Freud’s study as a ‘text’ that can be subjected to various readings and 
interpretations (cf., Crapanzano, 1981, pp. 122-148; Marcus, 1984; McCaffrey, 1984).
 Therefore, it’s obvious that “Dora’s Case” holds a great deal of significance 
for psychoanalytic theory as a ‘secondary discourse’ and for psychoanalytic 
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practice as a ‘primary discourse’ because, among the above mentioned reasons, it 
evokes principles of the incest taboo, the exchange of women, the rules of Kinship, 
among other minor issues.         
 Indeed, when Dora’s first dream is subjected to structural semiotic analysis 
it discloses elements of the incest taboo, the exchange of woman, and seduction. 
This interpretation sees a deep inter-relation (hence my epistemological bridge) 
between the personal and subjective (a ‘primary discourse’ in the ‘analytic setting’) 
and the universal principles (a ‘secondary discourse’ in the psychoanalytic 
community, which will not be approached threw theoretical psychoanalysis but 
threw anthropology as I explain below) of incest taboos, exchange of woman and 
kinship. Hence, was Dora an object of erotic barter? If so, was Freud justified in his 
conclusion that Dora should have given herself to Herr K? How might one explain 
Freud’s choice of the name ‘Dora’ (which means ‘gift’ in Greek)?   
 Dora, whose real name was Ida Bauer, was born on November 1, 1882, in 
Vienna to parents of Bohemian Jewish extraction (cf., Rogow, 1978, pp. 331-356; 
Bernheimer and Kahane, 1985). Her father, Philip, a prosperous textile manufacturer 
and a dominating figure, endured poor health throughout Dora’s childhood. He suffered 
from tuberculosis, a detached retina, and finally complications resulting from syphilis, 
for which Freud treated him six years before the advent of Dora’s analysis. Dora helped 
nurse her father during his much long illness. Dora’s mother, Käthe, who had a remote 
relationship with both Dora and her father, had withdrawn into a ‘housewife’s 
psychosis’, and her attentions had become focused largely on housecleaning tasks (cf., 
Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).         
 By the time Dora was eighteen, her parents had terminated sexual relations with 
each other, and Dora had become drawn to her father. Dora’s brother, Otto, fourteen 
months her senior, later become the chief theoretician and ideological leader of Austrian 
Socialism and an important figure in the international socialist movement (cf., Rogow, 
1978, pp. 331-356).         
 The eighteen-year-old Dora, whom Freud regarded as a typical ‘petite hystérie’, 
was treated by Freud during the months of October, November and December 1900. 
Dora’s symptoms included migraine headaches, which began when she was about 
twelve and gradually diminished, and later, coughing attacks that lasted from three to 
five weeks and that were accompanied by a complete loss of voice. Dora’s analysis was 
246 
 
precipitated by convulsions and loss of consciousness –an event covered by amnesia– 
following an argument with her father. After terminating therapy with Freud, Dora also 
experienced facial paralysis (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997).    
 The family was closely involved with another couple, Herr and Frau K. Frau K 
had also nursed Dora’s father and had become his mistress. Dora’s father had 
acknowledged this relationship to Freud and had related Dora’s insistence that he 
terminate it –and his refusal to do so. Freud quoted the father as saying: “She keeps 
pressing me to break off relations with Herr K and more particularly with Frau K, 
whom she used positively to worship formerly. But that I cannot do…I am bound to 
Frau K by ties of honourable friendship and I do not wish to cause her pain. The poor 
woman is most unhappy with her husband, of whom, by the by, I have no very high 
opinion” (Freud, 1905a, p. 26).        
 The K’s, whose ages are not revealed, had also ended sexual relations with each 
other and had discussed divorce; but Dora believed Herr K would not divorce his wife 
because of their children. Herr K had seduced one of his children’s governesses, an 
event that had become known to Dora, and shortly afterward, he propositioned Dora, 
then sixteen, while she and her father were visiting the K’s at a summer resort. On this 
occasion, Dora realized the nature of the relationship between her father and Frau K, 
and she responded to Herr K’s overture by slapping him. Two years prior to this 
incident, when Dora was fourteen, Herr K had set up an occasion in his office for a 
seduction. Dora fled from this scene ‘in disgust’ and had not revealed the incident until 
meeting Freud. She also told Freud that she was ‘ignorant of sexual knowledge’ at that 
time (cf., Freud, 1905a, pp. 7-122).        
 In the period between the two attempts at seduction, Herr K had been solicitous 
of Dora’s attention, sending flowers every day for a year and giving her a gift of an 
expensive jewel case. Shortly after Herr K’s proposition and after learning of the 
seduction of his children’s governess, Dora told her mother of the seduction attempt that 
occurred at the resort. When confronted, Herr K denied that the incident had taken 
place. Dora’s father told Freud (1905a) that the story was all a fantasy: “I myself believe 
that Dora’s tale of the man’s immoral suggestions is a fantasy that has forced his way 
into her mind” (Freud, op. cit., p. 26). Freud remarked that he found it difficult for Dora 
to focus on Herr K during their interviews and that Dora denied loving Herr K.  
 Dora viewed her father’s refusal to break off relations with the K’s and his 
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denial of Herr K’s advances toward her as a way of handing her over to Herr K and 
making her a reward for his (Herr K’s) toleration of the affair between her father and 
Frau K. Freud saw an element of truth in this but implied that this ‘exchange’ of 
Dora for Frau K was never openly stated and would have been denied by all the 
parties involved, especially Dora’s father.      
 In Freud’s words: “The two men had of course never made a formal agreement 
in which she was treated as an object for barter; her father in particular would have been 
horrified at any such suggestion. But he was one of those men who know how to evade 
a dilemma by falsifying their judgment upon one of the conflicting alternatives” (Freud, 
op. cit., p. 34). Freud recognized that Dora’s rage stemmed from her perception 
that her father had used her as erotic barter. Although he acknowledged her feelings 
of anger and rage in his report, he apparently did not acknowledge those feelings 
directly to Dora.          
 In fact, Freud sided with Dora’s father (who wanted Freud to ‘bring Dora to 
reason’) and even went so far as to say to Dora that to give herself to Herr K was: “the 
only possible solution for all the parties concerned” (Freud, op. cit., p. 108). Dora left 
analysis two weeks after this pronouncement.      
 Freud’s analysis of Dora rested on the interpretation of two dreams. Freud 
wrote a description of the case shortly after he published “Die Träumdeutung” in 1900. 
Freud hoped to show through the case how dreams can elucidate symptoms, and how, 
through associations, they can fill in amnesias. Freud saw a dream as ‘a fulfilment of a 
wish’ (see below). His use of Dora’s dreams led him back to her early infantile 
sexual fantasies, especially her early bed-wetting and autoeroticism, as well as to her 
oedipal rivalries (see above).      
 Dreams are often recalled and shred with others. As largely visual dream images 
are recalled during the waking state, they are cast into a narrative text, drawing on 
language and symbols that have culturally defined and shared meanings. Moreover, 
dreams have a structure (see above, especially Chapter 1). More precisely, the 
narrative text or form of a dream has a structure that, like a myth (see above, 
especially the long conclusion of Chapter 2), can be analysed to reveal deeper 
meanings and associations. Subjective and cultural elements are interactive precisely 
in the structural semiotic properties of a dream text and it is exactly following this 
dynamic that “Dora’s Case” unfolds an epistemological bridge between the 
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Theoretical Prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ and the Clinical (Practical) 
Constructs as a ‘primary discourse’, because if  I have posited that our 
unconscious is a ‘mental envelope’ written ab initio with mythological letters 
steering into Grotstein’s (1981b, 2000) epistemological meta-psychoanalytic 
syncretism as a unifying conceptualization transversal to all psychoanalytic models 
as a ‘secondary discourse’ where the extension in the domain of myth is profusely 
‘extended’, the following analysis of the structural semiotic properties of Dora’s 
first dream examines the interplay among Dora’s subjective realm (her personal 
mythology; her unconscious fantasy), the family circumstances in which she was 
enmeshed, and the universal principles of the incest taboo, the exchange of women, 
and seduction unfolding what could be Dora’s ‘primary discourse’. No 
psychoanalytical theory will be used in my interpretation, I will just deconstruct 
Dora’s dream according to its narrative, to its structural semiotic in its ‘primary 
discourse’: Dora’s dream threw her words (as I say below I am led to believe that the 
dream text is Dora’s rather than Freud’s): I will not use any psychoanalytical theory 
in order to avoid ‘any’ psychoanalytical ‘secondary discourse’; I will just use 
anthropology because subjective and cultural elements are interactive precisely in 
the structural semiotic properties of a dream text.     
 I use this structural semiotic method because of what I above mentioned many 
times following Laplanche (1999): the ‘magnetism between method and its object 
(the unconscious fantasy) constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, whatever 
the theory he may espouse as a ‘secondary discourse’, hence, because Dora is not 
my patient (obviously), only analyzing her ‘unconscious phantasy’ present in her 
dream threw her words (hence the structural semiotic method of analysis) I can try 
to grasp her ‘primary discourse’.       
 Indeed, Freud’s analysis of Dora rested on the interpretation of two dreams 
as mentioned. Freud wrote a description of the case shortly after he published “Die 
Träumdeutung” in 1900. Dora’s first dream examines the interplay among Dora’s 
subjective realm, the family circumstances in which she was enmeshed, and the 
universal principles of the incest taboo, the exchange of women, and seduction as also 
mentioned.           
 Dora’s first dream was a recurrent dream and one that she first dreamt at the 
time of Herr K’s proposition at the summer resort. She had the same dream while in 
249 
 
analysis with Freud. Although Freud reconstructed the Dora case from memory after the 
case was terminated, he remarked that he recorded both of Dora’s dreams immediately 
after the session in which each dream was presented and discussed. I am led to 
believe that the dream text is Dora’s rather than Freud’s.   
 Vincent Crapanzano (1981) rightly remarks that Strachey’s translation (author 
of the worldwide English translation and publisher of the ‘Standard Edition of Freud’s 
Complete Works’) of Dora’s first dream into English inexcusably changed the verb 
tense from present to past. Strachey translated the dream into English in this way: “A 
house was on fire. My father was standing beside my bed and woke me up. I dressed 
quickly. Mother wants to stop and save her jewel-case; but Father said: «I refuse to let 
myself and my two children be burnt for the sake of your jewel-case». We hurried 
downstairs, and as soon as I was outside I woke up. 1) In answer to an inquiry Dora told 
me that there had never been a fire at their house” (Freud, 1905a, p. 64).    
 Dora’s dream in the original German is: “In einem Haus brennt es, erzāhlte 
Dora, der Vater steht vor meinem Bett und weckt mich auf: Ich kleide mich schnell an. 
Die Mama will noch ihr Schmuckkästchen retten, der Papa sagt aber: Ich will nicht, dab 
ich und meine beiden kinder wegen deines Schmuckkästchens verbrennen. Wir eilen 
herunter, und sowie ich drauben bin, wache ich auf. 1) Es hat nie bei einen wirklichen 
Brand gegeben, antwortete sie dann auf meine Erkundigung” (Freud, 1905e, p. 225 in 
GW, V, pp. 163-286).         
 Dora’s dream translates form German into English as follows: ‘There is a fire in 
a house. Father is standing before my bed and he wakes me up. I get dressed quickly. 
Mama wants to stop and save her (little) jewel box, but Papa says: « I do not want me 
and my two children to burn to death because of your jewel box». We hurry down 
(stairs), and as soon as I am outside, I wake up. 1) When I enquired she answered, 
«There was never a real fire at our house».      
 I am so ‘semantically’ rigorous because I am developing a structural semiotic 
interpretation of the dream trying to unfold its ‘primary discourse’, and in this 
perspective the significant and the signifier are two different dimensions of the word 
(see the introduction of this Chapter), and if the word is incorrect its significant and 
its signifier are also incorrect, hence, its ‘primary discourse’ is also incorrect.
 Dora’s first dream revolves around a fire and an exchange between Dora’s 
mother’s jewel box and two children. Freud granted that when Dora first had the dream 
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it could have referred to only one child: Dora herself. In any event, it establishes an 
exchange of an adult woman’s jewel box and a young child. The action in the dram 
pivots on a refusal by an adult man: Dora’s father. In the dream it is Dora’s father who, 
through a refusal, decides the outcome of the exchange between the jewel box and child. 
It is through a refusal on his part that the mother’s jewel box is burned by fire and the 
child (or children) is saved (see my long conclusion of Chapter 2).   
 The structural semiotic features of Dora’s dream suggest that it is about: (1) the 
incest taboo (a refusal to act on or grant a wish); (2) a wish underlying that taboo or 
negative prohibition; and (3) the exchange and ultimate seduction of a child that is the 
paradoxical consequence of that initial refusal or taboo. This ‘transformation’ rests on 
the various meanings of the word verbrennen (‘burn’) and retten (‘rescue’; see my 
long conclusion of Chapter 2) and on the sexual connotations of Schmuckkästchen 
(‘little jewel box’). In my view, these are the key words in the dream text that can be 
used to analyse the structural semiotic elements of the dream.   
 Verbrennen means: (1) to burn down, to burn to death, to cremate, to incinerate, 
and; (2) is used figuratively to mean to fire up or ignite, as in passion. Retten means: (1) 
to rescue or salvage with great effort; (2) to redeem; and (3) to liberate, free, or 
(reflexively) to escape. As Freud noted: “Schmuckkästchen symbolizes female 
genitalia” (Freud, 1905a, pp. 69-70). Schmuckkästchen literally means ‘little box’ in 
German. Schmuck collectively means jewels, jewellery. Used figuratively, it means 
anything that makes things beautiful. The word has sexual connotations in both German 
and Yiddish. In Yiddish Schmuck means penis or ‘prick’; the pun here is that 
Schmuckkästchen means both female genitals and penis, and therefore is a metaphor for 
sexual intercourse.          
 The various meanings of these words are a mean by which the complex 
significances, structural semiotic properties, and the transformations of the dream text 
can be analyzed. Freud interpreted Dora’s first dream as a flight from danger (Herr K) –
a resolution to leave the hotel with her father after Herr K’s proposition– and, 
simultaneously, as a retreat to her father. Freud proposed that Dora had resurrected her 
love for her father as a cover or screen for her love for Herr K. Freud sensed then that 
some kind of a substitution or exchange between Dora’s father and Herr K was 
associated with Dora’s hysteria. Moreover, Freud saw the dream not only as Dora’s 
wish to be rescued from danger (Herr K’s threat to her virginity) by her father but also 
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as a wish to sacrifice and replace her mother.      
 Freud stated: “As you say, the mystery turns upon your mother. You ask how 
she comes into the dream? She is, as you know, your former rival in your father’s 
affections…Then it means that you were ready to give your father what your mother 
withheld from him; and the thing in question was connected with jewellery” (Freud, 
1905a, pp. 69-70). In one sense, then, the dream, in exchanging mothers jewel box 
(genitalia) for Dora, expressed Dora’s wish to burn to death her mother’s genitals and to 
move into her mother’s place with father. But there is an additional meaning to the 
exchange. Recall that the action of the dream exchange rests on father’s refusal (“Ich 
will nicht”).           
 This refusal results in the burning of mothers jewel box (genitalia) and the 
freeing of Dora, a chaste child, from that fire. In the dream, Dora’s father is beside her 
bed and awakens her from sleep. Could he not, through his refusal to let Dora burn, be 
saving her from (his own) “fires of passion” and burning Dora’s mother in those flames 
instead? This refusal, in a ‘primary discourse’, is the incest taboo. Dora’s dream of 
burning mother’s genitals by fire and saving a child (herself) from that fire is a 
metaphor in highly condensed form for both the taboo (the refusal) and the wish for 
incestuous intercourse.         
 Freud sensed that the dream’s deeper meaning lay in a reversal. Focusing on the 
fire metaphor, he therefore sought and found associations to it in water, namely in 
Dora’s early bed-wetting and masturbation. Reversal of the key structural semiotic 
elements in the dream exchange (jewel box/child) results in the following 
‘transformation’: burning of a chaste child (Dora) and saving of mother’s jewel box 
(genitalia). Viewed in this way, a further consequence of father’s initial refusal and the 
dream exchange is not only the saving of Dora’s virginity but also the inverse –that of 
‘sacrificing’ her virginity/sexuality (letting her burn)– and saving mother’s jewel 
box/sexuality. A further, ultimate consequence of father’s refusal to let Dora burn is 
also the reverse of that exchange: Dora’s seduction. In summary, the key elements of 
Dora’s first dream, viewed from a structural semiotic method, point to a ‘primary 
discourse’ that unfolds the incest taboo.      
 To the extent that Dora’s first dream incorporates elements of the incest taboo –
and the exchange and seduction of women that are inevitable consequences of the 
taboo– Freud’s case presages and confirms anthropological insights that link the incest 
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taboo to patterns of reciprocity and exchange and to principles of kinship and marriage. 
Of course when we reflect about incest and taboo we must take into account the 
anthropological assumptions and above I’ve explained my main reasons to develop the 
anthropological insights in this context and below I explain it again in order to be 
absolutely clear.         
 Accordingly, Freud’s case incorporates these related principles (kinship and 
marriage) not only in Dora’s existential or family circumstances but also, more 
important, in the narrative text of her first dream. I bring anthropology to my 
interpretation, because, as above mentioned, subjective and cultural elements are 
interactive precisely in the structural semiotic properties of a dream text, hence I 
have to analyse also the cultural elements of Dora’s dream text (hence, the 
epistemological bridge): I use anthropology to avoid any psychoanalytical 
‘secondary discourse’ as I said.        
 Gallop (1982) acknowledges in passing the connection between Freud’s case of 
Dora and Lévi-Strauss (as I explain below). She does not, however, explore the 
association in detail nor does she recognize the related themes of the incest taboo, 
exchange of women, and seduction in Dora’s first dream. The case demonstrates the 
deep inter-relation (hence, the epistemological bridge) of the subjective and what 
are proposed to be universal principles inherent to the structural semiotic 
properties of a dream text (psychoanalytically and anthropologically).  
 The structural semiotic relation between sexual taboos and the exchange of 
women is developed in detail by Claude Lévi-Strauss in the “Elementary Structures of 
Kinship” (1949). In this seminal work, Lévi-Strauss proposes that the exchange of 
women in marriage is a consequence of the incest taboo and its inherent sexual 
prohibitions. Joining Marcel Mauss’s (“The Gift, Forms and Functions of Exchange in 
Archaic Societies” published in 1923-24; my bold) theory of primitive reciprocity to an 
analysis of kinship and marriage, Lévi-Strauss states that marriages are the most basic 
form of gift exchange and that women are the most precious of gifts. In this view, the 
incest taboo should be understood as a mechanism to ensure that such exchanges of 
women between families and groups occur.      
 Lévi-Strauss states: “The prohibition of incest is less a rule prohibiting marriage 
with the mother, sister or daughter, than a rule obliging the mother, sister or daughter to 
be given to others. It is the supreme rule of the gift” (Lévi-Strauss, 1949, p. 481; my 
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bold). In the same work he also states previously: “The prohibition on the sexual use of 
a daughter or sister compels them to be given in marriage to another man, and at the 
same time it establishes a right to the daughter or sister of this other man…The woman 
whom one does not take, and whom one may not take, is, for that very reason, offered 
up” (Lévi-Strauss, op. cit., p. 51; my bold). And he adds in the same stream of thought: 
“For the woman herself is nothing other than one of these gifts, the supreme gift 
among those that can only be obtained in the form of reciprocal gifts” (Lévi-Strauss, op. 
cit., p. 65; my bold).          
 The structured relation between taboos and the exchange and seduction of 
women is proposed to be universal. Taking issue with Freud’s view on the origin of the 
incest taboo, Lévi-Strauss (1949) insists that the incest taboo is more than a historical 
event; rather, it is repeated ‘within each consciousness’. Specifically, Lévi-Strauss 
argues that: “One can speak of explanations only when the past of the species constantly 
recurs in the indefinitely multiplied drama of each individual thought, because it is itself 
only the retrospective projection of a transition which has occurred, because it occurs 
continually” (Lévi-Strauss, op. cit., p. 491).     
 Viewed this way, the subjective and universal are not incompatible or 
mutually exclusive. Rather, ‘universality’ of structural semiotic principles is, by 
definition, a consequence of redundancy and repetition within individuals over 
time and across space. The incorporation of the themes of the incest taboo, 
exchange of women, and seduction in Dora’s famous first dream demonstrates 
that, indeed, these related themes are deeply embedded in individual thought –
even in the unconscious unfolding in Dora’s dream its ‘primary discourse’.  
 Indeed, in her first dream, Dora wished to replace her mother with her father. To 
the extent that Dora’s father refused to actualize this fantasy or desire –and continued in 
a married relationship with Dora’s mother and in a sexual relationship with Frau K– 
Dora was (in principle) to be exchanged through the ensuing rules of exogamy and 
marriage; she must express her sexuality with a man other than her father. As Lévi-
Strauss defends above, the structural semiotic rules of kinship and marriage that follow 
from the incest taboo necessitate that she be offered up, be given to another. Herr K had 
given Dora gifts of flowers and an expensive jewel case. As recipient of the gifts, Dora 
was obliged to reciprocate with a return gift (cf., Mauss, 1923-24; Blau, 1964): herself. 
 It is clear from the structural semiotic analysis of Dora’s first dream and its 
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themes of an exchange between the jewel case and child and seduction, what kind of 
counter-gift is expected: her ‘jewel case’, herself, her sex. This analysis of Dora’s first 
dream –seen in light of the related principles of the incest taboo, exchange of women, 
and seduction– seems to support Freud’s view (as offensive or perplexing as it is to 
many critics of the case) that Dora should have to give herself, if not to Herr K, then 
to some man. Moreover, the incorporation of these themes in the structural 
semiotic properties of Dora’s first dream suggests that Dora herself was reaching 
the same conclusion, at least on an unconscious fantasy level, which unfolds its 
‘primary discourse’.         
 In “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life” (1901c) Freud explained that the 
name ‘Dora’, which he gave to Ida Bauer, was the name taken by a nursemaid, Rosa, 
who worked for Freud’s sister, also named Rosa. In order to prevent confusion, the 
maid had had to take another name and chose ‘Dora’. Freud stated: “When next day I 
was looking for a name for someone who could not keep her own, ‘Dora’ was the only 
one to occur to me. The complete absence of alternatives was here based on a solid 
association connected with the subject-matter that I was dealing with: for it was a 
person employed in someone else’s house, a governess, who exercised a decisive 
influence on my patient’s story, and on the course of the treatment as well” (Freud, 
1901c, p. 241).         
 Rogow (1978) suggests that Freud’s choice of his sister’s nursemaid’s name may 
have been due to Freud’s anger over Dora’s abrupt termination of treatment. Dora gave 
Freud two weeks’ notice, acting, according to Freud: “like a maidservant” (Rogow, 
1978, p. 341).         
 Hannah Decker (1982) suggests another possibility for Freud’s choice of the 
name. The daughter of Freud’s former collaborator, Josef Breuer, was named Dora and 
was the same age as Ida Bauer. This coincidence led Decker to note the similarities 
between Freud’s Dora and Breuer’s famous hysterical patient, Anna O. Decker remarks 
that a central and notable feature of each case was unrecognized transference and 
counter-transference (and I add) as a ‘primary discourse’ (cf., Decker, 1982, pp. 
113-136).           
 Decker suggests further that Freud’s treatment of ‘Dora’ opened up lingering 
and unresolved feelings of hostility between Freud and Breuer, from whom he was 
estranged at the time: “Although it is a speculation, I think that unconsciously Freud 
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wanted Breuer’s continued approval, that he was aware of the correspondences between 
Dora and Anna O., and that these obvious correspondences made him feel even more 
than he had in 1895 that Breuer’s scientific desertion was «ridiculous» and 
«nonsensical»….Combining a remembrance of past naming, a wish that a dead 
friendship were still alive, and an ironic, nose-thumbing gesture, Freud named his 
patient in part after Breuer’s daughter, who was, after all, the same age and had been 
conceived (as Freud absolutely believed) in connection with marital difficulties brought 
on by Breuer’s treatment of Anna O” (Decker, 1982, pp. 133-134).    
 My interpretation of Dora’s case trying to grasp its ‘primary discourse’ 
suggests still another possibility for Freud’s decision to name Ida Bauer ‘Dora’. 
Dora means ‘gift’ in Greek as I said previously. It is well known that Freud was 
thoroughly acquainted with Greek language, myth, and history. Ernest Jones (1953-57) 
remarks, for example, that Freud’s knowledge of classical Greek language was so 
familiar and deep that the young Freud kept his diary in Greek. Freud’s choice of 
‘Dora’, meaning ‘gift’, as marker for this case further supports my interpretation that 
Dora’s case in its ‘primary discourse’ can be found in its themes of incest, refusal, 
exchange of women, and seduction as I am trying to demonstrate since the beginning of 
this Chapter, because, as I said above, it is clear from the structural semiotic analysis of 
Dora’s first dream and its themes of an exchange between the jewel case and child and 
seduction, what kind of counter-gift is expected from Dora: her ‘jewel case’, herself, her 
sex. This analysis of Dora’s first dream –seen in light of the related principles of the 
incest taboo, exchange of women, and seduction– seems to support Freud’s view that 
Dora should have to give herself, if not to Herr K, then to some man. Moreover the 
incorporation of these themes in the structural semiotic properties of Dora’s first 
dream suggests that Dora herself was reaching the same conclusion, at least on an 
unconscious fantasy level, which unfolds its ‘primary discourse’.   
 These themes are reflected –in structural semiotic condensed form– in Dora’s 
first dream and are major themes in both Dora’s and Freud’s assessments of Dora’s 
relationships with her father and the K’s. Recall that Dora saw herself as erotic barter 
between her father and Herr K and that Freud concurred with this assessment in his 
report. Herr K had given Dora a jewel case as a gift. The structural semiotic analysis of 
Dora’s first dream and its theme of the exchange between the jewel case and child, seen 
in light of the structural semiotic principles of the exchange of women and seduction, 
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suggest that Dora herself was to be the counter-gift as above mentioned.   
 The name ‘Dora’, as well as the centrality of the jewel box in Dora’s first dream 
and in her relationship with Herr K, evokes the Greek myth of Pandora’s Box (see my 
long conclusion of Chapter 2). Kanzer (1978), focusing on the fire metaphor in Dora’s 
first dream, links the case to other imagery and myth. Accordingly, Zeus created 
Woman, motivated out of anger with Prometheus for stealing fire for men. This first 
woman, recipient of gifts from all the gods, was called Pandora, meaning ‘the gift of 
all’. A well-known story about Pandora links her defiance about a box presented to her 
as a gift from the gods to human conditions of misfortune and misery (cf., Kanzer, 
1978, pp. 72-82).         
 Freud’s case of Dora, which incorporates the themes of the incest taboo, the 
exchange of women, and seduction, is important to psychoanalysis in many dimensions, 
but in my interpretation the Rosetta stone is the way in which it presents Dora as erotic 
barter and views her sexuality as a commodity or gift to be traded by her father. These 
themes of taboo, exchange, and seduction are inter-related and are reflected in 
several levels of the case: (1) Dora’s family circumstances; (2) the narrative text of 
her first dream; (3) Freud’s interpretation; and (4) Freud’s choice of the name 
‘Dora’ for Ida Bauer. The presence of these principles in the Dora case suggests that 
they are, in fact, universal, hence, as stated above, the incorporation of the themes of 
the incest taboo, exchange of women, and seduction in Dora’s famous first dream 
demonstrates that, indeed, these related themes are deeply embedded in individual 
thought –even in the unconscious unfolding in Dora’s dream its ‘primary 
discourse’.           
 Freud concluded that Dora should give herself to Herr K. Was Freud justified in 
arriving at this interpretation? In my view, his conclusion was justifiable in several 
respects. Structural semiotic analysis of Dora’s first dream points to the related 
themes of exchange of women and seduction, and suggests that on an unconscious 
fantasy level Dora was moving toward the same conclusion, which unfolds its 
‘primary discourse’. Her first dream is significant from a structural semiotic 
standpoint because in the dream text Dora drew on symbolic idioms such as the jewel 
case and on language to express themes of taboo, exchange, and seduction. 
 However, Freud is only partially correct in his interpretation. Structural semiotic 
analysis of the dream text merely indicates that Dora must be exchanged and seduced 
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because of the incest taboo, and not necessarily by Herr K. Freud’s conclusion is 
justifiable in light of the structurally related principles of sexual prohibitions and the 
exchange and seduction of women that are the consequences of the incest taboo: 
principles made theoretically explicit by Lévi-Strauss as above mentioned.  
 My interpretation is simply that Freud’s position makes sense in light of these 
formal principles, not because men are inherently superior to women or because his 
view can be supported by contemporary normative standards on sexuality, courtship, 
and marriage. In fact, critical judgments about the (im)morality of the positions taken by 
Freud, Dora’s father, and Herr K on Dora’s sexuality have obscured, I believe, the 
presence and significance of these formal principles in the case. To be certain, 
principles of taboo, exchange, and seduction may vary in their specific cultural content 
and expression. Anthropologists recognize cross-cultural variation in: (1) the families 
and groups involved in formal exchanges; (2) reciprocity; (3) choice; and (4) 
compliance.          
 Nonetheless, regardless of the varying content of customs and norms governing 
these exchanges, to the extent that the incest taboo is carried out, daughters are 
renounced as sexual objects and as marriage partners, and are therefore in principle 
given to another. Turning to Dora, these formal principles (present in several levels 
of the case) remained inchoate and obscured in Freud’s own interpretation, largely 
because of unrecognized transference and counter-transference as a ‘primary 
discourse’, and have been confounded by others with normative elements of the case (i. 
e., the ‘morality’ of Herr K as suitor and exchange partner).    
 In conclusion, I interpret that Dora was correct in her assessment that she was 
erotic barter: an item of exchange between her father and Herr K. The dynamics 
between Dora’s family and the K’s can be viewed in terms of exchanges of various 
‘gifts’, including jewellery, women and sex. Freud was, also in light of these formal 
principles, justified in his conclusion that Dora should be exchanged and seduced, 
although whether specifically by Herr K is debatable.     
 The latter question would have to be evaluated in terms of the ‘symbolic norms’ 
about marriage and kinship prevalent in Austria at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
Freud’s choice of a name ‘Dora’, meaning ‘gift’, for Ida Bauer is, I believe, related to 
these central themes. In naming Ida Bauer ‘Dora’ Freud encapsulated in a word 
(see the introduction of this Chapter) the ‘primary discourse’ of the case. Drawing, 
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unconsciously, on Greek language and the Pandora myth, Freud chose a name that 
confirmed his view that Dora should be given, exchanged, and seduced: the 
analysis of Dora’s first dream –seen in light of the related principles of the incest 
taboo, exchange of women, and seduction– seems to support Freud’s view that Dora 
should have to give herself, if not to Herr K, then to some man. Moreover the 
incorporation of these themes in the structural semiotic properties of Dora’s first 
dream suggests that Dora herself was reaching the same conclusion, at least on an 
unconscious fantasy level, which unfolds its ‘primary discourse’, hence, if the 
‘magnetism between method and its object (unconscious fantasy)’ constitutes any 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, and Dora was reaching, on an unconscious fantasy 
level, the same conclusion of Freud, then, Dora’s case in its ‘primary discourse’ is: 
Dora is the gift.  
 
                 















Practical Constructs: a ‘primary discourse’ 
Clinical cases in a prison setting: my psychoanalytic follow-up 
  “Flectere si nequeo Superus, Acheronta movebo” (Freud, 1900a, p. 1).  
         
As I said in my Introduction and throughout my Thesis, and, once again, to 
be absolutely clear: my research agenda is an overview of the development to this 
point of psychoanalysis as a discipline both as a theory of the mind –formulated by 
Freud, Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein and Kernberg: these 
formulations unfold my theoretical prolegomena which were my Introduction, 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which constitutes what Laplanche (1999) calls the 
‘secondary discourse’ (see above)– and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: 
Freud’s clinical text illustrated by Chapter 3, my own clinical cases addressed in 
this Chapter and in my Conclusion, and a clinical update on the MPRP shown in 
Chapter 5: these are my practical constructs, which Laplanche (see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) calls the ‘primary discourse’–, and offer a prediction, in my 
Conclusion (that prediction was started in my Introduction as I said), concerning 
evolving psychoanalytic development over its (near) future.    
 In epigraph I use the same aphorism that Freud transcribed from Virgil’s Aeneid 
for his “Interpretation of Dreams”: “If Heaven I cannot bend, then Hell I will arouse” 
[Freud took this motto, not directly from Virgil, but from a political text by Ferdinand 
Lassale on the Austro-Italian War in 1859 (cf., Freud, ib.; Roudinesco & Plon, 1997)], 
exactly by the fact that in investigating criminals in a prison setting we are faced with 
this problematic, which is the following: the deviant feels and thinks to himself ‘If 
Heaven I cannot bend, then hell I will arouse’; in his own words ‘if peace and love I 
cannot bend, then war and hate I will arouse’. Hell (war and hate) is a metaphor of 
crime itself.           
 This chapter attempts to investigate the clinical and epistemological validity of 
the psychoanalytic clinical method (see Chapter 1) in a prison setting. I will try to 
explore the method of psychoanalytic practice as a ‘primary discourse’ through 
the analysis of two criminals who have committed more than three murders, and who 
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have not been diagnosed (until that time…) with any psychiatric disorders. I will 
elaborate a detailed analysis (I went every week to the prison setting during the 
years of 2006 and 2007) of their childhoods, as well as their clinical processes 
during their stay in prison trying to unfold its ‘primary discourse’.  
 Additionally, I will attempt to link, unfolding several psychoanalytic 
theoretical ‘secondary discourses’, the inmates crimes to their life history and how in 
the clinical setting is unfold its ‘primary discourse’. Indeed, the purposes of this 
chapter are to determine how psychoanalytic practice as a ‘primary discourse’ (in 
the clinical setting; as mentioned many times; see above) unfolds several 
‘secondary discourses’ and effects a positive improvement on the inmate’s 
personalities, and if it helps them to develop a sense of self awareness with regard 
to their inner realities unfolding its ‘primary discourse’, because, once again, the 
‘magnetism between method and its object (unconscious fantasy)’ constitutes any 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’.        
 I have data, taken from interviews with the inmates and their corresponding 
clinicians. I chose these two inmates for the purpose of this study specifically because 
they have been submitted to several therapies, which include psychopharmacological 
treatment under psychiatric orientation, cognitive behavioural therapy, and finally, 
psychoanalysis, to which they responded positively.     
 In 1916, Freud published a writing entitled “Some character-types met in 
psycho-analytic work” (cf., Freud, 1916a, pp. 309-336), in which (among other 
subjects) he elaborates a fecund ‘secondary discourse’ regarding the psychogenesis of 
crime: “As paradoxical as it may seem, I must say that the feeling of culpability is prior 
to the crime itself; the guilt is not as a result of the crime, but on the contrary, the crime 
is the result of the guilt. Therefore, we have reasons to describe these people as 
criminals, that act criminally as the result of a sense of guilt” (Freud, op. cit., p. 317; my 
bold).            
 The clinical narratives heard at the Prison Establishment of L… (P.E.L.) 
are in strict consonance with Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’ (and other ‘secondary 
discourses’; see below). One of the detained, Mr. J., committed six homicides, and 
proffered some illustrative affirmations: “I deserve everything done to me and much 
more. Therefore, don’t think that I am sorry for the treatment that I have received 
because, fortunately, I know what I’ve done and as such, know what I deserve. I could 
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live 200 years and that would never make up for the suffering I’ve caused many people. 
Even in death, I would not be able to make up for it”.     
 The analysis of the psychoanalytic clinical method is heuristic in relation to 
this prisoner. According to his clinician’s indication, who has accompanied him 
throughout his long years of incarceration, the prisoner reported resistance to cognitive-
behavioural therapies, as well as to psychopharmacological treatments. The therapist 
told me that the prisoner always assumed a great culpability in relation to the acts he 
committed, but that culpability appeared to have more remote causes, without any 
causal linkage to the crimes committed in adulthood.    
 Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’ is unfolded with this clinical narrative: 
“where does that obscure sentiment of guilt come from, that is prior to the act, and is it 
possible that this kind of motive carries an important role in human crimes?” (Freud, 
ib.).           
 Momentarily putting the Freudian interrogation aside, and returning to the 
‘phenomenological discourse’ (see above Chapter 3, but also Chapter 2) of the inmate: 
“when I was five years old, my father disappeared. I didn’t think it was strange because 
it was already a habit. But as the weeks passed, I didn’t understand what was 
happening. I questioned my mother and she responded that Dad had gone to a market, 
very far away, but that he would be returning any day. She told me not to say anything 
to anyone. At night, I slept with her, and every night I would hear her crying. I asked 
her if she was sick, if it was because I was doing bad things, or if the things I was doing 
were being badly done, but the answer was always the same: ‘don’t tell anyone because 
mom will cry’”.          
 The clinician treating the prisoner stated that this narrative was only verbalised 
at the end of his second year of psychoanalytic treatment (never had such been said nor 
touched upon through the use of other therapeutic techniques), and this was spoken in a 
moment of very intense emotion (compulsive crying and overwhelming guilt). In 
accordance with the clinician, I also denoted (in speaking with the inmate) a verisimilar 
and pregnant oedipal conflict (see above the long conclusion of Chapter 2, but also 
Chapter 3), specifically when the detained speaks of ‘sleeping with mom’, and that 
sleep is dedicated to the most absolute and culpable ‘silence’ (see above, in Chapter 2, 
Alford’s and Freud’s dynamic concerning the Todestrieb), and the fear of having done 
‘things wrong’. This oedipal conflict is strongly reinforced when the prisoner illustrates 
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an image of his father’s return, like someone coming from ‘Inferno’, so much that the 
prisoner barely recognized him: “one day I was at the door and I saw a man 
approaching, his clothes dirty and ripped, coming in my direction. I thought of hiding 
(guilt). But he called to me by my name. It was then that I knew well and recognized 
that it was my father. Yes, it was him, but it looked as if he had come from hell”. 
 In consonance, Freud specified the psychic dynamic subjacent to what he 
himself coined as the Oedipus complex: “The usual result of analytical work 
demonstrates that obscure sense of guilt proven of the Oedipus complex, being a 
reaction of two great criminal intentions, killing the father and have relations with the 
mother. In comparison with these two crimes, the delicts committed, for which the guilt 
feeling becomes fixated, constitute, without doubt, relief for the tormented Subject” 
(Freud, op. cit., p. 318; my bold).        
 The torment that Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’ characterizes is the ‘semantic 
shell’ (mutatis mutandis, see Chapter 3) present in the prisoner’s words: “having passed 
only about 15 days, my dad left again, and we did not know where he had been, or to 
where he was going again. But the torment with my mother began again. She only 
cried, cried and ate nothing. This time not too much time passed before he returned, but 
he did not look any better. He looked like a 70 year old man; skinny, not even like a 
bum. I, holding onto the skirt of my mother, cried the same way”.   
 This ‘holding onto the skirt of mom’ imbricates with the sentiment of an 
intrusive father, who is visualized as ‘a 70 year old man; skinny, not even like a bum’, 
and is acquiescent with Oedipus’s narrative in “Oedipus the King”, by Sophocles, 
which Freud described as being the mythological genesis of his ‘Oedipus Complex’ 
(see above, especially the long conclusion of Chapter 2, but also Chapter 3) formulation 
(cf., Freud, 1897c, pp. 273-274). Indeed, the ‘Oedipus Complex’ formulation emerged 
as a result of Freud’s association to the myth present in Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”; 
Freud explained this linkage in a letter to Fliess, dated October 15, 1897 (cf., Freud, 
ib.), and afterwards integrated it in “The Interpretation of Dreams” (cf., Freud, 1900a, 
pp. 1-338; 1900b, pp. 339-621): Oedipus questions Jocasta: “And Laius, how did he 
look? And, how old?” Jocasta responds: “He is tall, and his hair is beginning to grey”; 
Oedipus responds illustratively: “Poor old me, I am doomed” (cf., Powell, 2004, p. 
460).            
 The guilt that Oedipus assumes when he describes Laius as a finished old man 
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constitutes the classic psychological fideism between a son and his father, where the son 
feels that the father is no longer strong or virile, and he must be ‘killed’ so that the 
mother can finally be his. This desired parricide is prohibited yet pursued ab initio as 
Freud asserts: “parricide and incest with the mother constitute the two greatest crimes of 
humanity, the only ones that were pursued and abominated in primitive societies” 
(Freud, 1913k, p. 73).         
 This oedipal problematic is processed and developed under the spectrum of 
symbolic crime, not being arbitrary to affirm that in our most severe oedipal conflicts 
(not being resolved inherently through a positive identification with the father), the 
crime passes from being symbolic to real, dislocating itself from a crime against the 
father to crime aimed at society, which is, according to Lacan’s ‘secondary discourse’ 
(see above my Lacan’s ‘review’ in Chapter 2), represented in the child’s mind precisely 
as the “Name of the Father”, by the “Law of the Father”: “It is in the name of the father 
that we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of 
history, has identified his person with the figure of the law. This conception enables us 
to distinguish clearly, in the analysis of a case, the unconscious effects of this function 
from the narcissistic relations, or even from the real relations that the Subject sustains 
with the image and the action of the person who embodies it” (Lacan, 1966, p. 74).
 Lacan created these concepts in his Seminars “Freud’s Papers on Technique, 
The Seminar, Book I” in 1953 and “The Psychoses, The Seminar, Book III” in 1956 
(the former about ‘the Rat Man’ Ernst Lanzer; the latter about Daniel Paul Schreber), 
where the author explains the figure of the father as having the role of primary signifier. 
The primary signifier constitutes the first and most important signifier of culture 
‘assimilated’ by the infant; this operates as the symbolical function of the law (cf., 
Lacan, 1953-54; 1955-56; see above my Lacan’s ‘review’ in Chapter 2).   
 Accordingly, the deviant appears to inscribe himself in an internal dynamic 
where the law of the father was never internalised and as such, all other laws were 
interpreted as external to the Self. The deviant does not recognize authority by the fact 
that he did not obey (symbolically) the primary law (law of the father), and all other 
laws are merely mitigated reproductions of the law-of-the-father. Therefore, the deviant 
does not find any psychological reasons for obeying external laws, given the 
psychological fact that he did not obey his own internal law. It is as though there exists 
an ‘oedipal wound’ within the deviant that never healed, a guilt that only crime pacifies 
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but which is indelibly reinforced by the primary crime (the very first crime the deviant 
felt to have suffered): “I was waiting for my mother. The only thing I saw were some 
headlights of a car passing at a high speed, a deafening sound, and then a scream. The 
driver never stopped. My mother was 150 meters in front of me, lying in the gutter, 
mangled like a ball of human meat. She was dead. I was seven years old at the time. In 
an attempt to teach me, my father had me write whole notebooks every day, but because 
he did not understand even one word, he would scribble in the notebooks, writing letters 
and names without meaning”.        
 This narrative given by Mr. J. reveals a psychic space that becomes crystallized 
in the mind of the detained, that is, a mother killed by a criminal who escapes, and a 
father who is someone in which he does not confide because he is a father who 
understands nothing, he scribbles letters and names that bear no significance at all. 
These non-significant ‘letters’ and ‘names’ constitute something that is not significant: 
the very emotional alphabet of the detained, which is nothing more than, according to 
his own words, letters and names of a non significant father.    
 The detained only speaks of his mother’s death in the fourth year of analysis, 
after a massive projection toward the clinician, of whom Mr. J. complains as 
understanding nothing at all (paternal projection). The incriminating external blame 
becomes life’s meaning for Mr. J. The dialectic process of blame ‘is the highroad in 
differentiating bad internal objects (but opaque) susceptible to allowing the expulsion 
and the transformation of the subsequent’ (cf., Miller, 1990). However, there does not 
exist a dialectic for Mr. J., an object identification/differentiation does not exist, as 
Miller defends. Mr. J. sits and thinks of incriminating and punishing the man who killed 
his mother, the man who also killed him.       
 The opaqueness of Mr. J. bad internal objects only revealed their existence in 
analysis: this psychic reality was strongly repressed by the inmate. So strongly that it 
defined an internal implosion with extremely primitive acting outs: six homicides of 
men in positions of power: police, prison guards, lawyers; representatives of law that 
‘did not understand’ (his father), and a crime that culminated in the death of his mother: 
the driver never having been punished; the automobile, for Mr. J., characterized a 
bubble, an organized structure that protects its interveners. The metaphor of a bubble as 
the law representing an organized structure was stated by the prisoner as the result of a 
dream to the responsible clinic (and confirmed by me).     
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 Mr. J. transmutes into his mother’s avenger. Mr. J. is a Faust who allies himself 
(perversely) with Mephistopheles (cf., Goethe, 1808), a kind of pact (see above my 
Grotstein’s ‘review’ in Chapter 2) with the ‘structure of evil’: “One could point to 
many moments in Western literary history when writers explored the ‘structure of 
evil’: from the obstructive work of the Devil in the New Testament to his dank and cold 
presence in the atmosphere of place in Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’, from Defoe’s ‘The 
Political History of the Devil’ to Goethe’s ‘Faust’, from the evil structures of seduction 
in the sentimental novels of Richardson to Hawthorne’s ‘The Scarlet Letter’, from the 
complex novels of Dostoevsky to Bram Stoker’s portrait of «spiritual pathology» in 
‘Dracula’, and from Kafka’s novels to Golding’s ‘Lord of the Flies’. In the 
contemporary mind the serial killer is the statement of evil, and by studying what 
we imagine he does, we may come to understand what has always been part of our 
culture, our society, and the varying fates of some of our selves” (Bollas, 1996a, pp. 
184-185; my bold).          
 I quoted Bollas’s ‘secondary discourse’ extensively to illustrate that the 
‘structure of evil’ has been present since the beginning of our civilization and is a 
cultural heritage just as the superego is the heritage of the Oedipus complex (see 
below). Therefore, the ‘structure of evil’ represents the perverse laws present in our 
culture, and the superego is the judge, the categorical imperative of the ego, as Freud 
affirmed in 1924: ‘Kant’s categorical imperative is the direct heir of the Oedipus 
complex’ (cf., Freud, 1924b, pp. 159-170). Later, Freud explicitly states that the 
superego is the heir of the Oedipus complex, with this establishing a direct conceptual 
linkage between Kant’s categorical imperative and the superego itself. As it is widely 
recognized, Kant’s categorical imperative is an ethical formulation, a ‘moral law’ [Kant 
states that: ‘there is only one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on a maxim 
by which you can will that it, at the same time, should become a general law’ (cf., Kant, 
1785; 1788, p. 42)] aimed at regulating culture and society, analogous to the 
relationship between the superego and the ego; the superego regulates the ego.  
 If Freud affirms that: ‘the superego is the heir of the oedipal complex’ (cf., 
Freud, 1923c, pp. 12-59) then the culpability derived from the mitigated Superego 
(because the oedipal complex is not yet resolved) is absolutely more severe than any 
other transfiguring into a Dostoevskyan punishment, where the crime is shouted out by 
Raskolikoff (the principal character of Dostoevsky’s “Crime and Punishment”) in a loud 
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voice, which is what Dostoevsky [the most Freudian literary, according to Freud; see 
above, in Chapter 2, the end of my reflection concerning Alford and inherently Freud  
(cf., Freud, 1928b, pp. 177-194)] shows us in his “Crime and Punishment” showing, 
specifically, the guilt and the torment (superego) that finally drives Raskolikoff to 
confess to his horrendous crime by publicly shouting aloud a confession (cf., 
Dostoevsky, 1866).          
 We already saw the cultural heritage of this ‘evil’, but, scientifically, the evil as 
an act, the perversion of crime as a conscious act, ‘confessed act’, was primarily 
schematised by Cesare Lombroso (1876) in his book “L’Homme Criminel”. The author, 
utilizing the phrenological methods of Franz Josef Gall, analysed an impressionable 
quantity of craniums and studied the morphology of twenty seven thousand ‘abnormal’ 
people (prostitutes, assassins, epileptics, sexual perverts, etc). Lombroso judiciously 
describes the following pathology: criminals appear to be the ‘primary primates, the 
savage horde’ (cf., Lombroso, 1876) to which theme Freud returns to in “Totem and 
Taboo” (1913). This work was based on anthropological investigations (done mainly by 
Frazer: see above the long conclusion of Chapter 2), defending the universality of the 
Oedipal Complex and the ethnological validity of psychoanalytic formulations (cf., 
Freud, 1913k, pp. 1-161).         
 Freud was not very interested in criminology as it is presented here. The only 
kind of crime that fascinated him was parricide that he connected to incest, and the 
Oedipal Complex (as already referred to), and that he presented as a paradigm of all 
criminal acts of men. He established a very simple distinction between hysterics and 
criminals: “hysterics hide a secret that they do know; criminals conceal that same secret 
with full consciousness” (Freud, 1906b, p. 108). Freud writes this statement in a writing 
entitled “Psycho-analysis and the establishment of the facts in legal proceedings” 
(1906), precisely one year after the “Three essays on the theory of sexuality” (1905), 
which, in my perspective, conceptualizes the psychic dynamic underlying the ‘structure 
of evil’ (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243; 1906b, pp. 103-114).    
 I will now unfold, with more detail, Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’ to explain 
and understand the ‘structure of evil’ that the inmates present to us. This analysis will 
be made through the dynamic of infantile sexuality as a broad spectrum. The category 
within that spectrum that I will focus on is autoeroticism and as Freud states in the 
famous Chapter II of “The Three essays on the theory of sexuality”: “children can 
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become polymorphously perverse” (Freud, 1905b, p. 154).    
 The “Three essays on the theory of sexuality” was one of Freud’s most endeared 
works exactly because it establishes the major tenets of infantile sexuality and its 
manifestations in adulthood. In this work, and in “The Interpretation of Dreams”, we 
find the two major paradigms upon which Freud constructed all his ‘secondary 
discourse’.           
 In “The Interpretation of Dreams”, we find content on mental functioning as well 
as the interpretation paradigm (see Chapter 1); in the “Three essays on the theory of 
sexuality”, we find the basis for the construction of the theory on human sexuality, 
which will also be transformed into a theory of psychic representation, and into a more 
global theory involving the issue of object encounter. Freud, finally, affirms that: ‘an 
encountered object is an object re-encountered’ (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243), which 
is in full agreement with the descriptions narrated by this inmate (and also Mr. P.; see 
below): “I committed crimes because it was stronger than me; there is something that 
drives me”. As if there is an object (perverse) that asks to be re-encountered.  
 Freud is assertive: “The object choice of the pubertal period is obliged to 
dispense with the objects of childhood and to start afresh as a ‘sensual current’. Should 
these two currents fail to converge, the result is often that one of the ideals of sexual 
life, the focusing of all desires upon a single object, will be unattainable” (Freud, op. 
cit., p. 160). Indeed, it is not only a theory of human sexuality, but also a theory of 
the object and of the object relation, from Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’ but also 
from Object Relations School wider ‘secondary discourse’ (see above Chapter 2), 
and also from the ‘discourse’ of crime as an object.      
 Accordingly, in the “Three essays on the theory of sexuality” Freud begins with 
perversion, descending to its infantile origins, but, very curiously, the text is interrupted 
with the problem of culture, latency. Latency always appears in its connection with 
cultural issues, and not only in the obvious sense of defence against incest. This last 
meaning seems most obvious, since Freud mainly speaks of reaction-formation and 
sublimation (with regard to the theory of regression and of repression), but it also refers 
to defences against more primitive drives such as: defences against parricide and against 
murder in general and even against issues that are far more primitive, relating to man’s 
necrophilia drives and the cannibalistic mind; defences against cannibalism itself (cf., 
Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243; 1913k, pp. 1-161).     
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 Another prisoner of P.E.L., Mr. P., who committed three homicides, is also 
allocated in this precise anthropophagic thematic that Freud refers to: “I always felt, 
whenever I fought, like eating the other person. When I killed the first time, I felt 
exactly that, like I ate him”.         
 Freud shows that which is common to the human culture, overcoming the 
instinct barrier and amplifying one’s relationship to the world, which can only have one 
counterpart, which is the symbolic organization of the human subject and the organized 
mind. We are no longer animals, and that had impious consequences for the species. The 
human species had to acknowledge those aspects that remained, the moment we ceased 
being animals. To use an expression that is dear to Lacanians, ‘man is a failed animal’ 
and for that reason, a historical being (cf., Samuels, 1993).    
 In a certain way, Mr. P. historical being did not turn him into a failed animal but 
turned him into an animal without faults, as he himself recognizes: “I wanted to commit 
the perfect crime, without faults, because I never liked anyone. The others irritated me. 
Even in here (prison), if someone messes with me, they know that I will eat them alive”. 
The clinician who has been with the prisoner for the past three years reported that he has 
never shown remorse, but very much to the contrary, he has shown pride for the acts he 
committed. The psychoanalytic clinical method has shown to be efficient from the 
viewpoint of unfolding phantasms and hidden phantasms such as, for example, a 
prisoner with latent homosexuality (certain dreams show an intense eroticism toward his 
father), but presents himself to others as a ‘macho-Latino’, in his own words.  
 The prisoner has great difficulty in speaking about his father, evidencing a 
strong defence against primitive cannibalism as described by Freud, but only in relation 
to his father. It appears as though he would most like to ‘eat’ his father but does not do 
so. What he does do is eat others, as he himself has stated (its noteworthy that ‘eating 
someone’ and having sexual relations semantically signify the same in Portuguese 
vernacular and even in English).        
 The historical being of Mr. P. is only able to account for his movements in a 
world of ‘reality’, meaning that he is not capable of organizing those primitive aspects 
related to the defences that animals use: the instinct barrier; aspects pertaining to the 
relationship between the human subject and his own development. This idea is very 
important: the welding of the human species has the development of a barrier of another 
order as its counterpart; it is no longer the organized instinct barrier in other species. It 
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is a barrier of ethical order and, curiously, of ontic order, because this is what human 
nature is, as Mr. P. affirms: “I always liked being an animal and shitting on shitty ethics. 
I am free”.           
 Therefore, contrary to what it may seem at a glimpse, it is not the cultural nature 
of man, from the common sense point of view, that appears as part of the central theme 
of Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’. I do not believe that it is by chance that this 
thematic appears conjoined in a first instance, the description of perversions, and, in a 
second instance, the explanation of infantile sexual origins, and, finally, the issue of 
puberty, which Freud presents as a sketch of the final solution of all the problematic 
drafted throughout the text (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-243).    
 In fact, Freud goes on elaborating elements beginning with an approach to 
homosexuality, moving on to problems of perversions in general, consequently 
moulding the first significant shift in the passage of perversion to neuroses. This 
explanation, which appears in that famous phrase: “neuroses are, so to say, the negative 
of perversions” (Freud, op. cit., p. 165) is recaptured throughout the book. But it is not a 
negative per se, but a positive-negative, because it presents us with a quasi-paradoxical 
theory in which neurosis is, finally, a concealed perversion: a perversion that suffered 
repression. Above this first instance, this passage from perversion to neurosis, there is a 
second instance, which is the passage from neurosis to human sexual life in general. 
The connection of neurosis established by Freud, as the negative of perversion, and of 
perversion as something not repressed, almost as a pure instinct (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 
135-243), clearly articulates with something that Mr. P’s clinician as well as Mr. P. 
himself told me: “I’ve always lived, since I was young, dependent upon my instincts. 
I’ve always done what I’ve felt like doing. The first time I violated a woman, I was 14 
years old”. Keeping in mind that Freud’s linkage was not arbitrary: first, the description 
of perversions; second, the explanation of infantile sexual origins; and thirdly, puberty 
(cf., Freud, ib.).         
 Puberty without repressions, living through one’s instincts, appears to construct 
what Lombroso coined as a ‘born criminal’ (cf., Lombroso, 1876): this ‘born criminal’ 
represents the inextricable relationship between psychological perversion, sexual 
behaviour and social violence.        
 The current of thought that Freud establishes throughout his ‘secondary 
discourse’, regarding aspects that began as perversion, moving onto more symptomatic 
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issues (in the sense of anxiety and psychic conflict), and arriving, finally, to the reality 
of human sexuality in general, is extremely important. It is in this way that Freud 
sustains an essential continuity in human sexuality that appears as the backdrop in the 
constitution of all our affective, sexual, and criminal life (cf., Freud, 1905b, pp. 135-
243; 1906b, pp. 103-114). Freud erased all moral perspective on human sexuality by 
establishing that essential continuum which is infantile sexuality. For Freud, the 
organizer of human sexuality is autoeroticism. All of human sexuality is definitively 
interrelated with autoeroticism, existing as such, a kind of essential perversion as the 
foundation of all sexuality. It is pertinent to add that Mr. J. and Mr. P. reported 
compulsive masturbation, which characterizes a pre-pubertal autoeroticism.  
 Mr. J’s and Mr. P’s sexual lives follow the same pattern: relations that lack 
any affect and are constituted by physical and psychological violence: Both affirm 
that: “broads only give problems”. Mr. P. says: “I dated a woman who was 42 
years old and she was crazy because she only liked children, not even young men, 
she liked children. I thought that was disgusting. Even though I thought this was 
disgusting, I stayed with her, but I would beat her every day, until one day she 
took off, she ran away”. Mr. P’s clinician told me that Mr. P. showed an extreme 
hatred whenever he spoke of this woman, but was unable to explain his reasons for 
staying with her. When I spoke with him, I was able to confirm this as well as the 
existence of a perverse linkage between Mr. P. and the woman, but I also assessed 
that the perverse linkage was, in fact, between Mr. P. and himself through the 
above referred dynamic: autoeroticism, infantile sexuality, and puberty. Mr. P’s 
‘woman’ liked pre-pubertal children, and as a result, Mr. P. identified himself with 
these pre-pubertal children who were still autoerotic, as he himself is, in 
adulthood. In a certain way, he punished this woman for making him feel 
conscious culpability with regard to his own inner perversion, which unfolds its 
‘primary discourse’: the ‘magnetism between method and its object (unconscious 
fantasy)’ constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’.   
 Accordingly, Freud himself divided the classical explanations concerning 
sexuality, perversion and even crime: It’s the old dilemma, ‘nature versus nurture’ that 
Francis Galton formulated (cf., Mousseau, 1984). Freud reconfigured this dilemma into 
three dimensions: the environmental, the constitutional, and the psychic (cf., Freud, 
1905b, pp. 135-243.). Freud inscribes sexuality in these three categories, sustaining the 
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primacy of the psychic but not conveying the idea of psychic determinism, taking 
constitutional and environmental aspects into consideration. In relation to the 
environment, Freud speaks of conditioning but not in the classical sense of the term, but 
as experiential factors that influence the development of aspects that are inherent and 
innate to the proper structure of the species functioning. These factors, which Freud 
calls conditioning, are those that are specific to Psychoanalysis (cf., Freud, ib.).  
 The relationship between the real the constitutional and the psychic is 
constituted under the primacy of the psychic, being autoeroticism created exactly here; 
autoeroticism is only found through the psychic. The issue of autoeroticism gains its 
singularity, regarding inversion and then perversion (upon which Freud develops his 
idea of fixation, and then it is broadened), in the explanation of perversion, in infantile 
sexual choices, in the theories of infantile sexuality, and, as an outcome, in puberty, 
through the object encounter, which is the re-encounter of the object [as previously 
stated (cf., Freud, ib.)].        
 Autoeroticism is also a mediating factor in relation to the object (mother). The 
wider this angle that goes on being established between the satisfaction of a need and 
autonomous satisfaction, the better prepared autoeroticism will be to be a mediating 
factor in relation to the object. In exchange, the narrower the opening of this angle, to 
some kind of realization of its wholeness, approximation to the object itself becomes 
more difficult. The smaller this angle is (as the more the erotogenic zone remains 
connected to the satisfaction of a need), the greater the fixation: “Our study of thumb-
sucking or sensual thinking has already given us the three essential characteristics of an 
infantile sexual manifestation. At its origin it attaches itself to one of the vital somatic 
functions; it has yet no sexual object, and is thus autoerotic; and its sexual aim is 
dominated by an erotogenic zone” (Freud, op. cit., p. 150).    
 Freud presents many examples of this: when he emphasizes the constitutional 
factors in a determined problematic, he explains them through the hyper-presence of a 
stimulus, when the source is affirmed for itself and not as support or reference. In this 
case, autoeroticism does not constitute a mediating factor in relation to the object, but 
remains attached to the actual drive source, and it is in the opening of this 
aforementioned angle, that this factor of mediation will be constituted in relation with 
the other (cf., Freud, ib.).         
 It is this triple condition, the separation of the drive, the independence in the 
272 
 
presence of the object, and autoeroticism, which constitutes the scenario in which all 
human sexuality will be built. If not, the subject would fall into original passivity, into 
the death drive (see above, in Chapter 2, Alford’s and Freud’s dynamic concerning the 
Todestrieb), into autism. Naturally, the idea of ‘Thanatos’ is present: it is the fight 
against it, against this original passivity, which also allows for the structure of 
autoeroticism.          
 From the inmate’s narratives, I was able to substantiate the fixation present in 
the autoerotic stage with regard to both prisoners. For example, Mr. J. spoke of 
sleeping with his mother, and then having seen her murdered before his very eyes. 
This, in turn, fixated him at that mental age when autoeroticism is present as a 
mental organizer in the mind of the child. In Mr. J’s case, autoeroticism was not a 
mediating factor in relation to the object encounter (mother), which allows the re-
encounter of that object in puberty (as I said above). Seeing as how Mr. J. lost his 
object he became fixated on ‘it’, which unfolds its ‘primary discourse’: the 
‘magnetism between method and its object (unconscious fantasy)’ constitutes any 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’.        
 In summary, the prisoners demonstrate some emotional growth, denoting some 
self-awareness, but none of them, even those who have been in analysis for longer than 
four years, evidence any real internal reparation or acceptance of their internal paternal 
and maternal representations as something that is simultaneously positive or negative, 
which allows for an elaboration, or of a synthesis (see above, in Chapter 2, Bion’s 
‘selected fact’) of the internal ‘imagos’; on the contrary, the cleavage is excessive, 
making obvious as well as objective the oedipal fixation of the prisoners, taking on an 
apparently chronic features. The prisoners, after a long time (always after more than two 
years) said that they really felt more understood by the clinicians who spoke little and 
asked few questions (see above, in Chapter 2, Segal’s description about the ‘Kleinian 
Technique’), because, with other previous techniques, as Mr. J. illustrates: “When they 
ask me questions I feel like I am being interrogated by the police”.   
 The clinicians at P.E.L. welcome the psychoanalytic clinical method as it is 
implemented as a form of treatment and confirmed by me to be frequently practiced. 
Like so, the inmates at P.E.L. appear to prefer this therapeutic technique to the previous 
techniques attempted through the course of their incarceration. They have confirmed to 
feel a much more mitigated sense of liberty in speaking of their internal prisons 
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(without feeling as though they are being interrogated).     
 The two inmates interviewed for the purpose of this dissertation and who have 
been submitted to various psychodynamic and psychopharmacological treatments verify 
through their discourse, as well as confirmed by their corresponding clinicians and me, 
that they have promoted some self awareness of their inner realities. As Bion says, the 
purpose of any psychoanalytic treatment is to promote maturity, personal and emotional 
growth and development (cf., Bion, 1965), which is exactly what this research 
investigated and substantiated.        
 To conclude, the accounts of both inmate’s life history articulated with the 
crimes they committed, and, inherently, its ‘primary discourse’ unfolded in the 
clinical setting are in perfect harmony with several ‘secondary discourses’ [(Freud; 
Lacan; Bollas (an object relations theorist); Object Relations School wider ‘secondary 
discourse’; among others] presented throughout this Chapter (and not only in this 
Chapter…), which, from my perspective, illustrates the clinical and epistemological 





















Practical Constructs: a ‘primary discourse’ 
  A Clinical Object Relations approach to the ‘Menninger Psychotherapy 
                                      Research Project’ (MPRP) 
 
As I said in my Introduction and throughout my Thesis, and, once again, to 
be absolutely clear: my research agenda is an overview of the development to this 
point of psychoanalysis as a discipline both as a theory of the mind –formulated by 
Freud, Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein and Kernberg: these 
formulations unfold my theoretical prolegomena which were my Introduction, 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which constitutes what Laplanche (1999) calls the 
‘secondary discourse’ (see above)– and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: 
Freud’s clinical text illustrated by Chapter 3, my own clinical cases addressed in 
Chapter 4 and in my Conclusion, and a clinical update on the MPRP shown in this 
Chapter: these are my practical constructs, which Laplanche (see above 
Laplanche, op. cit.) calls the ‘primary discourse’–, and offer a prediction, in my 
Conclusion (that prediction was started in my Introduction as I said), concerning 
evolving psychoanalytic development over its (near) future.    
 Indeed, throughout my Thesis, my focus was (and will be until the next and final 
Chapter) on the coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that is 
the coherence of my doctoral Thesis as a whole. I’ve started with Freud’s strenuous 
endeavours to maintain the psychoanalysis that he had single-handedly created as a 
unitary and unified theory, tracing then the breakdown of this effort, even in Freud’s 
lifetime into the burgeoning theoretical diversity or ‘pluralism’ that characterizes 
worldwide psychoanalysis today, and then I’ve unfolded the beginning appearance of 
evidences –not yet widely remarked– of growing convergences from within very 
disparate and even seemingly very opposed theoretical perspectives, at least at the 
level of technical interventions and experience-near clinical theory, with 
implications, however, even for the level of experience-distant general 
(metapsychological) theory: this is how the theoretical prolegomena relate to the 
practical/clinical constructs. All this was done under the hermeneutic meta-
interpretation (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) because I’ve unfolded a 
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systematization of theories of mind interpreting them according to my clinical 
experience (the ‘analyst’s mind’; Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’). Such a 
development, if sustained, as I anticipate (and this doctoral Thesis also tries to 
promote), would strengthen the credibility of psychoanalysis as a science of the mind, 
amenable to growth –this growth constitutes the epistemological leap from the 
hermeneutic categorisation to the positivist research– through empirical research: 
the MPRP is a heuristic example of how psychoanalytic clinical research should be 
done; a positivist approach because ‘falsifiable’ research has to be positivist (being 
the MPRP a psychoanalytic clinical research, it is, by inherence, also a 
practical/clinical construct and, paradoxically, unfolds what Laplanche calls the 
‘primary discourse’) in accordance with the canons of scientific method.  
 In this line of argument I will ‘update’ the fecund epidemiological survey 
known as ‘Menninger Psychotherapy Research Project’ (MPRP), to infer the 
clinical validity of psychoanalytic practice in the clinical setting per se (unfolding 
its ‘primary discourse’, once again: ‘primary discourse’ is psychoanalytical clinical 
practice per se, but, as I will demonstrate below: the interaction of ‘types of 
patients’ and ‘types of treatments’ and how this interaction of these two 
dimensions is done, unfolds also, in my terminology, how ‘secondary discourse’ 
and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other), on one hand, and compare its 
results with those of psychotherapy (psychoanalytic psychotherapy; from now on I will 
address it as psychotherapy to avoid semantic redundancies), on the other hand. This 
epistemological antinomy will be illustrated with specific psychopathology inherent to 
the clinical cases.         
 Analysis of the data from the ‘Menninger Psychotherapy Research Project’ 
(from now on I will address it as MPRP) have consistently indicated little difference in 
the therapeutic outcome between patients seen in psychoanalysis and those seen in 
psychotherapy. Reanalysis of the data from the MPRP, utilizing a distinction between 
two broad configurations of psychopathology (cf., Blatt, 1974, pp. 107-157; 1990a, pp. 
299-335; Blatt & Schichman, 1983, pp. 187-254), however, indicates that patients 
whose pathology focuses primarily on disruptions of interpersonal relatedness and who 
use primarily avoidant defences (anaclitic patients), and patients whose pathology 
focuses primarily on issues of self-definition, autonomy, and self-worth and who use 
primarily counteractive defences (introjective patients) differ in their responsiveness 
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to psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.        
 Based on recently developed procedures for systematically evaluating the quality 
of object representation on the Rorschach, reanalysis of the Menninger data reveals that 
anaclitic patients have significantly greater positive change in psychotherapy, while 
introjective patients have significantly greater positive change in psychoanalysis. 
These statistically significant patient-by-treatment interactions (unfolding its 
‘primary discourse’, once again: ‘primary discourse’ is psychoanalytical clinical 
practice per se, but, as I said and I will demonstrate below: the interaction of ‘types 
of patients’ and ‘types of treatments’ and how this interaction of these two 
dimensions is done, unfolds also, in my terminology, how ‘secondary discourse’ 
and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other) are discussed in terms of their 
clinical implications as well as the importance of differentiating among types of 
patients in studies of therapeutic outcome and of therapeutic process, unfolding 
the full dynamic of the above mentioned epistemological antinomy.   
 After this introduction, I will now clarify what was and what is the MPRP. 
Among the scientific (psychoanalytic) community it is a cogent fact that the MPRP has 
made major contributions to the study of the outcome and dimensions of the therapeutic 
process in psychoanalysis and in psychotherapy. It has been written up extensively; five 
books (cf., Kernberg et al., 1972a, 1972b, pp. 87-275; Voth & Orth, 1973; Horwitz, 
1974; Appelbaum, 1977; Wallerstein, 1986) and over 60 articles have provided detailed 
analyses of the clinical predictions, the results of the psychological test findings, and 
quantitative and qualitative presentations of the empirical and clinical data (cf., 
Bachrach, 1988, pp. 164-166).       
 Initiated almost sixty years ago (1954), the project remains one of the more 
carefully designed, well controlled, and methodologically and clinically 
sophisticated comparative studies of two forms of psychological intervention: 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Though this extensive and comprehensive study 
has made many important contributions to psychoanalytic and psychotherapy research, 
one of the disappointments with the results has been the failure of the study, despite 
extensive analyses of the data, to discern differences between the effects of the two 
different types of therapeutic intervention.      
 Wallerstein in a comprehensive statement of the MPRP summarizes the results 
by noting that overall a fair number of patients in psychoanalysis did less well than 
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expected while a fair number of patients seen in psychoanalytic psychotherapy did 
better than expected. Generally there was less difference between the two groups than 
expected (cf., Wallerstein, 1986; 1988a, pp. 129-151; 1988b, pp. 241-261; 1988c, pp. 5-
22; 1989, pp. 563-591; 1994, pp. 120-141).       
 These results of the MPRP are consistent with other reports that indicate over the 
long-term that: “no one therapy has been shown to be overall significantly superior to 
any other” (Frank, 1979, p. 311). Extensive meta-analyses of comparative therapy 
outcome studies have shown few differences between alternative forms of treatment 
(cf., Smith et al., 1980; American Psychiatric Association Commission on 
Psychotherapies, 1982; Shapiro & Shapiro, 1982, pp. 581-604). Differences in 
treatment techniques appear to account for relatively little of the variance of 
treatment outcome.          
 Kazdin (1986) suggests that the similarities in treatment outcome among 
various types of therapy may simply reflect common processes shared by 
alternative techniques (cf., Frank, 1982, pp. 5-37; Strupp & Binder, 1984). Kazdin, 
however, also suggests that the failure to demonstrate systematic differences may be 
a function of methodological limitations (cf., Kazdin, 1986, pp. 95-105). There is 
considerable debate about whether the consistent lack of findings for a differential 
efficacy of various forms of therapy is an accurate description on the field (cf., 
Smith et al., 1980; Landsman & Dawes, 1982, pp. 504-516) or a consequence of 
methodological limitations (cf., VandenBos & Pino, 1980, pp. 23-69; Wortman, 1983, 
pp. 223-260). Support of the null hypothesis of no difference in many comparative 
studies of different types of therapy may not be a function of the lack of differences 
between different types of treatment, but a failure to address adequately major 
methodological issues in this type of research.      
 Imber et al. (1990) argue for the need in comparative studies of therapeutic 
change to develop not only general measures of global change such as symptom 
reduction, but, more important, to develop measures of change directly relevant to 
possible treatment-specific effects. They argue for the need to develop precisely 
specified, appropriately applied, outcome measures: “selected for presumed sensitivity 
to different treatments” (Imber et al., 1990, p. 352). They believe that: “the possibility 
remains that differential effects could be detected with measures more sensitive to 
individual treatments and their distinctive rationales and procedures” (Imber et al., ib.).
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 Though these investigators in the NIMH Collaborative Study of Depression 
developed outcome measures carefully derived from ‘rationales and procedures’ of 
three forms of treatment for depression (interpersonal psychotherapy, cognitive-
behavioural therapy, imipramine plus clinical management), their results provide little 
support for their basic hypothesis: “none of the therapies produced consistent effects 
on measures related to its theoretical origins” (Imber et al., ib.; my alterations). Their 
findings appear to support the contention of Butler & Strupp (1986) that the search for 
specific versus non-specific treatment effects is unproductive and that psychotherapy 
research should move on to more productive areas.     
 It is possible, however, that specific effects do occur in treatment, but that these 
effects pertain to dimensions of the patient rather than to dimensions of the therapist or 
aspects of the treatment process. It is noteworthy that almost all comparative 
psychotherapy research has been devoted to studying differences among types of 
therapists and types of therapy and very little attention has been devoted to 
studying the differential response of various types of patients to the same or 
different types of therapeutic intervention. Part of the difficulty in being able to 
identify systematic differences among the results of different therapeutic approaches 
may be a function of the failure to differentiate among types of patients. Rather than 
assuming that all patients respond to treatment in the same way, it may be more 
productive to distinguish among patients and to examine whether there might be 
an interaction between types of treatment and types of patient, with some patients 
responding more effectively to one form of treatment while other types of patients 
respond more effectively to another form of treatment (cf., Butler & Strupp, 1986, pp. 
30-40).           
 In this context and exactly because of the above mentioned ‘difficulties’, and 
once again to be absolutely clear, I evoke my main argument defended throughout my 
entire Thesis, steering in Laplanche’s harbour: “The [psychoanalytic clinical] method 
is one of association and cross-referencing, a deconstruction, and only at the 
horizon of this dissolution (Lösung) or analysis can another reality be sketched: 
what is called an unconscious fantasy. There is no point-for-point correspondence, 
however, no analogy or similitude between the behavioral or conscious discursive 
sequence from which the associations start and the fragment of an unconscious 
sequence which can be outlined through cross-references. So much so that any 
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method of a hermeneutic order –the direct transposition or translation of one 
discourse into another, be that second discourse Jungian, Kleinian, Lacanian or 
even Freudian– is ruled out. Ultimately, the reciprocal implication of method and 
object consists in the fact that the former is not only adapted to the latter but 
oriented, magnetically attracted by it” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 63; my alterations). 
 As Laplanche argues, as a ‘primary discourse’ ‘no analogy can be done 
between the behavioral or conscious discursive sequence from which the 
associations start and the fragment of an unconscious sequence’, but as a 
‘secondary discourse’, ‘scientific metaphors’, as Wallerstein posits, can be done 
and are done, because, if not, no theoretical advance was possible. And since each 
of our metapsychologies purports to explain the whole spectrum of 
psychopathology, and the proper roads to its amelioration, Wallerstein defends 
that we are without warrant, at least at this stage of our development as a science, 
to claim the greater heuristic usefulness or validity of any one of our general 
theories over the others, other than by the indoctrinations and allegiances built 
into us by the happenstance of our individual trainings, our ‘differing personality 
dispositions’ and the explanatory predilections then carried over into our 
consulting rooms (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22).    
 Exactly for the reasons above mentioned by Wallerstein and also by 
Laplanche’s arguments, and, once again: my research agenda is an overview of the 
development to this point of psychoanalysis as a discipline both as a theory of the 
mind –formulated by Freud, Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein and 
Kernberg: these formulations unfold my theoretical prolegomena which were my 
Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which constitutes what Laplanche (1999) 
calls the ‘secondary discourse’ (see above)– and a treatment of the disorders of the 
mind: Freud’s clinical text illustrated by Chapter 3, my own clinical cases 
addressed in Chapter 4 and in my Conclusion, and a clinical update on the MPRP 
being developed now: these are my practical constructs, which Laplanche (see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.) calls the ‘primary discourse’, and offer a prediction, in 
my Conclusion (that prediction was started in my Introduction as I said), 
concerning evolving psychoanalytic development over its (near) future.  
 My focus was on the coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure 
and that is the coherence of my doctoral Thesis as a whole. I’ve started with 
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Freud’s strenuous endeavors to maintain ‘the’ psychoanalysis that he had single-
handedly created as a unitary and unified theory, tracing then the breakdown of 
this effort, even in Freud’s lifetime –with special emphasis on “Dora’s Case” 
(Chapter 3) and  Freud’s “Interpretation of Dreams”; because ‘the interpretation 
of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the 
mind’ (cf., Freud, 1900b, pp. 339-621) I’ve explained it threw the ‘dream-work’ 
Laplanche’s definition of the psychoanalytic clinical method (Chapter 1)– into the 
burgeoning theoretical diversity or ‘pluralism’ that characterizes worldwide 
psychoanalysis today, and then I’ve unfolded the beginning appearance of 
evidences (not yet widely remarked) of growing convergences from within very 
disparate and even seemingly very opposed theoretical perspectives, at least at the 
level of technical interventions and experience-near clinical theory, with 
implications, however, even for the level of experience-distant general 
(metapsychological) theory: this is how the theoretical prolegomena relate to the 
practical/clinical constructs. All this was done under the hermeneutic meta-
interpretation (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) 
because I’ve unfolded a systematization of theories of mind interpreting them 
according to my clinical experience (the ‘analyst’s mind’; Laplanche’s ‘primary 
discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.).      
 Such a development, if sustained, as I anticipate (and this doctoral Thesis 
also tries to promote), would strengthen the credibility of psychoanalysis as a 
science of the mind, amenable to growth: this growth constitutes the 
epistemological leap from the hermeneutic categorization to the positivist research 
through empirical research: the MPRP, being developed in this Chapter, is a 
heuristic example of how psychoanalytic research should be done; a positivist 
approach because ‘falsifiable’ research has to be positivist– in accordance with the 
canons of scientific method, and inherently (after this Chapter) my Conclusion will 
summarize the present situation of psychoanalysis as one of increasing theoretical 
and practical diversity (sowing, once again, the theoretical prolegomena with the 
practical/clinical constructs) illustrating that the final aim of my entire dissertation 
is to consider in depth the impact of clinical practice on theoretical plurality and 
vice versa because Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work. After noting that 
the analyst has much more than evenly suspended attention in his mind as he 
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works with his patient in a session, I will review both older and more recent 
contributions on what the analyst has in his mind when working with a patient. I 
will suggest that the subject has been addressed mainly from a single-person 
perspective as mentioned by Wallerstein (‘differing personality dispositions’; cf., 
Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22). In this connection, and on the basis of clinical 
material, I will attempt to show how, against the background of the ‘implicit use of 
explicit theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. 
cit.), an ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s 
action and reaction takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary 
discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.). In my analysis of a session, I will 
introduce the concepts of ‘theoretical reason and practical reason’, and will 
contend that, whatever theories the analyst may have implicitly or explicitly in his 
mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.), they 
ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the ‘magnetism’ that 
Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’; see 
above Laplanche, op. cit.). Pursuing the same line of thought, I will describe 
validation in the clinical context as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of 
social and linguistic co-(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between 
patient and analyst [this is seen not only in the MPRP (hence, one more connection 
between this Chapter and my Conclusion and with my focus, unfolded throughout 
my entire dissertation, on the coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical 
structure and that is the coherence of my doctoral Thesis as a whole as above  
mentioned), but also in the ‘The Ulm Psychoanalytic Process Research Study 
Group’; the latter only referred briefly]. This process includes mutual aspects of 
observation and of communicative and pragmatic validation. In conclusion, I will 
suggest that the figure of the craftsman is an appropriate description of the analyst 
in his conception (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.) 
of his (deconstructive) work, whatever the theory he may espouse (Laplanche’s 
‘secondary discourse’; see above Laplanche, op. cit.).     
 I’ve defended (and I will defend it also in my Conclusion as just mentioned) this 
perspective throughout my entire Thesis because I agree completely with Laplanche 
(1999): the psychoanalytic clinical method is a deconstruction of what the patient’s 
unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of this ‘magnetism’ 
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that I defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (in my Conclusion, as 
mentioned) integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’ [only threw the ongoing process of 
decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction which 
takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the 
analyst’s conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, the 
‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes 
any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse as a 
‘secondary discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary 
discourse’, is always applied after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s 
‘primary discourse’] as Laplanche argues (see above Laplanche, op. cit.). 
Theoretical models are hermeneutic because there is a meta-interpretation of the 
theory done by each analyst, and my literature review (Chapter 2) was based 
entirely in this premise, but the interpretation of the unconscious manifestations is 
not hermeneutic exactly for the reasons mentioned (Chapter 1) by Laplanche. 
 I’ve developed throughout my Thesis this dynamic. It seems a paradox but it is 
not because as it is obvious from what I just said: Psychoanalytic theory comes after 
clinical work. 
Returning to the subject, and exactly in this context of the clinical work, 
Frank, for example, notes that research suggests: “the major determinants of therapeutic 
success appear to lie in aspects of the patients’ personality and style of life” (Frank, 
1979, p. 312). Frank sees as crucial the development of better criteria for the assignment 
of different types of patients to different therapies. Based on research findings by Malan 
(1976a, 1976b), Frank proposes that: “verbal, psychologically minded patients who 
have motivation for insight do well in insight-oriented therapies whereas action-oriented 
patients may do better in behavioural therapies” (Frank, ib.). He also suggests that 
patients who conceptualize their subjective worlds in greater complexity may do better 
in unstructured situations whereas less conceptually complex patients may respond 
better to a more structured therapy.        
 I steer into the harbour of some other theoretical (mitigated ‘secondary 
discourses’; see above my long conclusion of Chapter 2) formulations (cf., Blatt, 1974, 
pp. 107-157, 1990a, pp. 299-335; Blatt & Shichman, 1983, pp. 187-254; Blatt & Blass, 
1990, pp. 107-127) that discuss two parallel lines in personality development –an 
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anaclitic line that involves the development of stable, mutually satisfying interpersonal 
relations, and an introjective line that involves the development of a realistic and 
positive self-identity. These two developmental lines interact throughout the life-
cycle and are essential components of personality development. These formulations 
are consistent with Freud’s ‘secondary discourse’ in “Civilization and its 
discontents”, in which he states: “the development of the individual seems … to be a 
product of the interaction between two urges, the urge towards happiness, which we 
usually call ‘egoistic’, and the urge towards union with others in the community, which 
we call ‘altruistic’” (Freud, 1930b, p. 140). And Freud adds heuristically: “the man who 
is predominantly erotic will give first preference to his emotional relationships to other 
people; the narcissistic man, who inclines to be self-sufficient, will seek his main 
satisfactions in his internal mental processes” (Freud, 1930b, pp. 83-84). Freud (1914f, 
1926a) also distinguished between object and ego libido, and between libidinal instincts 
in the service of attachment and aggressive instincts necessary for autonomy, mastery 
and self-definition (cf., Freud, 1914f, pp. 73-102; 1926a, pp. 87-172).  
 Loewald notes that the exploration of: “these various modes of separation and 
union … (identify a) polarity inherent in individual existence of individuation and 
‘primary narcissistic union’ –a polarity that Freud attempted to conceptualize by various 
approaches but that he recognized and insisted upon from beginning to end by his 
dualistic conception of instincts, of human nature, and of life itself” (Loewald, 1964, p. 
490; my alteration): once again, ‘shared characteristics’ of different ‘secondary 
discourses’.          
 Accordingly, various forms of psychopathology can be conceptualized as an 
overemphasis and exaggeration of either the anaclitic or introjective developmental line 
at the expense of the other. This overemphasis defines two distinctly different 
configurations of psychopathology, each containing several types of disordered 
behaviour ranging from relatively severe to relatively mild forms of psychopathology.
 Based on developmental and clinical considerations, anaclitic 
psychopathologies are those disorders in which patients are primarily preoccupied with 
issues of relatedness and utilize primarily avoidant defences (withdrawal, denial, 
repression and displacement) to cope with psychological conflict and stress. Anaclitic 
disorders involve a primary preoccupation with interpersonal relations and issues of 
intimacy and sexuality rather than with issues of self-definition, anger and aggression. 
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Anaclitic disorders, ranging from more to less disturbed, include non-paranoid 
schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, infantile character disorder, anaclitic 
depression, and hysterical disorders.       
 In contrast, introjective psychopathology includes disorders in which the patients 
are primarily concerned with establishing and maintaining a viable sense of self and 
utilize primarily counteractive defences (projection, rationalization, intellectualization, 
doing and undoing, reactive formation and over-compensation) to cope with conflict 
and stress. Introjective patients are more ideational and concerned with establishing, 
protecting, and maintaining a viable self-concept than they are about the quality of their 
interpersonal relations and achieving feelings of trust, warmth, and affection. Issues of 
anger and aggression, directed toward the self or others, are usually central to their 
difficulties. Introjective disorders, ranging from more to less severely disturbed, include 
paranoid schizophrenia, the schizotypic or over-ideational borderline, paranoia, 
obsessive-compulsive disorders, introjective (guilt-ridden) depression, and phallic 
narcissism (cf., Blatt, 1974, pp. 107-157, 1990a, pp. 299-335; Blatt & Shichman, 1983, 
pp. 187-254).           
 These two broad configurations of psychopathology define two different types 
of patients with different types of personality organization, who have different needs, 
defences, and preoccupations. Distinctions between these two different types of patients 
and between these two primary configurations of psychopathology are established in 
terms of dynamic organization and functioning rather than on differences in 
symptoms.           
 In contrast to the a-theoretical diagnostic system established by DSM-IV 
(cf., Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Livesley, 1995; Mezzich, 1996; First, 1997; Kutchins 
& Kirk, 1997) and DSM-IV-TR (cf., American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 
based primarily on differences in manifest symptoms, the diagnostic 
differentiation between anaclitic and introjective pathologies is based on: ‘dynamic 
considerations, including differences in primary instinctual focus (libidinal versus 
aggressive), types of defensive organization (avoidant versus counteractive), and 
predominant character style (emphasis on object versus self-orientation, and on 
affects versus cognition)’ (cf., Blatt, 1991, pp. 449-458; my entire Chapter 2 was 
focused, threw the different ‘secondary discourses’, in these ‘dynamic 
considerations’, hence, the absolute connection between this Chapter and Chapter 
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2, and with my focus, unfolded throughout my entire dissertation, on the coherence 
of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that is the coherence of my 
doctoral Thesis as a whole as above mentioned).     
 I have this epistemological position steering into Blatt’s mitigated ‘secondary 
discourse’, who in his earlier investigations (cf., Blatt et al., 1988, pp. 127-158) 
indicates that these two different types of patients come to treatment with different 
needs, respond differently to therapeutic interventions, and change in different ways. 
Analysis of the data of Blatt’s earlier study based on more conventional diagnostic 
differentiations (psychosis, severe borderline, and neurotic psychopathology) was 
not as effective in understanding differences in change over the course of 
treatment; these conventional diagnostic distinctions seemed to be clinically much 
less relevant than the differentiation between anaclitic and introjective types of 
psychopathology.          
 The distinction between anaclitic and introjective patients was made in prior 
research (cf., Blatt et al., ib.) with a high degree of reliability, and the results indicate 
that these two groups of patients change in different ways during long-term, intensive, 
dynamically oriented, inpatient treatment. Introjective patients seem to change more 
readily, and their improvement was expressed primarily in a reduction of clinical 
symptoms and in an increase in level of cognitive functioning (a significant diminution 
of thought disorder on the Rorschach and an elevation of intelligence, particularly 
Performance IQ). Therapeutic change seemed to occur more slowly and in more subtle 
forms in anaclitic patients, expressed primarily in changes in the quality of interpersonal 
relations and their representation of human figures on the Rorschach.   
 Thus, anaclitic and introjective patients appear to change primarily in the 
modalities that express their basic concerns and preoccupations. Introjective patients 
change primarily in symptomatic expression and in cognitive processes, whereas change 
in anaclitic patients is expressed primarily around interpersonal relations. These 
findings suggest that in any comparative study of different types of 
psychotherapeutic intervention it may be important to examine the possibility that 
these two types of patients may be differentially responsive to different forms of 
therapy (cf., Blatt et al., ib.).        
 In addition to differentiating among different types of patients, it is also 
important in studying the outcome of psychotherapeutic interventions to utilize 
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assessment procedures that are independent of the judgments of the patient and/or 
the therapist. Both patient and therapist are not neutral observers; both have 
investment in the treatment process which can distort their judgment of its outcome (cf., 
Truax & Carkhuff, 1967; Truax & Mitchell, 1971, pp. 299-344; Gurman, 1977, pp. 503-
543; Parloff et al., 1978, pp. 233-282; Lambert et al., 1978, pp. 467-489; Frieswyk et 
al., 1986, pp. 32-38).          
 Beutler & Hamblin (1986) stress the need in outcome research to develop 
reliable and sensitive measures of therapeutic change. Mintz et al. (1979) point out 
that despite the large number of studies of psychotherapy outcome, only a few 
multivariate studies consider the issue of change in psychotherapy (cf., Kernberg 
et al., 1972b, pp. 87-275; Mitchell et al., 1973, pp. 482-502; Berzins et al., 1975, pp. 
10-19).          
 Common sources for outcome evaluation are information from patient, therapist, 
relatives, and clinical observers. Areas of outcome assessment include mood, behaviour, 
and personality based on global assessments of therapeutic success and level of final 
adjustment. Fiske et al. (1970), Beutler & Hamblin (1986), and Kazdin (1986) all stress 
the value of using multiple methods for assessing therapeutic change. Kazdin argues 
for multifaceted outcome assessment procedures that include different: “perspectives 
(patients, significant others, and mental health practitioners), different facets of the 
individual (affect, cognitions, and behaviour), and different modalities of assessment 
(self-report, clinician ratings, and direct observation [see Lambert et al., 1983])” 
(Kazdin, 1986, p. 100; my alteration).       
 It is especially important in psychotherapy research to include an 
independent assessment of change because the evaluation of therapeutic change by 
the therapist, the patient, and members of the patient’s family are not truly 
independent judgments of therapeutic progress. Though the judgment of patient 
and therapist can be important sources of insight into aspects of the therapeutic 
process and contribute in important ways to the evaluation of a patient’s progress, 
these perspectives have the typical advantages as well as the limitations of 
evaluations by participant observers. These perspectives need to be supplemented 
by assessment from independent observers who are uncommitted to the patient 
and the treatment process.        
 Psychological tests have the potential for providing aspects of this 
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independent assessment. They can be administered both early and later in the 
treatment and can be evaluated by judges who are completely independent of the 
treatment process. The data can be ‘disguised’ completely so that the judge need not 
now, for example, which two protocols came from the same patient and when in the 
treatment process a particular test protocol was obtained. The few studies that used 
psychological test assessment in psychotherapy research, such as the MPRP, however, 
have used test data to make clinical ratings of broad constructs such as ego strength or 
severity of psychopathology. The rating of these global concepts has the advantage 
of allowing an experienced and sophisticated judge to integrate a diversity of 
observations in making the ratings. These types of ratings, however, have the 
disadvantage of often being so broad that other judges in other settings may not be able 
to replicate the ratings. In addition, it is often difficult to specify precisely the various 
psychological dimensions that were integrated in the ratings.    
 Other research (cf., Blatt & Berman, 1984, pp. 226-239), however, has led to 
the development of more systematic ways of evaluating psychological test 
protocols, especially the Rorschach (I have to emphasize that Rorschach was a 
psychoanalyst and the test that has his name and that was developed by him is a 
psychoanalytical projective test, with the obvious pertinence of its method to a 
doctoral Thesis in Psychoanalysis, hence, one more connection between this 
Chapter and my Conclusion and with my focus, unfolded throughout my entire 
dissertation, on the coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that 
is the coherence of my doctoral Thesis as a whole as above mentioned), and has 
demonstrated that these empirical dimensions assess clinically important variables 
especially relevant to the assessment of change in the therapeutic process. The 
analysis of psychological tests, such as the Rorschach, can provide systematic ways of 
assessing clinically relevant dimensions that can serve as independent, empirical 
evaluations of the treatment process and of therapeutic outcome.   
 Despite extensive research over many years on objective and projective 
psychological assessment, it is noteworthy how seldom psychological tests are used as a 
potential independent assessment of aspects of the process and outcome of various 
forms of therapeutic intervention. Psychological test assessment methods have been 
infrequently used to evaluate aspects of psychotherapeutic process and outcome 
(cf., Waskow & Parloff, 1975) despite the fact that the Rorschach can provide data 
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essentially comparable to the level of observation that frequently occurs in 
intensive treatment, especially psychoanalysis, e.g., dreams and free associations 
(cf., Schafer, 1954).          
 Indeed, because of more heuristic conceptual developments: mitigated 
‘secondary discourses’, in my terminology (cf., Blatt, 1990b, pp. 394-416, 1991, pp. 
449-458), psychological tests, especially the Rorschach, can provide a potentially 
useful methodology for independently assessing clinically relevant dimensions of 
psychological change in a systematic fashion, particularly in studies of the effects 
of long-term, intensive therapy. Research also indicates that some Rorschach 
variables can be effective predictors of therapeutic outcome (cf., Tuber, 1983, pp. 
379-385; La Barbera & Cornsweet, 1985, pp. 120-124; Gerstle et al., 1988, pp. 277-
280), especially with children.        
 In the study to be reported in my doctoral Thesis, Rorschach protocols were 
obtained from Blatt’s data (cf., Blatt, 1990b, pp. 394-416, 1991, pp. 449-458), and Blatt 
applied these protocols before the beginning of treatment and again at termination and 
were independently evaluated to assess the extent and nature of therapeutic change in 
patients who had been in either supportive-expressive psychotherapy or psychoanalysis.
 Despite the numerous attempts to evaluate the differential effects of 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, the results of the MPRP uniformly indicate 
that there is no differential benefit favouring one form of treatment over the other. 
Kavanaugh, however, based on an analysis of Rorschach protocols administered to 
patients in the MPRP both at intake and termination of treatment, concluded that 
the patients in psychoanalysis: “changed in ways that were not paralleled by 
patients in psychotherapy” (Kavanaugh, 1985, p. 546; my alteration).
 Kavanaugh’s conclusions were based on an analysis of the quality of object 
representation on the Rorschach using scoring procedures developed by Urist 
(1977) and by Blatt et al. (1976). Kavanaugh found a significant increase in the degree 
of mutuality and benevolence in the representation of interactions of people, animals, or 
things on the Rorschach in patients in both psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Patients 
in psychoanalysis, in comparison to those in psychotherapy, also had a significantly 
greater increase in accurately perceived, extensively articulated, full human forms 
engaged in benevolent activity.        
 These findings are the first suggestion that aspects of the data from the 
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MPRP may indicate a significant treatment effect, particularly the relative efficacy 
of psychoanalysis over psychotherapy. This is the main aim of this Chapter 
because unfolds an attempt to extend the original analysis proposed by Kavanaugh 
by including in the data analyses a differentiation among type of patients to test for 
possible ‘significant interactions between type of patient and type of therapy’ (cf., 
Blatt et al., 1976, pp. 64-373; Urist, 1977, pp. 3-9; Kavanaugh, 1985, pp. 546-564): 
this was what I’ve unfolded in each of all the previous chapters focusing either on a 
‘secondary discourse’ or either on a ‘primary discourse’ or focusing in both 
‘discourses’ at the same time, because, as mentioned many times: ‘secondary 
discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other (‘significant 
interactions between type of patient and type of therapy’); I’ve defended this 
‘dynamic’ throughout my entire Thesis trying to demonstrate my main focus: the 
coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that is the coherence of 
my doctoral Thesis as a whole.       
 Indeed, repeating the key argument of this Chapter (but connected with all 
the previous Chapters and connected with the following Chapter which is my 
Conclusion as, once again, mentioned): in contrast to the a-theoretical diagnostic 
system established by DSM-IV (cf., Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Livesley, 1995; 
Mezzich, 1996; First, 1997; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997) and DSM-IV-TR (cf., 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000), based primarily on differences in 
manifest symptoms, the diagnostic differentiation between anaclitic and 
introjective pathologies is based on: ‘dynamic considerations, including differences 
in primary instinctual focus (libidinal versus aggressive), types of defensive 
organization (avoidant versus counteractive), and predominant character style 
(emphasis on object versus self-orientation, and on affects versus cognition)’ (cf., 
Blatt, 1991, pp. 449-458).         
 As I said, my entire Chapter 2 (the ‘lion part’ of my Thesis) was focused, 
threw the different ‘secondary discourses’, in these ‘dynamic considerations’, 
hence, the absolute connection between this Chapter and Chapter 2, and with my 
focus, unfolded throughout my entire dissertation, on the coherence of 
psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that is the coherence of my doctoral 
Thesis as a whole (as again and again mentioned), hence, this Chapter is before my 
Conclusion, because it sows all the ‘secondary discourses’ unfolded in Chapter 2 
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with its clinical efficacy (The MPRP demonstrates ‘the relative efficacy of 
psychoanalysis over psychotherapy’), or, more objectively, in this Chapter the 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ (unfolded in Chapter 3 and 4, but also in the next 
chapter: my Conclusion) is put under a methodological assessment, in accordance 
with the canons of scientific method per se, trying to demonstrate the scientific 
accuracy of psychoanalysis (as stated in my Introduction) both as a theory of the 
mind and a treatment of the disorders of the mind and this was my research 
agenda since the beginning of this dissertation: as above mentioned many times, 
my research agenda is an overview of the development to this point of 
psychoanalysis as a discipline both as a theory of the mind –formulated by Freud, 
Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein and Kernberg: these 
formulations unfold my theoretical prolegomena which were my Introduction, 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which constitutes what Laplanche (1999) calls the 
‘secondary discourse’– and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: Freud’s 
clinical text illustrated by Chapter 3, my own clinical cases addressed in Chapter 4 
and in my Conclusion, and a clinical update on the MPRP shown in this Chapter: 
these are my practical constructs, which Laplanche calls the ‘primary discourse’–, 
and offer a prediction, in my Conclusion (that prediction was started in my 
Introduction as I said), concerning evolving psychoanalytic development over its 
(near) future.          
 This psychoanalytic development is inherent (obviously) to the scientific 
accuracy of psychoanalysis as stated in my Introduction (The MPRP demonstrates 
‘the relative efficacy of psychoanalysis over psychotherapy’), or, more objectively, 
and, once again, but better explained, in this Chapter the analyst’s ‘primary 
discourse’ (unfolded in Chapter 3 and 4, but also in the next chapter: my 
Conclusion) is put under a methodological assessment, in accordance with the 
canons of scientific method per se, trying to demonstrate the scientific accuracy of 
psychoanalysis both as a theory of the mind and a treatment of the disorders of the 
mind: this methodological assessment is achieved by illustrating the patient-by-
treatment interactions (unfolding its ‘primary discourse’, once again: ‘primary 
discourse’ is psychoanalytical clinical practice per se, but, as I said and I will 
demonstrate below: the interaction of ‘types of patients’ and ‘types of treatments’ 
and how this interaction of these two dimensions is done, unfolds also, in my 
291 
 
terminology, how ‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect 
each other), which will be now illustrated exactly threw the following 
methodological assessment, in accordance with the canons of scientific method per 
se.   
Method 
                                                                                                                                                    
Nature of the sample 
The MPRP compared the relative effects of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy 
as I said. Twenty-two outpatients initially started in psychoanalysis and 20 outpatients 
initially started in psychotherapy were evaluated systematically at intake, at termination, 
and through a two-year follow-up period. The initial evaluation, supervised by a senior 
member of the clinical staff, consisted of extensive psychiatric interviews with each 
patient and family members, as well as a complete battery of psychological tests. At 
termination, and again at follow up two years later, all 42 patients were re-evaluated by 
the research team and administered another battery of psychological tests. In addition, 
detailed process notes and monthly summaries were independently prepared described 
therapeutic change as well as aspects of the treatment process. Patients in 
psychoanalysis and in psychotherapy were treated by experienced clinicians who had, 
on average, 10 years of clinical experience. There was no significant difference in level 
of clinical experience between the therapists in the psychoanalysis and psychotherapy 
groups –in fact some therapists served in both groups– but some of the 
‘psychoanalysts’, though experienced clinicians, were still candidates in analytic 
training (cf., Blatt, 1990b, pp. 394-416, 1991, pp. 449-458; Wallerstein, 1986, 1994, pp. 
120-141).          
 Patients were assigned to the two treatment groups based on clinical judgments 
about which treatment would be most appropriate for them. By and large, patients 
assigned to psychoanalysis were considered to be psychologically healthier than those 
assigned to psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Though all patients seen in psychotherapy 
and psychoanalysis were outpatients, some of the patients in the study were considered 
to be seriously disturbed and had been in treatment before with little positive result. 
During the course of the study, 15 of the 42 patients in the study required some 
hospitalization even though in the original selection patients were excluded if they had 
prior prolonged hospitalization, organic brain syndromes, mental retardation, and/or 
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overt psychosis.           
 In the MPRP, 33 of 42 patients had been given a Rorschach prior to 
beginning treatment and again at termination. The analysis of these Rorschach 
protocols of the 33 patients both at intake and termination are the focus of the 
present study in this Chapter. It’s noteworthy that Kavanaugh (1985) found no 
statistically significant differences on various demographic and clinical dimensions 
between these 33 subjects and the 9 additional subjects in the original Menninger 
sample that had not been given the Rorschach at termination and therefore could not be 
included in this study.         
 Of the 33 patients, 15 were male and 18 were female and their average age at the 
start of treatment was approximately 32 years. During the initial evaluations prior to the 
onset of treatment, 14 patients were diagnosed as neurotic, 15 as having character 
disorders, 2 as being borderline, and 2 as having latent psychosis. Fifteen of these 
patients were treated in psychoanalysis and 18 were treated in psychoanalytically 
oriented psychotherapy. It’s noteworthy that these figures differ slightly from those 
reported by Kavanaugh (1985), because Blatt (1990b, 1991) considered one patient who 
began treatment in psychoanalysis but later in the treatment process was switched to 
psychotherapy as having been in psychotherapy. Kavanaugh has considered this patient 
in his psychoanalysis group rather than in his psychotherapy group. During the course 
of treatment, 13 of the 33 patients were hospitalized for varying amounts of time. 
 Of the 15 patients seen in psychoanalysis, 6 were male and 9 were female, 
and they were on average 31.0 years of age. At intake, 7 were diagnosed as 
neurotic, 7 as having character disorders, and 1 as being borderline. They were 
seen in psychoanalysis on average 4.67 times each week for an average of 733.73 
total sessions. Five of the patients in this group were hospitalized at some time during 
the treatment process. Eighteen patients were seen in psychotherapy, 9 male and 9 
female, with an average age of 32.67 years. At intake, 7 were diagnosed as neurotic, 8 
as having character disorders, 1 as being borderline, and 2 with latent psychosis. These 
patients were seen on average for 2.72 times per week (ranging from 2 to 5 sessions 
each week) for an average total of 453.17 sessions. Eight of these patients were 
hospitalized at some time during the course of treatment.     
 Based on a distinction established by Blatt & Shichman (1983), two judges 
independently reviewed the case history material prepared prior to the beginning 
293 
 
of treatment and classified the patients as either having an anaclitic or an 
introjective type of psychopathology. Similar to experiences in a prior study (cf., Blatt 
et al., 1988, pp. 127-158), the two judges were able to make this distinction with 
high reliability; they agreed on the distinction in 26 of the 33 cases (78.8 %). 
Disagreement between the two judges on 7 of the 33 cases was resolved by a third 
independent judge who agreed with one judge on 3 of the cases and with the other judge 
on 4 cases. 
 
Evaluation of Rorschach Protocols                             
Prior research with the Rorschach (cf., Blatt & Berman, 1984, pp. 226-239) 
identified seven primary variables that emerged in a factor analysis of Rorschach 
scores, each of which defined a crucial psychological dimension. These included the 
degree of adherence to reality (F + %) (cf., Korchin & Larson, 1977, pp. 159-187); the 
extent of thought disorder, particularly involving disturbances in boundary articulation 
(cf., Blatt & Ritzler, 1974, pp. 370-381; Blatt & Wild, 1976); and the amount of 
differentiated, articulated, and integrated human forms that are accurately or 
inaccurately perceived (cf., Blatt et al., 1976, pp. 64-373). 
 
Thought disorder 
An overall estimate of thought disorder was developed for the Rorschach by 
differentially weighting different types of thought disorder based on the severity of 
boundary disturbance (cf., Blatt & Ritzler, 1974, pp. 370-381). The most severe 
boundary disturbance is reflected by the contamination response in which independent 
concepts or images lose their identity and definition. Boundaries are so unstable that 
independent representations cannot be consistently maintained, and they merge, or tend 
to merge, into a single distorted unit. The next major thought disorder on the continuum 
indicating difficulties in maintaining boundaries is the confabulation response. In this 
type of response, an initially accurate perception becomes lost in extensive, unrealistic, 
grandiose, personal elaborations and associations. In confabulatory thinking, ideas and 
images do not merge and fuse as in a contamination; rather, the extensive, unrealistic 
elaboration indicates loss of the distinction between the external perception and 
personal associations and reactions to it. The third major, but less severe, level of 
boundary disturbance is indicated by the fabulized combination response. In this 
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response, the separate definition of independent objects or concepts is maintained, as is 
the distinction between the perception and reactions to it. But unrealistic thinking is 
expressed by establishing illogical, arbitrary relations between independent and separate 
precepts or concepts. Two separate precepts are inter-related simply because they are 
spatially or temporally contiguous. Spatial or temporal contiguity is taken as indicating 
a real relationship, even though an arbitrary and unrealistic one.     
 A composite measure of severity of thought disorder measure was derived that 
included not only these three types of thought disorder, but also milder manifestations 
of each type of thought disorder as discussed by Rapaport et al. (1945-1946; see my 
Introduction) and Allison et al. (1968) as thought disorder tendencies. The various types 
of thought disorder and their differential weighting for the thought disorder measure 
are: contamination (6); contamination tendency (5); confabulation (4); confabulation 
tendency (3); fabulized combination (2); and fabulized combination tendency (1) (cf., 
Blatt & Berman, 1984, pp. 226-239). Higher scores indicate more extensive thought 
disorder. This measure of thought disorder had been found in prior research to be 
related to severity of psychopathology (cf., Blatt & Ritzler, 1974, pp. 370-381; Lerner et 
al., 1985, pp. 47-66; Wilson, 1985, pp. 346-355) and to measures of change in the 
treatment of seriously disturbed patients (cf., Blatt et al., 1988, pp. 127-158). 
 
Concept of the Human Object 
Based on concepts derived from developmental psychology, Blatt et al. (1976) 
developed a system for assessing the concept of the human figure on the Rorschach. 
The system calls for scoring human responses according to developmental principles of 
differentiation (types of human figures perceived: quasi-human part properties, human 
part properties, quasi-human full figures, and full human figures), articulation (number 
and type of perceptual and functional features attributed to figures), degree of internality 
in the motivation of action attributed to the figures (unmotivated, reactive, and 
intentional action), degree of integration of the object and its action (fused, 
incongruent, non-specific, and congruent action), content of the action (malevolent, 
benevolent), and nature of any interaction (active-passive, active-reactive, active-
active interactions).          
 In each of these six categories (differentiation, articulation, motivation of action, 
integration of the object and its action, content of the action, and nature of interaction), 
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responses are scored along a developmental continuum. This developmental analysis is 
made for those human responses that are accurately perceived (F +) and for those that 
are inaccurately perceived (F –). A weighted sum and an average developmental score 
(mean) for each of the six categories was obtained for F + and for F – responses 
separately.           
 Prior research (cf., Blatt et al., 1976, pp. 64-373; Ritzler et al., 1980, pp. 46-55; 
Lerner & St. Peter, 1985, pp. 77-92) indicates that these variables develop with age 
from early adolescence to adulthood and are significantly related to independent 
estimates of psychopathology. The composite weighted sum and the composite 
developmental average (mean) of the differentiation, articulation and integration of 
accurately perceived human forms (OR +) assess the capacity for investing in 
appropriate interpersonal relationships; the composite weighted sum and the composite 
developmental average (mean) of differentiated, articulated and integrated  inaccurately 
perceived human forms (OR –) assess the degree of investment in inappropriate, 
unrealistic, possibly autistic, fantasies rather than realistic relationships. 
                       
Mutuality of Autonomy Score (MOA) 
Another measure of object representation was included in the analysis of the 
Rorschach protocols –the assessment of the mutuality of autonomy. The MOA scale 
assesses the thematic content of interactions on the Rorschach by rating all human, 
animal, and inanimate relationships (stated or implied) in a protocol along a seven-point 
continuum ranging from mutual empathic relatedness (1) to themes of malevolent 
engulfment and destruction (7). Scale points 1 and 2, the most adaptive scores in the 
scale, refer to themes of reciprocal acknowledgment and parallel interactions, 
respectively. As an example, a score of 1 is given to a response to Card II of ‘two 
people having a heated political argument’. An example of a score of 2 is ‘two animals 
climbing a mountain’ on Card VIII. Scale points 3 and 4 indicate an emerging loss of 
autonomy in interaction in which the ‘Other’ exists solely either to be leaned upon (a 
score of 3) or to mirror oneself (a score of 4). An example of a score of 3 is a response 
to Card I of ‘two men leaning on a manikin’. A score of 4 is given to the response ‘a 
tiger looking at its reflection in the water’ to Card VIII. Points 5, 6 and 7 reflect an 
increasing malevolence and loss of control over one’s separateness. A score of 5 is 
given to responses characterized by themes of coercion, hurtful influence, or threat, 
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such as ‘a witch casting a spell on someone’ given to the top large detail of Card IX. A 
score of 6 indicates violent assault and destruction of one figure by another –for 
example, ‘a bat impaled by a tree’ to Card I. Finally, a score of 7 represents a larger-
than-life destructiveness imposed usually by inanimate, calamitous force as depicted, 
for example, in the response to Card X, ‘a tornado hurtling its debris everywhere’ (cf., 
Urist, 1977, pp. 3-9; Urist & Shill, 1982, pp. 450-454).     
 The average MOA score is assumed to express the individual’s usual quality of 
interpersonal relatedness. To reflect the range or repertoire of interactions, I also use in 
my data analyses each subject’s single most pathological and single most adaptive 
MOA scores. MOA scores have been shown to correlate significantly with measures of 
interpersonal and social functioning in clinical and non-clinical groups (cf., Urist, ib.; 
Tuber, 1983, pp. 379-385; Spear & Sugarman, 1984, pp. 113-129; Harder et al., 1984, 
pp. 1078-1082; Ryan et al., 1985, pp. 6-11; Blatt et al., 1988, pp. 127-158).  
 These various schemes for analyzing Rorschach responses were scored in the 
present analysis by judges who previously had established acceptable levels of inter-
rater reliability (item alpha ˃ .70) in scoring these schemes in prior research (see 
below). Judges scoring the various dimensions on the Rorschach were uninformed 
about any aspects of the patient including age, sex, and diagnosis as well as to 
which treatment group the patient had been assigned. Judges were also 
uninformed about which two Rorschach protocols were from the same patient and 
about whether a particular Rorschach protocol was obtained before the start of 
treatment or at termination. When indicated, Rorschach summation scores were co-
varied for total response productivity. 
 
Data Analysis 
Beutler & Hamblin (1986) and Mintz et al. (1979) stress the need for statistical 
procedures that deal with difference or change scores and the translation of these scores 
into common indices of outcome. They argue for the need to utilize a residualized gain 
score based on linear scaling procedures (cf., Beutler & Hamblin, 1986, pp. 48-53; 
Mintz et al., 1979, pp. 319-334). Ecker et al. (1988) also stress the value of residual gain 
over raw gain scores as an outcome measure. They point out how initial levels can have 
a distorting effect because patients with extremely low pre-therapy scores have more 
room to improve than those with less extreme pre-therapy scores (cf., Ecker et al., 1988, 
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pp. 560-564).           
 Also, the statistical phenomenon of regression toward the mean may inflate 
correlations between pre-post therapy test scores and amount of clinical change as 
a consequence of statistical artefact, and thus not accurately express psychological 
relations. Though residual gain scores (cf., Fiske et al., 1970, pp. 22-32) provide a more 
accurate estimate of change, Cronbach & Furby point out that one needs to be cautious 
with residualized scores because this correction may underestimate the degree of change 
of discarding a portion of: “some genuine and important change in the person” 
(Cronbach & Furby, 1970, p. 74). Residual gain scores, scores that partial out initial 
levels from later evaluations, however, provide a way of controlling statiscally for 
these possible differences in initial level. Within-group comparisons of different types 
of patients in each treatment group, however, would not be affected by the decision of 
assignment to treatment groups.        
 Two-way analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA) provides a statistical method 
that controls for initial levels of the variables being studied and allows for within-
group as well as between-group comparisons of the two types of patients in two 
different forms of therapy. Two-way ANCOVA of Rorschach scores at 
termination, co-varied on the level of these variables at the beginning of treatment, 
were used to assess the relative contributions of the two types of therapy 
(psychotherapy and psychoanalysis) and the two types of patients (anaclitic and 
introjective) to change of various Rorschach scores over the course of treatment. 
ANCOVA controls for the initial level of each Rorschach variable prior to the start of 
treatment. Each Rorschach variable at termination was co-varied on the level of that 
variable in the psychological test assessment conducted prior to the start of therapy, 
thereby providing a measure of the residual gain on that variable (cf., Green et al., 1975, 
pp. 689-699; Fiske et al., 1970, pp. 22-32; Manning & Dubois, 1962, pp. 288-321; 
Mintz et al., 1979, pp. 319-334). Two-way ANCOVA not only controls for the initial 
level of each Rorschach variable prior to the start of treatment, but it allows for 
the evaluation of the relative contributions of the main effects of ‘type of 
treatment’ and ‘type of patient’, as well as the interaction of these two dimensions 
(‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other), in 





Results          
 Table 1 (shown below) presents a comparison of some descriptive features of the 
anaclitic and introjective patients in psychoanalysis and in psychotherapy. As expected, 
there was a significant difference in total IQ; the more ideational introjective patients 
had a higher total IQ than the anaclitic patients. Also, by design, the patients in 
psychotherapy had significantly fewer therapy sessions each week than patients in 
psychoanalysis. But the two therapy groups were not significantly different in the total 
number of therapy sessions for the entire treatment. It is noteworthy that there were 
no significant interactions on any descriptive variables, thereby indicating that 
there were no systematic differences among the patients assigned to the two 
treatment groups. It is also noteworthy that there were no statistically significant 
differences among the four groups on the Luborsky Health-Sickness Rating Scale 
(HSRS) either at the beginning of treatment or at termination (see below).  
 Table 2 (shown below) presents a comparison of psychological test variables 
derived from the Rorschach protocols obtained before the start of treatment. There 
were statistically significant differences between the anaclitic and introjective 
patients at admission on a number of psychological test variables. Introjective 
patients at the beginning of therapy had significantly more thought disorder and 
significantly greater investment in inappropriate, unrealistically perceived human 
forms on the Rorschach (OR –) than anaclitic patients. Consistent with Blatt’s 
(1974) findings, introjective patients generally seemed clinically more disturbed at 
the outset of treatment than anaclitic patients. But there were no statistically 
significant main effects for treatment assignment, nor any significant interaction 
terms between ‘type of patient’ and ‘type of treatment’, on any of the 
psychological variables assessed at admission. These data indicate that though there 
were some differences in psychological characteristics between anaclitic and 
introjective patients before the start of therapy, there were no significant differences in 
psychological characteristics at the beginning of treatment between patients assigned to 
the two treatment groups, at least in terms of the variables assessed in my research (cf., 
Blatt, 1974, pp. 107-157; Blatt, 1990a, pp. 299-335).      
 Based on a two-way analysis of variance for a repeated measures design (time 1-
time 2 by anaclitic-introjective patients), significant and positive treatment effects were 
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found in the HSRS ratings of both anaclitic and introjective patients (t= 2.53, p. < .02 
and t= 3.55, p. < .005, respectively) regardless of whether the patients were in 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. But the comparison of the ratings on the 
Luborsky HSRS between the two treatment groups fails to indicate any 
statistically significant difference favouring either psychoanalysis or 
psychotherapy. Generally, the ratings of clinical protocols at admission and 
termination by experienced clinicians using the HSRS indicated that patients seemed to 
have improved significantly regardless of the type of treatment of their character style.    




Demographic Characteristics of Anaclitic and Introjective Patients in 
Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy 
 
                                      Anaclitic                                        Introjective 
 Psychoanalysis Psychotherapy Psychoanalysis Psychotherapy 
Males 2 6 4 3 
Females 7 6 2 3 
Age 27.78 33.42 35.83 31.17 
IQ 122.22 121.25 134.33 127.50 
Therapy     
Times/Week 4.50 2.54 4.92 3.08 







    
Admission 46.78 43.83 55.00 46.33 
Termination 58.67 50.92 68.67 60.92 





Two-way ANOVA (F Ratio) 






Males    
Females    
Age 1.02 .03 3.22 
IQ 11.33** 2.05 1.15 
Therapy    
Times/Week 2.64 41.26*** .04 





   
Admission 1.19 1.39 .34 
Termination 3.57 2.14 .00 
 
*= p <.05; **= p <.01; ***= p <.001 (cf., Blatt, 1974, pp. 107-157; Blatt & Lerner, 
1983, pp. 189-249; Blatt & Shichman, 1983, pp. 187-254; Blatt & Behrends, 1987, pp. 
279-297; Blatt, 1990a, pp. 299-335; Blatt, 1991, pp. 449-458; Blatt & Shahar, 2004, pp. 














Comparison of Rorschach Variables at Beginning of Therapy in Anaclitic and 
Introjective Patients in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy 
 











    
Reality Testing 
(F+ %) 
62.69 74.02 65.40 74.31 
Thought 
Disorderª 









    
Developmental 
Indexª 
‒.55 ‒2.22 1.05 5.21 
Developmental 
Mean 




    
Developmental 
Indexª 
‒1.07 ‒1.59 5.52 1.13 
Developmental 
Mean 





    
Average 
Score 
2.38 2.62 2.70 2.43 
Most 
PathologicalScore 
3.67 3.83 4.67 4.00 
Most Adaptive 
Score 
1.67 1.83 1.50 1.17 
 
 
Two-way ANOVA (F Ratio) 







   
Reality  
Testing (F+ %) 
.04 1.87 .03 
Thought  
Disorderª 
7.48** .07 .04 
Interpersonal Relations 
Concept of Object 
   
Adaptive 
Representations (OR+) 
   
Developmental  
Indexª 
4.15 .32 1.73 
Developmental  
Mean 




   
Developmental  
Indexª 





7.31** .74 1.32 
Mutuality  
of Autonomy (MOA) 
   
Average  
Score 
.05 .00 .70 
Most 
PathologicalScore 
.73 .13 .37 
Most Adaptive 
 Score 
3.82 .15 1.37 
 
*= p <.05; **= p <.01; ªScore co-varied to control for total number of Rorschach 
responses (cf., Blatt & Ritzler, 1974, pp. 370-381; Blatt et al., 1975, pp. 235-288; Blatt 
& Wild, 1976; Blatt et al., 1976, pp. 64-373; Blatt & Berman, 1984, pp. 226-239; Blatt 
et al., 1988, pp. 127-158; Blatt & Blass, 1990, pp. 107-127; Blatt et al., 1990, pp. 711-
728; Blatt, 1990a, pp. 299-335; Blatt, 1990b, pp. 394-416; Urist, 1977, pp. 3-9; Urist & 
Shill, 1982, pp. 450-454).         
           
 As indicated in Table 3 (shown below), however, statistically significant 
treatment effects and significant type of patient-by-treatment interactions were 
found on several Rorschach variables, particularly on those designed to assess 
differences primarily within the neurotic range. No significant treatment effects or 
significant patient-by-treatment interactions were found, however, on those Rorschach 
variables expected to differentiate primarily within the psychotic range (e.g., degree of 
reality testing, thought disorder, and investment in unrealistically perceived, distorted, 
possibly autistic types of object representation [OR‒]).     
 The significant results presented in Table 3, especially the findings with the 
Mutuality of Autonomy Scale (MOA), indicate a substantial patient-by-treatment 
interaction [once again, in this Chapter the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ (unfolded 
in Chapter 3 and 4, but also in the next chapter: my Conclusion) is put under a 
methodological assessment, in accordance with the canons of scientific method per 
se, trying to demonstrate the scientific accuracy of psychoanalysis both as a theory 
of the mind and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: this methodological 
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assessment is achieved by illustrating the patient-by-treatment interactions 
(unfolding its ‘primary discourse’, once again: ‘primary discourse’ is 
psychoanalytical clinical practice per se, but, as I am demonstrating, the 
interaction of ‘types of patients’ and ‘types of treatments’ and how this interaction 
of these two dimensions is done, unfolds also, in my terminology, how ‘secondary 
discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other), as is being 
illustrated exactly threw this methodological assessment] in which anaclitic patients 
improve more in psychotherapy than anaclitic patients in psychoanalysis, whereas 
introjective patients seen in psychoanalysis had significantly greater improvement 
than introjective patients seen in psychotherapy. It’s noteworthy that these 
differences in treatment effects for the two different types of patients are based on 
an evaluation of the patients’ responses to the Rorschach administered at 
termination, controlling statistically for the level of that variable on the Rorschach 
obtained at the outset of treatment.       
 In addition to the significant patient-by-treatment interaction noted with 
the MOA scale, a significant treatment main effect was also noted on the 
developmental level of object representation of accurately perceived human figures 
(OR+) on the Rorschach, indicating significantly greater constructive change for 
introjective patients in psychoanalysis than for introjective patients in 
psychotherapy. While a similar trend also occurred on this Rorschach variable with 
anaclitic patients favouring psychoanalysis over psychotherapy, this difference with 















Two-Way Analysis of Co-Variance of Rorschach Variables –Termination/ 
Intake– for Anaclitic and Introjective Patients in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy 
 
              Co-variate Means 
 















58.76 52.12 65.68 60.34 
Test Record 
Variables 
    
Reality Testing 
(F+ %) 
68.37 72.48 72.30 65.77 
Thought 
Disorderª 
‒1.89 ‒1.62 ‒1.79 4.80 
Object 
Representation 
(Accurate) (OR+)  
    
Developmental 
Indexª  
.41 ‒.55 1.47 ‒1.98 
Developmental 
Mean  










‒.16 ‒.16 ‒1.58 .26 
Developmental 
Mean  




    
Mean MOA 
Score 
3.30 2.23 2.41 3.23 
Most 
Pathological 
MOA Score  
(7= Most 
Pathological) 





1.32 1.45 1.02 1.77 
 
 
Analysis of Co-Variance (F Ratio) 
 







   
Health Sickness  
RatingScale (HSRS) 
1.98 1.02 .02 
Test Record  
Variables 
   
Reality  
Testing (F+ %) 





.86 1.20 1.02 
Object Representation 
(Accurate) (OR+)  
   
Developmental  
Indexª  
.04 6.34** 1.93 
Developmental  
Mean  
0 4.99* .62 
Object Representation 
(Inaccurate) (OR‒) 
   
Developmental  
Indexª  
.34 1.26 1.27 
Developmental  
Mean  
.62 .34 1.01 
Mutuality  
of Autonomy (MOA) 
   
Mean  
MOA Score 
.06 .27 14.57*** 
Most Pathological 
MOA Score  
(7= Most Pathological) 
.54 .06 11.00*** 
Most Adaptive MOA 
Score 
(1= Most Adaptive) 
0 5.55** 2.47 
 
*= p <.05; **= p <.01; ***= p <.001; ªScore co-varied to control for total number of 
Rorschach responses (cf., Blatt & Ritzler, 1974, pp. 370-381; Blatt et al., 1975, pp. 235-
288; Blatt & Wild, 1976; Blatt et al., 1976, pp. 64-373; Blatt & Berman, 1984, pp. 226-
239; Blatt et al., 1988, pp. 127-158; Blatt & Blass, 1990, pp. 107-127; Blatt et al., 1990, 
pp. 711-728; Blatt, 1990a, pp. 299-335; Blatt, 1990b, pp. 394-416; Urist, 1977, pp. 3-9; 




Discussion          
The relative therapeutic efficacy of psychoanalysis versus psychotherapy 
seems contingent to a significant degree on the nature of the patient’s pathology 
and character structure. Anaclitic patients, those patients whose pathology and 
character structure focus on issues of interpersonal relatedness and who are likely to use 
avoidant defenses (e.g., denial and repression), have more constructive therapeutic 
response in psychotherapy than psychoanalysis, as measured by independent assessment 
of Rorschach protocols obtained prior to the initiation of treatment and again at 
termination. In contrast, introjective patients whose pathology and character 
structure focus on issues of self-definition, self-control, and self worth, and who 
utilize primarily counteractive defenses (e.g., projection, isolation, 
intellectualization, doing and undoing, reversal, overcompensation), have 
significantly more constructive change in psychoanalysis than in psychotherapy, as 
assessed by independent scoring of clinically relevant dimensions on Rorschach 
protocols.           
 These findings are consistent with Blatt’s findings about the nature of 
therapeutic change (cf., Blatt et al., 1988, pp. 127-158) and indicate the importance 
of including in future research on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy process and 
outcome clinically relevant discussions among different ‘types of patients’ and 
‘types of treatments’ and how the interaction of these two dimensions is done, or, 
in my terminology, how ‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ mutually 
affect each other, hence my key argument: this psychoanalytic development is 
inherent (obviously) to the scientific accuracy of psychoanalysis as stated in my 
Introduction (as shown above The MPRP demonstrates ‘the relative efficacy of 
psychoanalysis over psychotherapy’), or, more objectively, and, once again, in this 
Chapter the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ (unfolded in Chapter 3 and 4, but also 
in the next chapter: my Conclusion) was put under a methodological assessment, in 
accordance with the canons of scientific method per se, trying to demonstrate the 
scientific accuracy of psychoanalysis both as a theory of the mind and a treatment 
of the disorders of the mind, which I think I did (but I will still add some more 
elements to consolidate my argument).      
 Indeed, these findings are also consistent with the report by Horowitz that in 
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brief therapy for bereavement, patients with developmentally lower levels of self-
concept had poorer outcome in insight-oriented treatment, whereas patients with 
developmentally more advanced self-concept responded less well to supportive 
treatment (cf., Horowitz et al., 1984, pp. 438-448). It seems consistent than more 
dependent, interpersonally oriented patients worked more effectively in a therapeutic 
context in which there was greater face-to-face contact and personal interaction with the 
therapist. It also seems consistent that more ideational patients who stress their 
separation, autonomy, and independence should find the context of psychoanalysis 
more conductive to therapeutic progress.      
 The data found in my research indicate a significant patient-by-treatment 
interaction in which the congruence between the patient’s character style and 
important aspects of the therapeutic situation determine the efficacy of treatment 
outcome. It’s noteworthy, however, that these results reflect the effects of these forms 
of psychological intervention as they were practiced by the clinicians who participated 
in the data found in my research, once again: this data illustrates the interaction of 
‘types of patients’ and ‘types of treatments’ and how this interaction of these two 
dimensions is done, or, in my terminology, how ‘secondary discourse’ and 
‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other.    
 Therefore, it is my epistemological position that caution needs to be 
exercised about generalizing from these findings about the therapeutic effects of 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy to other settings, without more specific 
information about the clinicians who participated and their detailed conceptualizations 
(mitigated ‘secondary discourses’ in my terminology) of each of the two forms of 
treatment (something that is not doable here because of the very nature of a doctoral 
dissertation).           
 These results suggest that we must be aware that the therapeutic context 
presents at least two major dimensions to patients –a therapeutic relationship and 
the possibility of insight and understanding (cf., Blatt & Behrends, 1987, pp. 279-
297). Though these two dimensions are intertwined in the therapeutic process, 
some patients seem to value and be more responsive to the quality of the 
therapeutic relationship, while other patients seem to value and be more 
responsive to the interpretive activity of the therapist and the process of insight. 
While most patients undoubtedly gain from both of these therapeutic dimensions, the 
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results of my research suggest that different ‘types of patients’ may be more 
responsive to one or the other of these dimensions of the therapeutic process. 
 These same issues may also apply to the therapist’s attitudes toward the 
therapeutic process. While in a broad and general sense psychotherapy may 
highlight more the interpersonal and relational dimensions and psychoanalysis 
more the interpretive dimensions, both these dimensions exist in any treatment 
process, whether psychotherapy or psychoanalysis. Depending on the therapist’s 
therapeutic style and conceptualization of the treatment process, or, mutatis 
mutandis, in my terminology, how ‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ 
mutually affect each other, these two dimensions should appear in a relative 
balance in every psychotherapeutic endeavor (cf., Blatt & Behrends, 1987, pp. 279-
297).            
 While the data of the present research indicate that different ‘types of patients’ 
may respond differentially to these two dimensions of the treatment process, these 
results do not necessarily indicate that therapists should alter their therapeutic style to 
accommodate the characterological emphasis of a particular patient. The data do 
suggest, however, that therapists should be alert to the fact that different patients, at 
least in the early phases of the treatment, may be relatively more responsive to one or 
the other of these dimensions. These formulations of some of the dynamics of the 
treatment process around issues of the therapeutic relationship and the 
interpretive activity of the therapist suggest that these dimensions should be 
important considerations in transference interpretations and in the appreciation 
and understanding of counter-transference dynamics to infer the clinical validity 
of psychoanalytic practice in the clinical setting per se, unfolding its ‘primary 
discourse’, because, once again: ‘primary discourse’ is psychoanalytical clinical 
practice per se, but, as shown threw the data of the present research: the 
interaction of ‘types of patients’ and ‘types of treatments’ and how this interaction 
of these two dimensions is done, unfolds also, in my terminology, how ‘secondary 
discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other.   
 As discussed by Blatt and others, these results also suggest that it may be useful 
to view the therapeutic process, like psychological development more generally, as a 
process that involves a series of attachments and separations: ‘gratifying involvements’ 
and ‘experienced incompatibilities’ (cf., Blatt & Behrends, 1987, pp. 279-297) that 
311 
 
facilitate and contribute to internalization and the development of more mature levels of 
psychological structures or schema (cf., Blatt & Blass, 1990, pp. 107-127; Blatt, 1991, 
pp. 449-458).          
 Though anaclitic patients may be more responsive to the interpersonal 
dimensions of the treatment process and express their gains primarily in changes related 
to interpersonal relations, eventually anaclitic patients also have to deal with issues of 
self-definition. Overideational introjective patients, in contrast, appear to be more 
responsive to the interpretive aspects and the insights gained than to the relational 
aspects of the treatment process, and to express their gains primarily in a reduction of 
manifest symptoms and in better cognitive functioning. Introjective patients, however, 
must also deal with issues of interpersonal relatedness once major conflicts around self-
definition and self-worth have been resolved. In this way the therapeutic process 
enables both anaclitic and introjective individuals to reinitiate a disrupted 
dialectical developmental process unfolding, once again, in my terminology, how 
‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ mutually affect each other. 
 Normal personal development involves an integrated and coordinated 
development of self-definition and interpersonal relatedness, with each dimension 
developing in its own right as well as synergistically contributing to overall 
development. The therapeutic process, like normal development, should ultimately lead 
to the integration of the relatedness and self-definitional developmental lines, with the 
individual progressing to higher and more mature expressions in both developmental 
lines.           
 The results of my research also indicate that the Rorschach can be a 
valuable method for the systematic and independent assessment of the effects of 
long-term, intensive treatment. The analyses of Rorschach protocols used in this 
research appear to provide greater differentiation of therapeutic effects than clinical 
judgements, as expressed, for example, in the HSRS ratings. In addition, the Rorschach 
can provide levels of observation and assessment of clinically relevant dimensions that 
are congruent with the level of discourse and the types of changes expected in long-
term, intensive treatment.         
 Relatively recent developments in the analysis of Rorschach responses now 
provide ways of systematically assessing changes in the quality of object representation 
and the representation of interpersonal interactions (cf., Blatt, 1990b, pp. 394-416; Blatt 
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& Lerner, 1983, pp. 189-249; Blatt et al., 1976, pp. 64-373; Blatt et al., 1988, pp. 127-
158; Blatt et al., 1990, pp. 711-728; Urist, 1977, pp. 3-9; Urist & Shill, 1982, pp. 450-
454). Empirical research has demonstrated that these dimensions are significantly 
related to important clinical distinctions. The assessments of these dimensions on the 
Rorschach present in my research were differentially sensitive to therapeutic change in 
the two types of treatment evaluated in the MPRP.      
 It’s noteworthy that the dimensions of the Rorschach that were sensitive to 
therapeutic change with the outpatients present in my research, were variables designed 
to assess aspects of functioning in the neurotic range. Dimensions of the Rorschach 
designed to assess functioning more in the psychotic range (e.g., reality testing, thought 
disorder, and investment in inaccurately perceived, distorted, and possibly autistic 
object representations [OR–]) did not yield significant finding in my research of the 
relative efficacy of two forms of therapy with an outpatient sample.   
 Prior research, however (cf., Blatt & Ritzler, 1974, pp. 370-381; Blatt et al., 
1976, pp. 64-373; Blatt et al., 1988, pp. 127-158), indicates that these other aspects of a 
Rorschach protocol were more effective in evaluating therapeutic change in the 
intensive treatment of seriously disturbed, hospitalized adolescents and young adults. 
 In conclusion, the results of my research indicate a relative efficacy for the 
two different forms of therapy studied in the MPRP, but that the relative 
therapeutic efficacy of psychoanalysis over psychotherapy is contingent on the 
congruence of the type of treatment with the character structure of the patients. 
The findings also indicate that the Rorschach can be an effective independent 
method for assessing therapeutic change and the efficacy of different forms of therapy, 
particularly if the Rorschach protocols are evaluated systematically for dimensions that 
are congruent with the general level of psychological organization of the patients being 
studied. The Rorschach has not been used extensively in psychoanalytic and 
psychotherapy research in the past, but the recent development of new procedures for 
systematically assessing the quality of object representation on the Rorschach (cf., Blatt, 
1990b, pp. 394-416) suggests that the Rorschach is capable of providing data that 
may be particularly useful in assessing the effects of long-term, intensive 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, hence, my key argument: the ‘Menninger 
Psychotherapy Research Project’ (MPRP) infer the clinical validity of 
psychoanalytic practice in the clinical setting per se unfolding its ‘primary 
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discourse’, once again: ‘primary discourse’ is psychoanalytical clinical practice per 
se, but, as demonstrated by the data : the interaction of ‘types of patients’ and 
‘types of treatments’ and how this interaction of these two dimensions is done, 
unfolds also, in my terminology, how ‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary 
discourse’ mutually affect each other.      
 Indeed, repeating, once again and finally, the key argument of this Chapter 
(but connected with all the previous Chapters and connected with the following 
Chapter which is my Conclusion as mentioned): in contrast to the a-theoretical 
diagnostic system established by DSM-IV (cf., Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Livesley, 
1995; Mezzich, 1996; First, 1997; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997) and DSM-IV-TR (cf., 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000), based primarily on differences in 
manifest symptoms, the diagnostic differentiation between anaclitic and 
introjective pathologies is based on: ‘dynamic considerations, including differences 
in primary instinctual focus (libidinal versus aggressive), types of defensive 
organization (avoidant versus counteractive), and predominant character style 
(emphasis on object versus self-orientation, and on affects versus cognition)’ (cf., 
Blatt, 1991, pp. 449-458): as I said, my entire Chapter 2 (the ‘lion part’ of my 
Thesis) was focused, threw the different ‘secondary discourses’, in these ‘dynamic 
considerations’, hence, the absolute connection between this Chapter and Chapter 
2, and with my focus, unfolded throughout my entire dissertation, on the coherence 
of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that is the coherence of my 
doctoral Thesis as a whole (as again and again mentioned), hence, this Chapter is 
before my Conclusion, because it sows all the ‘secondary discourses’ unfolded in 
Chapter 2 with its clinical efficacy (The MPRP demonstrates, as shown threw the 
data, ‘the relative efficacy of psychoanalysis over psychotherapy’), or, more 
objectively, in this Chapter the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ (unfolded in Chapter 
3 and 4, but also in the next chapter: my Conclusion) was put under a 
methodological assessment, in accordance with the canons of scientific method per 
se, demonstrating –threw empirical data– the scientific accuracy of psychoanalysis 
(as stated in my Introduction) both as a theory of the mind and a treatment of the 







Practical Constructs: a ‘primary discourse’ 
The ‘analyst’s mind’: Epistemological conjectures and Clinical refutations 
 
Concluding as I started (see my Introduction) and to sow my Thesis all together 
one last time: it is the issue of the collapse of Freud’s original unitary vision for 
psychoanalysis and the rise in its place of a burgeoning and, in some ways, 
bewildering theoretical diversity, or pluralism as we now call it, that Wallerstein 
undertook to present in his Presidential Address to the 35
th
 International 
Psychoanalytical Congress in Montreal in 1987, entitled “One psychoanalysis or 
many?” (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), as a topic of importance and concern to the 
worldwide psychoanalytic community, in the hope that a dialogue about it enhance our 
shared psychoanalytic understanding and commitment. In that Presidential Address, 
Wallerstein proposed that this growth in our theoretical diversity, by then widely 
acknowledged and accepted as reflecting our discipline’s state of affairs worldwide, 
even in United States, raised two fundamental questions: (1) what, in view of this ever-
growing pluralism, still holds us together as common adherents of a shared 
psychoanalytic science and profession; and (2) the corollary, what do we have in 
common that marks us off from other, non-psychoanalytic psychologies, for surely 
not every kind of psychological understanding is psychoanalytic (cf., Wallerstein, 
1988c, pp. 5-22)?         
 Wallerstein’s response at that time –which subsequent analytic debate has 
revealed to be far from widely shared (cf., Roudinesco & Plon, 1997)– is that our 
‘common ground’ is to be found in our experience-near clinical theory, our concern 
with anxiety and defence, with conflict and compromise, with self and object 
representation, with transference and countertransference, and with the like clinical 
constructs (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) that Wallerstein posited as a 
‘common ground’ for our understandings and our interventions across the entire 
array of theoretical (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) perspectives (cf., 
Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22).       
 Wallerstein argues whereas our diversity is to be found in our experience-distant 
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general theories or metapsychologies, which we invoke to try to explain the structure 
and functioning of our minds, and how we think our technical interventions that are 
guided by our clinical theory (psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary discourse’, is 
applied after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ as 
mentioned many times throughout this dissertation) alter that mental functioning 
towards desired changes or psychic maturity or mental health –however we 
conceptualise those (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22).    
 Towards that end, Wallerstein dubbed our diverse general theories, our 
metapsychologies, as nothing but our scientific metaphors (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’), ‘quite loosely coupled’ to our clinical theories and observations (the 
‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary 
discourse’): “The [psychoanalytic clinical] method is one of association and cross-
referencing, a deconstruction, and only at the horizon of this dissolution (Lösung) 
or analysis can another reality be sketched: what is called an unconscious fantasy. 
There is no point-for-point correspondence, however, no analogy or similitude 
between the behavioral or conscious discursive sequence from which the 
associations start and the fragment of an unconscious sequence which can be 
outlined through cross-references. So much so that any method of a hermeneutic 
order –the direct transposition or translation of one discourse into another, be that 
second discourse Jungian, Kleinian, Lacanian or even Freudian– is ruled out. 
Ultimately, the reciprocal implication of method and object consists in the fact that 
the former is not only adapted to the latter but oriented, magnetically attracted by 
it” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 63; my alterations).      
 As Laplanche argues, as a ‘primary discourse’ ‘no analogy can be done 
between the behavioral or conscious discursive sequence from which the 
associations start and the fragment of an unconscious sequence’, but as a 
secondary discourse ‘scientific metaphors’, as Wallerstein posits, can be done and 
are done, because, if not, no theoretical advance was possible. And since each of 
our metapsychologies purports to explain the whole spectrum of psychopathology, 
and the proper roads to its amelioration, Wallerstein defends that we are without 
warrant, at least at this stage of our development as a science, to claim the greater 
heuristic usefulness or validity of any one of our general theories over the others, 
other than by the indoctrinations and allegiances built into us by the happenstance 
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of our individual trainings, our ‘differing personality dispositions’ and the 
explanatory predilections then carried over into our consulting rooms (cf., 
Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22).       
 Exactly for the reasons above mentioned by Wallerstein and also by 
Laplanche’s arguments, my research agenda was an overview of the development 
to this point of psychoanalysis as a discipline both as a theory of the mind –
formulated by Freud, Lacan, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Grotstein and 
Kernberg: these formulations unfold my theoretical prolegomena which were my 
Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, which constitutes what Laplanche (1999) 
calls the ‘secondary discourse’– and a treatment of the disorders of the mind: 
Freud’s clinical text illustrated by Chapter 3, my own clinical cases addressed in 
Chapter 4 and in this Conclusion, and a clinical update on the MPRP shown in 
Chapter 5: these were (my Conclusion is being done now, hence the ‘were’ in italic)  
my practical constructs, which Laplanche (1999) calls the ‘primary discourse’–, 
and offer a prediction, in this Conclusion, but that I’ve started in my Introduction, 
concerning evolving psychoanalytic development over its (near) future.  
 My focus was (and will be also my focus in this Conclusion) on the 
coherence of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that is the coherence of 
my doctoral Thesis as a whole: I’ve started with Freud’s strenuous endeavors to 
maintain ‘the’ psychoanalysis that he had single-handedly created as a unitary and 
unified theory, tracing then the breakdown of this effort, even in Freud’s lifetime –
with special emphasis on “Dora’s Case” (Chapter 3) and  Freud’s “Interpretation 
of Dreams”; because ‘the interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge 
of the unconscious activities of the mind’ (cf., Freud, 1900b, pp. 339-621) I’ve 
explained it threw the ‘dream-work’ Laplanche’s definition of the psychoanalytic 
clinical method (Chapter 1)– into the burgeoning theoretical diversity or 
‘pluralism’ that characterizes worldwide psychoanalysis today, and then I’ve 
unfolded, in Chapter 2, but also in my Introduction, throughout my entire Thesis 
(Chapter 4, Chapter 5) and (will be unfolded also) in this Conclusion, the 
beginning appearance of evidences (not yet widely remarked) of growing 
convergences from within very disparate and even seemingly very opposed 
theoretical perspectives, at least at the level of technical interventions and 
experience-near clinical theory, with implications, however, even for the level of 
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experience-distant general (metapsychological) theory: this was how the 
theoretical prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ relate to the practical/clinical 
constructs as a ‘primary discourse’.       
 All this was done under the hermeneutic meta-interpretation (Laplanche’s 
‘secondary discourse’) because I’ve unfolded a systematization of theories of mind 
interpreting them according to my clinical experience (the ‘analyst’s mind’; 
Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’). Such a development, if sustained, as I anticipate 
(and this doctoral Thesis also tries to promote), would strengthen the credibility of 
psychoanalysis as a science of the mind, amenable to growth: this growth 
constitutes the epistemological leap from the hermeneutic categorization to the 
positivist research) through empirical research: the MPRP (Chapter 5) was a 
heuristic example of how psychoanalytic clinical research should be done; a 
positivist approach because ‘falsifiable’ research has to be positivist– in 
accordance with the canons of scientific method.     
 Inherently, this Conclusion will summarize the present situation of 
psychoanalysis as one of increasing theoretical and practical diversity (sowing, 
once again, the theoretical prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ with the 
practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary discourse’) illustrating that the final aim 
of my entire dissertation is to consider in depth the impact of theoretical plurality 
on clinical practice and vice versa, because, as mentioned many times, 
Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work.     
 Indeed, after noting that the analyst has much more than evenly suspended 
attention in his mind as he works with his patient in a session, I will review both 
older and more recent contributions on what the analyst has in his mind when 
working with a patient. I will suggest that the subject has been addressed mainly 
from a single-person perspective as mentioned by Wallerstein (‘differing 
personality dispositions’; cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22). In this connection, and 
on the basis of clinical material, I will attempt to show how, against the 
background of the ‘implicit use of explicit theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’), an ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by the 
patient’s action and reaction takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s 
‘primary discourse’).         
 In my analysis of a session, I will introduce the concepts of ‘theoretical 
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reason and practical reason’, and contend that, whatever theories the analyst may 
have implicitly or explicitly in his mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’), they 
ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the ‘magnetism’ that 
Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’). 
Pursuing the same line of thought, I will describe validation in the clinical context 
as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and linguistic co-
(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between patient and analyst [this 
was seen not only in the MPRP (Chapter 5) but also in the ‘The Ulm 
Psychoanalytic Process Research Study Group’; the latter only referred briefly)]. 
This process includes mutual aspects of observation and of communicative and 
pragmatic validation.         
 In conclusion of my Conclusion, I will suggest that the figure of the 
craftsman is an appropriate description of the analyst in his conception 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) of his (deconstructive) work, whatever the 
theory he may espouse (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’). Indeed, I’ve defended 
this perspective throughout my entire Thesis because I agree completely with 
Laplanche (1999): the psychoanalytic clinical method is a deconstruction of what 
the patient’s unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of this 
‘magnetism’ that I defend that the analyst can only be a craftsman (in this 
Conclusion as just mentioned) integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a 
‘secondary discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’ [(only threw the ongoing 
process of decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and 
reaction which takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges 
unfolding the analyst’s conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, 
the ‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) 
constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse 
as a ‘secondary discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a 
secondary discourse’, is always applied after the clinical work, which is the 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’] as Laplanche argues. Theoretical models are 
hermeneutic because there is a meta-interpretation of the theory done by each 
analyst, and my literature review (Chapter 2) was based entirely in this premise, 
but the interpretation of the unconscious manifestations is not hermeneutic exactly 
for the reasons mentioned (Chapter 1) by Laplanche.     
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 I’ve developed throughout my Thesis this dynamic. It seems a paradox but 
it is not because as it is obvious from what I just said: Psychoanalytic theory comes 
after clinical work as all Freud’s ‘cases’ illustrated and the best example of my 
statement is the “Interpretation of Dreams”. The importance of the analysis of 
Freud’s “The Interpretation of Dreams” and how it related to my literature review 
(Chapter 2) and what this analysis contributed to the achievement of my initial 
research goals was demonstrated by what I said in Chapter 1 concerning the 
psychoanalytical clinical method: ‘it was only during the 19thC, particularly after 
the impact caused by Comtian positivism, that the term «clinical method» was 
introduced in medicine specifically to name a set of social, analytical, therapeutic 
and propædeutic techniques. These practices did spread rapidly. By the end of the 
century even Freud had adopted them as the hidden epistemological structure but 
he abandoned it with the publication of the “Interpretation of Dreams” where he 
created the «psychoanalytic clinical method»’.      
 Accordingly, once again: the key difference between the clinical method and 
the psychoanalytic clinical method is that in the latter there is a never-ending 
deconstruction “work[ing] out the dissolution [Lösung] of the dream” (Freud, 1900, 
2, in Studienausgabe, p. 280; my alterations); ‘the dream is the royal road to the 
unconscious’ and what is an absolute of the psychoanalytic clinical method is its 
deconstructive ‘way’ to ‘follow/explore/discover’ the ‘unconscious fantasy’ (cf. 
Laplanche, op. cit.): ‘when at the bedside (couch) of a sufferer’ is an analyst where: 
“the reciprocal implication of method and object consists in the fact that the 
former is not only adapted to the latter but oriented, magnetically attracted by it” 
(Laplanche, op. cit., p. 63; my alteration). On the contrary, the clinical method is a 
‘way to follow when at the bedside of a sufferer’ not by a deconstructing way of 
explore the unconscious fantasy but as a way of constructing nosological 
categorizations of how to explain the organic or conscious pathology, hence my 
epistemological distance concerning the a-theoretical diagnostic system established 
by DSM-IV (cf., Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Livesley, 1995; Mezzich, 1996; First, 
1997; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997) and DSM-IV-TR (cf., American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), based primarily on differences in manifest symptoms as I’ve 
illustrated over and over again in Chapter 5.      
 Only the psychoanalytic clinical method (Chapter 1) tries to understand 
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(verstehen), not explain (erklären), the unconscious fantasies. That is why 
(following Freud’s own words as I’ve illustrated) the “Interpretation of Dreams” 
as a ‘secondary discourse’ relate with the psychoanalytical practical/clinical 
constructs as a ‘primary discourse’ –hence the importance I gave to it in 
elaborating an entire chapter (Chapter 1, which is entitled precisely ‘The 
Psychoanalytical Clinical Method’) on the foundational text of the psychoanalytic 
clinical method: the “Interpretation of Dreams”–, meaning, as I above mentioned, 
the “Interpretation of Dreams” is where Freud created the ‘psychoanalytic clinical 
method’: all psychoanalytic practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary discourse’  
are inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method created by Freud in the 
“Interpretation of Dreams”: the ‘magnetism between method and its object’ (the 
‘unconscious fantasy’) constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’: all the 
theories that I’ve schematized in my literature review (Chapter 2) constitute a 
‘secondary discourse’ regarding Freud’s psychoanalytic clinical method: the 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’.        
 After this final clarification, in my Thesis I’ve also established (and will be 
also established in this Conclusion) the scientific accuracy or truth-value 
interpretations in clinical work (mainly in my Introduction, Chapter 5, but also 
throughout my Thesis) providing concrete examples of how the analyst 
deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of what theoretical model he 
embraces: the keynote here was always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work: by a 
permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of what the 
analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models.      
 Indeed, the Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-
ending dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical 
method) in its essence. Freud is the first object relations theorist because object 
relations have, like all other schools of psychoanalytic thought (like Laplanche 
states), as their ‘primary discourse’ the deconstruction: the theoretical meta-
interpretations of Freud, Fairbairn, Bion, Matte-Blanco, Lacan, Grotstein and 
Kernberg (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) constitute all clinical dissolutions 
inherent to the psychoanalytic clinical method. That is why I’ve stated in my 
literature review (Chapter 2) that all these authors follow Freud –directly or 
indirectly, theoretically speaking– building up a syncretic universalist model 
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unified exactly by the Rosetta stone of psychoanalysis: its deconstructive method. 
I’ve stated even more: the more the theorist differs from Freud and the more the 
theorist deconstructs Freud, the more the theory is following the vital essence of 
psychoanalytic clinical method: once again, the deconstruction.   
 Accordingly, once again: the ‘common ground’ that I’ve argued (in my  
Introduction, in my Chapter 2 and unfolded throughout my entire Thesis) is 
nothing more, as Wallerstein also recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), 
than acknowledge that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations 
that configures the form of our ‘secondary discourse’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’): they are all formalizations of the analyst’s psychic process present in 
the clinical session; that is why Bion’s Grid, Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s 
bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the formalization of the analyst’s psychic process 
not as a ‘primary discourse’ but as a ‘secondary discourse’: they are 
epistemological tools that have only one purpose: being deconstructed by the 
‘analyst’s mind’ (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’) in the clinical session. That is 
why we call it a formalization of the psychic process: it is its form, not its content.
 In this connection, what I will summarize in this Conclusion (repeating 
myself ipsis verbis to be absolutely clear about what were and what are my Thesis 
aims) is the present situation of psychoanalysis as one of increasing theoretical and 
practical diversity (sowing, once again, the theoretical prolegomena as a 
‘secondary discourse’ with the practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary 
discourse’) illustrating that the final aim of my entire dissertation is to consider in 
depth the impact of theoretical plurality on clinical practice and vice versa, 
because, as mentioned many times, Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work.
 Indeed, after noting that the analyst has much more than evenly suspended 
attention in his mind as he works with his patient in a session, I will review both 
older and more recent contributions on what the analyst has in his mind when 
working with a patient. I will suggest that the subject has been addressed mainly 
from a single-person perspective as mentioned by Wallerstein (‘differing 
personality dispositions’; cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22). In this connection, and 
on the basis of my own clinical material, I will attempt to show how, against the 
background of the ‘implicit use of explicit theories’ (Laplanche’s ‘secondary 
discourse’), an ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by the 
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patient’s action and reaction takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the analyst’s 
‘primary discourse’). In my analysis of a session, I will introduce the concepts of 
‘theoretical reason and practical reason’ (concepts that sow the theoretical 
prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ with the clinical/practical constructs as a 
‘primary discourse’), and contend that, whatever theories the analyst may have 
implicitly or explicitly in his mind (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’), they 
ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the ‘magnetism’ that 
Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’).  
 Pursuing the same line of thought, I will describe validation in the clinical 
context as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and linguistic co-
(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between patient and analyst: this 
was seen not only in the MPRP (Chapter 5) but also in the ‘The Ulm 
Psychoanalytic Process Research Study Group’; the latter only referred briefly in 
this Conclusion. This process includes mutual aspects of observation and of 
communicative and pragmatic validation. In this Conclusion, I will also suggest 
that the figure of the craftsman is an appropriate description of the analyst in this 
conception of his (deconstructive) clinical work (Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’), 
whatever the theory he may espouse (Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) as again 
and again mentioned.         
 Indeed, after sowing my Thesis all together one last time, and returning to the 
introduction of this Conclusion [(which will also sow my Thesis all together, but in a 
conclusive way (obviously)]: the last decades have been characterized by increasingly 
vigorous debate on theoretical (as a ‘secondary discourse’) and practical/clinical (as 
a ‘primary discourse’) diversity in psychoanalysis as I’ve illustrated throughout my 
entire Thesis. Two contributions by Wallerstein mentioned many times throughout this 
dissertation (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22; Wallerstein, 1990, pp. 3-20) marked the 
official birth of a period of institutional discussion in international psychoanalysis. 
Wallerstein recognized: “our increasing psychoanalytic diversity (…), a pluralism of 
theoretical perspectives, of linguistic and thought conventions, of distinctive regional, 
cultural, and language emphases” (Wallerstein, 1988c, p. 5).    
 In the light of this evidence, as I said above, Wallerstein asks us: “what it is, in 
view of this increasing diversity that still holds us together as common adherents of a 
shared psychoanalytic science and profession?” (Wallerstein, ib.). In his search for 
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‘common ground’, Wallerstein suggests that this must be located: ‘‘in the clinical 
enterprise” (Wallerstein, 1990, p. 7; my bold). In Wallerstein’s (1990) view, what we 
can have in common is a similar way of relating to our patients in the here and now 
of the interplay of transference and counter-transference, or, in my terminology, 
the similar way of relating to our patients in the here and now of the interplay of 
transference and counter-transference is how ‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary 
discourse’ mutually affect each other. At any rate, Wallerstein is here pleading for a 
change of focus from theory to practice –that is, to the privacy of therapeutic activity 
in the analyst’s consulting room. And there is no doubt that the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the 
analyst’s ‘primary discourse’) is an essential part of the intimacy of the ‘clinical 
enterprise’.           
 What we see in psychoanalysis is in fact not so much pluralism as mere plurality, 
or, worse still, theoretical fragmentation, since we lack a methodology for systematic 
comparison of the various theories and technical approaches (hence the absolute 
pertinence that I attribute to Chapter 5 and inherent connections, for example, 
with Chapter 2). Ricardo Bernardi (2005) seems to share these fears when he wonders 
what comes after pluralism, and enquires into the conditions necessary for the diversity 
observed in the psychoanalytic field to become a factor of progress. Bernardi’s (2002, 
2003) research on how we psychoanalysts argue in our controversies leaves us with a 
pessimistic feeling about our capacity to meet on ‘common ground’, but, once again: 
the ‘common ground’ that I’ve argued in my Introduction, in my Chapter 2 and 
unfolded throughout my entire Thesis is nothing more, as Wallerstein also 
recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), than acknowledge that there are a 
pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of our 
‘secondary discourse’(in my terminology).      
 Yet David Tuckett considers that this crisis carries with it an opportunity for 
change: “For too long, and too often, psychoanalysts have tended to conduct arguments 
in a manner more ideological than subject to reason. Arguments warranted by reference 
to authority, arguments derived from analogy or metaphor, the canonization and 
‘Indexing’ of texts, and a certain tendency towards isolationism from other disciplines 
relevant to our field, have been standard features of our discipline. (...) It is time not 
only to review our methodology for assessing our truths, but also to develop 
approaches that will make it possible to be open to new ideas while also being able 
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to evaluate their usefulness by reasoned argument. The alternative is the Tower of 
Babel (Tuckett, 1994a, p. 865; my bold; see my Introduction and Chapter 2 with 
Kernberg’s arguments at the end). 
It therefore seems impossible to overcome the impasse without improving the 
rational basis of our arguments and, ultimately, without modifying the paradigm of the 
construction of theory in psychoanalysis (cf., Thomä & Kächele, 2006; see my 
Chapter 2, where I explain, not arbitrarily in the beginning with the example of 
Grünbaum, and later on, following Bion, what are the criteria that construct a 
valid theory in psychoanalysis).        
 In this Conclusion, however, rather than concentrating on the fears 
expressed by some of the just mentioned authors, I will summarize (repeating 
myself ipsis verbis to be absolutely clear about what were and what are my Thesis 
aims) the present situation of psychoanalysis as one of increasing theoretical and 
practical diversity (sowing, once again, the theoretical prolegomena as a 
‘secondary discourse’ with the practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary 
discourse’) illustrating that the final aim of my entire dissertation is to consider in 
depth the impact of clinical practice on theoretical plurality and vice versa because, 
as mentioned many times, Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work as I’ve 
argued throughout my entire Thesis and present now my final argument as again 
and again mentioned.        
 Ultimately, after all, we clinicians must be capable of finding our bearings in the 
midst of an enormous diversity of theories of very different origins and levels of 
abstraction. This presents us with the challenge of operating with a number of 
theories as a ‘secondary discourse’ simultaneously in our minds without losing 
coherence as we work with the patient unfolding its ‘primary discourse’. 
 Moreover, the situation has lately become even more complicated, as the 
growing permeability of the psychoanalytic community to neighboring sciences 
and disciplines (the cognitive and affective neurosciences; research on the early 
mother–baby relationship as I’ve illustrated in Chapter 2 especially with Bion; 
research on psychotherapeutic process and outcome as I’ve shown in Chapter 5) 
has added still more ‘secondary discourses’ to the psychoanalyst’s clinical work 
and how he unfolds its ‘primary discourse’. Besides metapsychological and 
theoretical-clinical publications, we are witnessing a growing number of applications of 
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the theory of therapeutic change from fields outside but related to psychoanalysis proper 
(cf., Beebe & Lachmann, 2002).        
 In this way, a tension arises in the theory of therapeutic technique between 
traditional clinical knowledge and modern approaches based on empirical and 
experimental research, and this calls for a process of reflective integration with a 
view to maximizing synergy and coherence in our therapeutic activity.  
Yet the enormous range and diversity of theories as a ‘secondary discourse’ 
currently available to the analyst contrasts with the rarity of studies that seek to 
explore how the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’) works in a 
situation of pluralism as a ‘secondary discourse’. Quite probably, apart from possible 
causes in epistemology (cf., Fonagy et al., 1999) and in the sociology of knowledge, the 
origins of the theoretical fragmentation may lie precisely in the lack of interest in 
exploring the complex psychological and knowledge-acquisition processes that 
unfold in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’) as one of the 
main sources of diversity and pluralism as a ‘secondary discourse’ in 
psychoanalysis.         
 Identification of the conditions in which pluralism as a ‘secondary 
discourse’ operates in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’)  thus 
becomes an urgent challenge (and my Thesis tries to answer to this challenge), 
since, as Victoria Hamilton points out: “although many psychoanalysts agree that 
pluralism is here to stay, it is not easy to spell out the connections between the 
ideology of pluralism and its application in clinical practice” (Hamilton, 1996, p. 24; 
my alterations). In the psychoanalytic debate, a frequent question is whether the 
different theories as a ‘secondary discourse’ might have arisen partly from the 
analysis of different ‘types of patients’ as I’ve illustrated in Chapter 5.  
 This may be the case in part, but there are indications that pluralism as a 
‘secondary discourse’ goes much deeper, because the last few decades have 
brought confirmation that interpretations vary considerably even with material of 
one and the same patient (cf., Bernardi, 1989; Pulver, 1987) as I’ve shown in my 
Introduction.          
 If the question is posed in these terms, the exercise of pluralism as a 
‘secondary discourse’ of course becomes a difficult task. At any rate, the 
practical/clinical problem as a ‘primary discourse’ is how to work with the 
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different theoretical models as a ‘secondary discourse’, given Strenger’s view that: 
“pluralism is not identical with relativism. (...) The relativist says that the same 
proposition can be both true and false, depending on how you look at it. The pluralist 
shows that the standards of rightness associated with different versions can neither 
be reduced to each other nor meaningfully be taken to compete. The pluralist does 
not believe that the same proposition can be both true and false; he assumes that certain 
theories are incommensurable, i.e., not comparable with each other” (Strenger, 1991, p. 
160; my bold).         
 From my perspective, as I’ve argued throughout my entire dissertation, 
pluralism as a ‘secondary discourse’ does not preclude realism, since the a priori 
condition of possibility for any theory in psychoanalysis and for any dialogue 
between psychoanalysts is that there shall be a reality that transcends the observer, 
even when it can be apprehended only fragmentarily and partially: the 
‘unconscious fantasy’ (cf., Strenger, 1991; Cavell, 1993; Laplanche, 1999), as 
mentioned throughout my Thesis over and over again, but specially in Chapter 1 
with Laplanche’s arguments. On the other hand, the assumption of an intersubjective 
viewpoint does not on any account eliminate the concept of an objective world with 
which we are in contact and with respect to which we endeavor to be more or less 
objective.           
 As Cavell notes: “both a real, shared, external world and the concept of such a 
world are indispensable to propositional thought, and to the capacity to know one’s own 
thoughts as thoughts, as a subjective perspective on the world” (Cavell, 1998, p. 79). An 
idea such as this opens the door to pluralism as a ‘secondary discourse’, that is to 
say, to an intermediate path between a situation of total incommensurability 
between theories and a theoretical monism that could be upheld only from an 
authoritarian posture as I’ve illustrated in Chapter 2 specially at the end with 
Kernberg’s arguments.         
 Jordán (2004) suggests that the capacity to make correlations and thereby to 
work with common sense with the patient in the session is facilitated if the analyst 
operates with more than one theoretical system in his mind as I’ve argued in all the 
Chapters of my Thesis and I will also argue in this Conclusion. But as Gabbard 
reminds us: “for some clinicians, however, shifting from one clinical perspective to 
another, depending on the patient’s needs, is too cumbersome and unwieldy” (Gabbard, 
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1990, p. 58; concerning Gabbard’s heuristic arguments see my Introduction).
 Wallerstein (1988c), on the other hand, claims that it is possible to pay 
attention to the clinical phenomena described by each theoretical perspective 
without espousing the entire theoretical model as a ‘secondary discourse’ per se (in 
my terminology) as I’ve showed in my Introduction, Chapter 1, Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and I will also show in this Conclusion. Many 
psychoanalysts do indeed consider that different patients with different 
psychopathological structures need different theoretical approaches as my last 
Chapter concerning the Menninger Psychotherapy Research Project illustrated. 
 In this connection, Gabbard advocates pragmatism: “Each of these 
approaches to the theoretical pluralism of modern psychoanalysis is workable for 
some clinicians. Regardless of which approach is found more suitable, all clinicians 
should be wary of rigidly imposing theory onto clinical material. The patient must 
be allowed to lead the clinician into whatever theoretical realm is the best match 
for the clinical material. (…) Finding the theoretical framework that best fits a 
particular patient entails a great deal of exploratory trial and error” (Gabbard, 
1990, p. 58; my alterations). 
 
The analysing mind: Something more than evenly suspended attention 
I use the concept of the ‘analysing mind’ to denote the mind of the analyst 
working with his patient in the session trying to unfold its ‘primary discourse’. The 
idea is that the analyst’s analytic competence extends far beyond the ‘analysed mind’. 
 It is hardly necessary to say that if it is necessary to find ‘common ground’ as a 
‘secondary discourse’ in clinical practice as a ‘primary discourse’, the study of what 
the analyst ‘has in his mind’ is bound to encounter problems from the beginning, for the 
simple reason that what the analyst may really have in his mind during analysis is 
not obvious on an absolute level: it is here that the formalization of psychic process 
in the clinical session like Bion’s Grid, Lacan’s mathemes, or Matte-Blanco’s bi-
logic become vital epistemological ‘tools’ to the analyst as I’ve illustrated in 
Chapter 2. All that is really clear is what he ought to have in his mind –or rather, 
what he ought not to have in it. This was determined by Freud himself in his 
‘recommendations on technique’ (cf., Freud, 1912f, pp. 109-120).  
 Freud’s advice can ultimately be subsumed in a single precept, inherent in the 
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rule of ‘evenly suspended attention’, whereby the analyst is counselled to behave like a 
remote surgeon who puts aside all his feelings, or a mirror that reflects only what is 
shown to it.           
 Yet, Freud’s perceptive intent met with an important obstacle –namely, the 
inevitable existence of blind spots in the analyst’s psychoanalytic perception as I’ve 
illustrated in Chapter 2 with  Freud’s, Bion’s, Alford’s and (a part of) Object 
Relations School ‘secondary discourse’ concerning ‘the world of «thanatos»’. 
 Freud had no doubt that observance of the psychoanalytic clinical method 
(Chapter 1) was constantly jeopardized by various resistances arising within the analyst 
himself. It was but a vain hope that Ferenczi (1928; see below) was expressing when he 
claimed that the training analysis, the: “psycho-analytic purification” (Freud, 1912f, p. 
116) would help to eliminate the blind spots and, with them, the theoretical and 
technical divergences in psychoanalysis.      
 However, Ferenczi himself stressed the immense complexity of the mental work 
expected of the analyst: allowing the patient’s free associations to act on him; giving 
free rein to his ‘unconscious phantasy’ (as I’ve illustrated with Laplanche’s 
arguments in Chapter 1) to enable him to elaborate the material supplied by the 
patient’s associations; comparing in the here and now newly emerging links with 
previous results of analysis; and exercising unremitting vigilance over, and maintaining 
a critical eye on, his own subjectivity. In the view of Ferenczi, the ‘analyst’s mind’: 
“swings continuously between empathy, self-observation and making judgements” 
(Ferenczi, 1928, p. 96).         
 We do now know, from his letter of 4 January 1928 to Ferenczi, that Freud was 
aware of the limitations of his recommendations. With regard to the title of Ferenczi’s 
contribution on the elasticity of technique, Freud writes: “For my recommendations on 
technique which I gave back then were essentially negative. I considered the most 
important thing to emphasize what one should not do, to demonstrate the temptations 
that work against analysis. Almost everything that is positive that one should do I left to 
‘tact’, which has been introduced by you. But what I achieved in so doing was that the 
obedient ones didn’t take notice of the elasticity of these dissuasions and subjected 
themselves to them as if they were taboos. That had to be revised at some time, without, 
of course, revoking the obligations” (Freud & Ferenczi, 2000, p. 332).   
 Of course, we analysts are to this day debating the nature of the ‘obligations’ that 
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are held to define what is specifically psychoanalytic, but have not arrived at clear or 
definitive conclusions. Be that as it may, a growing consensus has arisen in the last few 
years to the effect that there is much more to the analyst–patient relationship than 
the mere interplay of transference and counter-transference.   
 Indeed, if, as Wallerstein (1990) argues, what we can have in common is a 
similar way of relating to our patients in the here and now of the interplay of 
transference and counter-transference, or, in my terminology, the similar way of 
relating to our patients in the here and now of the interplay of transference and 
counter-transference is how ‘secondary discourse’ and ‘primary discourse’ 
mutually affect each other, and there is much more to the analyst–patient 
relationship than this interplay of transference<>counter-transference and 
‘secondary discourse’<>‘primary discourse’ mutuality: that much more is, from 
my perspective, the ‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method and 
its object’ as a ‘primary discourse’ per se, as I’ve defended throughout my entire 
Thesis, but specially in Chapter 1 with Laplanche’s arguments, which sows with 
the ‘common ground’ that I’ve argued in my Introduction, in my Chapter 2 and 
unfolded throughout my entire Thesis, which was nothing more, as Wallerstein 
also recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), than acknowledge that there are 
a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the form of our 
‘secondary discourse’ (in my terminology). I’ve defended this perspective 
throughout my entire Thesis because I agree completely with Laplanche (1999): 
the psychoanalytic clinical method is a deconstruction of what the patient’s 
unconscious manifests to the ‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of this ‘magnetism’ 
that I will defend in this Conclusion that the analyst can only be a craftsman 
integrating the theoretical models in his mind as a ‘secondary discourse’ but never 
as a ‘primary discourse’: only threw the ongoing process of decision-making that is 
co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction which takes place in the 
‘analyst’s mind’ the ‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the analyst’s 
conception of his (deconstructive) work; or, in other words, the ‘magnetism 
between method and its object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes any analyst’s 
‘primary discourse’, whatever the theory he may espouse as a ‘secondary 
discourse’; or, more objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary discourse’, is 
always applied after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ as 
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Laplanche argues. Theoretical models are hermeneutic because there is a meta-
interpretation of the theory done by each analyst, and my literature review 
(Chapter 2) was based entirely in this premise, but the interpretation of the 
unconscious manifestations is not hermeneutic exactly for the reasons mentioned 
(Chapter 1) by Laplanche.  I’ve developed throughout my Thesis this dynamic, 
because as it is obvious from what I have been saying since the beginning of this 
dissertation: Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work.    
 Indeed, according to a broad conception of the psychoanalytic relationship, the: 
“real characteristics of the participants and a highly primitive object relationship” 
(Infante, 1968, p. 767; my bold) are the support and framework of the analytic process. 
Various authors (cf., Arlow & Brenner, 1988; Pulver, 1987; Bernardi, 1989) have 
demonstrated the effect of the theories the analyst has in his mind on selective 
listening to the material as I’ve illustrated in my Introduction.   
 Meyer (1988) points out that the analyst’s personal equation is also manifested 
in cognitive styles that condition his attitude and the way he perceives and thinks of the 
patient. Stein suggests that the: “analyst’s emotional reactions in the analysis depend on 
the analyst’s theoretical convictions of what does and does not constitute good analysis” 
(Stein, 1991, p. 326). On the other hand, it is hard to overestimate the perceptive 
functions of the visions of man and the world implicit in the various theories, 
whether personal as mitigated ‘secondary discourses’ or those of schools of thought 
as wider ‘secondary discourses’ as I’ve illustrated in Chapter 2.  
 In the last few years, exploration of the mental processes of the analyst as he 
works with his patient has been boosted by the activity of the European 
Psychoanalytical Federation’s Working Party on Theoretical Issues (EPF-WPTI), 
which opted to consider first the issue of the role and significance of ‘implicit 
(private, preconscious) theories in clinical practice’ (cf., Canestri et al., 2006, pp. 29-
44; Silvan, 2005).          
 This research programme takes as its starting point the pioneering view 
expressed by Joseph Sandler in 1983, hence the importance I gave to him in my 
Introduction: “With increasing clinical experience the analyst, as he grows more 
competent, will preconsciously (descriptively speaking, ‘unconsciously’) construct a 
whole variety of theoretical segments which relate directly to his clinical work. They 
are the products of unconscious thinking, are very much partial theories, models or 
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schemata, which have the quality of being available in reserve, so to speak, to be called 
upon whenever necessary. That they may contradict one another is no problem. They 
coexist happily as long as they are ‘unconscious’” (Sandler, 1983, p. 38, my 
alterations).           
 In the construction of the ‘map of private (implicit, preconscious) theories 
in clinical practice’ (cf., Canestri et al., 2006, pp. 29-44) the WPTI offers the 
psychoanalytic community a systematic qualitative research design based on the 
study of: (a) clinical reports of analytic work; (b) the clinical experience of the 
group members; and (c) each analyst’s negotiation of the public theory that he 
espouses in a wide range of contexts.       
 On the basis of these experiences, the authors have identified six categories, or 
vectors that seem relevant to how concepts are used in the practice of 
psychoanalysis (once again, it is here that the formalization of psychic process in 
the clinical session like Bion’s Grid, Lacan’s mathemes, or Matte-Blanco’s bi-logic 
become vital epistemological ‘tools’ to the analyst as I’ve illustrated in Chapter 2). 
Applying a heuristic model, they explore the psychic space of the analyst’s theory, 
ordering it in accordance with differing theoretical and motivational elements and 
knowledge structures with its topographical classification (mutatis mutandis, see 
my Lacan’s review in Chapter 2). The vectors are not independent of each other, 
and various elements classified within one vector may also be included in another. 
In terms of the model, these vectors interact dynamically, determining the 
formation of clinical judgements and the analyst’s therapeutic interventions in 
accordance with the weight or value assigned to them (mutatis mutandis, see my 
Bion’s review in Chapter 2 specially Bion’s Grid, but also Chapter 5).  
 Very briefly, the six vectors, or categories, are: ‘(1) the topographical vector, 
which contains the psychic level on which theoretical thought takes place (non-public, 
conscious, preconscious, or unconscious); (2) the conceptual vector, which includes 
ideological formations or ones containing a vision of the world (e.g. tragic or romantic); 
(3) the ‘action’ vector, which includes the role ascribed to evenly suspended attention in 
listening, the way in which interpretations are formulated verbally, and the way the 
analyst interacts practically with the patient; (4) the ‘object relations of knowledge’ 
vector, which includes the affiliations and loyalties resulting from the psychoanalytic 
training system; (5) the ‘coherence versus contradiction’ vector, which includes the way 
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in which contradictions are handled theoretically (elasticity and tolerance of 
contradictions); (6) the developmental vector, which includes evaluation of the 
preferred type of material (verbal or non-verbal) or of a given phase of development’ 
(cf., Canestri et al., 2006, pp. 29-44; mutatis mutandis, see my entire Chapter 2, 
specially Bion’s review and Bion’s Grid, but also Chapter 5).    
 Indeed, exploration of the ‘implicit understanding of clinical material beyond 
theory’ (cf., Canestri, 2006, pp. 13-28) admittedly casts light on the concrete 
conditions brought about by pluralism as a ‘secondary discourse’ in the ‘analyst’s 
mind’ trying to unfold its ‘primary discourse’. However, from my perspective, one 
aspect is insufficiently considered in this approach. This concerns the way in which the 
various vectors or categories described by the WPTI interact in the ‘analyst’s mind’ and 
in the analytic situation. It seems to me, as I will illustrate later with my clinical 
material that what could be called the ‘movement’ or ‘dynamic considerations’ of 
‘partial theories, models or schemata’ (cf., Sandler, 1983; see my Introduction, 
Chapter 2 and the end of Chapter 5 concerning these ‘dynamic considerations’ 
and with my focus, unfolded throughout my entire dissertation, on the coherence 
of psychoanalysis as a theoretical structure and that was and is the coherence of 
my doctoral Thesis as a whole as again and again mentioned) is co-determined by the 
patient in his interaction with the analyst. The problem of an interpersonal and 
intersubjective heuristic arises here, because what is involved is the role we assign to the 
link (or interaction) between two minds working together.      
 By this I am suggesting that in the ‘analyst’s mind’ there comes into being 
an ongoing progress of decision-making which, against the background of the 
‘implicit use of explicit theories’ (‘implicit use’ indicates a process of decision-
making determined by practical/clinical reasons that assess the use-related value, 
or utility, of explicit theories at a given moment; the guiding question in this case is 
not why but for what purpose), is constantly influenced by the patient’s action and 
reaction, because, as again and again mentioned: the psychoanalytic clinical 
method is a deconstruction of what the patient’s unconscious manifests to the 
‘analyst’s mind’. It is because of this ‘magnetism’ that I defend in this Conclusion 
that the analyst can only be a craftsman integrating the theoretical models in his 
mind as a ‘secondary discourse’ but never as a ‘primary discourse’: as I said just 
now, only threw the ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by 
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the patient’s action and reaction which takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the 
‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the analyst’s conception of his 
(deconstructive) work; or, in other words, the ‘magnetism between method and its 
object’ (the unconscious fantasy) constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, 
whatever the theory he may espouse as a ‘secondary discourse’; or, more 
objectively, psychoanalytical theory, ‘a secondary discourse’, is always applied 
after the clinical work, which is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ as Laplanche 
argues.           
 Indeed, the processes of validation –or invalidation– of the analyst’s 
interpretations take place in the course of this interaction, that is (once again): only 
threw the ongoing process of decision-making that is co-determined by the 
patient’s action and reaction which takes place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ the 
‘primary discourse’ emerges unfolding the analyst’s conception of his 
(deconstructive) work.        
 Accordingly, the recent work in progress of the EPF’s Working Party on 
Theoretical Issues is connected with earlier developments that date back to Ferenczi 
(1928; see above) himself and can be included in what I am arguing since the beginning 
of this dissertation as just now mentioned. Indeed, in addition to the study by Ramzy 
(1974) on analytic inference, some authors, influenced, paradoxically, by the 
‘emergence of cognitive psychology’ (Holt, 1964), have made important contributions 
to the investigation and description of the analyst’s mental phenomena during a session 
(cf., Greenson, 1960; Bowlby, 1969; Peterfreund, 1975). What all these authors have 
in common is their dissatisfaction with metapsychology as an appropriate theory 
for describing and understanding how the ‘analyst’s mind’ works in session with 
the patient.           
 In the view of Holt (1964), the analyst’s cognitive processes include a wide 
range of phenomena: “perceiving, judging, forming concepts, learning (especially that 
of a meaningful, verbal kind), imagining, fantasying, imaging, creating, and solving 
problems” (Holt, 1964, p. 650). In his study of the analyst’s processes of ‘emotional 
knowing’ (that is, the process of empathic understanding), Greenson (1960) suggests 
that in his daily work with the patient –concretely, during breaks or in the explanation 
of disruptions of empathy– the analyst constructs a ‘working model’ that combines 
different aspects and characteristics, both physical and psychic, of the patient. In the 
334 
 
course of analytic work the analyst listens: “through this working model. (…) The 
conception of a working model of the patient implies a special kind of internal object 
representative. It is an internal representation which is not merged with the self and 
yet is not alien to the self. By cathecting the working model as a supplement to the 
external patient one approaches the identificatory processes” (Greenson, 1960, pp. 421- 
423; my bold), that is (advancing in my final argument): even with the ‘implicit use of 
a explicit theory’ ‘which is not merged with the self and yet is not alien to the self’, 
this implicit use of a theory still unfold a ‘secondary discourse’. I do agree that the 
recent ‘map of private (implicit, preconscious) theories in clinical practice’ (cf., 
Canestri et al., 2006, pp. 29-44) the WPTI offers the psychoanalytic community 
unfolds the ‘implicit understanding of clinical material beyond theory’ and 
Greenson’s older contribution on this subject tried to do the same, but in spite of 
these contributions sow the theoretical prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ 
with the practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary discourse’, they just try to 
unfold the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, which is different from unfolding it.
 Indeed, empathic listening through the ‘working model’ is a function of the 
analyst’s experiential self (mutatis mutandis, see my Bion’s review in Chapter 2 
specially Bion’s Grid). Accordingly, Bowlby (1969) argues the same: “models 
described here (…) are (…) none other than the internal worlds of traditional 
psychoanalytic theory seen in a new perspective” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 82; my bold). 
Peterfreund defends the same: ‘the stored programs and data that make up the various 
operational models represent specific selections of the total data available over time’ 
(cf., Peterfreund, 1975, p. 61).       
 Therefore, as the authors themselves acknowledge, a ‘working model’ or a 
‘operational model’ or even a ‘internal world of traditional psychoanalytic theory’ 
should be seen as: “mini-theories in action” (Bowlby, ib.), or ‘partial theories’ 
(Sandler’s expression; see above), or as ‘a supplement’ (Greenson’s expression just 
mentioned), or ‘selections’ (Peterfreund’s expression just mentioned), in their 
concrete reference to the here and now of the clinical setting sowing the theoretical 
prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ with the practical/clinical constructs as a 
‘primary discourse’, but neither the older contributions (mainly: Greenson, 1960; 
Bowlby, 1969; Peterfreund, 1975) or the recent contributions (mainly: the 
European Psychoanalytical Federation’s Working Party on Theoretical Issues, 
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Canestri et al., 2006, pp. 29-44) grasp the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ per se, 
because, one thing is what the analyst has in his mind when working with a patient 
(as showed above with this reflection concerning the use ‘implicit use of explicit 
theories’), another thing is what is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ per se (the 
‘analyst’s mind’ per se). After all my reflections throughout my Thesis I can finally 
state my final position concerning what is the ‘analyst’s mind’ per se in its full 
meaning as just mentioned (that I will clarify even further in this Conclusion).
 Indeed, the processes of validation –or invalidation– of the analyst’s 
interpretations take place in the course of the interaction in the here and now of 
the clinical setting, which both older and recent contribution agree upon but this is 
the ‘why’: the for ‘what purpose’ is not answered (as mentioned above, regarding 
this ‘implicit use of explicit theories’, ‘implicit use’ indicates a process of decision-
making determined by practical/clinical reasons that assess the use-related value, 
or utility, of explicit theories at a given moment; the guiding question in this case is 
not why but for what purpose): the ‘what purpose’ is, as defended throughout my 
entire Thesis: the ‘magnetism between method and its object’: the unconscious 
fantasy, which constitutes any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, because, once again 
and finally: the ‘common ground’ that I’ve argued (in my Introduction, in my 
Chapter 2 and unfolded throughout my entire Thesis) was nothing more, as 
Wallerstein also recognizes (cf., Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22), than acknowledge 
that there are a pluralism of hermeneutic meta-interpretations that configures the 
form of our ‘secondary discourse’ (in my terminology): they are all formalizations 
of the analyst’s psychic process present in the clinical session; that is why Bion’s 
Grid, Lacan’s mathemes and Matte Blanco’s bi-logic are so heuristic: they are the 
formalization of the analyst’s psychic process not as a ‘primary discourse’ but as a 
‘secondary discourse’: they are epistemological tools that have only one purpose: 
being deconstructed by the ‘analyst’s mind’ in the clinical session. That is why we 
call it a formalization of the psychic process: it is its form, not its content.  
 In this connection, what I’ve summarized until now in this Conclusion 
(repeating myself ipsis verbis to be absolutely clear about what were and what are 
my Thesis aims) was the present situation of psychoanalysis as one of increasing 
theoretical and practical diversity (sowing, once again, the theoretical prolegomena 
as a ‘secondary discourse’ with the practical/clinical constructs as a ‘primary 
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discourse’) illustrating that the final aim of my entire dissertation is to consider in 
depth the impact of theoretical plurality on clinical practice and vice versa, 
because, as mentioned many times, Psychoanalytic theory comes after clinical work. 
 Indeed, what I did until now in this Conclusion was that after noting that 
the analyst has much more than evenly suspended attention in his mind as he 
works with his patient in a session, I’ve reviewed (very briefly, because I am 
concluding…) both older (mainly: Greenson, 1960; Bowlby, 1969; Peterfreund, 
1975) and more recent contributions (mainly: the European Psychoanalytical 
Federation’s Working Party on Theoretical Issues, Canestri et al., 2006, pp. 29-44) 
on what the analyst has in his mind when working with a patient clarifying that 
one thing is what the analyst has in his mind when working with a patient (as 
showed above with the reflection concerning the use ‘implicit use of explicit 
theories’), another thing is what is the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’ per se (the 
‘analyst’s mind’ per se); concerning what is the ‘analyst’s mind’ per se in its full 
meaning as just mentioned I will clarify it even further in this Conclusion, and now 
I will suggest that the subject has been addressed mainly from a single-person 
perspective as mentioned by Wallerstein (‘differing personality dispositions’; cf., 
Wallerstein, 1988c, pp. 5-22).        
 In this connection, and on the basis of my own clinical material, I will 
attempt to show how, against the background of the ‘implicit use of explicit 
theories’ (as mentioned, still a ‘secondary discourse’), an ongoing process of 
decision-making that is co-determined by the patient’s action and reaction takes 
place in the ‘analyst’s mind’ (the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’). In my analysis of 
a session, I will introduce the concepts of ‘theoretical reason and practical reason’ 
(concepts that sow the theoretical prolegomena as a ‘secondary discourse’ with the 
clinical/practical constructs as a ‘primary discourse’), and contend that, whatever 
theories the analyst may have implicitly or explicitly in his mind (still a ‘secondary 
discourse’), they ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ (the 
‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a 
‘primary discourse’).        
 Pursuing the same line of thought, I will describe validation in the clinical 
context as a single, wide-ranging, continuous process of social and linguistic co-
(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between patient and analyst: this 
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was seen not only in the MPRP (Chapter 5) but also in the ‘The Ulm 
Psychoanalytic Process Research Study Group’; the latter only referred briefly in 
this final part of my Conclusion. This process includes mutual aspects of 
observation and of communicative and pragmatic validation. In the end of this 
Conclusion, I will also suggest that the figure of the craftsman is an appropriate 
description of the analyst in this conception of his (deconstructive) clinical work 
(Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’), whatever the theory he may espouse 
(Laplanche’s ‘secondary discourse’) as again and again mentioned.     
       
An analytic session         
 Mrs. C. is just starting her sixth year of analysis at a frequency of four sessions a 
week; she came for a consultation on reaching the age of 60 because she could no 
longer tolerate the depressive pain that had been afflicting her for many years. 
 She had been involved in the resistance to the Salazar dictatorship (in Portugal), 
during which she had been exposed to dangerous situations and suffered traumatic 
losses of companions of both sexes in the struggle. Forty years earlier, her partner had 
been killed, and this had plunged her into profound mourning. Mrs. C. had then 
consulted a psychotherapist, but the relationship had ended abruptly after a few weeks 
following a session in which he made sexual advances to her, taking advantage of her 
helplessness and need for protection. This experience exacerbated her sense of 
emptiness and gave rise to a feeling of resentment towards therapists, so that she 
postponed a further consultation until her symptoms became very difficult to tolerate. 
Ten years previously, she had married. The relationship with P. had: ‘helped me to 
endure the pain’.           
 The first years of her therapy, characterized by a climate of sensitivity and 
patience, were occupied by the analysis of her mourning, guilt feelings, and idealization 
of her dead and ‘disappeared’ companions. The result was the gradual appearance of 
greater vitality, accompanied by aggression and rivalry. Mrs. C.’s modesty and 
gentleness were interrupted a few times by episodes of intense rage directed at myself, 
in which she contemplated the idea of abandoning the treatment. As a rule, these were 
triggered by situations in which she could no longer keep at bay the knowledge that I 
was a separate person, with independent opinions of my own: her intense rage arose out 
of the painful experience of rejection and humiliation.     
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 The idealization of the analyst concealed feelings of resentment towards men, 
and, in particular, towards her father. As the idealization diminished, there developed a 
threatening erotic transference which, as the expression of a phantasy of erotic and 
narcissistic fusion, proved to be a defence against the consciousness of her wish to be a 
man and her profound sense of inferiority at being a woman (without going into detail, I 
am here referring to the concept of penis envy, or the wish to have a penis. This has no 
implications with regard to Mrs. C.’s sexual orientation. In fact, her sense of inferiority 
at being a woman affected her gender role identity, so that her view of men was 
permeated with resentment and rivalry. This theme appears in the session reproduced 
here).            
 The symptomatic and structural changes taking place in Mrs. C. were obvious 
and in line with Freud’s hypothesis of the bond [Junktim] between self-knowledge and 
cure, all within the framework of a vigorous analytic process. Just before the session 
transcribed here, the last of the week, Mrs. C. spent a week abroad for work reasons. 
The session takes place a few days prior to a break for a week and a half on my account. 
So it is a session between two breaks, hers involving four and mine six missed sessions. 
The report I am about to present was written up immediately after the session, based on 
memory. The text in square brackets gives information on what I felt and thought during 
the interaction with the patient. 
Patient: Last night I had a dream: I was with P. [her husband] and there were 
three other men, dressed in black. One of them lifted up his shirt and showed me a patch 
of skin that was red with eczema and weeping. This had quite an effect on me. Another 
man said: ‘Finally I meet someone with the same thing as myself ’. He lifted his trouser 
leg up to the knee and also showed an area of inflamed skin that was weeping; liquid 
was oozing out of it. Something happened with the other man, but I can’t remember. I 
did not like this at all, and told P. we should leave. We crossed a desolate, stony piece 
of land, like those panoramas you see in science fiction films after a nuclear catastrophe, 
and then we met up with a group, this time of women, also all dressed in black. We had 
to cross a place like a dammed-up lake or ravine, but this was very dangerous, because 
every so often the water came and flooded everything. We thought we would have a go, 
but one of the women, M., an old acquaintance of mine, told me that it was extremely 
dangerous, and that she had decided not to do it, because one had only a few minutes to 
find somewhere to cross without the water coming. P. and I began to cross, but in a 
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funny direction; instead of going straight across, we set off the other way, lengthwise. It 
was a place full of caves –very odd. Eventually some narrow stone staircases appeared 
which you could go up to reach the other shore. I said: ‘Let’s save ourselves by going 
this way’, and we began to climb the stairs. But P. did something –made some 
movement– that suddenly pushed me up together with the steps and left me hanging, on 
the verge of plunging into an enormously deep abyss. I panicked; I could feel the wind 
in my face, and did not want to die. I told P.: ‘Please let me down, as I could fall and die 
at any moment’. I woke up in terror, like at five in the morning, and had trouble falling 
asleep again; I was afraid of continuing the same dream.     
 [Several long minutes passed after she brought the dream. The dream itself had 
been told slowly, with dramatic intensity and very cautiously, as if she were choosing 
every word. Her account grabbed my attention, aroused my curiosity, and immediately 
set my own theories-cum-phantasies in motion. Fleeting ideas passed back and forth in 
my mind: today, I thought, was Thursday, before the weekend break and a few days 
before a six-session break attributable to me. Might P. stand for me, P. (as my middle 
name)? Might this movement that leaves her on the verge of the abyss have anything to 
do with my absence? Have these men showing their wounds been castrated? Men and 
women in black and a desolate landscape put me in mind of prolonged mourning, Mrs. 
C.’s chronic depression, the traversal of the analysis. Men and women separate from 
each other, a couple trying to traverse a landscape already devastated by a nuclear 
catastrophe –what kind of primitive tragedy is being staged in the dream? An oedipal 
tragedy, or traumatic losses? After all, her account had taken up about a quarter of an 
hour, and I felt that there was more in it that had not been said than had actually been 
expressed. It seemed to me that what was most important were the silences. For this 
reason I opted for a circumspect, expectant attitude. Of course, I had many things that I 
could use as a basis for breaking the long silence that followed her account. For 
example, I could ask her for associations, or enquire what might have caused M. to 
decide not to cross to the opposite shore. But I waited for a few more long minutes. I 
went on thinking and observing how she settled down on the couch, wrapped in the 
blanket. What a difference compared with the beginning of the analysis, five years ago, 
when she hardly looked at me on coming in and going out, and always had a gloomy, 
scared expression on her face! How hard it had been for her to decide to lie down on the 
couch. It was only after a couple of months that she had dared to abandon the face-to-
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face setting. Now, on the other hand, she would come in with a broad smile, look me 
squarely in the face, and, after taking the blanket, wrap herself up in it and lie down in 
relaxed fashion on the couch]. [She interrupts my train of thought]. 
Patient: The dream must have something to do with my sexuality. Er ... It’s hard 
for me to talk about this. Er ... Even though I have been in analysis for years, I feel 
ashamed and frightened. I don’t know –why is it so difficult for me? Why can’t I speak 
more freely, and simply tell you things ...?      
 [A fresh silence ensues]. 
Analyst: Tell me things which you already know about your dream, but which 
you keep quiet about, which you reserve for the silences, the pauses, and put them into 
your slow, cautious telling. For example, I think you know why M. appears in the 
dream; you must know what kind of difficulties made M. decide not to cross the 
dammed-up lake. 
Patient: Er ... M. is gay, and men cause her enormous panic. [A silence]. Yes, of 
course, this fear of talking about my sexual phantasies. I’ve always been used to casting 
them aside as soon as they appear, and it terrifies me to get in touch with them. 
Analyst: Panic ... about getting turned on? That’s something very dangerous. 
Crossing this ravine, going into the caves –sex. It seems you have to do it, but without 
getting turned on, without pleasure, and without enjoyment. Getting turned on and 
enjoying yourself brings you to the verge of the abyss. The dam might burst and flood 
you all of a sudden with dangerous pleasure. 
Patient: Er ... All right then. [Resolutely]. Yesterday there was something I 
didn’t mention. At X., I was given a fantastic room, with a spectacular view. I took a 
few books along with me, and the music I prefer, and I enjoyed lying down reading and 
listening to music. It was a huge pleasure. For three nights I had intense erotic dreams 
about the Spanish delegate, the enfant terrible of the seminar, the one you said yesterday 
had been the star. That man … Er ... 
Analyst: Lying down, settling down, starting to feel good here and to feel 
pleasure –phantasies come up, talking to me about them, here ... it’s all very dangerous.
 Patient: Every day lately I’ve been thinking I should go far away and meet an 
attractive, intelligent fellow so that I can have sexual phantasies and feel secure, without 
a catastrophe happening. But, er ... I realize that the Spanish is a substitute for you. The 
whole thing is with you. It makes me feel very ashamed and, what is more, afraid. As if 
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I were a little girl and you were going to punish me severely for these thoughts. 
 [I wonder if not only the Spanish but also P. in the dream is a substitute for CP –
that is, for me. I feel wrapped up in the erotic idealization. I let myself be moved by her 
and think of the boundaries between analysis and life. Working with Mrs. C., I often 
have the impression that she experiences me directly as a primary experience –as if it 
was not a matter of transferences, but of very early experiences: there is an element of 
fusion and lack of differentiation in the relationship with her. The thought crosses my 
mind: how far does transference interpretation go? If I interpret that I am identified with 
her husband, saying something like ‘The people crossing the dammed-up lake are you 
and I, as a couple, and so I am the one who turns you on’, would I not be committing an 
iatrogenic act? The catastrophe –going to bed with her analyst? I realize that Mrs. C. is 
indeed right to perceive the danger; what must it have been like with the first therapist? 
I must tread a narrow path between accepting the idea of occupying her husband’s place 
and not crossing the line of seduction. I think of the incest taboo. How am I to do this? 
I decide on a cautious approach to the transference-related erotic phantasies]. 
Analyst: Be that as it may, it seems obvious that, yesterday and today, you feel 
more secure on the couch, because you are gradually bringing me closer to your sexual 
phantasies. Of course, the problem is that, the more you can settle down here, wrap 
yourself up in the blanket ...        
 [She interrupts me]. 
Patient: Yes, that’s right, ideas I dare not mention come up in me. 
Analyst: You don’t only have to travel abroad; there also has to be a step, a 
situation here, a bridge, between your trip and my break next week. There, there’s no 
danger. You can talk today, Thursday, and then there will be three days’ break; another 
few days, and you won’t see me for six sessions. 
Patient: Yes, that must be what makes me feel secure here ... 
Analyst: That there won’t be any catastrophe. At any rate, there are so many 
things in the dream, so much information that we can’t manage to analyse today –there 
are only a few more minutes to the end of the session. You have taken your time, 
you’ve been very slow and cautious. It’s as if you were showing and not showing at the 
same time.           
 [I stop there, although I would have liked to continue, saying something more or 
less along the lines of: what is it that’s being hidden? The skin with eczema, oozing pus, 
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inflamed –a painful, agonizing sexual excitement? Who are we talking about? Mutilated 
men inside yourself? Something of yours that you see in men? What is this business 
about homosexuality? On the other hand, you have always presented P. as uninterested 
in sex and unattractive to you. Yet in the dream, P. is evidently capable, with just one 
movement, of turning you on, making you panic, and putting the fear of death into you. 
And another thing: won’t this dream have the effect that you’ll go underground until 
there’s another opportunity here in the analysis –another situation that will make you 
feel secure?]. [Just as I am having this last thought, she surprises me with the following 
words]. 
Patient: Hopefully the subject will not go underground –because I realize it’s 
crucial and important. A great deal depends on understanding my sexuality. I’m 
different; a lot has changed. I’m not terrified any more by the things that used to 
frighten me. I feel more secure in my life and work, and with myself. On this trip, some 
very important things happened to me inside, even though I haven’t fully understood 
them yet. Evidently I feel that I can do things in another way –that I can live differently, 
with more enjoyment, and have more pleasure in life. 
 
Theoretical reasons and practical reasons 
I wanted to present this particular session of a six-year analysis because I believe 
it illustrates the thesis (my main thesis inherent to my doctoral Thesis as again and again 
mentioned) that whatever theories the analyst may have ‘implicitly or explicitly in 
his mind’, whether consciously or preconsciously (see the end of the first part of 
this Conclusion), they ultimately yield to clinical/practical/deconstructive ‘reasons’ 
(the ‘magnetism’ that Laplanche posits between the ‘method and its object’ as a 
‘primary discourse’) unfolding the analyst’s ‘primary discourse’, and now, to 
conclude my doctoral Thesis, I will illustrate exactly that: the analyst’s ‘primary 
discourse’, in this case, my ‘primary discourse’, because it was unfolded with my 
patient according to my ‘secondary discourse’ (be that a mitigated/personal 
‘secondary discourse’ or a wider/school of thought ‘secondary discourse’ or a 
‘implicit use of explicit theories’ ‘secondary discourse’), unfolding what is the 
‘analyst’s mind’ per se in its full meaning.      
 Indeed, by a practical reason, I mean the capacity to use reflection to answer the 
question of what one must do at a given time: the distinction between theoretical and 
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practical reasons is an ancient philosophical problem that can be traced back to Aristotle 
himself. The νουσ θεωρητικοσ differs from the νουσ πρακτικοσ in the character of its 
end. Practical reason is stimulated by the object of the appetite. The Scholastics 
followed the tradition by drawing a distinction between speculative reason and 
operational reason; this distinction was also taken up by Kant, who emphasizes that the 
two reasons –theoretical and practical– are not two distinct types of reason, but one and 
the same reason, which differs in its application (cf., Ferrater Mora, 1969).  
 In this case, the question is: what consideration made me wait rather than 
making an interpretation, even though I had so many possible interpretations in my 
mind? Looking at events after they have happened, one can ask why they occurred. 
However, if we put ourselves in the situation in which they are happening –that is, in 
my place at the time when Mrs. C. is telling her dream and settling down on the couch 
in silence –it will be understood that my problem there was not one of explanation, but 
of prediction; that is to say, of determining what would happen in the future, how Mrs. 
C. would react if I were to interpret in this way or that.    
 Practical reasons per se thus seek, on the basis of a set of alternatives, none of 
which has yet come about, to answer the question as to which alternative is the best, that 
is, as to what is to be done. So it is not a matter of questions of fact and their 
explanation, but of issues of value, of what it is desirable to do. In the ‘analyst’s mind’ 
during the session, there is a constant movement between, on the one hand, 
theoretical reasons which, in the form of ‘partial mini-theories’ (conjectures), will 
make it possible to understand and explain the interaction of the moment in terms 
of the knowledge acquired during the course of the process, and, on the other 
hand, practical reasons, which guide the taking of decisions on what to say and 
when and how to interpret.        
 If material from subsequent sessions were to hand, we would surely find answers 
to many of the questions I silently put to myself during and after the telling of the 
dream. However, that is not a situation that corresponds to the reality of the moment, 
because it is not a matter of finding ex post facto explanations (theoretical reasons), but 
of venturing predictive hypotheses about something that has not yet occurred. In 
practical reasoning, the agent seeks to evaluate and weigh up his reasons for acting –to 
ponder about what argues for and against the alternative courses of action open to him 
(if this involves the use of theories, the question now shifts towards the utility or use-
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related value of these theories as above mentioned).     
 Furthermore, this decision is finally taken in the first person –that is, from a 
subjective point of view, in terms of the particular situation in which one finds oneself 
at that moment. The decision thus carries with it the full singularity of an encounter 
with another in the here and now. This is an ideographic, creative, and ineffable 
moment, when the analyst takes a risk which, for reasons of principle, can never be 
covered by theory; it is so to speak a moment ‘devoid’ of theory. At this point, we 
must perhaps espouse the epistemological doctrine of probabilism, according to which 
only approximate knowledge is possible, and any claim to absolutely certain and sure 
knowledge is precluded on principle (see Ferrater Mora, 1969).  
 However, that is not the end of the problem. The decision to intervene in the 
way I did –that is, the decision not to intervene– remained in abeyance, pending 
Mrs. C.’s reply. It was she who validated my action by saying, ‘The dream has to 
do with my sexuality’, and by confiding in me about her fear and shame of 
confessing her erotic wishes and phantasies concerning myself. By her 
intervention, she ‘gave me permission’ to select some of the many interpretations 
that I had thought up in silence. In analytic work, in other words, practical reasons 
are validated by the patient’s ‘unconscious fantasy’.     
 So what was the consideration that made me wait, rather than interpreting, even 
though I had so many possible interpretations in my mind? The answer does not seem 
difficult: the patient’s way of bringing the initial dream suggested to me that, through 
the telling, an emotional experience whose development I had to respect was 
unfolding, even though I was not clear about what precisely was being staged at 
that moment. Very probably, I was aware, in some part of my mind, of Mrs. C.’s 
sensitivity and the traumatic situation with the previous therapist, so that I perhaps 
thought that it was good for her to ‘use’ me in her internal world as a sexual object in a 
context of security [... I feel wrapped up in the erotic idealization. I let myself be moved 
by her and think of the boundaries between analysis and life ...].    
 What is certain is that my posture of silence and non-intervention seems to 
have made it possible for Mrs. C. herself to have been the one who explained the 
meaning of this emotional experience –for her to have interpreted her own 
conduct. What unfolded was her own sexuality –and, furthermore, it did so in the 
register of her transference on to me. The counter-transference affect that guided 
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me in my silent waiting was one of positively toned calm expectation: I felt good 
when I saw that Mrs. C. was able to be with me without the anxiety she had shown at 
the beginning [What a difference compared with the beginning of the analysis, five 
years ago, when she hardly looked at me on coming in and going out, and always had a 
gloomy, scared expression on her face! ... Now, on the other hand, she would come in 
with a broad smile, look me squarely in the face, and, after taking the blanket, wrap 
herself up in it and lie down in relaxed fashion on the couch].    
 In addition, the primacy I attribute to emotional experience in the analytic 
situation presumably arises also out of my knowledge about research on process 
and outcome in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis (as I’ve shown in Chapter 5 and 
that I give so much importance as again and again mentioned throughout this 
Thesis), which show that the patient’s experience of the analyst is of crucial 
importance as a prognostic element and curative factor.    
 In this connection, I am aware that my approach here also presupposes the 
theory that the analyst must, in the analytic situation, create the conditions of security 
necessary for the unfolding of a new emotional experience in which ancient fixations 
on to bad objects can be overcome, while at the same time encouraging new, more 
positive identifications. My conception of the analytic process is thus a relational 
one. The creation of such conditions in this case took priority over interpretive 
work, at least as regards interpretation of the dream contents and of the  
‘unconscious fantasy’ per se (as I’ve illustrated in Chapter 1). 
 
Validation in the clinical context     
 Validation in the clinical context –that is, within the session with the patient– 
is a continuous and inescapable process. As Tuckett writes, it: “is part and parcel of 
accepted analytic technique that we seek to amend our understanding and interpretation 
according to a constant subjective monitoring of the ‘truth’ of what we think is 
happening” (Tuckett (1994b, p. 1162). Tuckett distinguishes two levels in the overall 
validation process: micro-validation within the session, and macro-validation, which 
takes place in the absence of the patient.      
 Rubovits-Seitz, too, presupposes the existence of these two levels in his 
statement that: “Interpretive validation during the treatment of patients depends on the 
error-detecting and error-correcting strategies of checking, revising, comparing, and 
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selection of alternative (de)constructions. [However, he adds] more definitive [ex post 
facto], post-analytic validation requires a record of the analytic process, which the 
analyst can study systematically and retrospectively in as much detail as necessary” 
(Rubovits-Seitz, 1992, p. 162; my alterations).     
 Although I am concerned here to explore in more detail the process of micro-
validation– that is, the constant activity of monitoring, together with the patient, 
what we believe is happening during the session– I must again point out that my 
focus in this doctoral Thesis (and specially in this Conclusion) is not so much on the 
validation of interpretations as on exploration of the working of the ‘analyst’s mind’ 
and its ‘primary discourse’ in a situation of theoretical pluralism as a ‘secondary 
discourse’.           
 At any rate, with regard to the scope of micro-validation, I agree with the 
recommendation of Kächele, Schachter, and Thomä (2009) that we should put an end to 
the interminable debate about the validity of individual interventions and 
interpretations, given that all these interventions and interpretations are part of a wider 
game. As Freud’s chess metaphor implies, the value of an individual move can be 
determined only on the basis of the general state of the game. Hence the scientific 
accuracy or truth-value of the interventions in a given session stems from their 
‘magnetism with the object’ at a particular moment in the overall process, 
because, as defended again and again (mainly in my Introduction, Chapter 5 and 
this Conclusion, but also throughout my Thesis): the scientific accuracy or truth-
value interpretations in clinical work is provided by concrete examples of how the 
analyst deconstructs the clinical phenomena independently of what theoretical 
model he embraces: the keynote here was always how the ‘analyst’s mind’ work: 
by a permanent deconstructionist method; a methodological deconstruction of 
what the analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical models: the Freudian heritage 
(hence, the title of my Thesis) is this never-ending dissolution (Lösung) that is 
psychoanalysis (and its psychoanalytic clinical method) in its essence.   
 With regard to ‘extra-clinical validation by an empirical methodology’ –as 
consistently pursued by these authors over a period of 40 years threw ‘The Ulm 
Psychoanalytic Process Research Study Group’– Kächele, Schachter, and Thomä 
(2009) seem to incline towards the epistemological doctrine of statistical probabilism. 
Multi-dimensional single-case studies using empirical methodology reveal tendencies or 
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statistical regularities in the patient’s response, which, during the course of the 
treatment, lose stability and are replaced by others (cf., Kächele et al., 2009). Whereas 
the study of an individual session can throw light on aspects of the preferred 
techniques applied by the analyst or the explicit use of his implicit theories, it 
cannot provide a definitive answer to certain questions that are crucial to 
psychoanalysis, such as, for example, the issue of curative factors. This would 
require systematic research on aggregated single-case studies (cf., Kächele et al., 2009).
 Indeed, in spite of these authors seem a little bit extreme I do agree that 
concerning the ‘extra-clinical validation by an empirical methodology’ they are correct. 
It is exactly by this reason (in addition to other reasons already mentioned) that the 
MPRP constitutes a vital Chapter of this dissertation because, as mentioned many times, 
this doctoral Thesis also tries to promote the credibility of psychoanalysis as a science 
of the mind amenable to growth (this growth constitutes the epistemological leap from 
the hermeneutic categorisation to the positivist research) through empirical research (the 
MPRP is a heuristic example of how psychoanalytic research should be done; a 
positivist approach because ‘falsifiable’ research has to be positivist; being the MPRP a 
psychoanalytic clinical research, it is, by inherence, also a practical/clinical construct 
and, paradoxically, unfolds what Laplanche calls the ‘primary discourse’) in accordance 
with the canons of scientific method.       
 From this point of view, the micro-validation procedure corresponds to the 
application of practical rules, or rules of the art –that is to say, the set of precepts to be 
followed by the analyst in order for his interventions to lead directly to the desired end. 
Micro-evaluation thus belongs to the sphere of practical implementation of the 
psychoanalytic clinical method (Chapter 1).      
 The subject of valid knowledge is related to the philosophical issue of ‘truth’. 
There are three classical criteria of ‘truth’: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic 
utility. In this context, attempts have been made to apply such criteria to the matter of 
validation of the psychoanalytic clinical method (cf., Hanly, 1990; Strenger, 1991). 
For a long time, the idea prevailed that the object of psychoanalysis was the search for 
the ‘truth’ of the unconscious. The last few decades, however, have witnessed: “a 
redefinition of the object of [psychoanalytic] study; that is, the particular 
intersubjective figure constituted by the analyst–patient relationship” (Canestri, 
1994, p. 1079; my alterations).        
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 In this last sense, it is no longer possible to continue to separate investigation 
of the unconscious from consideration of the investigative dynamic of patient and 
analyst, and much more is clearly involved than contemplation of the conjectured 
‘truth’ of the unconscious. To paraphrase Sandler and Dreher (1996), we cannot 
continue to ignore ‘what analysts and patients want’. From the point of view of the 
validation of psychoanalytic work during the session, the three classical criteria of 
‘truth’ can be regarded as abstractions of a single, broad validation process that includes 
observation, conversation, and interaction (cf., Kvale, 1995).    
 For it to be applicable to psychoanalytic reality, the classical idea of knowledge 
as a reflection of reality must be replaced by a conception in which knowledge is also 
social and linguistic co-(de)construction of the intersubjective reality between 
patient and analyst. In the analytic situation, analyst and patient are constantly 
interpreting and negotiating the meaning of the relationship between them, and this 
becomes the material of their communication with each other. Conversation becomes 
the ultimate context within which knowing must be understood (cf., Rorty, 2000). 
‘Truth’ is constituted by way of dialogue, and valid knowledge emerges as the result of 
alternative, conflicting interpretations and possibilities of action, which are discussed, 
negotiated, and discerned in accordance with the rules of the psychoanalytic clinical 
method.           
 This certainly has nothing to do with relativism or the notion that ‘anything 
goes’. The a priori condition of the dialogue between patient and analyst is the 
belief in (and, in a strong sense, the affirmation of) a truth that transcends us, that 
is, as above mentioned, the a priori condition of possibility for any theory in 
psychoanalysis and for any dialogue between psychoanalysts and for any dialogue 
between patient and analyst is that there shall be a reality that transcends the 
observer, even when it can be apprehended only fragmentarily and partially: the 
‘unconscious fantasy’ (cf., Strenger, 1991; Cavell, 1993; Laplanche, 1999), as 
mentioned throughout my Thesis over and over again, but specially in Chapter 1 
with Laplanche’s arguments.        
 In the clinical context, what matters is the relationship between patient and 
analyst and what is apprehended only fragmentarily and partially: the 
‘unconscious fantasy’. If the dichotomy between facts and values is abandoned, the 
dimensions of aesthetics and ethics are added to that of this ‘truth’. In the case of a 
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social (de)construction, the beauty and use-related value of the (de)constructed 
knowledge move into the foreground. The result is a shift from a psychoanalytic model 
based on archaeology, whose object is the discovery of a concealed ‘truth’, to an 
architectural model, in which the main concern is the (de)construction of a new house.
 Hence, validation in the analytic session is an ongoing process of checking of 
hypotheses and conjectures, of questioning, and then deconstruction of all these: 
“The [psychoanalytic clinical] method is one of association and cross-referencing, a 
deconstruction, and only at the horizon of this dissolution (Lösung) or analysis can 
another reality be sketched: what is called an unconscious fantasy” (Laplanche, 
1999, p. 63; cf., Freud, 1937b, pp. 257-269; my alterations).   
 Indeed, this validation is only valid if involves the relevant knowledge with 
the patient: the ‘unconscious fantasy’. Through dialogue, analyst and patient arrive at 
a consensus, or take note of their differences, on what has been observed, on what will, 
for them, be deemed as a ‘selected fact’ and on its ‘meaning’: in the above mentioned 
session the decision to intervene in the way I did –that is, the decision not to 
intervene– remained in abeyance, pending Mrs. C.’s reply. It was she who 
validated my action by saying, ‘The dream has to do with my sexuality’, and by 
confiding in me about her fear and shame of confessing her erotic wishes and 
phantasies concerning myself. By her intervention, she ‘gave me permission’ to 
select some of the many interpretations that I had thought up in silence. In analytic 
work, in other words, practical reasons are validated exclusively by the patient’s 
‘unconscious fantasy’; as I’ve illustrated in detail and throughout my entire Thesis 
(especially in my Chapter 2, the ‘lion part’ of my dissertation), Bion explains that 
the ‘selected fact’ describes the synthesis processes experienced by the 
psychoanalyst, similar to the way in which paranoid-schizoid objects become coherent 
and initiate the depressive positions, as adumbrated by Klein, and also being very 
similar to Laplanche’s ‘primary discourse’ (see my Chapter 2, specially Bion’s 
review): this synthesis processes experienced by the psychoanalyst is only valid, 
from my perspective, if its ‘method is one of association and cross-referencing, a 
deconstruction, and only at the horizon of this dissolution (Lösung) or analysis can 
another reality be sketched: what is called an unconscious fantasy’: the horizon of 
this dissolution (Lösung) unfolds the ‘analyst’s mind’ per se and that is its (only) 
pragmatic validation, that is: the a priori condition of possibility of any dialogue 
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between patient and analyst is that there shall be a reality that transcends the 
observer, even when it can be apprehended only fragmentarily and partially: the 
‘unconscious fantasy’; the a posteriori/pragmatic condition of possibility of any 
‘analyst’s mind’ is its ‘primary discourse’ in its full meaning: the dissolution 
(Lösung) of analysis itself. 
 
The analyst as a craftsman        
 To conclude and to clarify my final statement which will be also inherent to the 
closing statement of this doctoral Thesis I will put forward my conception of the analyst 
as a craftsman. As we have seen, in the theory of technique there has been a tendency to 
restrict the analyst’s mental processes to description of the ideal conditions of 
observance of the rule of evenly suspended attention. This position, first formulated by 
Freud (1912f) in his recommendations, presupposes an ideal mating between the 
understanding of the unconscious and therapeutic change, in which the latter is seen as a 
consequence of insight, in accordance with the classical interpretation given to Freud’s 
affirmation of the ‘Junktim’ –that is, of the inseparable bond between cure and research: 
“In psycho-analysis there has existed from the very first an inseparable bond [Junktim] 
between cure and research. Knowledge brought therapeutic success. It was impossible 
to treat a patient without learning something new; it was impossible to gain fresh insight 
without perceiving its beneficent results. Our analytic procedure is the only one in 
which this precious conjunction is assured. It is only by carrying on our analytic 
pastoral work that we can deepen our dawning comprehension of the human mind. This 
prospect of scientific gain has been the proudest and happiest feature of analytic work” 
(Freud, 1927b, p. 256).         
 Yet, Freud was perfectly aware at this time that observance of the rule of evenly 
suspended attention created a genuine tension between the search for the ‘truth’ of the 
unconscious and the ‘knowledge’ thus obtained: “One of the claims of psycho-analysis 
to distinction is, no doubt, that in its execution research and treatment coincide; 
nevertheless, after a certain point, the technique required for the one opposes that 
required for the other” (Freud, 1912f, p. 114).      
 More is in my view gained if we accept that the unity of insight and treatment 
is not regarded as an a priori characteristic of the psychoanalytic clinical method, 
but instead as a unity in the course of achievement, meticulously deconstructed by 
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the analyst in the manner of a craftsman, day by day, in the sessions with the 
patient.           
 Of course, this deconstruction may be appropriate or otherwise; it may give rise 
to therapeutic change for better or for worse. Equally, this deconstruction is co-
determined in a continuous process by the patient’s verbal and non-verbal action and by 
his reaction to our verbal and non-verbal interventions.     
 At the back of their minds, all analysts have specific models of the therapeutic 
change that is desirable and feasible for each patient –that is, theories concerning the 
strategies that will have the effect of bringing about these changes (cf., Sandler and 
Dreher, 1996). In each interaction with his patient, the analyst decides on the best way 
of intervening to promote a small change on the road to ‘cure’ in the patient. In this 
complex process, the analyst is guided by many (partly) learned rules, which he 
endeavours to apply as best he can.        
 In addition, he possesses ‘working models’ (see above), be that a 
mitigated/personal ‘secondary discourse’ or a wider/school of thought ‘secondary 
discourse’ or a ‘implicit use of explicit theories’ ‘secondary discourse’ as showed 
above; I use Greenson’s expression not only because I am sowing my Conclusion 
and inherently my Thesis, but also because illustrates, as I will show below, that, 
like a craftsman, the analyst stands mid-way between conscious (or preconscious; 
see above) concept as a ‘secondary discourse’ and unconscious precept as a 
‘primary discourse’; this mid-way, in Greenson’s expression is a ‘internal 
representation which is not merged with the self and yet is not alien to the self’ 
which sow beautifully with my final argument.      
 Indeed, this ‘working models’ enable the analyst to evaluate the impact of his 
interventions and permit the correction of any adverse side-effects they may have. In a 
word, the analyst is concerned not only with listening to the unconscious, but also with 
the regulation of the patient’s psychic equilibrium and with the therapeutic relationship 
moment by moment, so as to preserve an optimum level of regression to the 
‘unconscious fantasy’ both in himself and in his patient.    
Therefore, I argue that the figure of the craftsman is a valid description of the 
analyst in this conception of his work. Like a craftsman, the analyst stands mid-way 
between conscious (or preconscious; see above) concept as a ‘secondary discourse’ 
and unconscious precept as a ‘primary discourse’. For example, let us imagine a 
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successful piece of craftsmanship: a beautiful spoon carved in the shape of a hand. To 
make it, the craftsman gave form to the phantasy of the instrument as a prolongation 
of the human body. There is an isomorphic relationship between the hand and the 
spoon –that is, a relationship of form and function, which coincide and are the 
product of the various processes made manifest by the craftsman’s aesthetic sense. If 
the carving is defective –for instance, if the cavity is not deep enough– the isomorphism 
will be imperfect, the spoon will be useless, and it will forfeit its beauty.   
 Indeed, like a craftsman, threw the deconstruction of ‘working models’ as a 
‘secondary discourse’ and of the unconscious reality of the patient as the ‘primary 
discourse’, the ‘analyst’s mind’, also guided by the aesthetic sense, deconstructs 
equivalences that are capable, in a single movement, of combining understanding and 
treatment, ‘knowledge’ and utility. The structuring of the analytic situation presents a 
‘scale’ model of the intersubjective reality (the regression in the ‘analyst’s mind’ to 
the unconscious fantasy both in himself and in his patient) involving patient and 
analyst.           
 A craftsman will normally use limited amounts of materials and theoretical and 
practical instruments in order to create his works. Similarly, the analyst utilizes 
heterogeneous information, accumulated during his training and experience, which must 
be creatively adapted to each concrete case. Analytic work thus comes to resemble a 
recycling process. In our craft of psychoanalysis, our ‘norm’ is the use of pre-existing 
materials (‘working models’, ‘partial theories’, and ‘schemata’, be that a 
mitigated/personal ‘secondary discourse’ or a wider/school of thought ‘secondary 
discourse’ or a ‘implicit use of explicit theories’ ‘secondary discourse’). The 
combination of evenly suspended attention and free association facilitates the moment-
by moment, spontaneous evocation and deconstruction of these models in the dyadic 
interaction.           
 Therefore, I am describing the deconstructivist, second-hand nature of clinical 
work, whereby the analyst uses heterogeneous raw materials –that is, ones that are 
diverse in their origin and nature, because any investigation of the ‘analyst’s mind’ 
trying to unfold its ‘primary discourse’, regardless of the scope or explanatory force 
of the theories as a ‘secondary discourse’ that an analyst may use, there are always 
areas that we don’t know: “Nobody really knows. Even the more consistent thinkers 
practice inconsistently and in ways that are personal and idiosyncratic. There are many 
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uncertainties” (Hamilton, 1996, p. 317; my bold). It may be more accurate to say that, in 
his daily work and having regard to the decisions he is constantly taking, every analyst 
is immersed in uncertainty. At the moment when the analyst decides to intervene and 
chooses a particular interpretation from a diversity of possibilities, he takes a risk, 
which, although to a greater or lesser extent calculated, nevertheless constitutes a leap 
into the void.           
 This is a singular and unique creative moment which involves and demonstrates 
the complexity of the ‘analyst’s mind’ and which transcends any theory or technique, 
whether explicit or implicit: it is praxis itself: it is the ‘analyst’s mind’ unfolding its 
‘primary discourse’ in its full meaning: the ‘magnetism between method and its 
object’ in the clinical setting unfolds the ‘unconscious fantasy’, which constitutes 
any analyst’s ‘primary discourse’: its ‘method is one of association and cross-
referencing, a deconstruction, and only at the horizon of this dissolution (Lösung) 
or analysis can another reality be sketched: what is called an unconscious fantasy’: 
the horizon of this dissolution (Lösung) unfolds the ‘analyst’s mind’ per se threw its 
‘primary discourse’ in its full meaning: the dissolution (Lösung) of analysis itself:  
the psychoanalytic clinical method is a never-ending deconstruction: “work[ing] 
out the dissolution [Lösung] of the dream” (Freud, 1900, 2, in Studienausgabe, p. 
280; my alterations). The Freudian heritage (hence, the title of my Thesis) is this 
never-ending dissolution (Lösung) that is psychoanalysis and its psychoanalytic 
clinical method in its essence: the ‘analyst’s mind’ unfolding its ‘primary 
discourse’ in its full meaning works by a permanent deconstructionist method; a 
methodological deconstruction of what the analyst meta-interprets: the theoretical 
models as a ‘secondary discourse’, as defended throughout my entire dissertation.  
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